Nathalie Champagne

The Corporation of the Township of South Frontenac brought a motion seeking a contempt order against Jason and Terri Brunette for alleged breaches of a prior consent order concerning property by-laws, specifically regarding vehicle storage and salvage operations.

The Township also sought an order requiring the respondents to provide proof of vehicle ownership upon request.

The court found that while some minor breaches of the consent order occurred (unplated vehicles, extended parking of a broken-down vehicle), the Township failed to prove contempt beyond a reasonable doubt for the alleged salvage operation or the storage of a friend's vehicle.

The court declined to find contempt, emphasizing that it should be a last resort, and also refused the request for proof of ownership, stating it would reverse the onus of proof.

The respondents were found guilty of breaching the order and ordered to pay $300 in costs.

This summary judgment motion concerned a failed real estate transaction where the vendor (Hastings Local Housing Corporation) terminated the Agreement of Purchase and Sale (APS) due to an inability or unwillingness to obtain severance for two properties that had merged titles.

The plaintiff-purchaser sought specific performance or damages.

The court found that the vendor had a contractual obligation and a duty to act in good faith to apply for severance under the terms of the APS (clauses 10 and 15) and the Planning Act.

The vendor's failure to apply for severance constituted a breach of contract.

While specific performance (transfer of property) could not be ordered without severance, the court declared the contract binding and ordered the vendor to pursue a bona fide application for severance within 60 days.

The applicant, having been found guilty of conspiracy to commit human smuggling, challenged the constitutionality of the three-year mandatory minimum sentence under s. 117(3.1)(a) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.

The applicant argued the provision violates s. 12 of the Charter as it would be grossly disproportionate when applied to a reasonably foreseeable hypothetical offender who plays a minor role for little profit.

Applying the framework from R. v. Nur, the court agreed that a three-year sentence for a minor participant would be grossly disproportionate and shock the conscience.

The court further found the infringement was not justified under s. 1 of the Charter, declaring the mandatory minimum provision unconstitutional and of no force and effect.

The accused brought a pre-trial application to exclude two videotapes containing a confession to the murder of the deceased.

The confession was obtained during a 14-month undercover police operation, which the court identified as a variation of a 'Mr. Big' scheme.

The undercover officers posed as criminals and offered to help the accused defeat an upcoming polygraph test, leading to a confession and re-enactment of the stabbing.

The court applied the Hart framework and found that while the operation triggered the presumptive inadmissibility of the confession, the Crown successfully proved the confession was reliable and its probative value outweighed its prejudicial effect.

The court also dismissed arguments that the police conduct violated section 7 of the Charter or amounted to an abuse of process.

The application to exclude the evidence was dismissed.

The accused was charged with impaired driving causing death and bodily harm, driving over 80 causing death and bodily harm, and criminal negligence causing death and bodily harm following an ATV accident.

The accused drove an ATV not meant for passengers with two passengers, one without a helmet, after consuming alcohol.

The ATV crashed in a ditch, seriously injuring one passenger and causing the death of the other.

The court acquitted the accused of the over 80 charges due to evidence of bolus drinking raising a reasonable doubt.

However, the court found the accused was impaired and that her series of negligent decisions constituted a marked and significant departure from the standard of a reasonable person.

The accused was found guilty of impaired driving causing bodily harm and death, and criminal negligence causing bodily harm and death.

The Crown applied under s. 521(1) of the Criminal Code for a review of a Justice of the Peace's decision to release the accused on strict conditions.

The Crown argued the Justice of the Peace erred in considering the rareness of detention on the tertiary ground as a guiding principle and in giving inappropriate weight to electronic monitoring and COVID-19 delays.

The court found no error in the Justice of the Peace's analysis regarding the tertiary ground or the weight given to electronic monitoring and COVID-19's impact on trial delays.

The Crown's application was dismissed, and the accused's release was maintained.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal on charges under the Customs Act and Explosives Act.

The respondent, a domestic traveler, was stopped at a mixed-traffic corridor border crossing, where a search of his vehicle revealed undeclared firecrackers.

The trial judge excluded the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, finding breaches of ss. 8, 9, and 10.

On appeal, the Superior Court found the trial judge erred in law by concluding that s. 99(1)(f) of the Customs Act did not apply to domestic travelers.

However, the court upheld the acquittal, finding that despite the trial judge's inadequate reasons, the record did not establish that the border services officer had reasonable grounds to suspect a contravention of the Act.

Derek Summers appealed his criminal conviction for driving while disqualified, arguing that it should be stayed under the Kienapple principle due to a prior conviction for driving while suspended under the Highway Traffic Act arising from the same incident.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding that the two offences had sufficient legal disparities in elements, mens rea, penalties, and gravamen to preclude the application of the Kienapple principle, thereby upholding Parliament's intent to deter criminal driving behaviour.

The appellant, a domestic traveler residing on Cornwall Island, appealed his conviction for hindering an officer and evading compliance under the Customs Act after failing to attend a secondary inspection at a mixed-traffic corridor border crossing.

The appellant argued the primary border services officer lacked reasonable grounds to suspect a contravention of the Act when making the referral based solely on an automated license plate 'lookout'.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, holding that the threshold for a search under s. 99(1)(f) of the Customs Act does not apply to a mere referral to secondary inspection, which is a routine part of the screening process.

The applicant, Dennis Marchand, brought a motion to add Christine Denis and 8766177 Canada Inc. as parties to an existing oppression remedy application under section 241 of the Canadian Business Corporations Act.

Marchand alleged that the original respondents, Stuart Graham and David Harroch, dissolved their shared company (7104383 Canada Inc.) and subsequently operated a new hockey tournament through Christine Denis's company (8766177 Canada Inc.).

