Christopher Paul Presswood

This decision concerns Heather Vukovic, charged with Careless Driving Causing Death under the Highway Traffic Act.

The charge arose from a collision where Vukovic's vehicle, travelling westbound on Highway 9, collided with another vehicle turning left into oncoming traffic, resulting in the other driver's death.

While the defendant was found to be speeding, the court considered witness testimony and accident reconstruction evidence, which indicated the victim's vehicle caused the collision by turning into oncoming traffic.

The court applied the legal standard for careless driving, emphasizing that it does not require perfection and that speed alone is insufficient.

Ultimately, the court was not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's driving constituted careless driving causing death, finding her not guilty.

The defendant was charged with driving with excess blood alcohol.

He brought a Charter application alleging arbitrary detention (s. 9) and violation of his right to counsel (s. 10(b)).

The court dismissed both Charter claims, finding that the initial stop was a lawful investigative detention and that the police were reasonably diligent in facilitating his right to counsel, despite his lack of diligence in pursuing alternatives.

Consequently, the breath test results were admitted, and the defendant was found guilty.

The defendant, Simon Williams, faced charges of possessing child pornography.

He challenged the admissibility of evidence, alleging violations of his section 8 Charter rights due to delayed filing of Reports to a Justice (RTJs) and misleading Informations to Obtain (ITOs) for search warrants.

The court found that the RTJs were filed "as soon as practicable" given the investigating officer's workload and travel, and that any delay was minor and did not warrant exclusion of evidence.

The court also affirmed the validity of the ITOs, finding no misleading omissions or impermissible speculative inferences regarding the defendant's propensity to collect child pornography.

Consequently, the defendant's Charter claims were dismissed, the evidence was admitted, and guilty verdicts were entered on both counts.

The defendant, Dylan Cummins, was charged with failing to provide a breath sample contrary to section 320.15 of the Criminal Code.

The court found that the prosecution proved the elements of the offence beyond a reasonable doubt and that the defendant did not have a reasonable excuse for non-compliance.

The court also addressed an alleged violation of the defendant's section 10(b) Charter right to counsel, finding a breach occurred at the police station related to drug trafficking charges (later withdrawn), but determined there was no causal, contextual, or temporal connection between this breach and the evidence for the breath sample charge.

Consequently, the court declined to exclude the evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, leading to a finding of guilt for failing to provide a breath sample.

The defendant was sentenced following guilty pleas to drug-related and driving offences.

The court imposed a sentence of time served (64 days credited as 96 days on a 1.5:1 basis) plus one day, followed by 24 months probation with conditions including drug treatment, non-association orders, and a one-year driving prohibition.

The sentencing was significantly influenced by the defendant's contraction of COVID-19 while in custody at Maplehurst, which the court found to be a unique mitigating circumstance warranting a departure from the Crown's suggested range.

This decision addresses jury instructions on modes of participation for two accused, Richard Ireland and Trayon Johnson, in a joint jury trial for second-degree murder and attempted murder.

The Crown's application for Ireland as a principal (s. 21(1)(a) Criminal Code) and Johnson as an aider (s. 21(1)(b) Criminal Code) was granted.

The Crown's application for Johnson as a co-principal (s. 21(2) Criminal Code) was dismissed, as was Johnson's request for the jury to be instructed only on s. 21(2) and thus preclude a second-degree murder verdict for him.

The court found an air of reality for Johnson's conviction as an aider but not as a co-principal for second-degree murder.

Trayon Johnson, charged with second-degree murder and attempted murder, sought an order under s. 638(1)(b) of the Criminal Code to challenge prospective jurors for cause.

He proposed augmenting the traditional *Parks* questions with multiple-choice options to address subconscious racial bias against men of African ancestry.

The court acknowledged the existence of racial stereotypes and unconscious bias, finding that appropriately-constructed multiple-choice questions could be more effective than standard "yes/no" questions in identifying such biases.

The proposed multiple-choice questions were approved to ensure an impartial jury.

