Aquilas Kapend

The offender, Hussein Ali Kelkas, was found guilty of three charges of sexually assaulting two complainants.

The court considered victim impact statements, the offender's background, and a sexual behaviours assessment.

Aggravating factors included the violent nature of the assaults, anal penetration, ejaculation without a condom, and the offender's criminal record.

Mitigating factors included family support and an apology to the court.

The court accepted a joint submission for a sentence of five and a half years of imprisonment, less 32 days for pre-sentence custody.

Ancillary orders included a mandatory DNA order, lifetime registration under the Sex Offender Information Registration Act, a lifetime weapons prohibition, and a non-communication order with the complainants.

The accused was charged with three counts of sexual assault against two complainants he met through social media.

The core issue at trial was credibility, as the accused claimed the sexual encounters were consensual or initiated by the complainants, while the complainants testified they explicitly refused consent.

The court applied the W.(D.) framework for assessing credibility and admitted similar fact evidence showing the accused used the same deceptive tactics and phrases with both women.

The court rejected the accused's evidence as incredible and found the complainants' testimonies credible and reliable, resulting in convictions on all counts.

M.L. was charged with sexual assault and common assault.

The sexual assault allegation stemmed from an incident in 2006, early in the cohabiting relationship with the complainant, D.W. The common assault charge arose from an incident in 2016 when M.L. attempted to serve D.W. with family court documents.

The court applied the W.(D.) analysis for the sexual assault charge, considering the complainant's credibility, delayed disclosure, and potential motives to fabricate.

The court found inconsistencies and omissions in D.W.'s testimony regarding the sexual assault and the circumstances of her leaving the home, and noted the Crown did not call a potentially dispositive witness.

For the common assault, the court accepted that M.L. tugged D.W.'s hood to place papers inside, constituting an assault.

M.L. was acquitted of sexual assault but convicted of common assault.

The accused was charged with sexual assault, assault, and theft following a visit by the complainant to his home.

The complainant alleged severe physical and sexual violence, including the accused placing his fist in her vagina and shaving her pubic hair while she slept.

The accused testified and denied the allegations, claiming the complainant attacked him.

The court applied the W.D. framework to assess credibility and found significant inconsistencies and reliability issues in the complainant's evidence, exacerbated by heavy drug and alcohol consumption.

Finding the accused's evidence raised a reasonable doubt, the court acquitted him on all counts.

A 16-year-old youth was charged with sexual assault under section 271 of the Criminal Code for conduct that occurred on December 13, 2015.

The complainant, a 19-year-old, alleged that the accused inserted his penis into her vagina without consent during a sexual encounter that began with consensual sexual activity.

The accused admitted to vaginal intercourse but claimed it was unintentional and that he believed he was engaging in anal intercourse to which the complainant had consented.

The trial addressed both the admissibility of the accused's statement to police under section 146 of the Youth Criminal Justice Act and the substantive elements of sexual assault, including the defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent.

Edward Hall was found guilty of aggravated assault, assault with a weapon, possession of a weapon for a dangerous purpose, assault, and breach of probation.

The court considered sentencing principles, including the totality principle and Gladue factors for Indigenous offenders.

The defence sought a 4-year sentence with enhanced pre-sentence credit, while the Crown sought 6 years consecutive.

The court granted enhanced pre-sentence credit at 1.5:1 for both periods of custody, and an additional 20 days qualitative credit due to harsh detention conditions (lockdowns, triple bunking).

The final sentence was 265 days jail consecutive to any outstanding sentence, plus 765 days pre-sentence custody credit, resulting in a total custodial portion equivalent to 34 months, followed by 12 months probation with specific conditions.

The accused was charged with assaulting a peace officer contrary to section 270(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

Police responded to a 911 call for medical assistance at a residence where a seizure was occurring.

The accused, upset and intoxicated, was asked to leave the kitchen to allow emergency personnel access.

A confrontation ensued between the accused and the officer.

The Crown alleged the accused attempted to head-butt the officer.

The trial judge found that while the accused was agitated and advancing aggressively, the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused intentionally attempted to head-butt the officer.

The accused was acquitted.

The accused, Julian Justinico, was charged with sexual assault and breaking and entering to commit sexual assault against the complainant, SD.

The Crown's case relied on circumstantial evidence, including the accused's conduct and statements at a party prior to the assault, and DNA evidence found on the complainant's genitals.

The defence challenged the admissibility of similar act evidence and the reliability of DNA evidence for identity.

The court found the accused's prior conduct admissible as an admission and for animus/motive, and concluded that the DNA evidence, combined with other circumstantial evidence and the absence of benign explanations for transfer, established identity beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was found guilty on both counts.

The appellant appealed his assault conviction for spanking his four-year-old daughter, which caused serious bruising.

He argued the trial judge erred by inferring causation without expert evidence and by rejecting his defence under s. 43 of the Criminal Code.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that expert evidence was not required to establish causation and that the trial judge reasonably concluded the force used exceeded what was reasonable under the circumstances.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent on two counts of assaulting peace officers.

The trial judge had allowed the defence to reopen its case twice and found that the respondent was a "licensee" with a right to occupy his mother's home, meaning the police were not acting in the execution of their duties when attempting to evict him.

The trial judge also found that the force used by the respondent in self-defence was not excessive.

The appeal court upheld the trial judge's decision on the reopening of the case, the respondent's status as a licensee, and the reasonableness of his self-defence, thus dismissing the appeal.

The respondent's request for compensation for delays was also dismissed.

The accused was charged with aggravated assault following a stabbing at a house party.

The sole issue at trial was the identity of the attacker.

The accused testified and denied stabbing the complainant, but the court rejected his evidence due to significant inconsistencies with his post-arrest statement.

The court found the complainant's testimony credible and corroborated by DNA evidence on the knife and a Facebook message from the accused expressing remorse.

The accused was found guilty on all charges.

The accused, charged with sexual assault, brought a motion challenging the validity of a DNA warrant issued under s. 487.05 of the Criminal Code.

The accused argued that after excising certain impugned statements from the Information to Obtain (ITO), there were no longer reasonable grounds to believe he was a party to the offence.

The court conducted a sub-facial review and found that even with the excisions, the ITO contained sufficient information to meet the standard for issuing the warrant.

The court also allowed amplification evidence that corrected good faith omissions by the police.

Furthermore, the court held that even if a s. 8 Charter breach had occurred, the DNA evidence would not be excluded under s. 24(2) as its admission would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The motion was dismissed.