Michael Purcell

The offender, an Indigenous man, was convicted of five counts of second-degree murder after setting fire to a home, killing his intimate partner and four children.

The Crown sought a 25-year period of parole ineligibility, while the defence sought 18 years, citing Gladue factors.

The court found that the extreme gravity of the offences and the compelling aggravating factors, including the creation of a firetrap and the vulnerability of the victims, meant the offender's moral blameworthiness was not diminished despite significant Gladue factors.

The court imposed a life sentence with 25 years of parole ineligibility.

The accused was sentenced for intimidating a justice system participant (a provincial prosecutor) under section 423.1 of the Criminal Code.

The accused sent threatening emails and made phone calls to the prosecutor and his wife at their home address in the early morning hours after the prosecutor declined to resolve the accused's Highway Traffic Act charges on favorable terms.

The court imposed a conditional sentence of two years less one day with 12 months of house arrest and GPS monitoring, followed by three years of probation.

The court found that while the offence was serious and pre-meditated, the accused's untreated schizophrenia, obsessive-compulsive disorder, and related mental health issues materially contributed to the commission of the offence and warranted a reduction from the baseline custodial sentence of 18 months.

This decision concerns the prosecution of Archie McKay for five counts of first-degree murder following a fatal house fire in Kitchenuhkoosib Inninuwug, Ontario.

The court reviews extensive circumstantial evidence, including expert testimony, extrinsic misconduct, and ante-mortem statements, to determine whether McKay deliberately set the fire and possessed the requisite intent for murder.

The court finds McKay guilty of second-degree murder in relation to all five victims, concluding that the evidence does not establish planning and deliberation or criminal harassment necessary for first-degree murder.

The Crown applied to admit ante-mortem statements of the deceased, Geraldine Chapman, made to four individuals (Cheryl Meekis, Stewart Albany, Tom Chapman, Thyra Chapman) under the state of mind or principled exceptions to the hearsay rule in a first-degree murder trial.

The court assessed the relevance, necessity, and reliability of each set of statements.

Statements to Cheryl Meekis were ruled inadmissible due to lack of relevance and witness credibility issues.

Statements to Stewart Albany regarding fear/worry were admissible under the state of mind exception, while those alleging direct threats were inadmissible under the principled exception due to insufficient reliability.

Most statements to Tom Chapman were inadmissible, being deemed irrelevant or the witness's conclusions/biased interpretations.

Statements to Thyra Chapman regarding accusations of cheating and property damage were admissible under the principled exception, as their substantive reliability was established.

The Crown applied to admit three out-of-court statements made by three witnesses under the past recollection recorded exception to the hearsay rule during a trial for first-degree murder.

The statements included a police interview report and two sets of medical notes.

The court applied the four-part test for past recollection recorded, assessing reliability, timeliness, absence of memory, and present voucher for accuracy.

The court admitted the police statement with redactions and one set of medical notes in full, but excluded the psychiatric consult note due to reliability concerns regarding the source of the recorded information.

The accused was found guilty of threatening to cause bodily harm, threatening to cause damage to property, intimidation of a justice system participant, and criminal harassment.

The offences involved sending threatening communications to a police officer, a probation officer, and a judge, driven by the accused's religious beliefs and desire to destroy a Buddha statue.

The court sentenced the accused to 2 years and 3 months in custody, reduced by 90 days for pre-sentence custody, followed by 3 years of probation.

The Crown brought an application under s. 714.1 of the Criminal Code to allow six witnesses to testify remotely at a first-degree murder trial.

The witnesses included one civilian and five medical professionals, two of whom were proposed expert witnesses.

The court granted the application for the civilian witness due to her documented health issues and panic attacks related to traveling.

However, the court dismissed the application for the medical professionals, finding that the presumptive rule of in-person testimony should not be displaced merely for the convenience of busy professionals, especially given the seriousness of the charges and the high materiality of the expert evidence.

This is an application by the Crown in a first-degree murder trial to admit 'extrinsic misconduct evidence,' comprising police occurrence reports, 911 calls, and ante-mortem statements of the deceased, Geraldine Chapman, to friends and family.

