COURT FILE NO.: 6890/12

DATE: 2019-01-04

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

KIM MANOS

Plaintiff

– and –

RIOTRIN PROPERTIES (FLAMBOROUGH) INC., WAL-MART CANADA CORP. and JOHN DOE

Defendants

Sivan Tumarkin and Michael Gerhard, for the Plaintiff

Sabatina Vassalli and Jeffrey Goit, for the Defendant Wal-Mart

HEARD: April 3-17, 2018

WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS: May 17, 2018

Gibson J.

reasons for decision

Introduction

[1] The plaintiff Kim Manos needed a fire extinguisher for his boat. On December 12, 2010, he went to the Defendant Walmart’s store in Waterdown, Ontario to look for one. He enlisted the assistance of a Walmart employee. While Mr. Manos was crouched looking at fire extinguishers on a shelf, he found one that had a loose safety pin. He handed it to the employee, and continued to look at other fire extinguishers. While the employee was attempting to reinsert the pin, the fire extinguisher discharged. The discharge hit Mr. Manos. How much, where and for how long it hit him is disputed between the parties. As is its subsequent impact upon Mr. Manos. He submits that he has suffered from a severe respiratory injury caused by the discharge that has altered the course of his life, and from whose significant deleterious effects he continues to suffer on a daily basis. Walmart disputes this, and says that he is exaggerating or malingering.

[2] In a nutshell, this frames the dispute between the parties. The defendant Walmart has admitted liability, at paragraph 4 of its Statement of Defence. What remains in sharp dispute between the parties are the issues of causation and damages. The plaintiff submits that the significant and ongoing health challenges he faces were caused by the fire extinguisher incident, and that he should be awarded significant damages. Walmart submits that the plaintiff`s action should be dismissed, with costs.

[3] The issues that the Court must thus address are: did the incident of December 12, 2010 at the defendant’s store cause the plaintiff’s injuries? And if the answer is yes, what damages flow from those injuries?

The Law of Causation

[4] The assessment of a case involving the tort of negligence involves consideration of a number of factors: whether there was a duty of care; the breach of a relevant standard of care; damage; cause-in-fact, or causation; and remoteness, including proximate cause, cause-in-law, and legal causation.

[5] The central issue in this case is causation. As the Supreme Court of Canada indicated in Clements v. Clements, 2012 SCC 32, [2012] 2 S.C.R. 181, at paragraph 6:

On its own, proof by an injured plaintiff that a defendant was negligent does not make that defendant liable for the loss. The plaintiff must also establish that the defendant’s negligence (breach of the standard of care) caused the injury. That link is causation.

[6] In Athey v. Leonati, 1996 CanLII 183 (SCC), [1996] 3 S.C.R. 458, the Supreme Court of Canada outlined at paragraphs 13-20 a number of general principles applicable to the issue of causation, including: causation is established where the plaintiff proves to the civil standard on a balance of probabilities that the defendant caused or contributed to the injury; the test for causation is the “but for” test; that the causation test is not to be applied too rigidly; it is not necessary for the plaintiff to establish that the defendant’s negligence was the sole cause of the injury; there is no basis for a reduction in liability because of the existence of other preconditions; and, a tortfeasor must take his victim as he finds him (the “thin-skull” doctrine).

[7] The Supreme Court of Canada confirmed in Clements that the test for proving causation in personal injury cases is the “but for” test: the plaintiff must prove, on a balance of probabilities, that ‘but for’ the defendant’s negligent act, the injury would not have occurred. At paragraph 8 in Clements, Chief Justice McLachlin stated:

The test for showing causation is the “but for” test. The plaintiff must show on a balance of probabilities that “but for” the defendant’s negligent act, the injury would not have occurred. Inherent in the phrase “but for” is the requirement that the defendant’s negligence was necessary to bring about the injury – in other words that the injury would not have occurred without the defendant’s negligence. This is a factual inquiry…

[8] The Supreme Court reaffirmed that causation is assessed using the “but for’ test at paragraph 28 of Ediger v. Johnston, 2013 SCC 18. A “but for” cause is a necessary cause: “Inherent in the phrase ‘but for’ is the requirement that the defendant’s negligence was necessary to bring about the injury – in other words that the injury would not have occurred without the defendant’s negligence.”

