Rick Leroy

The defendants moved for summary judgment to terminate a commercial property agreement due to the failure to obtain condominium conversion approval within two years, a condition precedent under the Planning Act.

The plaintiffs opposed, seeking specific performance or damages, arguing the property was unique and the defendants breached their good faith obligation to diligently pursue approval.

The court granted summary judgment, finding the condominium conversion commercially absurd and specific performance impossible without Planning Act compliance.

While denying specific performance, the court found the defendants breached their duty to notify the plaintiffs of the futility of the plan and awarded the plaintiffs $285,000 in damages for their investment and relocation costs, offset by accumulated rent held in court.

This trial decision addresses a family law dispute between cohabiting parents concerning relocation, decision-making authority, parenting time, child and spousal support, and occupation rent.

The Applicant mother unilaterally relocated with the children to Barrie, which the Respondent father opposed.

The court approved the relocation, acknowledging the established status quo, and implemented a modified joint decision-making framework where the mother has final authority in case of disagreement.

A detailed parenting schedule was set.

The Applicant's claim for occupation rent was dismissed.

The court imputed the Respondent's income for support purposes, accounting for undeclared cash revenue and personal expenses, and ordered further calculations for support arrears and section 7 expenses.

The applicant sought to validate an informal, unwitnessed document dated December 31, 2021, as a will or codicil of the deceased, Garnet Earl Rombough, under section 21.1 of the Succession Law Reform Act.

The deceased had a formal will from 2012.

Respondents challenged the 2021 document, alleging lack of testamentary capacity, undue influence, fraud, and forgery.

The court found the 2021 document authentic, made with testamentary capacity, and free from undue influence or fraud.

It determined that the 2021 document, read in conjunction with the 2012 will, represented the deceased's final testamentary intentions, acting as a codicil to the earlier will.

The application was granted, and both documents were admitted to probate.

The applicant mother sought orders regarding parenting time and decision-making for the parties' two children.

The respondent father engaged in a prolonged campaign of coercive control, domestic violence, and false reporting to child protection agencies.

The court found the father's behaviour caused significant emotional harm and instability for the children.

Applying the best interests of the child test under section 24 of the Children's Law Reform Act, the court suspended the father's parenting time until he demonstrates a material change in circumstances through trauma counselling and a mental health assessment.

The court also issued a one-year restraining order against the father and awarded costs to the mother.

This motion for judgment addressed liability and damages following the tragic drowning of Maci Bancroft, a child with Mowat-Wilson Syndrome and global developmental delay, while in the unsupervised care of her father, Nicholas Bancroft.

The plaintiffs, Maci's mother (Shauntal Campeau-Proulx), older sibling (Zayden Bancroft), and Maci's estate, sought damages for negligence.

The court found Nicholas Bancroft solely liable for negligence due to his abandonment of supervisory duties during bath time.

Claims against Sarah Bercier, who was also present, were dismissed as no duty of care was established.

The court also dismissed claims for pain and suffering under the Trustee Act due to lack of evidence of conscious suffering, and a request to declare the judgment non-dischargeable in bankruptcy, deferring this to the bankruptcy court.

Damages for loss of care, guidance, and companionship were awarded to the mother and sibling, with the amounts adjusted to reflect Maci's special needs and limited capacity to provide future care and guidance.

The appellant appealed his conviction for impaired operation of a motor vehicle by a drug.

Following a single-vehicle accident, the appellant was taken to the hospital where police delayed informing him of his arrest and right to counsel.

During this delay, hospital staff drew a blood sample for medical purposes, which police later seized via a warrant.

The trial judge found breaches of the appellant's ss. 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b) Charter rights but admitted the blood sample, finding it was not causally connected to the breaches.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, holding that the trial judge erred by reversing the burden of persuasion regarding whether the appellant would have consented to the blood draw had his rights been respected.

The Court conducted a s. 24(2) analysis, excluded the blood sample evidence, and entered an acquittal.

