Aswani Kumar Datt

The accused, Krishna Arora, pleaded guilty to four counts of forcible confinement and one count of extortion with a firearm.

The offences involved confining four individuals and extorting $1.75 million from a lawyer by threatening violence and using firearms.

The court considered aggravating factors such as the seriousness of the crimes, the use of firearms, and the significant trauma to victims, balanced against mitigating factors including the accused's personal circumstances, lack of extensive criminal record, and potential immigration consequences.

The Crown sought a nine-year sentence, while the defence sought three years.

The court imposed a total effective sentence of eight years imprisonment, including credit for pre-sentence custody and house arrest.

Ancillary orders for DNA, firearm prohibition, forfeiture, victim fine surcharge, and restitution were also made.

The offender pleaded guilty to two counts of communicating with minors (ages 14 and 16) for the purpose of obtaining sexual services.

The Crown sought a custodial sentence of 3-6 months on each count, consecutive.

The defence sought fines or a conditional sentence.

The court rejected the Crown's argument that the offender was in a position of trust and exploited it.

Balancing significant aggravating factors (two victims, callous conduct, high moral blameworthiness) against substantial mitigating factors (first-time offender, guilty plea before trial, no actual sexual activity, low reoffending risk), the court imposed substantial fines rather than incarceration, finding this met the objectives of deterrence and denunciation.

The appellant, Ramanpreet Sran, appealed his conviction for driving with excess blood alcohol (over 80) contrary to s. 235 of the Criminal Code.

The appeal was based on three grounds: alleged unlawful and arbitrary detention (s. 9 Charter), lack of reasonable suspicion for an Approved Screening Device (ASD) demand (s. 9 Charter), and failure to provide an interpreter for Panjabi (s. 10 Charter).

The appellate court, applying a standard of review of palpable and overriding error for factual findings and correctness for legal standards, dismissed the appeal.

The court found no Charter breaches, affirmed the lawfulness of the ASD demand based on the officer's reasonable suspicion, and concluded there was no language barrier requiring an interpreter.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit contrary to section 253(b) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown's case relied on breath samples obtained through an approved screening device (ASD) at the roadside and subsequent Intoxilyzer testing at the police station.

The defence challenged the validity of the ASD demand on section 8 Charter grounds, arguing the officer lacked reasonable suspicion, and also challenged whether the breath tests were taken "as soon as practicable" as required by section 258(1)(c).

The court found the officer had formed the requisite reasonable suspicion based on the totality of circumstances and that the police acted reasonably in all circumstances, including the delay occasioned by the accused's exercise of his right to counsel.

The accused was convicted.

A solicitor sought leave to appeal a costs order requiring him to personally pay costs on the basis that he engaged in “sharp practice” contrary to the Rules of Professional Conduct.

The motion judge held that although a master may examine a lawyer’s conduct when determining costs under Rule 57.07(2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, making an actual finding that the lawyer breached the Rules of Professional Conduct exceeds a master’s jurisdiction.

Such findings are reserved for Law Society discipline proceedings with full procedural protections.

Given the seriousness of a professional misconduct determination and the procedural context of the costs motion, the matter raised a legal issue warranting appellate review.

Leave to appeal was granted.

The appellant appealed a conviction for failing or refusing to comply with a demand to provide a breath sample into an approved screening device under s. 254(5) of the Criminal Code.

She argued that the trial judge misapplied the W.D. credibility framework, misapprehended evidence relating to the police officer, her own testimony, and medical evidence regarding asthma, and convicted her on a charge not properly particularized in the information.

The appeal court held that the trial judge’s factual findings and credibility assessments were entitled to deference and were supported by the evidence, including the officer’s testimony that the appellant had numerous opportunities to provide a sample but failed to do so.

The court also concluded that the trial judge’s reasons were functionally sufficient and disclosed an intelligible basis for the verdict.

The appellant failed to establish any palpable and overriding error or miscarriage of justice.

The defendant brought a motion seeking various relief including dismissal for delay, amendment of pleadings, issuance of a third party claim, a litigation timetable, and case management.

Following mixed success on the underlying motion, the court addressed costs.

The court found that the plaintiffs’ lawyer engaged in improper litigation conduct by misleading opposing counsel about payment of a prior costs order while secretly arranging for the funds to be garnished by a government creditor.

The court characterized the conduct as sharp practice contrary to professional obligations and held that it caused unnecessary motion costs.

Costs were awarded partly against the plaintiff corporation and partly personally against the plaintiffs’ lawyer under Rule 57.07.

The accused applied for a stay of proceedings or exclusion of evidence arising from a police strip search and penile swab following arrest for sexual assault.

The court found the removal of clothing and penile swab constituted a strip search and that the police lacked properly articulated grounds and failed to conduct the search in a reasonable manner, resulting in breaches of ss. 8 and 10(b) of the Charter.

The court also found the accused should have been re‑informed of the right to counsel prior to the intrusive procedure.

Although the breaches were serious, they did not meet the threshold for a stay of proceedings.

Applying the Grant framework, the court excluded the DNA evidence from the penile swab but admitted a later blood sample and ruled that the accused’s videotaped statement was voluntary.

Following a motion seeking to compel examinations under Rule 39.03 in aid of a contempt proceeding, the court addressed the issue of costs.

The moving parties had attempted to compel the examination of opposing counsel and several non-parties regarding a mortgage transaction allegedly breaching a prior court order.

The court found that the evidentiary steps taken were excessive, disproportionate, and primarily aimed at forcing the opposing lawyer to give evidence against his client and potentially disqualify himself.

Although the moving parties were entitled to limited costs for compelling a timetable for an affidavit, the motion to compel examination of counsel was dismissed and the responding party substantially succeeded.

Substantial indemnity costs were awarded to the responding party due to the unreasonable litigation strategy adopted by the moving parties.

Multiple condominium corporations brought motions under s. 69.4 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act to lift the automatic stay of proceedings following the bankruptcy of a property manager and his company.

The underlying actions alleged fraudulent mortgage loans and fraudulent overcharging in condominium management contracts.

The court held that the claims involved issues of fraud, complex contingent debts, and disputes requiring full adjudication with multiple parties, making the bankruptcy claims process inadequate.

The court lifted the statutory stays to allow four existing civil actions to continue and permitted a lender to commence two related actions, ordering that all six proceedings be case-managed together on the Commercial List.

The court also imposed terms limiting costs recovery against the bankrupt estates prior to discharge.