Matthew Collins

The accused brought a pre-trial application to exclude two videotapes containing a confession to the murder of the deceased.

The confession was obtained during a 14-month undercover police operation, which the court identified as a variation of a 'Mr. Big' scheme.

The undercover officers posed as criminals and offered to help the accused defeat an upcoming polygraph test, leading to a confession and re-enactment of the stabbing.

The court applied the Hart framework and found that while the operation triggered the presumptive inadmissibility of the confession, the Crown successfully proved the confession was reliable and its probative value outweighed its prejudicial effect.

The court also dismissed arguments that the police conduct violated section 7 of the Charter or amounted to an abuse of process.

The application to exclude the evidence was dismissed.

An application under section 74 of the Firearms Act to review the Chief Firearms Officer's decision to revoke the applicant's firearms licence.

The applicant, a retired military officer with PTSD and a history of alcohol abuse, had his licence revoked following several incidents involving mental health crises and impaired driving between October 2017 and September 2018.

The applicant sought to overturn the revocation, presenting new medical evidence from specialized treatment providers indicating significant improvement in his condition, abstinence from alcohol, and minimal risk regarding firearm possession.

The court found the original decision reasonable but determined that the new medical evidence was substantial enough to undermine the factual assumptions underlying the revocation decision and granted the application.

The accused, charged with the first-degree murder of her common-law spouse by stabbing, applied for judicial interim release.

The court found that while the proposed bail plan (involving the Elizabeth Fry Society and electronic monitoring) mitigated the primary and secondary grounds for detention, it failed to satisfy the tertiary ground.

Given the strength of the Crown's case, the potential for a lengthy sentence, and the accused's post-offence dissembling, the court held that releasing the accused without a reliable surety and strict supervision would undermine public confidence in the administration of justice.

The application was dismissed.

The accused, Rosemary Levett, was charged with administering a noxious substance (Zopiclone) to Nora Wara, intending to aggrieve or annoy her, contrary to subsection 245(b) of the Criminal Code.

The central issue was whether the Zopiclone tablet was ingested by the complainant and, if so, whether the accused administered it.

The Crown's case relied entirely on the complainant's testimony.

The court found numerous inconsistencies and incongruities in the complainant's narrative, including conflicting statements about her motives, her actions regarding evidence preservation, and her general credibility.

The court was not confident in the complainant's sincerity and found that the Crown had not displaced the presumption of innocence.

The accused was acquitted.

Duane Gore was convicted of operating a motor vehicle while disqualified, a subsequent offence.

The Crown sought 30-36 months imprisonment and a lifetime driving prohibition, while the defence sought 12 months.

The court considered sentencing principles, aggravating factors (prior record, deliberate act), and significant mitigating factors (eight years of sobriety, rehabilitation, remorse, stable employment, family support).

The court distinguished the case from others involving impaired or dangerous driving.

Acknowledging the need for denunciation and deterrence, but also the offender's rehabilitation, the court imposed a sentence of 12 months imprisonment and a mandatory three-year driving prohibition, rejecting a lifetime prohibition to support rehabilitation.

The appellant appealed his conviction for failing to slow down and proceed with caution for an emergency vehicle contrary to section 159(2) of the Highway Traffic Act.

At trial, the appellant testified that he slowed to approximately 40 kilometres per hour upon seeing the emergency vehicle lights, while the officer testified the vehicle did not slow down as it approached the RIDE checkpoint.

The trial justice found the appellant guilty, accepting that slowing to 40 kilometres per hour was insufficient to meet the statutory obligation to slow down and proceed with caution.

The appeal was dismissed, with the court finding the conviction was reasonable and well-supported by the evidence.

The accused was charged with driving while disqualified.

He brought a Charter application alleging that the police officer's vehicle stop constituted an arbitrary detention under s. 9, arguing the officer lacked reasonable suspicion and used the Highway Traffic Act as a ruse.

The court found the stop was a valid exercise of police powers under s. 216(1) of the Highway Traffic Act to check for licensing and insurance, which promotes road safety.

The court concluded there was no arbitrary detention or Charter breach, and dismissed the application to exclude the identification evidence.

The appellant appealed her conviction for speeding (159 km/h in a 100 km/h zone) on the grounds that her paralegal agent entered a guilty plea without proper instructions and that her plea was uninformed.

The appellant sought to introduce fresh evidence consisting of her affidavit and supporting documents.

The court dismissed the appeal on two grounds: first, the appellant's agent on appeal failed to follow the required protocol for allegations of incompetent assistance by not providing notice to trial counsel or conducting independent investigation; second, the proposed fresh evidence failed to meet the Palmer test for admissibility and actually supported the conclusion that the plea was voluntary and informed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for driving a motor vehicle with a speed measuring device (radar detector) contrary to section 79(2) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The appellant raised three grounds of appeal: (1) the officer lacked reasonable and probable grounds to stop and search the vehicle; (2) insufficient evidence proved the seized device was a speed measuring device; and (3) the trial judge reversed the burden of proof.

The appellate court dismissed all grounds, finding that the officer had reasonable grounds based on the Spectre device detection and visual observation, that the prosecution adequately proved the device was a radar detector through the officer's experience and the device's response to police radar, and that while one passage appeared problematic, the trial judge's overall decision correctly applied the burden of proof.

An appeal of a conviction for failing to maintain a daily logbook as required under the Highway Traffic Act and Ontario Regulation 555/06.

The appellant was observed by a police officer attempting to complete his logbook while driving on Highway 401.

