21 total
Statement to police at collision scene admissible as accused was not psychologically detained.
The accused was charged with two counts of dangerous operation of a conveyance causing death following a motor vehicle collision.
At a blended voir dire, the accused applied under s. 24(2) of the Charter to exclude a statement he made to a police officer at the scene, alleging a breach of his s. 10(b) right to counsel.
The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application, finding that the accused was questioned as a witness, not a suspect, and was not psychologically detained when he provided the statement.
The statement was also found to be voluntary.
Husband ordered to pay $353,752 equalization and $5,500 monthly spousal support; income imputed due to non-disclosure.
The applicant wife and respondent husband separated after a 29-year marriage.
The trial addressed the equalization of net family properties, numerous exclusion claims primarily by the husband, unequal division, income determination, and spousal support.
The court found the husband's evidence regarding his financial affairs and exclusion claims to be largely unreliable, noting his failure to provide adequate disclosure and his history of non-compliance with court orders.
The court allowed some of the husband's exclusion claims where supported by documentary evidence but denied others due to commingling and lack of tracing.
The wife's claim for an unequal division of net family properties was dismissed.
The court imputed an annual income of $232,500 to the husband due to his inadequate disclosure and ordered him to pay $5,500 per month in spousal support, along with an equalization payment of $353,752.
The accused was sentenced to an effective eight-year term for extorting $1.75 million and forcibly confining four individuals at a law office.
The accused, Krishna Arora, pleaded guilty to four counts of forcible confinement and one count of extortion with a firearm.
The offences involved confining four individuals and extorting $1.75 million from a lawyer by threatening violence and using firearms.
The court considered aggravating factors such as the seriousness of the crimes, the use of firearms, and the significant trauma to victims, balanced against mitigating factors including the accused's personal circumstances, lack of extensive criminal record, and potential immigration consequences.
The Crown sought a nine-year sentence, while the defence sought three years.
The court imposed a total effective sentence of eight years imprisonment, including credit for pre-sentence custody and house arrest.
Ancillary orders for DNA, firearm prohibition, forfeiture, victim fine surcharge, and restitution were also made.
Plaintiffs awarded $175,000 in partial indemnity costs following successful motion for Mareva injunctions.
The plaintiffs successfully obtained Mareva injunctions and certificates of pending litigation against the defendants in a prior decision.
They sought substantial indemnity costs of $306,793.48 or partial indemnity costs of $208,768.58.
The court found that the defendants' lack of transparency required the plaintiffs to incur significant costs to prove their case.
The court awarded the plaintiffs partial indemnity costs fixed at $175,000, payable forthwith, leaving open the possibility for the trial judge to increase the award to substantial indemnity if the plaintiffs succeed at trial.
The accused was acquitted of drug trafficking because the Crown failed to prove constructive possession of cocaine found in his vehicle.
The defendant was charged with possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking following a motor vehicle stop.
The Crown alleged the defendant possessed 40 grams of cocaine found in a vehicle he owned and was operating.
The defendant challenged the lawfulness of the vehicle search under the Charter and argued there was reasonable doubt as to his possession of the drugs.
The court found the vehicle search was lawful as a search incident to arrest and under the Highway Traffic Act inventory search provisions.
However, on the merits, the court found the Crown had not proven possession beyond a reasonable doubt, as the drugs were located in an area accessible to the passenger, there was no evidence of knowledge or control by the defendant, and no other indicia of drug trafficking were present.
The defendant was acquitted.
The court imposed substantial fines rather than incarceration for an offender who pled guilty to communicating with minors for sexual services.
The offender pleaded guilty to two counts of communicating with minors (ages 14 and 16) for the purpose of obtaining sexual services.
The Crown sought a custodial sentence of 3-6 months on each count, consecutive.
The defence sought fines or a conditional sentence.
The court rejected the Crown's argument that the offender was in a position of trust and exploited it.
Balancing significant aggravating factors (two victims, callous conduct, high moral blameworthiness) against substantial mitigating factors (first-time offender, guilty plea before trial, no actual sexual activity, low reoffending risk), the court imposed substantial fines rather than incarceration, finding this met the objectives of deterrence and denunciation.
The court dismissed the summary conviction appeal, finding no Charter breaches regarding the ASD demand or the appellant's English proficiency.
The appellant, Ramanpreet Sran, appealed his conviction for driving with excess blood alcohol (over 80) contrary to s. 235 of the Criminal Code.
The appeal was based on three grounds: alleged unlawful and arbitrary detention (s. 9 Charter), lack of reasonable suspicion for an Approved Screening Device (ASD) demand (s. 9 Charter), and failure to provide an interpreter for Panjabi (s. 10 Charter).
