Paul Gordon Andrews

The court considered whether powers of attorney for personal care appointing Lee Aubin as attorney for Patricia Roper should be terminated, and whether Roper had any liability to Aubin and/or Seniors Total Care Inc. The court found that Aubin was disqualified from acting as attorney under the Substitute Decisions Act, 1992, and that the 2021 power of attorney was invalid due to lack of capacity and undue influence.

The services agreement between Roper and Seniors Total Care was also found void for unconscionability and incapacity.

Costs were awarded on a substantial indemnity scale against Aubin.

This endorsement addresses a last-minute motion by counsel, Clinton Culic, to be removed as lawyer of record for the respondent, Lee Aubin, which necessitated an adjournment of the main application.

The court granted the adjournment, ordered the respondent, Ms. Aubin, to pay $7,500 in costs thrown away to the applicant, BMO Trust Company.

The court also directed Mr. Culic to appear at a later date to show cause why he should not be personally liable for reimbursing Ms. Aubin for these costs due to his conduct in delaying the motion to withdraw.

The moving party brought a motion to set aside an ex parte order that froze her bank accounts and made her personally liable for a judgment regarding funds allegedly misappropriated from the responding party's elderly father.

She also argued the seized funds were exempt from seizure under the Wages Act as they originated from a WSIB settlement.

The court dismissed the motion to return the seized funds, exercising its discretion to reduce the wage exemption to 0% for the already seized amounts due to strong prima facie evidence of financial impropriety.

However, the court varied the order to allow an 80% exemption for future wages and directed a trial of the issue regarding her ultimate liability.

Following the successful defence of a contempt motion brought by the respondent, the applicant sought full indemnity costs of $8,296.52.

The court found that the respondent acted in bad faith by bringing six meritless contempt charges to perpetuate litigation and attack the applicant personally.

The court rejected the respondent's arguments regarding impecuniosity, noting her income of nearly $100,000.

The applicant was awarded costs of $6,800, with a slight reduction due to his delay in providing benefits information.

The respondent mother brought a motion for contempt against the applicant father, alleging multiple breaches of a final family court order.

The allegations included failing to offer the right of first refusal during a medical emergency, breaching the holiday schedule, allowing unauthorized weekend access, failing to exchange the children at school on snow days, and delaying authorization for benefit information.

The court dismissed the motion in its entirety, finding that the father's actions did not constitute willful or deliberate breaches of the order, and emphasizing that contempt is a remedy of last resort not to be used lightly in family law disputes.

The defendant corporation was convicted of operating a commercial motor vehicle in excess of its registered gross weight under section 125 of the Highway Traffic Act.

The original Justice of the Peace imposed a fine of $5,866.00 using the mandatory sliding scale.

The defendant appealed the conviction, which was dismissed, but was permitted to make further submissions on sentencing.

The court considered whether exceptional circumstances under section 59(2) of the Provincial Offences Act justified reducing the fine below the mandatory minimum.

The court found that a combination of errors—one by the Service Ontario office in issuing an incorrect licence and one by the defendant in failing to verify the licence—constituted exceptional circumstances warranting a 25% reduction in the fine.

The defendant corporation appealed its conviction under section 121 of the Highway Traffic Act for operating a commercial motor vehicle in excess of its registered gross weight.

The trial judge found the defendant guilty based on weigh scale evidence showing the vehicle weighed 31,510 kg against an authorized gross weight of 8,043 kg.

The defendant challenged the reliability of the weigh scale, arguing it required calibration.

The appellate court upheld the conviction, holding that weigh scales constitute prima facie evidence of accuracy under the principle established in R. v. Bland, and that merely raising the issue of calibration without evidence of actual inaccuracy does not create reasonable doubt.

The court dismissed the appeal but allowed the defendant to present sentencing submissions before pronouncing sentence anew, as the trial judge had imposed sentence without hearing from the defence.

The Regional Municipality of York appealed the acquittal of the respondent on a charge of disobeying a red light signal as captured by a red light camera system.

The trial justice dismissed the charge on the basis that the specific location of the offence was not displayed on the face of the photograph itself, only on the back via certification by a provincial offences officer.

The appellate court allowed the appeal and entered a finding of guilt, holding that the applicable legislation and regulations do not require the specific intersection location to be displayed on the photograph itself.

The location code on the photograph, combined with the certified statement of the provincial offences officer and the certificate of offence, satisfied the statutory requirements for proof of the place of offence.