The accused, detained for over six months without a judicial interim release hearing, sought a 90-day bail detention review under s. 525 of the Criminal Code.

Despite a lengthy criminal record and a history of breaching release orders, the accused had been accepted into a residential addiction treatment program.

The court applied the Antic-ladder principle and the Supreme Court's guidance in R. v. Myers, emphasizing that pre-trial detention is the exception and release is favoured.

Considering the significant time already spent in pre-trial custody and the structured nature of the proposed treatment program, the court found that the continued detention was no longer justified.

The accused was ordered released to the treatment facility under strict conditions.

Following the resolution of a family law application involving parenting time and section 7 expenses, the court determined the issue of costs.

The applicant had sought an accounting of section 7 expenses and other relief, but met with little success and engaged in relentless ad hominem attacks against the respondent.

The court found that the applicant's conduct drove up his legal fees unnecessarily.

Applying the principles of divided success and responsibility for unnecessary costs, the court ordered that the parties bear their own costs.

The accused, an Indigenous person with a history of substance abuse, was detained for six months on charges including trafficking in persons.

A detention review was held under s. 525 of the Criminal Code.

The court found that while the initial detention was justified on secondary grounds, the accused's subsequent rehabilitation efforts and a new release plan involving family sureties mitigated the risks.

The court also found the tertiary ground for detention was not met, emphasizing the need to apply Gladue principles.

The accused was ordered released on strict house arrest conditions.

The Crown brought a motion to admit a video-recorded statement made by the accused to police.

The accused opposed the admission, arguing the statement was involuntary and obtained in breach of his rights to silence and counsel under ss. 7 and 10(b) of the Charter.

The court found that the accused's jeopardy had not changed during the interview, so the right to counsel was not retriggered.

The court also held that the police officer's persistence in questioning did not overbear the accused's operating mind or right to choose whether to speak.

Despite a four-minute gap in the evidentiary record during the accused's transport to the station, the court concluded the statement was voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Crown's application was granted and the statement was ruled admissible.

The accused, Linda Ceasor, was charged with attempted murder, dangerous use of a knife, and threatening bodily harm.

The central issue was whether the Crown proved specific intent to kill beyond a reasonable doubt, considering the cumulative effect of alcohol consumption, emotional distress (due to her son's incarceration), and the nature of the assault.

The defence argued that these factors negated specific intent, proposing conviction for lesser included offenses.

The court found that the combination of intoxication and emotional distress overrode her capacity for critical thought, leading to a misconceived purpose rather than an intent to kill.

She was acquitted of attempted murder and convicted of assault with a weapon and threatening bodily harm, with a judicial stay on the dangerous use of a knife charge.

The accused, J.R., faced 29 criminal counts, including assault, sexual assault, threats, confinement, and probation breaches, arising from a six-month relationship with the complainant, Ms. S. Four counts were withdrawn by the Crown.

The trial focused on the credibility and reliability of Ms. S's narrative, particularly given inconsistencies and her substance use.

The court dismissed several sexual assault and property interference counts due to lack of proof of bodily harm, intent, or factual inconsistencies.

However, the court found J.R. guilty on multiple counts of assault, sexual assault (where fear vitiated consent), confinement, threats, and breach of probation, accepting the core of Ms. S's testimony despite peripheral inconsistencies.

The accused, Brandon Aubin, faced four charges: three Criminal Code offences related to a residential basement fire and one Controlled Drugs and Substances Act (CDSA) offence for Butane honey oil production.

The Crown's case was circumstantial, relying on expert fire investigation evidence.

The defence presented an alternative fire origin theory and the accused testified, denying the introduction of Butane.

The court dismissed the mischief endangering life charge but found the accused guilty beyond a reasonable doubt on the two arson charges and the CDSA production charge, concluding that the fire was caused by the ignition of Butane vapour introduced by the accused shortly before the incident.

The accused, David Gaudet, sought a detention review under section 525 of the Criminal Code after being detained on the secondary ground for five months.

