Frederick L. Forsyth

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The trial proceeded as a blended trial incorporating Charter applications and a voluntariness voir dire.

The defence raised multiple Charter breaches including violations of sections 10(a), 8, and 9 of the Charter, as well as alleged breaches of section 498 of the Criminal Code regarding detention.

The court dismissed all Charter applications and found the accused guilty as charged based on breath test evidence showing readings of 142 and 127 milligrams of alcohol per 100 millilitres of blood.

The accused was charged with aggravated assault contrary to section 268 of the Criminal Code for allegedly punching the complainant in the face on September 9, 2014, causing her to fall unconscious and sustain serious injuries including a fractured orbital bone.

The Crown's case relied primarily on the complainant's testimony that she was struck by the accused while standing at his parents' patio door.

The defence argued that the complainant's injuries were consistent with a fall caused by tripping on the uneven patio surface while wearing spiked heels.

The trial judge found that while the complainant's evidence was preferred, the totality of the evidence, particularly the testimony of the accused's mother who was present at the patio door and did not observe the alleged punch, raised a reasonable doubt as to whether the accused actually punched the complainant.

The charge was dismissed.

The accused was charged with accessing child pornography contrary to section 163.1(4) of the Criminal Code.

The defence brought Charter applications challenging the validity of the search warrant under section 8 and alleging breaches of the right to counsel under section 10(b).

The court found that the Information to Obtain the search warrant contained significant embellishments and generalizations about offender behaviour that were devoid of meaningful factual support.

The court determined that the ITO provided only suspicion and speculation rather than reasonable and probable grounds that evidence would be found at the residence 13 months after the alleged offence.

The court also found multiple breaches of the accused's section 10(b) rights during questioning by police before he was informed of his right to counsel.

Both the physical evidence and the accused's statements were excluded pursuant to section 24(2) of the Charter.

The accused was charged with impaired care or control of a motor vehicle contrary to s. 253(1)(a) of the Criminal Code and with refusing to provide a breath sample contrary to s. 254(5).

The Crown's case was that the accused was found sleeping in his vehicle against a guardrail on Highway 403.

The defence argued that the accused had been involuntarily placed in the passenger seat by a friend who was driving, and that the friend caused the collision and fled the scene.

The court acquitted on the refusal charge, finding the accused was unable to provide a proper breath sample due to his level of intoxication.

The court convicted on the care or control charge, finding that the accused's position in the vehicle and access to keys established a realistic risk he would drive while impaired.

The accused pleaded guilty to dangerous driving and impaired operation of a motor vehicle after driving eastbound in the westbound lanes of Highway 407 while heavily impaired by alcohol, causing multiple drivers to take evasive action to avoid head-on collisions.

The accused, a Fire Chief with no criminal record, had blood alcohol readings of 225 and 209 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The Crown sought 14-30 days jail, a two-year driving prohibition, and 12 months probation.

The defence sought a non-custodial sentence with fines, community service, and an 18-month driving prohibition.

The court imposed fines totalling $4,025 (including victim surcharge), an 18-month driving prohibition, 18 months probation with alcohol counselling and abstinence conditions, and 100 hours community service.

The accused was charged with dangerous driving contrary to section 249(1)(a) of the Criminal Code and multiple counts of breaching probation orders.

The Crown proceeded summarily on all counts.

The trial focused on whether the accused's driving on the Skyway Bridge on Canada Day constituted dangerous driving.

A police officer testified that the accused executed repeated aggressive lane changes at speeds of 80-110 km/h on a congested multi-lane highway, causing other drivers to brake heavily and take evasive action.

The accused denied making any lane changes on the bridge.

The court accepted the officer's evidence and found the accused guilty, applying the marked departure test established in R. v. Beatty and R. v. Hundal.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown's case relied on breath test results taken outside the two-hour statutory presumption period, requiring expert toxicological evidence to establish the accused's blood alcohol concentration at the time of driving.

The central issue was whether the accused engaged in "bolus drinking" (rapid consumption of large quantities of alcohol shortly before driving), which would render the expert's extrapolation unreliable.

