James Moak

Claude Laporte appealed his conviction for failing to comply with an Order to Comply under the Building Code Act.

The appeal raised four grounds: misapprehension of evidence regarding his testimony, incorrect interpretation of "build" and "owner" under the Building Code Act, improper judicial interference by raising the principle of collateral attack, and an erroneous consideration of the defence of officially induced error.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding no material misapprehension of evidence, confirming the applicability of the collateral attack principle to administrative orders, and rejecting the officially induced error defence.

A private prosecution was brought against the defendants for erecting a fence that violated height restrictions under the Township of South Stormont Fence By-Law.

The defendants claimed the fence replaced a pre-existing hedge under section 9.2 of the by-law or was exempt under section 9.3 by council resolution.

The court found neither exemption applied.

The defendants were convicted of four counts relating to fence height violations in sections 3.1 and 3.2 of the by-law.

Two counts were dismissed.

The court rejected defenses of officially-induced error and due diligence, finding the defendants had clear notice of non-compliance and failed to take reasonable steps to remedy the situation despite numerous warnings and opportunities to comply.

The defendants brought an application to dismiss charges in a private prosecution alleging violations of a municipal fence by-law.

The defendants raised five grounds: abuse of process due to prior adjudication, statutory bar due to limitation period expiry, insufficient knowledge of the informant, res judicata and issue estoppel, and unauthorized practice of law by the informant.

The court dismissed all grounds, finding that the prior proceeding involved different charges and a different fence, the limitation period had not expired as the fence had been modified, the informant had reasonable and probable grounds, the doctrine of issue estoppel did not apply, and the informant's conduct was permitted under applicable law society by-laws.

The appellant appealed his conviction for driving a motor vehicle with a speed measuring device (radar detector) contrary to section 79(2) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The appellant raised three grounds of appeal: (1) the officer lacked reasonable and probable grounds to stop and search the vehicle; (2) insufficient evidence proved the seized device was a speed measuring device; and (3) the trial judge reversed the burden of proof.

The appellate court dismissed all grounds, finding that the officer had reasonable grounds based on the Spectre device detection and visual observation, that the prosecution adequately proved the device was a radar detector through the officer's experience and the device's response to police radar, and that while one passage appeared problematic, the trial judge's overall decision correctly applied the burden of proof.

The appellant appealed his conviction for speeding contrary to section 128 of the Highway Traffic Act and driving with a hand-held communication device contrary to section 78.1(1) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The trial justice found the appellant guilty based on evidence from a police officer who observed the appellant driving at 130 km/h in a 100 km/h zone and using an electronic device.

The appellant testified he was holding a business card and that his cell phone was inoperable.

The appellate court found that the trial justice erred in applying the credibility assessment principles from R. v. W.(D.), applying a different standard to the appellant's testimony than to the officer's testimony, and effectively reversing the burden of proof.

The appeal was granted and a new trial was ordered.