Trayon Johnson, charged with second-degree murder and attempted murder, applied to introduce his exculpatory police statement made on October 20, 2017, under the *Edgar* exception.

The court granted the motion, finding that despite instances of dishonesty and manipulation during the 12-hour interview, a contextual analysis left doubt regarding the spontaneity of the statement.

In such cases, the statement should be admitted for the jury to assess its weight and the accused's credibility, not for the truth of its contents.

The jury will be instructed on how to use the statement to assess Johnson's reaction and credibility when confronted with the allegations.

The applicant, Richard Ireland, jointly charged with second-degree murder and attempted murder alongside Trayon Johnson, sought to sever his trial from Johnson's.

Ireland argued that Johnson's police statement, which heavily implicated Ireland and expressed fear of him, would cause incurable prejudice despite excisions of prior discreditable conduct.

The Crown opposed the severance.

The court dismissed the application, emphasizing the presumption of joint trials for co-accused, even with "cut-throat" defences.

It held that proper jury instructions could mitigate any prejudice, and that the interests of justice, including efficiency and avoiding inconsistent verdicts, favoured a joint trial.

A youth was charged with two counts of sexual assault and unlawful confinement arising from incidents on April 25 and June 2, 2017.

The Crown withdrew the charges related to the June 2 incident at the mid-trial stage.

The trial proceeded on the April 25 sexual assault allegation.

The complainant testified that the accused sexually assaulted her in a park by forcing vaginal intercourse against her will.

The accused denied the assault occurred.

The court found the complainant's credibility undermined by surveillance video evidence and inconsistencies in her testimony, and acquitted the accused.

The defendant was charged with failure to provide a breath sample contrary to section 254(5) of the Criminal Code.

A police officer observed the defendant seated in the driver's seat of a vehicle in a bar parking lot, heard the engine running, and formed reasonable suspicion that the defendant had alcohol in his body and was in care or control of the vehicle.

The officer made a lawful approved screening device demand.

The defendant refused to comply, claiming he had an ignition interlock device installed in his vehicle and was waiting for a designated driver.

The court found the demand was lawful, the refusal was unequivocal and wilful, and the defendant had no reasonable excuse for non-compliance.

The defendant was convicted.

The appellant, Rahman Wahab, appealed his conviction for operating a motor vehicle with excess blood/alcohol, arguing that his s. 10(b) Charter right to counsel of choice was violated.

The trial judge had misapprehended the timing of the appellant's assertion of this right.

However, the appeal court found that the appellant was not reasonably diligent in communicating his request for specific counsel, and the police had made reasonable efforts to facilitate counsel.

Therefore, no s. 10(b) Charter violation occurred.

Even if there had been a breach, the breath sample analyses would not be excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter, given the minimal impact on rights and the strong societal interest in adjudicating drinking and driving cases.

The appeal was dismissed.

The accused, a financial manager at Bank of Montreal, was charged with fraud and conspiracy to commit fraud.

The Crown alleged he knowingly opened numerous fraudulent accounts and issued credit cards to an individual, Mr. Baz, and his associate, Mr. Tariq, using fictitious names and addresses, resulting in a $68,000 loss to the bank.

The defence argued the accused was a victim of a scheme and merely followed common, albeit non-compliant, bank practices under pressure to meet sales targets.

The court disbelieved the accused's testimony regarding his lack of knowledge of Mr. Baz's fraudulent activities, finding his involvement to be a rational inference from the circumstantial evidence, including the recovery of fraudulent IDs and BMO credit cards in Mr. Baz's possession.

The court found the accused guilty on both charges.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving (over 80).

The Crown sought to rely on breath test results taken more than two hours after driving to establish the defendant's blood alcohol level at the time of driving.

The court found that the police breached the defendant's Charter rights by failing to comply with the "as soon as practicable" requirement under section 254(3) of the Criminal Code.