The accused, Archie McKay, is charged with five counts of first-degree murder arising from a fire that killed Ms. Chapman and four children.

The Crown seeks to admit this evidence to prove the underlying offence of criminal harassment (s. 231(6) of the Criminal Code), establish the accused's state of mind (intent), and demonstrate motive and animus, which are probative of identity.

The accused argued that much of the evidence was irrelevant, lacked probative value, or was unreliable.

The court conducted an individual analysis of each piece of evidence, ruling some admissible for narrative, context, animus, motive, and to prove elements of criminal harassment, while deeming others inadmissible due to lack of relevance or probative value.

The admissibility of ante-mortem statements is subject to a further hearsay voir dire at trial.

This decision addresses two mid-trial rulings in a criminal case.

First, the Crown sought to introduce the preliminary inquiry transcript of a police constable who was unable to testify due to serious illness, pursuant to s. 715 of the Criminal Code.

The court found the criteria for admission were met and exercised its discretion to admit the evidence, as there was no unfairness to the accused.

Second, the Crown sought to admit emails sent by the accused to the investigating officer.

The court determined the officer was a "person in authority" from the accused's perspective and found the emails to be voluntary, as they were unsolicited and free from threats, promises, oppression, or police trickery.

Both applications by the Crown were granted.

The Crown applied under section 714.1 of the Criminal Code for an order permitting ten civilian witnesses from a remote First Nation community (Kitchenuhmaykoosib Inninuwug) to testify remotely via video in a first-degree murder jury trial.

The accused opposed the application, arguing that remote testimony would compromise trial fairness, particularly regarding the jury's ability to assess witness credibility and demeanour, given the seriousness of the charges and the contested issues of the fire's cause and criminal harassment.

The court granted the application in part, allowing four witnesses (William Cromarty, Alfred Beardy, Jennaya Shoomin, and Karla Cutfeet) to testify remotely due to their limited anticipated evidence or personal circumstances (age, mobility, school attendance).

However, the court denied remote testimony for six other witnesses (Bella Chapman, Solomon Begg, Thyra Chapman, Kristina Winter, Tiana Meekis, and Candace Crowe), deeming their anticipated evidence too crucial to be compromised by the limitations of video testimony.

The order for remote testimony was made conditional on various factors, including technical reliability, secure location, technical support, police presence, and proper oath administration.

The accused, Nicholas Cox and Erick Silva-Stone, pleaded guilty to unlawful act manslaughter in the death of Christopher Avery Houghton, which occurred during a robbery involving an unloaded firearm and subsequent stabbing.

The court accepted a joint submission on sentence, imposing 12 years custody for Mr. Cox (who had a youth record for similar offences) and 10 years custody for Mr. Silva-Stone (a first-time offender).

The judge considered aggravating factors including the profound impact on the victim's family, the callous nature of the crime, the use of a weapon, and the commission during a robbery.

Mitigating factors included early guilty pleas, sincere expressions of remorse, young age, and efforts towards rehabilitation.

The Crown sought a ruling on the admissibility of prior discreditable conduct to establish the accused's identity and provide narrative context in a criminal trial for uttering threats, impeding justice, and criminal harassment.

The accused, Lance Crossley, was self-represented with amicus curiae assistance.

The court applied the general principle that prior misconduct evidence is inadmissible to prove propensity but recognized exceptions for identity, narrative, and similar fact evidence, requiring relevance and a probative value outweighing prejudicial effect.

The court admitted evidence from March 2018 to February 2020, finding it inextricably linked to the current charges and highly probative of identity, motive, and intent, subject to limiting instructions.

However, incidents from 2016 and January 2018 were deemed too remote and prejudicial, thus inadmissible.

The Crown applied to admit hearsay statements of a deceased witness, Sarah Jane Bluecoat, in a first-degree murder trial.

Ms. Bluecoat's statements were taken on May 2, 2019 (typed Q&A), and later adopted under oath and video-recorded on August 3, 2021, after she initially declined on July 14, 2021.

The accused opposed the admission, arguing that necessity was not met due to the Crown's failure to preserve cross-examination rights (e.g., by proceeding with a preliminary inquiry or using s. 709 of the Criminal Code) and that the statements lacked threshold reliability.