The court rejected the accused's testimony regarding his drinking pattern as incredible and evasive, finding no credible evidence of bolus drinking.

The court convicted the accused based on the toxicologist's expert opinion that the accused's blood alcohol concentration at the time of driving was between 130 and 175 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit contrary to section 253(b) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown's case relied on breath samples obtained through an approved screening device (ASD) at the roadside and subsequent Intoxilyzer testing at the police station.

The defence challenged the validity of the ASD demand on section 8 Charter grounds, arguing the officer lacked reasonable suspicion, and also challenged whether the breath tests were taken "as soon as practicable" as required by section 258(1)(c).

The court found the officer had formed the requisite reasonable suspicion based on the totality of circumstances and that the police acted reasonably in all circumstances, including the delay occasioned by the accused's exercise of his right to counsel.

The accused was convicted.

The accused was convicted of aggravated assault contrary to section 268 of the Criminal Code for delivering a single kick to the head of an already injured victim who was lying on the floor of a prisoner holding cell.

The assault occurred during an incident in the Milton Courthouse bullpen on April 8, 2011.

The court found the accused guilty of aggravated assault but rejected the Crown's argument that he was acting as a party to the assault under section 21(2).

The sentencing decision addresses the appropriate quantum of sentence, the application of sentencing principles, and the controversial issue of enhanced pre-trial custody credit under section 719(3.1).

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg per 100 mL of blood contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown relied on breath test results obtained using an Intoxilyzer 8000C.

The defence challenged the reliability of the breath tests by cross-examining the qualified technician extensively regarding deviations from manufacturer protocols, including failure to visually monitor the instrument during diagnostic checks, uncertainty regarding simulator identification, and temperature recording discrepancies.

The defence sought to rebut the statutory presumption under section 258(1)(c) by establishing the instrument was operated improperly.

The court found that without expert toxicological evidence to establish the significance of the alleged procedural deviations, a reasonable doubt could not be raised regarding proper operation of the instrument.

The accused was convicted and sentenced to a $1,100 fine and one-year driving prohibition.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with alcohol in her body contrary to section 253(b) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown proceeded summarily.

The defence brought a Charter application alleging breaches of sections 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, specifically challenging the timing of the approved screening device demand and the delay in providing the right to counsel.

The court found no breach of Charter rights, holding that the officer's investigative steps were reasonable and compliant with the immediacy requirements of section 254(2) of the Criminal Code.

The trial proceeded on the merits following dismissal of the Charter application.

The accused was charged with two counts under s. 253(1) of the Criminal Code: operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The Crown's case relied on the accused's involvement in a motor vehicle collision with a police officer's vehicle, physical observations of impairment, and a toxicology report projecting the accused's blood alcohol concentration at the time of the incident.

The defence challenged the reliability of the toxicology report's assumptions, particularly regarding the timing of the incident and the possibility of bolus drinking.

The court found that the Crown failed to prove the essential factual underpinnings of the toxicology report beyond a reasonable doubt and that the physical evidence of impairment was insufficient to meet the threshold for conviction.

Both charges were dismissed.

The accused was charged with two counts under Section 253(1) of the Criminal Code: operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit.

The charges arose from an incident on December 23, 2010, when the accused's vehicle was found in a ditch at the intersection of Britannia and Tremaine Roads.

The Crown proceeded summarily.

The accused pleaded not guilty.

The trial judge found that the accused was in care or control of the motor vehicle and was impaired by alcohol at the time of arrest.

The accused was convicted on both counts.

The accused brought a motion for a stay of proceedings pursuant to section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging that the delay between his arrest on October 5, 2010 and his trial date of March 7, 2012 (17 months and 2 days) violated his right to trial within a reasonable time.

The Crown conceded that the total delay warranted Charter scrutiny but argued that the institutional delay, after appropriate deductions for intake and neutral periods, was approximately 11 months, which fell within acceptable guidelines.

