James McCarthy

The Corporation of the Township of South Frontenac brought a motion seeking a contempt order against Jason and Terri Brunette for alleged breaches of a prior consent order concerning property by-laws, specifically regarding vehicle storage and salvage operations.

The Township also sought an order requiring the respondents to provide proof of vehicle ownership upon request.

The court found that while some minor breaches of the consent order occurred (unplated vehicles, extended parking of a broken-down vehicle), the Township failed to prove contempt beyond a reasonable doubt for the alleged salvage operation or the storage of a friend's vehicle.

The court declined to find contempt, emphasizing that it should be a last resort, and also refused the request for proof of ownership, stating it would reverse the onus of proof.

The respondents were found guilty of breaching the order and ordered to pay $300 in costs.

This is an appeal of a decision by the Chief Building Official (CBO) of the Municipality of Mississippi Mills regarding building permit fees and development charges.

The Applicant, 2755249 Ontario Inc., sought permits for the conversion and renovation of a former seniors' residence into apartments.

The CBO assessed the units as new construction, leading to higher fees, and subsequently failed to issue a permit for Phase II of the project.

The court found the CBO's decision to categorize the renovation and expansion of existing units as new construction to be unreasonable and incorrect.

The appeal was granted, the CBO's decision was set aside, and specific fee amounts were ordered for both Phase I and Phase II, with a building permit to be issued upon payment.

This appeal and cross-appeal concerned a claim of infringement of riparian rights due to the construction of a boat house.

The trial judge found an infringement but held the action was time-barred.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the appeal and cross-appeal.

While disagreeing with the trial judge's reasoning on the discoverability rule's application to s. 4 of the Real Property Limitations Act, the Court affirmed that the limitation period had expired.

It clarified that discoverability applies to s. 4, but the limitation period began when the boat house was constructed in 1969, as the infringement would have been obvious to the predecessors in title, and an extinguished cause of action cannot be revived by a transfer of property.

The applicants sought to prevent the Township of Wollaston from selling a parcel of land, arguing it was subject to a charitable trust established by a will and, alternatively, that the sale was ultra vires as not properly authorized by by-law.

The court found that no charitable trust was created as certainty of intention was not met, meaning the Township held the land in fee simple.

However, the court agreed that the Township's decision to sell the property was ultra vires because it was not authorized by a specific by-law, rendering the agreement of purchase and sale null and void.

The court noted the Township could rectify this by passing a proper by-law.

Due to mixed success, no costs were awarded.

The plaintiffs sought leave to bring a motion for an interlocutory injunction against their neighbours regarding a disputed boat ramp and dock, after having already set the action down for trial.

The court denied leave, finding no substantial or unexpected change in circumstances since the action was set down, as the complained-of conduct was already detailed in the statement of claim.

In obiter, the court noted that even if leave had been granted, the injunction would have been dismissed under the RJR MacDonald test because the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate irreparable harm and the balance of convenience favoured maintaining the status quo.

The defendants brought a motion for security for costs under Rule 56.01(1)(a) and (e) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The plaintiffs, who commenced the action while residing in Ontario, were subsequently posted to Colorado due to the husband's military service.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the plaintiffs' move was not a free choice to avoid a costs order, and they retained exigible assets in Ontario, including an RRSP and federal wages.

The court also found the action was not frivolous or vexatious.

The moving party brought a motion to set aside an ex parte order that froze her bank accounts and made her personally liable for a judgment regarding funds allegedly misappropriated from the responding party's elderly father.

She also argued the seized funds were exempt from seizure under the Wages Act as they originated from a WSIB settlement.

The court dismissed the motion to return the seized funds, exercising its discretion to reduce the wage exemption to 0% for the already seized amounts due to strong prima facie evidence of financial impropriety.

However, the court varied the order to allow an 80% exemption for future wages and directed a trial of the issue regarding her ultimate liability.