The court dismissed the motion, finding no evidence that Denis or 8766177 Canada Inc. were involved with the original corporation or were affiliates, thus lacking a foundation for a cause of action under section 241 of the CBCA against them.

The plaintiff was involved in a single-vehicle accident on Highway 417, allegedly caused by an unpaved bump.

He failed to provide the required 10-day statutory notice to the Ministry of Transportation under s. 33(4) of the Public Transportation and Highway Improvement Act, only serving a claim 30 months later.

The defendant moved for summary judgment.

The court found no genuine issue for trial, concluding the plaintiff lacked a reasonable excuse for the delay, particularly after retaining counsel, and failed to rebut the presumption of prejudice caused by the road being repaved before notice was given.

The action was dismissed.

The applicant father brought a motion seeking an order that his custody and access motion be deemed urgent and heard before a case conference.

He alleged the respondent mother unilaterally left the home with their child and raised concerns about her mental health and marijuana use.

The court found the applicant's evidence consisted of bald, unsupported assertions and did not meet the compelling evidence test required under Rule 14(4.2) to bypass a case conference.

The motion was dismissed.

Following the consented annulment of the debtor's bankruptcy proposal, the moving party sought solicitor and client costs of over $62,000.

The court rejected the application of Rules 38.08(1) and 23.05(1), finding that section 197 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act governed the costs motion.

Applying the factors in Rule 57.01(1), the court found the debtor's conduct in filing the proposal was ill-advised but not reprehensible enough to warrant solicitor and client costs.

Finding the claimed hours excessive and unreasonable, the court fixed costs at $8,000 inclusive of HST.

The plaintiff and defendant both sought leave to amend their pleadings in an accounting dispute arising from a construction management contract.

The defendant opposed the plaintiff's proposed amendment, arguing it raised a new cause of action that was statute-barred under the Limitations Act.

The Master applied a broad approach to defining a cause of action and found the amendment was based on the same factual matrix as the original claim.

The Master also found that discoverability was a genuine issue for trial, as the plaintiff only received the defendant's general ledger recently.

Both parties were granted leave to amend their pleadings, with costs awarded to the plaintiff.

The bankrupt, Charles Rotenberg, applied for a discharge from his third bankruptcy, which was opposed by the trustee and the Attorney General of Canada (Canada Revenue Agency).

The court refused an adjournment request by the bankrupt, noting the long history of the matter and previous adjournments.

The court reviewed the bankrupt's history of multiple bankruptcies, consistent failure to file tax returns and pay income tax, and lack of cooperation with the trustee.

Despite counsel's argument for a conditional discharge, the court found the bankrupt lacked insight and a concrete plan to address his financial situation, and his recent actions were "too little too late." The discharge was refused on grounds including previous bankruptcies, failure to perform duties under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, failure to comply with surplus income requirements, and assets not equaling fifty cents on the dollar of unsecured liabilities.

Leave was granted to re-apply in 48 months, conditional on full tax compliance.

The plaintiff, DST Consulting Engineers Inc., brought a motion to compel answers to refusals and re-attendance at examinations for discovery by the defendants, 2299910 Ontario Inc. and CanRil Corporation.

DST claimed $31,114.57 for environmental engineering assessment services.

The court found that the defendants' corporate representative, Charles Guilbault, lacked basic knowledge and provided evasive answers, frustrating the discovery process.

The motion was granted, compelling the defendants to answer most refused questions, provide particulars of alleged deficiencies, and ordering a second examination with a different representative, Terrence Guilbault.

The moving parties, creditors of a bankrupt company (Acorn), sought to set aside the registrar's dismissal for delay of three actions originally brought by Acorn against the Crown.

The actions were dismissed while subject to an automatic stay due to Acorn's bankruptcy.

The court found that the registrar lacked jurisdiction to dismiss the actions while they were stayed.

Alternatively, applying the Reid factors, the court found the explanation for delay adequate, the motion brought promptly given the circumstances, and no uncompensable prejudice to the Crown, whose own actions contributed to any alleged prejudice.

The dismissals were set aside.

The bankrupt purchased a vehicle in Alberta, financed by the creditor who registered its security interest under the Alberta PPSA.

The bankrupt later spent time in Ontario and brought the vehicle there, but maintained his Alberta employment, driver's license, and vehicle registration.

Upon bankruptcy, the trustee disallowed the creditor's secured claim, arguing the creditor failed to register in Ontario within 15 days of the vehicle being 'brought in' under s. 5(2) of the Ontario PPSA.

The court allowed the creditor's appeal, finding the vehicle was merely physically present in Ontario for convenience and had not been 'brought in' within the meaning of the Act, thus preserving the creditor's secured status.

The defendants, TSV Holdings Ltd. and Azure Health Care Ltd., brought a motion to prevent the plaintiffs, Cimtel Inc. and Wireless Resident Nurse Alert Technology Inc., from examining Clayton Astles, CEO of Azure, for discovery.

Astles was previously president of Austco Canada, a subsidiary, and was involved in the events leading to the litigation.

The court applied the factors from Farris v. Staubach to determine if the plaintiff's choice of examiner should be interfered with.

The court found Astles had sufficient knowledge and direct involvement, and that substituting another representative would prejudice the plaintiffs.

The motion was dismissed, upholding the plaintiffs' right to examine Astles.

The defendants brought a motion for a further and better affidavit of documents, seeking the plaintiff's complete corporate tax returns and financial statements from 2006 to 2012.

The underlying action involved claims for breach of contract and lost opportunity related to two government requests for proposals.

The court found the request for tax returns overbroad and irrelevant, as the plaintiff was not claiming general lost income.

However, the court ordered the production of corporate records relating to the distribution of shares to individuals who worked on the proposals, as the plaintiff claimed it paid workers in shares due to lost profits.

Success being divided, no costs were ordered.