[9] The Supreme Court further stated that a trial judge is to take a robust and pragmatic approach in determining whether a plaintiff has established that the defendant’s negligence caused his loss. There is no need for scientific evidence of the precise contribution the defendant’s negligence made to the injury.

Evidence

[10] The plaintiff called 11 witnesses: the plaintiff himself, Kim Manos; Dr. Stephen Duncan (the plaintiff’s family doctor since 1997); Dr. Patrick Killorn (the plaintiff’s treating respirologist since 2011); Dr. Sheldon Mintz (expert respirologist); Dr. Shawn Scherer, Read Clinic (vocational expert); Brad Borkwood, Blue Point Valuations (accounting expert); Keith Milner (friend of the plaintiff); Paul Quest (friend of the plaintiff); Don Murray (a former work supervisor of the plaintiff); Donnie Armstrong (a former work supervisor of the plaintiff); and Adam Wissenz (a former work colleague of the plaintiff).

[11] The defendant called 11 witnesses: Jeff Reitsma (an engineer with 30 Forensics); Glenna Courchesne (a claims adjuster with ClaimsPro); Shibu Kuravilla ( Wal-Mart employee, the “John Doe” in the original style of cause of the proceeding); Brian Velenosi (a used car dealer, Good Cars Only); Paul Fousek (a private investigator with Hightech Investigations); Dr. Neighbour (a treating physician at the Firestone Clinic); Dr. McIvor (a treating physician at the Firestone Clinic); Dr. Mate (expert respirologist); Amanda Paci (accounting expert); Dr. Anderson (a treating ENT specialist); and Dr. Chaimowitz (psychiatric expert).

[12] The plaintiff Kim Manos, who was 53 at the time of the incident and is now 60, described in his evidence his life as a car salesperson before the events of December 12, 2010. It had the usual vicissitudes of employment in a fluid and sometimes volatile industry. He worked over the years both as a car salesperson and as a sales manager, at various car dealerships.

[13] He then described the incident. Mr. Manos was an avid boater. On Sunday December 12, 2010, around 2:00 p.m., he went to the Walmart in Waterdown looking for a fire extinguisher for his boat. He asked a Walmart employee to assist him (later confirmed to be Shibu Kuravilla). Mr. Manos knelt down to examine the fire extinguishers on offer. He found one with the pin out, which, at the employee’s request, he handed to the employee. While reading the box of another extinguisher, he heard a very loud noise. The fire extinguisher being handled by the Walmart employee discharged onto him. He breathed in and inhaled the mixture. After the discharge stopped, he noticed two footprints of his shoes, in the powder on the floor. He noticed the taste in his mouth. He estimated the distance at around 5-7 feet. He initially said that the discharge lasted 10-12 seconds, then said 8-10 seconds, then on cross-examination said 5-6 or 7 seconds at least. He remembers a burning in his nose and throat.

[14] The Walmart employee Shibu Kuravilla’s evidence concerning the incident was somewhat different. Mr. Kuravilla gave his evidence through a Hindi interpreter. He acknowledged that on the day of the incident, the fire extinguisher discharged while he was trying to reinsert the pin. He initially said that the discharge was 2-3 seconds. There was dust all around, like smoke. Some of the dust fell on Mr. Mano’s face. Some was also on his jacket, pants and shoes. He estimated the distance between the fire extinguisher and Mr. Manos at 5-7 feet.

[15] In giving his evidence, Mr. Kuravilla was obviously keen to minimize his involvement in the incident. It is significant that during his testimony he acknowledged that some of the discharge was on Mr. Mano’s face.

[16] The plaintiff subsequently went to a walk-in clinic in Aldershot, then to his family doctor Dr. Stephen Duncan in the following days. There ensued a medical odyssey involving many different physicians over the next seven years, as his symptoms worsened. Many of those physicians gave evidence during the trial.

[17] Mr. Manos recounted the various difficulties and myriad medical consultations he has had in the intervening years.

[18] I generally found Mr. Manos to be a credible witness concerning the incident at Walmart, and I accept his evidence about that incident. As a result of the actions of a Walmart employee, he was covered with the discharge from the fire extinguisher (Foray, which contains monoammonium phosphate). He both inhaled and ingested some of the discharged chemicals.

