Volga Balkova Pankou

A paralegal licensed by the Law Society of Ontario systematically filed over 220 meritless appeals following guilty pleas to Highway Traffic Act offences.

The appeals were filed with no intention to proceed and were designed to exploit regulatory provisions that prevent recording of convictions and demerit points on driving records until appeals are sustained.

By filing appeals within the 30-day window and allowing them to languish, the paralegal effectively delayed the accrual of demerit points for two years from the offence date, thereby circumventing the demerit point system.

The court dismissed all 242 appeals (including 18 filed by an unidentified entity called "Traffic Tasks Legal") as abandoned and not proceeded with, finding the conduct constituted an abuse of the appeal process.

The Ontario Court of Justice allowed the City of Toronto's appeal of judicial stays of proceedings against Henry Shein Canada and Lisa Lee-Tucker for red light camera infractions.

The stays were originally granted due to violations of s. 11(b) of the Charter (right to a trial within a reasonable time) and common law abuse of process because the cases exceeded the 18-month presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan.

The Court found that the trial judge erred by initiating the stays sua sponte without proper notice to the prosecution, violating the procedural requirements under s. 109 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The decision clarifies that stays for delay under s. 11(b) require notice and that trial judges must exercise caution when bringing motions on their own initiative, especially in unrepresented accused cases under the Provincial Offences Act.

The City of Toronto appealed the decision of Justice of the Peace N. Tahiri who imposed fines below the statutory minimum for red light camera offences under s. 144(18.1) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The appeal focused on whether the Justice of the Peace properly applied s. 59(2) of the Provincial Offences Act, which allows courts to impose fines below the minimum in exceptional circumstances.

The Ontario Court of Justice found that the Justice of the Peace failed to properly apply the statutory test, relying instead on docket management considerations without addressing the required legal criteria or inquiring into defendants' personal circumstances.

The Court held that the discretion under s. 59(2) must be exercised judicially, with reasons explaining the decision, and that the fines were imposed arbitrarily.

The appeal was allowed, but the fines remained unchanged at the City's request.

The Ontario Court of Justice considered a joint appeal by the City of Toronto challenging common law stays of proceedings entered by a Justice of the Peace in four separate Highway Traffic Act cases.

The stays were imposed due to persistent audio difficulties during remote Zoom hearings, which the Justice of the Peace found compromised the fairness of trials.

The Court held that the threshold for abuse of process was not met, as there was no prosecutorial misconduct, no prejudice to the accused’s right to a fair trial or the integrity of the justice system, and alternative remedies were available.

The Justice of the Peace erred by issuing stays without considering individual circumstances and failing to explore less drastic solutions such as in-person attendance or adjournment under s. 83.1(4) of the Provincial Offences Act.

The stays were left undisturbed as the City did not seek re-prosecution.

This decision addresses a motion for directions brought by the City of Toronto concerning approximately 250 outstanding appeals under the Highway Traffic Act (HTA) initiated by notices of appeal following guilty pleas entered by paralegal representatives.

The Court identified a troubling pattern where appeals were filed but not actively pursued, often by a non-licensed individual, Kiril Kovuntunko, and a licensed paralegal, Adelin B. Mocanu, operating through Ticket Justice.

The Court ordered that all such appeals be perfected by April 9, 2025, with transcripts filed and service completed, and set a hearing date for May 26-27, 2025.

The judgment highlights procedural safeguards, the statutory framework for Part I POA appeals, and the importance of ensuring appeals are not used to delay justice.

The appellant appealed a conviction for careless driving contrary to section 130 of the Highway Traffic Act.

The trial justice found the appellant guilty based on evidence of multiple unsafe lane changes, including approaching another vehicle too closely, suddenly switching lanes, cutting abruptly in front of that vehicle, nearly colliding with a pickup truck, and weaving between lanes.

The appellant raised three grounds of appeal: that there was no evidence of high speed, that the trial justice failed to apply the principles from R v. WD regarding reasonable doubt, and that the court erred in finding the driving lacked reasonable consideration.

The appeal court dismissed all grounds, finding the trial justice properly applied the law and reasonable doubt principles, and that the accepted evidence clearly established a breach of section 130.

The appellant appealed a provincial offence conviction on the grounds that the Justice of the Peace erred in dismissing a Charter s. 11(b) application regarding trial delay.

The appellant had retained counsel days before the first trial date without disclosure, resulting in an adjournment to September 15, 2017.

At trial, the appellant pleaded guilty to a reduced charge and was sentenced.

The court dismissed the appeal on two grounds: first, that a guilty plea constitutes a waiver of the right to challenge pre-trial rulings, and second, that on the merits, the delay was caused by the defence and therefore did not violate the applicable legal tests.

The appellant appealed his conviction for disobeying a stop sign contrary to section 136 of the Highway Traffic Act.

The appeal raised four grounds: improper denial of an adjournment application, failure to afford meaningful opportunity to review disclosure, conviction by section 54 rather than section 9.1 of the Provincial Offences Act, and insufficient evidence of identification.

The court dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding that the adjournment was properly denied, the brief hold-down for disclosure review was reasonable, section 54 was the appropriate procedure, and identification evidence was sufficient.

The appellants sought extension of time to appeal provincial offence convictions for a parking violation and a red light infraction.

This was the fourth application for extension of time.

The appellants had repeatedly failed to appear at trial dates, appeal dates, and subsequent proceedings.

Previous applications had been dismissed as abandoned, and a prior judge had ordered that no further applications be filed without judicial leave.