The defendant was arrested at 3:57 a.m., the breath demand was made at 3:59 a.m., but the breath samples were not taken until 6:14 a.m. and 6:31 a.m., resulting in a 90-minute unexplained delay.

The court excluded the breath test evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding that admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while the concentration of alcohol in his blood exceeded the legal limit contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The accused applied to exclude the results of a breath analysis on Charter grounds.

The court found violations of section 10(b) of the Charter in two respects: (1) the arresting officer failed to advise the accused of his right to counsel immediately upon arrest, instead delaying seven minutes to conduct other investigative steps; and (2) the breath technician failed to provide the accused with a second opportunity to consult counsel after the accused expressed mistrust of the duty counsel he had consulted.

The court excluded the breath test evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, emphasizing systemic problems within the Peel Regional Police regarding compliance with the immediacy requirement of section 10(b).

The charge was dismissed.

The accused was charged with dangerous operation of a motor vehicle causing bodily harm, operation while impaired by alcohol, and operation with blood alcohol exceeding 80 mg/100 mL.

The trial involved a Charter application regarding the seizure of blood samples obtained for medical purposes.

The court found that continuity of the blood samples was established and that no Charter breach occurred.

However, the court determined that the Crown failed to prove the "no bolus drinking" assumption underlying the toxicologist's read-back opinions, rendering those opinions inadmissible.

The accused was acquitted of the impaired and over-80 charges but convicted of dangerous driving causing bodily harm based on evidence of excessive speeding on a residential street, loss of control, and collision with a tree.

A ruling on the voluntariness of a statement made by an accused charged with sexual offences against a child.

The accused was interviewed by police for approximately three hours following his arrest.

The Crown sought to admit the entire statement at trial, while the defence argued that portions of the statement were involuntary due to police inducements and the use of coercive interrogation techniques.

The court found that the initial portion of the statement was voluntary but excluded statements made after the police officer presented the accused with a stark choice between admitting to a one-time mistake or being investigated as a serial predator, which constituted a quid pro quo inducement that overbore the accused's will.

The accused brought a motion to stay proceedings on the basis that his right under s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms to be tried within a reasonable time had been violated.

The accused was charged with dangerous operation of a motor vehicle causing bodily harm, impaired operation causing bodily harm, and operation with blood alcohol exceeding 80 mg per 100 mL of blood, all straight indictable offences.

The overall delay from the laying of charges to the scheduled trial completion was approximately 31 months.

The first trial date was adjourned due to late disclosure of a critical expert toxicology report.

The court dismissed the application, finding that while there was some actual prejudice, the institutional and Crown delay did not rise to the level of a Charter violation when considered holistically against the complexity of the case, the conduct of the defence, and society's interest in a trial on the merits.

A youth was charged with invitation to sexual touching contrary to s. 152 of the Criminal Code and committing an indecent act by exposing his genital organs to a person under the age of 16 years contrary to s. 173(2) of the Criminal Code.

The allegations arose from incidents that occurred when the complainant was between two and five years old while attending an unlicensed daycare operated by the accused's mother.

The complainant did not disclose the incidents until Grade 5, when prompted by a classroom discussion about inappropriate sexual touching.

The trial judge found the complainant's testimony credible and reliable, and rejected the accused's denials as marked by inconsistencies and implausibilities.

The accused was convicted on both counts.

The accused was charged with care and control of a motor vehicle while impaired.

He was found in the early morning hours sitting in a car on the side of the road with all four tires flat, waiting for his father to pick him up.

The Crown proved impairment beyond a reasonable doubt based on observations of slurred speech, disorientation, bloodshot eyes, odour of alcohol, and breath test results exceeding the legal limit.

However, the court found that the presumption of care and control under s. 258(1)(a) of the Criminal Code was rebutted because the vehicle was inoperable and could not be driven.

The Crown failed to establish de facto care and control by proving a realistic risk of danger, as the vehicle was in a well-lit area, the road was not busy, and the vehicle's lights were on.

The charge was dismissed.