Rick Leroy

The accused brought Charter applications seeking a stay of proceedings or exclusion of evidence arising from police stops and searches following a 911 report of a domestic dispute and suspected drug trafficking.

Police stopped a vehicle containing approximately 32.5 pounds of marijuana and later stopped a second vehicle carrying cash.

The defence alleged breaches of sections 7, 8, and 9 of the Charter, including arbitrary detention, unreasonable search, loss of a 911 recording, degradation of evidence, and improper commingling of seized drugs.

The court held that the initial stop constituted a lawful investigative detention based on a detailed 911 call from an identified caller and that the officer’s observations and smell of marijuana provided reasonable grounds to arrest and search.

The loss of the 911 recording and evidence-handling issues did not prejudice the accused’s right to make full answer and defence.

The Charter applications were dismissed and the seized evidence ruled admissible.

The plaintiffs sought leave to appeal orders removing their solicitor of record and awarding costs.

The motion judge considered the test under Rule 62.02(4) of the Rules of Civil Procedure for granting leave to appeal.

The underlying orders were based on a conflict of interest arising from a solicitor’s prior solicitor-client relationship and the potential use of confidential information, applying the principles from Martin v. MacDonald Estate (Gray).

The court found no good reason to doubt the correctness of the original decision removing counsel and awarding costs.

Leave to appeal was refused and the parties were ordered to bear their own costs of the motion.

The defendants brought a motion for security for costs under Rule 56 in an action arising from a failed real estate transaction and subsequent landlord‑tenant disputes.

The self‑represented plaintiff alleged fraud and misrepresentation relating to a Seller Property Information Statement and sought extensive damages against the vendors and real estate agents.

The court found that the defendants met the threshold under Rule 56 due to outstanding unpaid costs awards and concerns that the action was frivolous or vexatious.

The plaintiff failed to prove impecuniosity or provide evidence supporting financial hardship.

Security for costs was therefore ordered, with different amounts depending on whether the plaintiff proceeded under the regular or simplified rules.

The accused applied under ss. 7, 8 and 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms to exclude a surreptitious audio recording made by a complainant during a private conversation in the accused’s home.

The defence argued the recording constituted an unreasonable warrantless search and that its prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value.

The court held that the complainant was not acting as a state agent because she recorded the conversation before contacting police and for mixed personal reasons rather than primarily to gather evidence.

As a result, the Charter was not engaged.

The court further found the recording had significant probative value as an apparent admission and minimal prejudice, and admitted it into evidence.

The accused brought a similar fact application concerning whether allegations made by two complainants could be used across counts in a multi-count indictment for sexual offences.

The Crown argued the evidence should be assessed together to establish propensity and the improbability of coincidence, while the defence argued that significant dissimilarities and evidence of collaboration between the complainants undermined admissibility.

The court reviewed the governing principles from leading authorities on similar fact evidence, including the balancing of probative value against moral and reasoning prejudice.

The court found evidence suggesting inadvertent collaboration between the complainants and identified credibility concerns that diminished the probative value of cross-count use.

The court ruled that the allegations must be evaluated separately and could not be used to bolster one another through similar fact reasoning.

A municipality brought an application seeking declarations and an injunction against a salvage yard operation alleged to contravene municipal zoning by-laws and site plan requirements.

The respondents argued their use complied with the zoning by-law, that it was grandfathered prior to an interim control by-law under the Planning Act, and that municipal conduct and representations created estoppel or bad faith issues requiring trial.

The court held the matter could properly be determined under Rule 14 because the material facts were not in dispute and the central issue was legal interpretation of the zoning by-law.

Interpreting the by-law purposively, the court found that a lawful salvage yard required a principal building or structure and could not operate solely as open storage on bare land without site plan approval or building permits.

The respondents’ use was therefore unlawful and could not constitute a prior legal non‑conforming use.

Allegations of municipal bad faith and estoppel were unsupported by evidence and could not defeat statutory obligations.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment dismissing a construction defect claim on the basis that it was barred by the two-year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The action concerned alleged deficiencies in the installation of exterior stone veneer, which caused persistent efflorescence and latent moisture problems.

The court considered the discoverability principle and whether the plaintiffs knew or ought to have known of the material facts giving rise to the claim.

It held that the plaintiffs reasonably relied on earlier assurances from the contractor and manufacturer that the efflorescence was normal and did not discover the latent defect until a manufacturer’s representative suggested installation deficiencies in August 2010, followed by expert reports.

As the statement of claim was issued within two years of that discovery, the limitation period had not expired and the motion for summary judgment was dismissed.