The appellants did not comply with this order.

The court found the repeated filings to be frivolous and an abuse of process, and dismissed both applications with an order prohibiting further applications without prior written leave from a judge.

The appellant appealed his conviction for failing to stop at a red light contrary to section 144.18.1 of the Highway Traffic Act.

The evidence consisted solely of red light camera photographs and encoded data.

The appellant raised four grounds of appeal: (1) no photograph showed the vehicle in the intersection during the red light; (2) the court referred to outside knowledge not in evidence; (3) the prosecutor gave evidence via submissions; and (4) there was a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The appellate court dismissed all grounds and upheld the conviction, finding that the circumstantial evidence from the photographs reasonably supported the inference that the vehicle entered the intersection on the red light.

The appellant appealed the acquittal of the respondent on a charge of failing to signal a lane change contrary to section 142(1) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The trial court had erred in law by requiring proof that other vehicles were actually affected by the failure to signal.

The Court of Appeal clarified that the offence requires only that another vehicle "may be affected" by the movement, not that it actually be affected.

The appeal was allowed and a finding of guilt was entered.

The appellant appealed his conviction for stunt driving contrary to section 172(1) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The appellant raised five grounds of appeal: (1) the officer should not have reviewed his notes prior to testimony; (2) the Justice of the Peace erred in finding the officer had sufficient independent recollection; (3) the Justice of the Peace erred in accepting speedometer evidence without independent certification; (4) the prosecution failed to prove the vehicle's speed exceeded 50 km/hr over the posted limit; and (5) the Justice of the Peace pre-judged the case.

The appeal was dismissed on all grounds.

The appellant appealed his conviction on the grounds that his trial was unfair.

The Justice of the Peace improperly terminated the appellant's cross-examination of the officer after only one question, before the witness could answer the appellant's second question regarding photographs of the scene.

The court found the trial was indeed unfair due to this procedural irregularity and allowed the appeal, ordering a new trial.

Four provincial offence appeals concerning the arbitrary rejection of joint submissions as to sentence by Justices of the Peace.

The appellate court found that in each case, the trial courts erred in law by rejecting joint submissions without applying the appropriate legal test established in R v. Anthony-Cook.

The rejections were based on improper considerations including insistence on set fines, desire for consistency without regard to circumstances, unfounded concerns about ability to pay, and assertions of judicial independence.

The court emphasized that joint submissions are essential to the efficient operation of provincial offences courts and should only be rejected where the proposed sentence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute or be contrary to the public interest.

All four appeals were allowed and sentences were varied to reflect the original joint submissions.

A school bus driver was convicted of making a lane change not in safety contrary to section 142(1) of the Highway Traffic Act after striking a vehicle while pulling away from a bus stop.

The driver appealed on three grounds: that the trial judge erred in finding him partially credible, that the burden of proof was not properly applied, and that the defence of due diligence was not considered.

The appeal was dismissed.

The court held that credibility assessments are not all-or-nothing propositions, the trial judge properly applied the WD test, and the factual findings did not support a due diligence defence.

The appellant appealed a conviction for speeding following entry of a guilty plea.

The paralegal representing the accused entered a guilty plea contrary to the accused's instructions and without her consent.

The court found that the decision to plead guilty was the exclusive right of the accused and that the guilty plea was entered without proper authority.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction for disobeying a stop sign contrary to section 136(1) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The appellant raised multiple grounds of appeal, including misapprehension of evidence, disregard of evidence, error in accepting the officer's identification of the vehicle, failure to play audio evidence from the in-car video, and that the verdict was unreasonable.

The trial court had accepted the officer's straightforward testimony that he observed the appellant's blue Hyundai Elantra drive through a stop sign without stopping, and found this evidence was supported by the in-car video.

The court reasonably explained the colour discrepancy between the officer's description and the video appearance.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant sought to extend time to appeal a guilty plea to disobeying a speed sign contrary to section 182(2) of the Highway Traffic Act, for which he received a $60 fine.

The appeal was filed over one year after the guilty plea was entered on November 14, 2014.

The appellant cited physical and mental health disabilities, including inflammatory bowel syndrome, as the reason for the delay.

The stated ground of appeal was that a police officer made a statement after the plea that caused the appellant to doubt his plea.

The court found no apparent merit to the applications or appeal and adjourned the matter to July 29, 2016, marked peremptory on the appellant to proceed.

The Regional Municipality of York appealed the acquittal of the respondent on a charge of disobeying a red light signal as captured by a red light camera system.

The trial justice dismissed the charge on the basis that the specific location of the offence was not displayed on the face of the photograph itself, only on the back via certification by a provincial offences officer.

The appellate court allowed the appeal and entered a finding of guilt, holding that the applicable legislation and regulations do not require the specific intersection location to be displayed on the photograph itself.

The location code on the photograph, combined with the certified statement of the provincial offences officer and the certificate of offence, satisfied the statutory requirements for proof of the place of offence.

An appeal against conviction for failing to yield to traffic on a highway.

The appellant was charged under section 136(1)(b) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The sole ground of appeal was whether the Justice of the Peace erred in refusing the appellant's adjournment request at the completion of the Crown case.

The adjournment was sought to allow the appellant to consult with counsel regarding undisclosed evidence that emerged during cross-examination of the investigating officer.

The trial judge denied the adjournment twice and proceeded to conviction.

The appellate court found that the adjournment application was not properly adjudicated, that relevant factors were not considered, and that the denial resulted in a miscarriage of justice by preventing the appellant from calling a defence in a strict liability offence.