[19] His evidence concerning the subsequent health effects in the years since seemed embellished to some extent. He was not always the most straightforward witness: when challenged, he frequently broke into a patter (perhaps influenced by his experience as a car salesman) which devolved into peripheral or irrelevant issues, and detracted from his credibility in certain regards. However, this has understandably clearly been a very emotional experience for Mr. Manos, and some account must be taken of the effect of that upon the presentation of his evidence. I am satisfied on the basis of his evidence of the core truth of his contention that Mr. Manos has suffered, and continues to suffer, from significant respiratory difficulties. Indeed, these were evident in the courtroom during the course of the trial.

Analysis

[20] The defendant contends that the issue which must be determined in respect of causation is whether the plaintiff’s respiratory difficulties since 2010 are due to a short exposure to chemicals from the fire extinguisher, or are rather the natural progression of a previously existing illness. Walmart admits responsibility for the incident, but disputes that the incident caused the plaintiff injuries.

[21] The plaintiff claims that he now has Reactive Airways Dysfunction Syndrome (RADS) as a result of the incident. Walmart submits that the plaintiff had no objective respiratory deterioration whatsoever after the incident at the Waterdown store on December 12, 2010, making a diagnosis of RADS impossible. The evidence does not support the defendant’s contention in this regard.

[22] With respect to the diagnosis of RADS and the overall issue of causation, the plaintiff called Dr. Duncan (family physician), Dr. Killorn (treating respirologist) and Dr. Mintz (expert respirologist). The Defendant sought to discount their conclusions. I was ultimately persuaded that their opinions likely most closely reflected what has actually happened to Mr. Manos in medical terms. I accept the opinion evidence of Dr. Killorn and Dr. Mintz concerning their diagnosis.

[23] Walmart Canada also submitted that there were significant credibility issues with the Plaintiff’s case. These included the plaintiff’s “obsessive interest” in the litigation, his insistence to his treating physicians on a diagnosis of RADS, various representations that were made to the treating physicians regarding his pre-incident health, his previous litigation history, and what it says is the unbelievable story regarding the August 16, 2011 methacholine challenge (that is, his subsequent recollection that his notebook indicated that he had taken Ventolin on the day of the methacholine challenge, notwithstanding that the plaintiff told the technician at the time that he last took his puffers on August 13 and 14, 2011; this, Walmart contends, is a retrospective effort to reconcile the negative test result to demonstrate a link to the fire extinguisher incident). They also point to surveillance footage showing him boating and exerting himself in activities, and not coughing.

[24] I am prepared to accept Mr.Mano’s explanation regarding the Methacholine challenge test on August 16, 2011, and that the he subsequently recalled with the assistance of his notebook that he had taken Ventolin on the day of the test. This explanation offers one potential explanation for the unusual sprirometry test results on that day.

[25] Mr. Manos’ “obsessive interest” is entirely understandable, given that it is his life that has been impacted. Different people have different personalities and will react in different ways to major challenges in their lives. This does not automatically import that they are not credible, or that their evidence is contrived.

[26] I do not concur with the Defendant’s submissions regarding the video surveillance footage from 2016, 2017 and 2018 introduced through the private investigator Paul Fousek. The defendant submits that it is significant because it does not depict the plaintiff wheezing or coughing. This is an unpersuasive submission. The video footage only represents a brief period, and is insufficient to allow broader definitive conclusions to be drawn. It depicts nothing remarkable or extraordinary, and no actions that called for unusual physical activity for any extended period of time. Notwithstanding that it took up considerable time at trial, the video evidence was of little assistance to the Court and did not advance the defendant’s case.

[27] Some comment upon the evidence of the defendant’s engineer witness Jeff Reitsma is also required. He highlighted the supposedly unharmful nature of the monoammonium phosphate (Foray) chemical released, describing it as a nuisance dust, and noted that it was sometimes used as a food additive. He based his assessment on a release period of two seconds. His calculations about exposure used the total volume of the store. He also acknowledged that he did not examine the fire extinguisher itself because it was not made available to him, notwithstanding that it subsequently emerged that it was still in the store manager’s office.