The appellate court, applying a standard of review of palpable and overriding error for factual findings and correctness for legal standards, dismissed the appeal.
The court found no Charter breaches, affirmed the lawfulness of the ASD demand based on the officer's reasonable suspicion, and concluded there was no language barrier requiring an interpreter.
Necessity defence left to jury where evidence showed accused may have helped child escape danger.
During a criminal jury trial involving allegations connected to the use of forged travel documents to bring a minor from Sri Lanka to Canada, the court was required to determine whether there was an air of reality to the common law excuse of necessity.
The alleged peril related to a third party, a young Tamil male who later obtained refugee protection in Canada due to risks of detention, disappearance, or torture in Sri Lanka.
The court reviewed the governing legal framework for necessity from Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence and considered whether the evidence could support findings of imminent peril and absence of reasonable legal alternatives.
Although the accused did not testify, circumstantial evidence suggested they may have acted to help the child escape danger rather than for profit.
The court concluded that the evidentiary record was capable of supporting the inference required and that the defence of necessity should be left with the jury.
Pre-trial motion partially granted; evidence obtained after unlawful airport search and detention excluded under Charter.
The applicant, charged with passport and immigration offences, brought a pre-trial motion challenging the admissibility of statements and documents obtained by Canada Border Services Agency officers at an airport.
The court found that the applicant was not detained and voluntarily provided documents prior to 8:00 p.m., rendering that evidence admissible.
However, after 8:00 p.m., the officers conducted a warrantless search of the applicant's wallet that exceeded his consent, and detained him without providing rights to counsel.
Applying the Grant framework under s. 24(2) of the Charter, the court excluded the documents found in the wallet and the subsequent statements, finding serious Charter breaches that undermined the applicant's rights.
Section 11(b) Charter application for unreasonable delay dismissed as Crown and institutional delay fell within Morin guidelines.
The applicants, charged with offences related to an armoured car robbery, applied for a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter, alleging a violation of their s. 11(b) right to be tried within a reasonable time.
The total delay from the laying of charges to the scheduled trial was approximately 49 months.
The court applied the Morin framework and found that the majority of the delay was attributable to the inherent time requirements of the case and defence actions, particularly during a protracted preliminary inquiry.
The total Crown and institutional delay was calculated at just under 13 months, which fell within the Morin guidelines.
Finding no unreasonable delay and no evidence of actual prejudice, the court dismissed the application.
The court convicted the accused of driving over the legal limit, finding the police had reasonable suspicion for the roadside demand and administered breath tests as soon as practicable.
The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit contrary to section 253(b) of the Criminal Code.
The Crown's case relied on breath samples obtained through an approved screening device (ASD) at the roadside and subsequent Intoxilyzer testing at the police station.
The defence challenged the validity of the ASD demand on section 8 Charter grounds, arguing the officer lacked reasonable suspicion, and also challenged whether the breath tests were taken "as soon as practicable" as required by section 258(1)(c).
The court found the officer had formed the requisite reasonable suspicion based on the totality of circumstances and that the police acted reasonably in all circumstances, including the delay occasioned by the accused's exercise of his right to counsel.
The accused was convicted.
Master lacked jurisdiction to find breach of professional conduct rules in costs motion.
A solicitor sought leave to appeal a costs order requiring him to personally pay costs on the basis that he engaged in “sharp practice” contrary to the Rules of Professional Conduct.
The motion judge held that although a master may examine a lawyer’s conduct when determining costs under Rule 57.07(2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, making an actual finding that the lawyer breached the Rules of Professional Conduct exceeds a master’s jurisdiction.
Such findings are reserved for Law Society discipline proceedings with full procedural protections.
Given the seriousness of a professional misconduct determination and the procedural context of the costs motion, the matter raised a legal issue warranting appellate review.
Leave to appeal was granted.
Conviction for failing to provide breath sample upheld on summary conviction appeal.
The appellant appealed a conviction for failing or refusing to comply with a demand to provide a breath sample into an approved screening device under s. 254(5) of the Criminal Code.
She argued that the trial judge misapplied the W.D. credibility framework, misapprehended evidence relating to the police officer, her own testimony, and medical evidence regarding asthma, and convicted her on a charge not properly particularized in the information.
The appeal court held that the trial judge’s factual findings and credibility assessments were entitled to deference and were supported by the evidence, including the officer’s testimony that the appellant had numerous opportunities to provide a sample but failed to do so.
The court also concluded that the trial judge’s reasons were functionally sufficient and disclosed an intelligible basis for the verdict.
