Deborah A. Kinsella

The appellant appealed a conviction under section 4(1) of the Dog Owners Liability Act (DOLA) for failing to exercise reasonable precautions to prevent her dog from biting a person.

The trial Justice of the Peace found the appellant guilty and imposed restrictions on two dogs and fines totalling $800.

The appeal court allowed the appeal in part, finding that while the conviction was supported by evidence, the trial judge erred in failing to identify which specific dog was responsible for the bite and in imposing restrictions on both dogs without evidentiary support.

The court set aside the fines and restrictions on the younger dog (Dolly), finding that only the older dog (Stella) was involved in the incident.

Claude Laporte appealed his conviction for failing to comply with an Order to Comply under the Building Code Act.

The appeal raised four grounds: misapprehension of evidence regarding his testimony, incorrect interpretation of "build" and "owner" under the Building Code Act, improper judicial interference by raising the principle of collateral attack, and an erroneous consideration of the defence of officially induced error.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding no material misapprehension of evidence, confirming the applicability of the collateral attack principle to administrative orders, and rejecting the officially induced error defence.

The appellant, Andrew Zaranek, appealed a conviction for operating a commercial vehicle and following too closely under section 158(2) of the Highway Traffic Act.

He argued that the trial justice of the peace erred by finding the essential element of speed (exceeding 60 km/h) was proven, alleging judicial notice was improperly taken.

The appellate court found that proof of speed exceeding 60 km/h is an essential element for a charge under s. 158(2).

It clarified that the trial judge did not take judicial notice of speed, but rather inferred it from video evidence and took judicial notice of the Highway 401 speed limit.

The appellate court agreed that the video evidence supported a reasonable inference that the vehicle was travelling over 60 km/h.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Diljot Sethi, appealed a conviction for operating a motor vehicle while holding a handheld communication device, contrary to section 78.1 of the Highway Traffic Act.

The trial Justice of the Peace found the appellant guilty, imposing a $500 fine and costs.

The appellant argued that the Justice of the Peace erred in concluding that even if his testimony was accepted, it would still constitute an offence.

The appeal court reviewed the evidence and the relevant legislation, including exceptions for hands-free use and specific actions like making or ending calls.

The court found that the appellant's admitted use of the device to access his electronic logbook, even if mounted, was not a permitted exception under the regulation.

The appeal was dismissed, upholding the conviction.

The appellant appealed his conviction for failing to slow down and proceed with caution for an emergency vehicle contrary to section 159(2) of the Highway Traffic Act.

At trial, the appellant testified that he slowed to approximately 40 kilometres per hour upon seeing the emergency vehicle lights, while the officer testified the vehicle did not slow down as it approached the RIDE checkpoint.

The trial justice found the appellant guilty, accepting that slowing to 40 kilometres per hour was insufficient to meet the statutory obligation to slow down and proceed with caution.

The appeal was dismissed, with the court finding the conviction was reasonable and well-supported by the evidence.

The appellants appealed their convictions for driving a commercial motor vehicle with major brake defects.

The driver was charged under section 107 of the Highway Traffic Act, and the company was charged with operating a vehicle with push rod stroke exceeding prescribed limits under HTA Regulation 587.

The appellants challenged the convictions on four grounds: failure to distinguish between owner, operator, and driver; failure to consider due diligence; failure to establish the owner-operator's knowledge of defects; and failure to establish that brake testing was conducted in accordance with regulations.

The court dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding that the Crown proved the actus reus of the offence beyond a reasonable doubt and that the appellants failed to establish a factual basis for the due diligence defence.

The appellant appealed her conviction for speeding (159 km/h in a 100 km/h zone) on the grounds that her paralegal agent entered a guilty plea without proper instructions and that her plea was uninformed.

The appellant sought to introduce fresh evidence consisting of her affidavit and supporting documents.

The court dismissed the appeal on two grounds: first, the appellant's agent on appeal failed to follow the required protocol for allegations of incompetent assistance by not providing notice to trial counsel or conducting independent investigation; second, the proposed fresh evidence failed to meet the Palmer test for admissibility and actually supported the conclusion that the plea was voluntary and informed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for driving a motor vehicle with a speed measuring device (radar detector) contrary to section 79(2) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The appellant raised three grounds of appeal: (1) the officer lacked reasonable and probable grounds to stop and search the vehicle; (2) insufficient evidence proved the seized device was a speed measuring device; and (3) the trial judge reversed the burden of proof.

The appellate court dismissed all grounds, finding that the officer had reasonable grounds based on the Spectre device detection and visual observation, that the prosecution adequately proved the device was a radar detector through the officer's experience and the device's response to police radar, and that while one passage appeared problematic, the trial judge's overall decision correctly applied the burden of proof.

An appeal of a conviction for failing to maintain a daily logbook as required under the Highway Traffic Act and Ontario Regulation 555/06.

The appellant was observed by a police officer attempting to complete his logbook while driving on Highway 401.

The logbook showed entries for Markham and Montreal with a partially drawn line.

The trial justice convicted the appellant based on circumstantial evidence that he had stopped in Montreal and failed to record the change in duty status.

The appeal was dismissed, with the court finding that the circumstantial evidence reasonably supported the inference that the appellant had changed his duty status without properly recording it in his logbook.

The appellant appealed his conviction for speeding contrary to section 128 of the Highway Traffic Act and driving with a hand-held communication device contrary to section 78.1(1) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The trial justice found the appellant guilty based on evidence from a police officer who observed the appellant driving at 130 km/h in a 100 km/h zone and using an electronic device.

The appellant testified he was holding a business card and that his cell phone was inoperable.