The court found that necessity was established by the witness's death, distinguishing the case from prosecutorial "neglect." The court further found that both substantive and procedural reliability were met, allowing the jury a satisfactory basis to evaluate the evidence, despite the absence of contemporaneous cross-examination.

The Crown's application was granted.

The accused brought a severance application seeking separate trials on five counts involving four complainants arising from alleged sexual touching in a shared social and organizational context.

Applying the severance framework under s. 591 of the Criminal Code and the factors from the governing Supreme Court authority, the court held the accused had not shown on a balance of probabilities that severance was required to ensure a fair trial.

The court found a sufficient legal and factual nexus among the allegations, including common context, comparable seriousness, and a potentially viable count-to-count similar fact application.

Any prejudice from propensity reasoning could be addressed through limiting instructions, while separate trials would create inefficiency and delay.

The court sentenced the offender for incest, sexual exploitation, making child pornography, possessing child pornography, and criminal harassment arising from prolonged sexual abuse of a vulnerable minor half-sibling and a large collection of violent child pornography.

Applying Friesen, the court emphasized denunciation and deterrence for sexual offences against children and vulnerable persons, while also undertaking a detailed Gladue analysis because the offender was Indigenous.

The court found significant aggravating factors including grooming, abuse of power, violence, lasting harm, threats to distribute intimate images, and the size and nature of the pornography collection.

Gladue factors reduced moral blameworthiness only in relation to the offences against the complainant, not the child pornography possession offence.

After accounting for totality and harsh pre-sentence custody conditions, the court imposed a global sentence of twelve years less enhanced credit for time served, together with ancillary orders.

The accused was charged with robbery and conspiracy to commit robbery arising from a bitcoin transaction.

The complainant alleged that the accused set him up to be robbed by an unknown third party.

The court applied the W.(D) framework to assess credibility and accepted the accused's evidence that he was not involved in the robbery.

The court also found significant inconsistencies in the complainant's testimony, leaving a reasonable doubt as to the accused's guilt.

The accused was acquitted on both counts.

The accused was charged with second-degree murder following a shooting at a nightclub.

The accused admitted to shooting the deceased but claimed self-defence, arguing he feared for his life due to the deceased's history of violence and gang affiliation.

The court rejected the self-defence claim, finding the accused's response unreasonable given his role in instigating the confrontation and introducing a concealed firearm.

The court also rejected the partial defence of provocation, finding the accused did not lose self-control.

The accused was found guilty of second-degree murder.

The court sentenced the offender following convictions for sexual interference arising from prolonged sexual abuse of a child by a parental figure in a position of trust, with related convictions for invitation to sexual touching, sexual exploitation, and threats stayed under the Kienapple principle.

Applying the sentencing principles in the Criminal Code, the court held that denunciation, deterrence, and separation from society predominated in light of the complainant’s age, the prolonged pattern of abuse, the trust relationship, the threat made at the outset, and the serious victim impact.

The court placed the case in the seven- to eight-year range but reduced the custodial term to account for enhanced pre-sentence custody credit.

A sentence of six years and 321 days was imposed, together with multiple ancillary orders including a tailored lifetime s. 161 prohibition.

The accused was charged with sexual offences against two young sisters, ages 4 and 6 at the time of the alleged incidents.

The Crown's case relied entirely on the testimony of the two child complainants, who provided accounts of sexual abuse during police interviews and subsequent court testimony.

The trial court found that despite some corroborating details in the children's accounts, their testimony was undermined by significant credibility issues, including fatigue, difficulty concentrating, contradictions between their statements, and the impact of leading questions and procedural delays.

The court acquitted the accused on all charges, finding that the Crown had failed to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused, charged with the first-degree murder of her common-law spouse by stabbing, applied for judicial interim release.

The court found that while the proposed bail plan (involving the Elizabeth Fry Society and electronic monitoring) mitigated the primary and secondary grounds for detention, it failed to satisfy the tertiary ground.

Given the strength of the Crown's case, the potential for a lengthy sentence, and the accused's post-offence dissembling, the court held that releasing the accused without a reliable surety and strict supervision would undermine public confidence in the administration of justice.

The application was dismissed.