The court found that while the accused suffered some prejudice from the frustration of his first trial date, the majority of his claimed prejudice was charge-related rather than delay-related.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the accused had not satisfied the balance of probabilities test for establishing a section 11(b) breach.

The accused was charged with theft under $5,000 arising from an incident at a Walmart store where she allegedly left the store with unpaid merchandise.

The Crown's case relied primarily on the testimony of a loss prevention officer who observed the accused placing items into her shopping cart and then leaving without paying for them.

The accused testified that she was distracted by young children and urgent medical appointments, and that unpaid items had been placed in the cart by her children or had become concealed beneath a baby car seat.

The court found reasonable doubt regarding the accused's intent to steal and dismissed the charge.

A Charter application alleging breach of section 7 rights due to lost surveillance video was also dismissed.

The accused was charged with failing to comply with a demand for a breath sample under s. 254(2)(b) of the Criminal Code.

A police officer stopped the accused for speeding and, observing signs of impairment, requested a roadside breath sample using an approved screening device (ASD).

The accused made six attempts to provide a sample, each resulting in an error code indicating an insufficient sample.

The Crown alleged the accused intentionally failed to provide a proper sample.

The defence argued the accused was suffering from a chest cold and cough that prevented him from providing an adequate sample, and that he was attempting to comply with the officer's instructions.

The court found reasonable doubt regarding the accused's intent to fail and acquitted him.

The applicant sought a bail review following his detention on charges of robbery and being masked with intent arising from November 2010 robberies at an Oakville Mac's Milk Store and a Mississauga Rabba Fine Foods Store.

At the preliminary hearing, the applicant was ordered to stand trial on counts relating to the Mac's Milk robbery but was discharged on counts relating to the Rabba store robbery.

The applicant brought a bail review application arguing material change in circumstances, including the discharge on some counts, time served in pre-trial custody, and proposed sureties.

The Crown opposed the application, emphasizing the applicant's serious misconduct while in custody, including possession of cocaine and a homemade weapon concealed in his rectum, and subsequent drug-related incidents.

The court dismissed the bail review application, finding the applicant had not met the onus on a balance of probabilities to demonstrate cause for vacating the detention order.

The accused was charged with two counts of assault level one (section 266 of the Criminal Code) arising from alleged incidents on July 30, 2010 and between October 1 and November 30, 2008.

The victim was the accused's former wife.

The Crown proceeded summarily and the accused pleaded not guilty.

The trial involved testimony from the complainant, police officers, and the accused and his adoptive father.

The court applied the R. v. W.D. analysis and found the accused guilty on both counts based on the credibility of the complainant's evidence, corroborating photographic evidence of injuries consistent with bite marks, and the lack of credibility in the accused's categorical denials.

The accused was charged with production of cannabis and possession for the purpose of trafficking contrary to the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

The accused brought a Charter motion under sections 8, 10(b), and 24(2) seeking to quash the search warrant and exclude evidence obtained as a result of alleged breaches.

The court found that the Information to Obtain the search warrant contained material misrepresentations and failed to meet the requirement of full, frank, and fair disclosure.

Specifically, the detective overstated his expertise in marijuana grow operations when interpreting hydro consumption data, failed to adequately substantiate the reliability of an anonymous Crime Stoppers tip that was eight and one-half months old, and conducted only cursory surveillance.

The court concluded that without the detective's unsupported expert opinions regarding hydro readings, the remaining evidence fell short of establishing reasonable grounds to believe a marijuana grow operation was occurring at the residence.

The accused pleaded guilty to possession of child pornography contrary to s. 163.1(4) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown proceeded summarily, making the maximum sentence 18 months imprisonment with a minimum of 14 days.

The court considered aggravating and mitigating factors, including the accused's youthful age (19), lack of criminal record, genuine remorse, engagement in counselling, relatively small collection of images (28 unique pictures), and absence of distribution or evidence of pedophilia.

The Crown sought 12 months imprisonment, while the defence sought an intermittent sentence of 14-90 days.

The court imposed 90 days intermittent imprisonment followed by 3 years probation with conditions including psychiatric assessment.