The appellate court found that the trial justice erred in applying the credibility assessment principles from R. v. W.(D.), applying a different standard to the appellant's testimony than to the officer's testimony, and effectively reversing the burden of proof.

The appeal was granted and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed a conviction entered under default proceedings for improperly using a blue flashing light contrary to section 62(32) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The certificate of offence listed an incorrect set fine of $85.00 when the correct fine for a commercial motor vehicle should have been $200.00.

The court found that the certificate was not complete and regular on its face and therefore could not support a conviction under the default proceedings.

The appeal was allowed and the conviction was quashed.

The appellant was convicted of failing to properly wear a seatbelt contrary to section 106(2) of the Highway Traffic Act.

A police officer testified that he observed the appellant driving a tractor-trailer without a fastened seatbelt on Highway 401.

The appellant testified that he was wearing his seatbelt and that the colour of his shirt may have created a visual illusion.

On appeal, the court found that the trial justice erred by permitting cross-examination on statements made to the police officer without a voir dire on voluntariness, and by allowing improper cross-examination suggesting the appellant had tailored his evidence based on disclosure.

The appeal was granted and a new trial was ordered.

An appeal of a conviction under sections 107(11) and 207(1) of the Highway Traffic Act for operating a commercial motor vehicle with major defects.

The central issue was whether the corporate defendant was properly identified as "Trans-West Logistics Inc." when the vehicle registration documents identified the owner as "Logistiques Trans-West Inc." The appellant argued that the exact legal name must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt and that prior case law on corporate identity should have been binding.

The appellate court found that the prior cases involved materially different facts and that stare decisis did not apply.

The court determined that the evidence established beyond a reasonable doubt that the two names referred to the same corporate entity and that the name constituted a misnomer rather than a substitution of a different entity.

The conviction was upheld with the corporate name amended to reflect the registration documents.

The accused was charged with arson under section 434 of the Criminal Code for intentionally or recklessly causing damage by fire to a hotel property on April 21, 2016.

At the preliminary inquiry, the Crown relied almost entirely on circumstantial evidence, including security video footage and expert fire investigation testimony.

The Crown's case rested on identifying the accused in the breezeway area where the fire originated in the hours before the fire was discovered, and the fact that the accused was found in possession of a lighter.

The court found that while there was evidence the fire was intentionally or recklessly set, the Crown failed to establish a permissible inference regarding the accused's identity as the person who set the fire.

The critical gap was the timing: the accused was last identified in the breezeway at approximately 12:52 pm, but smoke was not noticed until approximately 1:25 pm—a 33-minute gap.

The expert testimony established that the fire would likely have ignited no earlier than 1:05 pm, meaning the accused could not have been the person who set it.

The court held that any inference bridging this temporal gap would constitute impermissible speculation rather than a reasonable inference based on proven facts.

A 16-year-old youth was charged with sexual assault under section 271 of the Criminal Code for conduct that occurred on December 13, 2015.

The complainant, a 19-year-old, alleged that the accused inserted his penis into her vagina without consent during a sexual encounter that began with consensual sexual activity.

The accused admitted to vaginal intercourse but claimed it was unintentional and that he believed he was engaging in anal intercourse to which the complainant had consented.

The trial addressed both the admissibility of the accused's statement to police under section 146 of the Youth Criminal Justice Act and the substantive elements of sexual assault, including the defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent.

The accused was charged with assaulting a peace officer contrary to section 270(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

Police responded to a 911 call for medical assistance at a residence where a seizure was occurring.

The accused, upset and intoxicated, was asked to leave the kitchen to allow emergency personnel access.

A confrontation ensued between the accused and the officer.

The Crown alleged the accused attempted to head-butt the officer.

The trial judge found that while the accused was agitated and advancing aggressively, the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused intentionally attempted to head-butt the officer.

The accused was acquitted.

An appeal from a conviction under section 159(3) of the Highway Traffic Act for failing to move into another lane for an emergency vehicle if safe to do so.

The appellant argued that the offence could only be committed upon passing a stopped emergency vehicle, not upon approaching it.

The trial justice found the appellant guilty based on the interpretation that the obligation to move lanes is triggered "upon approaching" a stopped emergency vehicle.

The appeal court upheld the conviction, finding the statutory language clear and unambiguous.

The accused was charged with sexual assault causing bodily harm and criminal negligence causing bodily harm arising from the transmission of genital herpes to his intimate partner.

The Crown alleged that the accused failed to disclose his herpes status before engaging in unprotected sexual intercourse, thereby vitiating the complainant's consent through fraud.

The defence argued that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused transmitted the virus, and alternatively, that consent was not vitiated because the accused did not intend to cause bodily harm.

The court acquitted the accused on both counts, finding that the Crown failed to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was the source of the infection, and that even if transmission were proven, the accused's non-disclosure did not constitute the requisite "serious deception" necessary to vitiate consent under the fraud doctrine as articulated in R. v. Mabior and R. v. Hutchinson.

The defendant pleaded guilty to multiple offences including assault with a weapon, uttering threats to cause death, possession of a weapon for a dangerous purpose, assault, and multiple breaches of recognizance and probation.

The central issue was whether the defendant was entitled to enhanced pre-sentence custody credit at a 1.5:1 ratio or limited to 1:1 credit under section 719(3.1) of the Criminal Code.

The court found that the "bail misconduct exclusion" was not engaged because the Crown did not seek to formally cancel the defendant's bail upon re-arrest, and therefore awarded enhanced credit.

The defendant was sentenced to custody followed by probation with conditions including substance abuse treatment, anger management counselling, and weapons prohibition.