[28] Mr. Reitsma’s evidence was ultimately unhelpful. As he acknowledged on cross-examination, his scenario of total store contamination was different than what actually occurred in this case, in which the evidence indicates the discharge hit Mr. Manos in the face, and that the discharge lasted longer than two seconds. The short-term exposure of concentration of the chemicals in the immediate vicinity of Mr. Manos during this incident would obviously, as a matter of simple logic, be substantially greater than if it had dispersed throughout the total volume of a large Walmart store. Further, there is a qualitative difference between the effects of ingestion vs. inhalation. The assertion that the Foray mixture is ‘not toxic’ when ingested is different than its potential to cause harm as an inhaled irritant. As Mr. Reitsma rightly acknowledged, this is a medical question that he is not qualified to answer.

[29] I find that the totality of the evidence adduced at trial demonstrates, on a balance of probabilities, that the fire extinguisher incident at the Waterdown Walmart on December 12, 2010, caused the plaintiff Kim Manos significant respiratory injury. I am satisfied that, but for his exposure to the fire extinguisher chemicals in that incident, he would not have suffered from the progressing respiratory disease known as Reactive Airways Dysfunction Syndrome (RADS)/Irritant Induced Asthma (IIA), which he developed and suffered since that time.

[30] I agree with the conclusion of Dr. Killorn that the incident at Walmart was a “trigger” and a “seminal event” which led to the plaintiff’s severe and deteriorating respiratory condition.

[31] In taking a robust and pragmatic approach to determining whether the defendant’s negligence caused the plaintiff’s loss, and the impact of the injury upon Mr. Manos, I have considered not just the expert medical evidence adduced, but also the observations from the lay witnesses Keith Milner, Don Murray, Donnie Armstrong, Paul Quest and Adam Wissenz. Their ability to contrast their observations of the plaintiff prior to the incident, with what they have observed since, was illuminating.

[32] Given the plaintiff’s apparent pre-existing symptomatology and possible predisposition or vulnerability to a respiratory injury such as this, it is important to recall the guidance of the Supreme Court of Canada in Athey v. Leonati with respect to the thin skull doctrine.

[33] I concur with the submissions of the plaintiff regarding the significant facts arising from the evidence which support a finding of causation in this case.

[34] First, in the 20 years preceding the fire extinguisher incident at Walmart, the plaintiff’s respiratory health was relatively stable and under control, and any intermittent symptoms such as coughing and wheezing were effectively treated by his family physician Dr. Duncan with medications.

[35] Second, in the 30 months before the incident, the plaintiff’s only respiratory complaint to Dr. Duncan was regarding a post-viral cough stemming from an Upper Respiratory Infection on September 21, 2010, which was effectively treated with medication.

[36] Third, the plaintiff’s intermittent respiratory symptoms did not impact his work attendance or work performance.

[37] Fourth, the plaintiff was sprayed by chemicals from the fire extinguisher on December 12, 2010, which he inhaled and ingested at that time.

[38] Fifth, the plaintiff began experiencing respiratory issues within 24 hours of the incident, and sought medical care for those issues.

[39] Sixth, since the incident now over seven years ago, the plaintiff’s respiratory health has declined dramatically, despite all of the medications and treatments he has been prescribed.

[40] In contrast, the defendant suggested two possible theories for the plaintiff’s respiratory deterioration since the 2010 incident: the plaintiff’s condition did not change after the incident at Walmart but rather, his respiratory health deteriorated in the natural course until he was diagnosed with asthma in 2014, a progression unrelated to the incident at Walmart and which would have occurred in any event; or, that he is malingering. I do not find either of these theories convincing.

[41] Dr. Mate’s most recent theory, which was not mentioned in her reports but presented for the first time at trial, that the plaintiff has Neutrophilic Asthma, was not substantiated by the evidence or the conclusions of the other specialists.

[42] I agree that Dr. Chaimowitz aptly described the majority of the specialists’ views regarding the plaintiff’s respiratory illness:

I do note fairly thoughtful and conflicting views about cause of his current respiratory presentation. The majority of those views seem to suggest that whatever predisposition he had to respiratory difficulties, or whatever respiratory difficulties he has had, the exposure to the ammonium phosphate from the fire extinguisher likely sufficiently irritated his airways that it caused a significant exacerbation in his condition sufficient that he likely developed RADS with only modest response to medications.

[43] I would further concur with the view expressed by Dr. Chaimowitz that the most likely explanation is the one that seems the most obvious, which is that the plaintiff is a person whose previous reactive respiratory disease was exacerbated by the irritant from the fire extinguisher.