The appellant failed to establish any palpable and overriding error or miscarriage of justice.
Court orders lawyer personally to pay costs for misleading opposing counsel.
The defendant brought a motion seeking various relief including dismissal for delay, amendment of pleadings, issuance of a third party claim, a litigation timetable, and case management.
Following mixed success on the underlying motion, the court addressed costs.
The court found that the plaintiffs’ lawyer engaged in improper litigation conduct by misleading opposing counsel about payment of a prior costs order while secretly arranging for the funds to be garnished by a government creditor.
The court characterized the conduct as sharp practice contrary to professional obligations and held that it caused unnecessary motion costs.
Costs were awarded partly against the plaintiff corporation and partly personally against the plaintiffs’ lawyer under Rule 57.07.
Penile swab ruled unconstitutional strip search; DNA evidence excluded.
The accused applied for a stay of proceedings or exclusion of evidence arising from a police strip search and penile swab following arrest for sexual assault.
The court found the removal of clothing and penile swab constituted a strip search and that the police lacked properly articulated grounds and failed to conduct the search in a reasonable manner, resulting in breaches of ss. 8 and 10(b) of the Charter.
The court also found the accused should have been re‑informed of the right to counsel prior to the intrusive procedure.
Although the breaches were serious, they did not meet the threshold for a stay of proceedings.
Applying the Grant framework, the court excluded the DNA evidence from the penile swab but admitted a later blood sample and ruled that the accused’s videotaped statement was voluntary.
Court cannot compel bifurcated issue hearing without party consent under Rule 6.1.01.
In a complex Commercial List case management proceeding involving multiple condominium corporations, lenders, and other parties arising from alleged fraud related to loans arranged for condominium corporations, the court addressed whether a previously scheduled separate hearing of a threshold issue should proceed.
The threshold issue concerned whether certain loans were enforceable against the condominium corporations.
Several parties withdrew their earlier consent to bifurcate the proceedings under Rule 6.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
The court held that, absent unanimous consent, it lacked jurisdiction to compel a separate hearing of the threshold issue and therefore cancelled the proposed hearing.
The court instead directed that the actions proceed expeditiously to a consolidated trial with a structured discovery process and encouraged mediation.
Substantial indemnity costs awarded after disproportionate motion targeting opposing counsel.
Following a motion seeking to compel examinations under Rule 39.03 in aid of a contempt proceeding, the court addressed the issue of costs.
The moving parties had attempted to compel the examination of opposing counsel and several non-parties regarding a mortgage transaction allegedly breaching a prior court order.
The court found that the evidentiary steps taken were excessive, disproportionate, and primarily aimed at forcing the opposing lawyer to give evidence against his client and potentially disqualify himself.
Although the moving parties were entitled to limited costs for compelling a timetable for an affidavit, the motion to compel examination of counsel was dismissed and the responding party substantially succeeded.
Substantial indemnity costs were awarded to the responding party due to the unreasonable litigation strategy adopted by the moving parties.
Court lifts BIA stay to permit fraud-related civil actions against bankrupt defendants.
Multiple condominium corporations brought motions under s. 69.4 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act to lift the automatic stay of proceedings following the bankruptcy of a property manager and his company.
The underlying actions alleged fraudulent mortgage loans and fraudulent overcharging in condominium management contracts.
The court held that the claims involved issues of fraud, complex contingent debts, and disputes requiring full adjudication with multiple parties, making the bankruptcy claims process inadequate.
The court lifted the statutory stays to allow four existing civil actions to continue and permitted a lender to commence two related actions, ordering that all six proceedings be case-managed together on the Commercial List.
The court also imposed terms limiting costs recovery against the bankrupt estates prior to discharge.
Sentence appeal dismissed; trial judge properly considered conditional sentence and sentenced appellant for his conduct alone.
The appellant appealed the sentence imposed by the trial judge, arguing that the judge improperly considered the actions of others and failed to impose a conditional sentence.
The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge sentenced the appellant solely for his own conduct and properly considered the request for a conditional sentence.
The appeal was dismissed as the sentence was entirely fit.
Appeal from sexual assault conviction and three-year sentence dismissed; no unreasonable delay or evidentiary errors found.
The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault and his sentence of three years' imprisonment.
He argued that his right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter was violated due to institutional delay following a mistrial.
He also challenged the admission of his prior guilty plea for assaulting the complainant's mother and the admission of the complainant's videotaped statement under s. 715.1 of the Criminal Code.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no unreasonable delay and no error in the evidentiary rulings.
The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the three-year penitentiary sentence was fit given the repeated sexual assaults on a child in a position of trust.