The logbook showed entries for Markham and Montreal with a partially drawn line.

The trial justice convicted the appellant based on circumstantial evidence that he had stopped in Montreal and failed to record the change in duty status.

The appeal was dismissed, with the court finding that the circumstantial evidence reasonably supported the inference that the appellant had changed his duty status without properly recording it in his logbook.

The appellant, Brian White, appealed his conviction for having care or control of a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The appeal was based on two grounds: the trial judge's finding that the appellant had not rebutted the presumption of care and control by lacking intention to exercise it, and the trial judge's finding that the vehicle was operable.

The Superior Court dismissed the appeal, affirming that the trial judge's conclusions on both the appellant's intention to set the vehicle in motion and the vehicle's operability were supported by the evidence and entitled to deference.

The Crown brought a dangerous offender application against the accused, who pled guilty to multiple domestic violence offences including criminal harassment, forcible confinement, and assault with a weapon against his former girlfriend.

The accused had a lengthy history of violence against intimate partners and multiple mental health diagnoses.

The court found that the accused met the criteria for a dangerous offender designation, noting a pattern of repetitive and persistent aggressive behaviour showing a failure to restrain his behaviour and a substantial degree of indifference to the consequences.

The court concluded that the risk could not be adequately managed in the community and imposed an indeterminate sentence.

The accused, Jamie Farrell-Cote, was sentenced for sexual interference, invitation to sexual touching, and exposure involving a 12-year-old complainant when he was 20.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the abuse of a child and breach of trust, and mitigating factors such as the accused's youth at the time, lack of predatory behaviour, and subsequent pro-social conduct.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence for child abuse offences while balancing the gravity of the offence with the offender's moral blameworthiness.

A global sentence of 30 months imprisonment was imposed, along with various corollary orders.

The accused, K.B., was charged with sexual assault and related collateral charges.

The Crown alleged K.B. sexually assaulted the complainant, SW, while driving her home.

The court assessed the credibility and reliability of the complainant, the accused, and the accused's spouse, TL, noting inconsistencies and potential motives.

The complainant had significant mental health issues and was under the influence of medication and marijuana at the time of the alleged incident.

The court found that the evidence, taken as a whole, left a state of uncertainty, and the Crown failed to prove K.B.'s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

K.B. was acquitted.

The appellant appealed a conviction for operating a motor vehicle with an alcohol level exceeding 80 mg, arguing arbitrary detention under section 9 of the Charter and seeking exclusion of evidence under section 24(2).

The trial judge found no detention until the approved screening device demand.

The appeal court upheld this finding, concluding that the initial police interaction was a general inquiry, not a detention, and that the officer's subjective belief was not determinative.

Applying the principles from *R. v. Suberu* and *R. v. Grant*, the court found no Charter breach.

Even if a breach had occurred, the court determined that excluding the reliable breath sample evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute, considering the officer's good faith and the seriousness of the offence.

The accused, J. F.-C., was charged with multiple sexual offences against the complainant, M.P., who was 12 years old at the time of the alleged incidents in 2008.

The charges included sexual assault (s. 271), sexual exploitation (s. 151(a)), invitation (s. 152), and exposure for a sexual purpose (s. 173(2)) under the Criminal Code.

The court assessed the complainant's narrative, acknowledging inconsistencies common in adult testimony about childhood events, but found her evidence credible regarding the core allegations.

Despite the complainant's infatuation and compliance, the court determined that J. F.-C. knew M.P. could not consent.

The accused was found guilty on counts 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 12.

G.B. was sentenced following convictions for sexual offences against his two daughters, J.B. (17) and A.B. (14-15).

The court considered aggravating factors including breach of trust, victim vulnerability, the number of victims, the invasive nature of the assault on J.B., and G.B.'s substance abuse as an aggravating risk factor.

Mitigating factors included community support and G.B.'s disadvantaged background as a survivor of sexual abuse.

The defence proposed a global sentence of 3 years and 9 months, while the Crown sought 5 years.

The court imposed a global sentence of 3 years and 9 months (including 9 months pre-sentence custody), consisting of 2 years for the offence against J.B. and 1 year consecutive for the offence against A.B. Various ancillary orders were made, including a DNA order, SOIRA order for life, weapons prohibition, and a 10-year contact prohibition for A.B.

The accused was charged with aggravated assault after striking her ex-partner in his left eye during an argument.

The complainant had a pre-existing condition that caused his left eye to bulge and required him to wear protective glasses.

The blow ruptured the eye, ultimately necessitating its surgical removal and replacement with a prosthetic.

The court found that the accused intentionally applied force without consent, that a reasonable person would have foreseen the risk of bodily harm, and that the resulting loss of the eye constituted permanent disfigurement.

The accused was found guilty.

The appellant appealed a conviction for operating a motor vehicle with blood alcohol exceeding 80 mg contrary to the Criminal Code.

He argued that the breath samples were not taken "as soon as practicable" under s. 258(1)(c)(ii) due to a 90‑minute delay between the roadside stop and the first Intoxilyzer test, and that his s. 10(b) Charter right to counsel was breached by a delay before speaking with Legal Aid.

The court held that the trial judge’s findings of fact regarding police resource allocation and transport to a detachment with a breath technician were reasonable and entitled to deference.

The evidence supported the conclusion that the breath tests were taken as soon as practicable and that the right to counsel was not violated.

Even if a breach had occurred, the breath results would not have been excluded under s. 24(2).