[44] I conclude that the defendant Walmart Canada is liable for the injuries sustained by the plaintiff Kim Manos, that he now suffers from RADS/IIA, and that the exposure to the chemicals in the fire extinguisher during the incident on December 12, 2010, caused his injuries.

Damages

[45] The Plaintiff submits that the following heads of damages are applicable in this case:

a. Non-pecuniary (general) damages;

b. Pecuniary damages pertaining to:

i. Past income loss;

ii. Future income loss;

iii. Future treatments; and,

c. Subrogated claims (OHIP and Great West Life).

[46] As the Supreme Court of Canada stated in Andrews v. Grand & Toy Alberta Ltd., 1978 CanLII 1 (SCC), 2 S.C.R. 229 at p. 261, the monetary evaluation of non-pecuniary losses is a philosophical and policy exercise more than a legal or logical one. The award must be fair and reasonable, fairness being gauged by earlier decisions; but the award must also of necessity be arbitrary or conventional. No money can provide true restitution.

[47] The plaintiff submits that a non-pecuniary general damages award in this case should be in the range of $225,000-$275,000.

[48] I have reviewed the precedent cases provided to me by both counsel, including the 10 cases involving respiratory injuries from Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia, Ireland and the United States of America helpfully provided in the plaintiff’s Compendium of Damages: Holmes v. London (City) Hospital Board, 1977 CarswellOnt 458 (Ont. H.C.J.); Smyth v. Waterfall, 2003 CarswellOnt 4383 (Ont. S.C.J.); Stucke v. Richard McDonald & Associates Ltd., 2006 ABQB 239; Welsh v. Cotton Seed Distributors Limited, (2000) SC 20347/99 (N.S.W. S.C.); McFarlane v. Boral Limited, [2007] NSWDDT 9; Turner v. Eastwest Airlines Limited,[2009] NSWDDT 10; Koljibabic v. BHP Billiton Nickel West Pty. Ltd.,[2008] WADC 165; Akram Karam v. Palmone Shoes Pty. Ltd., [2010] VSC 3; Newell v. Bus Eireann/Irish Bus, [2001] IESC 61; and Lawrence v. E.I. Du Pont Nemours & Co., [2007] U.S.C.A. (6th Circuit) No. 05-6895.

[49] With regard to non-pecuniary (general) damages, I note the following factors:

a. The plaintiff was 53 years old when the fire extinguisher incident occurred in 2010. He was in generally good health, insofar as he was able to work and partake in all activities of daily living and leisure;

b. The plaintiff is now 60 years old and has developed a very severe form of asthma, which has resulted in decreasing lung function despite aggressive treatments by respirologists over the past seven years;

c. The plaintiff suffers from RADS / IIA as a result of the incident at Walmart in 2010;

d. Although he still has good days and bad days, the plaintiff suffers daily from episodes of severe shortness of breath, wheezing and coughing which are quite disruptive to him and to people around him;

e. The plaintiff has become socially isolated and is not able to enjoy many activities of daily living and leisure to the same extent or frequency that he did prior to the incident;

f. He is increasingly despondent, stressed and anxious about his condition and how it has impacted his life;

g. He is no longer able to work in the auto industry in the same or similar capacity he worked in since the late 1970’s;

h. He experiences various secondary health issues and concerns as a result of the incident, including difficulty sleeping, fatigue, abdominal pains, and other aches and pains;

i. The plaintiff’s disability has been recognized as severe and prolonged by CPP Disability;

j. The plaintiff’s symptomology requires ongoing medical treatment, which will likely last for the remainder of his life;

k. He continues to receive an escalating volume of medications with potent side effects, including Prednisone and Nucala;

l. Prolonged use of these medications will likely result in significant side effects; and,

m. The plaintiff’s respirologist Dr. Killorn has prognosticated that he may eventually require oxygen therapy or even a lung transplant.

[50] Accordingly, taking into account these factors and the precedent cases cited to me, I consider that an appropriate amount of non-pecuniary general damages in this case would be $225,000.

[51] With regard to pecuniary damages pertaining to income losses and future treatments, the plaintiff need not prove on a balance of probabilities that a future pecuniary loss will occur, since conclusions about the future are inherently speculative. If the plaintiff establishes that there is a real and substantial risk of future pecuniary losses, or a ‘simple probability’, then he may be entitled to compensation.

