Elisabeth Foxton

Stephen John LeClair pleaded guilty to two counts of possessing child pornography and one count of accessing child pornography.

The Crown sought a 4-year prison sentence, while the defence argued for a conditional sentence of 2 years less a day or a 12-month jail sentence.

The court considered the large volume and vile nature of the child pornography, the severe victim impact, and the primary sentencing principles of denunciation and deterrence.

While acknowledging the offender's remorse, low risk of reoffending, and prior good character, the court found that an alleged acquired brain injury did not reduce moral culpability.

The court concluded that a conditional sentence was inappropriate given the gravity of the offences and the need for a strong denunciatory and deterrent message.

A sentence of 3.5 years in custody was imposed.

The accused, a transport truck driver, was charged with dangerous driving causing death after his vehicle struck a line of stopped traffic on Highway 401, killing one driver.

The Crown argued the accused failed to observe warning signs and maintain a safe distance.

The defence argued the accused was temporarily blinded by the rising sun as he rounded a curve, making the accident unavoidable.

The court found the actus reus was established but concluded the Crown failed to prove the mens rea, as the blinding sun provided a reasonable alternative explanation for the accused's failure to stop.

The accused was acquitted.

The accused was charged with dangerous operation of a motor vehicle causing death after his tractor-trailer rear-ended a line of stopped traffic on a highway, killing one driver.

At trial, the accused applied for a directed verdict of acquittal, arguing the Crown failed to adduce sufficient evidence that his driving was a marked departure from the standard of a reasonable driver.

The court dismissed the application, finding there was sufficient circumstantial evidence regarding visibility, braking, and impact speed upon which a properly instructed jury could reasonably infer guilt.

The accused, a registered massage therapist, was charged with sexual assault after allegedly touching a client's vaginal area during a treatment session.

The Crown argued the touching was sexual and non-consensual, while the accused claimed he was performing a legitimate therapeutic adjustment of the pubic symphysis.

The court found reasonable doubt regarding whether the touching was sexual in nature, leading to an acquittal on the sexual assault charge.

However, the court found that the accused failed to obtain informed consent to touch the complainant's pubic bone area, resulting in a conviction for common assault.

Daniel Cook, charged with domestic violence offences and in custody, sought a bail application during a part-heard trial that was adjourned due to the COVID-19 public health crisis.

The court first determined that the bail application met the requirement for urgency.

The primary issue then became whether the substantive bail application should be heard by the trial judge (Justice Tranmer) or by the Ontario Court of Justice, given that the accused had not previously applied for bail.

The court distinguished R. v. Watts, finding that section 523(2)(a) of the Criminal Code empowers a trial judge to alter an accused's judicial interim release status once trial proceedings have commenced.

Consequently, the substantive bail application was referred back to the trial judge.

A police officer with the Belleville City Police was charged with criminal harassment and breach of trust by a public officer.

The officer engaged in repeated unauthorized surveillance of his former girlfriend's residence over a period of approximately two years, including multiple drive-bys and attendance at the end of her driveway.

The officer also conducted numerous unauthorized searches of Ministry of Transportation and Canadian Police Information Computer databases to obtain the former girlfriend's and her spouse's personal information and addresses.

The court found the officer guilty on both counts, determining that his conduct constituted oppressive watching of the dwelling house and a serious and marked departure from the standards expected of a police officer in a position of public trust.