The court considered the impact of the pandemic, the accused's Indigenous identity and Gladue principles, the strength of the Crown's case, and new information regarding the accused's stability and medical condition (asthma).

Despite the original detention being justified, the court found continued detention disproportionate given the indeterminate trial delay, suspension of Indigenous support services, and the accused's demonstrated ability to comply with strict conditions.

The accused was released into house confinement with a surety.

This is a costs ruling following a summary judgment motion in a family law dispute concerning property valuations and equalization.

The applicant sought $16,203 in costs, while the self-represented respondent sought $12,807.

The court found that both parties contributed to the procedural impasse and the need for the motion, with the respondent's delayed and inadequate disclosure and the applicant's over-reaching valuation claims.

Emphasizing the importance of timely disclosure and rational litigation conduct, the court ordered the parties to share the costs of the motion equally.

The applicant was awarded fixed costs of $8,060 against the respondent.

The accused was tried on historical sexual offence allegations arising from an alleged pattern of abuse involving a child complainant in a family caregiving setting.

The court undertook a detailed credibility and reliability assessment, focusing on inconsistencies, deliberate falsehoods on collateral matters, delayed reporting, and the risk that the complainant's narrative had incorporated adult suggestion following an initial disclosure made in a crisis about pornography use.

Applying the reasonable doubt standard and the W.(D.) framework, the court held that the complainant's evidence could not safely be accepted at face value.

The court found both credibility and reliability impediments and concluded the foundation for conviction was unstable.

The charges were dismissed.

The court sentenced the offender following convictions for sexual interference arising from prolonged sexual abuse of a child by a parental figure in a position of trust, with related convictions for invitation to sexual touching, sexual exploitation, and threats stayed under the Kienapple principle.

Applying the sentencing principles in the Criminal Code, the court held that denunciation, deterrence, and separation from society predominated in light of the complainant’s age, the prolonged pattern of abuse, the trust relationship, the threat made at the outset, and the serious victim impact.

The court placed the case in the seven- to eight-year range but reduced the custodial term to account for enhanced pre-sentence custody credit.

A sentence of six years and 321 days was imposed, together with multiple ancillary orders including a tailored lifetime s. 161 prohibition.

The accused, charged with the first-degree murder of her common-law spouse by stabbing, applied for judicial interim release.

The court found that while the proposed bail plan (involving the Elizabeth Fry Society and electronic monitoring) mitigated the primary and secondary grounds for detention, it failed to satisfy the tertiary ground.

Given the strength of the Crown's case, the potential for a lengthy sentence, and the accused's post-offence dissembling, the court held that releasing the accused without a reliable surety and strict supervision would undermine public confidence in the administration of justice.

The application was dismissed.

M.L. sought a bail review after being detained by a Justice of the Peace on charges including CDSA, weapons, and ammunition offences.

The review considered new evidence, such as M.L.'s personal history of trauma and addiction, her recent commitment to recovery programs (Suboxone, AA, NA, Bible study, yoga), and the support offered by the John Howard Society for housing and supervision.

The court found that this new evidence, which was not available at the initial bail hearing, materially ameliorated the flight risk and the risk of re-offending, thereby rebutting the reverse onus for release.

Bail was granted with conditions focused on supervision, rehabilitation, and non-communication with a co-accused.

The appellant, R.K., appealed three rulings of the Consent and Capacity Board (CCB).

The CCB found that R.K.'s power of attorney for personal care did not confer the necessary authority to his friend W.D. to give or refuse consent to treatment, that R.K. was incapable of making treatment decisions for schizophrenia, and that appointing W.D. as his representative was not in R.K.'s best interests.

The Superior Court of Justice, applying a reasonableness standard for facts and mixed law/fact and correctness for extricable law, upheld all three CCB rulings.

The court affirmed the CCB's interpretation of the Health Care Consent Act, 1996 regarding the scope of powers of attorney, R.K.'s inability to appreciate the foreseeable consequences of refusing antipsychotic medication, and W.D.'s unsuitability as a representative due to his views on conventional medicine.