[52] The evidence with regard to these issues came from Dr. Shawn Scherer of the Read Clinic, a psychologist and vocational expert; Brad Borkwood of Blue Point Valuations; and Amanda Paci, a forensic accountant retained by the defendant.

[53] The defendant’s witness in this regard, Amanda Paci, provided only a limited critique report without proffering any alternative income loss scenarios or calculations for the Court to consider.

[54] Dr. Scherer testified about his assessment of Mr. Mano’s vocational abilities and employability before and after the incident at Walmart, which included a variety of tests over a two-day period in 2017. He concluded that the plaintiff is significantly impaired from a vocational and employability standpoint. He explained in detail the incident’s cascading effect upon the plaintiff’s functionality, and that he is now unable, because of his respiratory illness and sequelae, to return to that job. Dr. Scherer opined that, at this time, Mr. Manos is able to perform a sedentary, low stress job, with minimal interactions with people, several hours a day.

[55] When asked about his prognosis regarding the plaintiff`s future employability given that it is now more than seven years post-incident, his response was “what you see is what you are going to get.” He concluded that the plaintiff’s vocational impairments will persist for the remainder of his life, and that the job he currently has as a part-time driver for Halton Honda is appropriate given his current health limitations.

[56] The plaintiff submits that his past income loss is $375,000 and future income loss is $502,500-$558,200. This range was illustrated in several alternative scenarios provided by Mr. Borkwood.

[57] With regard to future care costs, although the plaintiff is receiving very expensive Nucala medication, he is currently receiving it on compassionate grounds from the manufacturer of this medication, Nucala has recently been approved for funding coverage, and the plaintiff will likely be grandfathered in and thus be unlikely to incur the expense of paying for this medication in future.

[58] The plaintiff submits however that he should be provided with a reasonable amount for psychological treatments in relation to this incident. I would note in this regard that the report and testimony of Dr. Chaimowitz concluded that the Plaintiff had no psychiatric impairment, nor required any psychiatric treatment because of the incident. I do not consider that the Plaintiff has substantiated his request for a sum in this regard.

[59] I accept the following propositions emerging from the evidence regarding pecuniary damages: the plaintiff’s injuries from the incident led to a cascading decline in his functionality, which severely limited (and continues to limit) his employability options given his age and ongoing health issues; his vocational and employability abilities have been significantly impacted and reduced as a result of the incident in the Walmart on December 12, 2010; his current job as a driver is likely appropriate at the present time and possibly in the future, given his ongoing limitations and declining health; and, but for the incident, the plaintiff would likely have continued in the auto industry as a sales person from 2010 to age 70. The various scenarios posited by the plaintiff involving him working in managerial positions seem too speculative to be given weight.

[60] On the basis of the evidence of Brad Borkwood, which takes into account appropriate negative contingencies and does not factor in speculative positive contingencies, and the present value of future lost gross earnings adjusted for contingencies pursuant to Rule 53.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, this would constitute past losses of $236,700, and future losses of $306,600, for a total of $543,300.

[61] The Plaintiff submits that OHIP’s subrogated interest claim is $18,965.48, and Great West Life’s is $2,387.13.

[62] I am satisfied on the evidence that the plaintiff should receive an award of damages in respect of past and future income losses.

Order

[63] The defendant Walmart Canada shall pay damages to the plaintiff as follows:

1. Non-pecuniary general damages in the amount of $225,000;

2. Pecuniary damages pertaining to:

a. Past income loss in the amount of $236,700; and

b. Future income loss in the amount of $306,600.

3. Subrogated claims on behalf of:

a. OHIP in the sum of $18,965.48; and

b. Great West Life in the sum of $2,387.13.

Costs

[64] If the parties are unable to agree on costs, they may make written submissions to me through my judicial assistant (maximum three pages, plus bill of costs). The plaintiff may have fourteen days from the release of this judgment to provide his submissions; the defendant a further fourteen days for its response; and the plaintiff then a further seven days for any reply.

Gibson J.

Released January 4, 2019

COURT FILE NO.: 6890/12

DATE: 2019-01-04

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

KIM MANOS

Plaintiff

– and –

RIOTRIN PROPERTIES (FLAMBOROUGH) INC., WAL-MART CANADA CORP. and JOHN DOE

Defendants

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

GIBSON J.

Released: January 4, 2019