Christopher Paul Presswood

The offender was found guilty by a jury of two counts of sexual assault against his then-wife, involving forced vaginal penetration.

The Crown sought a 4-year custodial sentence, while the defence sought 3 years.

The court considered the aggravating factors of intimate partner violence and breach of trust, alongside the offender's lack of insight and the collateral immigration consequences of his sentence.

The offender was sentenced to 3.5 years in custody for each count, to be served concurrently, along with mandatory ancillary orders.

This decision concerns Heather Vukovic, charged with Careless Driving Causing Death under the Highway Traffic Act.

The charge arose from a collision where Vukovic's vehicle, travelling westbound on Highway 9, collided with another vehicle turning left into oncoming traffic, resulting in the other driver's death.

While the defendant was found to be speeding, the court considered witness testimony and accident reconstruction evidence, which indicated the victim's vehicle caused the collision by turning into oncoming traffic.

The court applied the legal standard for careless driving, emphasizing that it does not require perfection and that speed alone is insufficient.

Ultimately, the court was not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's driving constituted careless driving causing death, finding her not guilty.

The defendant was charged with driving with excess blood alcohol.

He brought a Charter application alleging arbitrary detention (s. 9) and violation of his right to counsel (s. 10(b)).

The court dismissed both Charter claims, finding that the initial stop was a lawful investigative detention and that the police were reasonably diligent in facilitating his right to counsel, despite his lack of diligence in pursuing alternatives.

Consequently, the breath test results were admitted, and the defendant was found guilty.

The defendant, Simon Williams, faced charges of possessing child pornography.

He challenged the admissibility of evidence, alleging violations of his section 8 Charter rights due to delayed filing of Reports to a Justice (RTJs) and misleading Informations to Obtain (ITOs) for search warrants.

The court found that the RTJs were filed "as soon as practicable" given the investigating officer's workload and travel, and that any delay was minor and did not warrant exclusion of evidence.

The court also affirmed the validity of the ITOs, finding no misleading omissions or impermissible speculative inferences regarding the defendant's propensity to collect child pornography.

Consequently, the defendant's Charter claims were dismissed, the evidence was admitted, and guilty verdicts were entered on both counts.

The defendant, Dylan Cummins, was charged with failing to provide a breath sample contrary to section 320.15 of the Criminal Code.

The court found that the prosecution proved the elements of the offence beyond a reasonable doubt and that the defendant did not have a reasonable excuse for non-compliance.

The court also addressed an alleged violation of the defendant's section 10(b) Charter right to counsel, finding a breach occurred at the police station related to drug trafficking charges (later withdrawn), but determined there was no causal, contextual, or temporal connection between this breach and the evidence for the breath sample charge.

Consequently, the court declined to exclude the evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, leading to a finding of guilt for failing to provide a breath sample.

The court imposed an indeterminate sentence on the offender following his designation as a dangerous offender.

The offender had sexually assaulted and forcibly confined a 23-year-old victim in April 2017.

He had a significant criminal history including prior sexual offences against children and adults.

Two psychiatrists provided evidence regarding risk assessment, treatability, and management prospects.

The court found that neither a conventional determinate sentence nor a determinate sentence with long-term supervision would adequately protect the public, given the offender's chronic dangerousness, lack of insight, minimization of responsibility, sexual deviance, and poor treatment outcomes despite multiple prior interventions.

The defendant was sentenced following guilty pleas to drug-related and driving offences.

The court imposed a sentence of time served (64 days credited as 96 days on a 1.5:1 basis) plus one day, followed by 24 months probation with conditions including drug treatment, non-association orders, and a one-year driving prohibition.

The sentencing was significantly influenced by the defendant's contraction of COVID-19 while in custody at Maplehurst, which the court found to be a unique mitigating circumstance warranting a departure from the Crown's suggested range.

Trayon Johnson, charged with second-degree murder and attempted murder, sought an order under s. 638(1)(b) of the Criminal Code to challenge prospective jurors for cause.

He proposed augmenting the traditional *Parks* questions with multiple-choice options to address subconscious racial bias against men of African ancestry.

The court acknowledged the existence of racial stereotypes and unconscious bias, finding that appropriately-constructed multiple-choice questions could be more effective than standard "yes/no" questions in identifying such biases.

The proposed multiple-choice questions were approved to ensure an impartial jury.

Trayon Johnson, charged with second-degree murder and attempted murder, applied to introduce his exculpatory police statement made on October 20, 2017, under the *Edgar* exception.

The court granted the motion, finding that despite instances of dishonesty and manipulation during the 12-hour interview, a contextual analysis left doubt regarding the spontaneity of the statement.

In such cases, the statement should be admitted for the jury to assess its weight and the accused's credibility, not for the truth of its contents.

The jury will be instructed on how to use the statement to assess Johnson's reaction and credibility when confronted with the allegations.

This decision addresses jury instructions on modes of participation for two accused, Richard Ireland and Trayon Johnson, in a joint jury trial for second-degree murder and attempted murder.

The Crown's application for Ireland as a principal (s. 21(1)(a) Criminal Code) and Johnson as an aider (s. 21(1)(b) Criminal Code) was granted.

The Crown's application for Johnson as a co-principal (s. 21(2) Criminal Code) was dismissed, as was Johnson's request for the jury to be instructed only on s. 21(2) and thus preclude a second-degree murder verdict for him.

The court found an air of reality for Johnson's conviction as an aider but not as a co-principal for second-degree murder.

The applicant, Richard Ireland, jointly charged with second-degree murder and attempted murder alongside Trayon Johnson, sought to sever his trial from Johnson's.

Ireland argued that Johnson's police statement, which heavily implicated Ireland and expressed fear of him, would cause incurable prejudice despite excisions of prior discreditable conduct.

The Crown opposed the severance.

The court dismissed the application, emphasizing the presumption of joint trials for co-accused, even with "cut-throat" defences.

It held that proper jury instructions could mitigate any prejudice, and that the interests of justice, including efficiency and avoiding inconsistent verdicts, favoured a joint trial.

The Crown applied to designate the accused as a dangerous offender following his guilty plea to sexual assault and forcible confinement.

The accused argued that his future treatment prospects were compelling and that a Long-Term Offender Supervision Order would be appropriate.

The court found that the accused's pattern of sexual violence over a 17-year period, his persistent denial of responsibility, his anti-social personality traits, and his failure to benefit from previous treatment demonstrated that his threat to public safety was intractable.

The court designated the accused as a dangerous offender under multiple provisions of the Criminal Code.

A youth was charged with two counts of sexual assault and unlawful confinement arising from incidents on April 25 and June 2, 2017.

The Crown withdrew the charges related to the June 2 incident at the mid-trial stage.

The trial proceeded on the April 25 sexual assault allegation.

The complainant testified that the accused sexually assaulted her in a park by forcing vaginal intercourse against her will.

The accused denied the assault occurred.

The court found the complainant's credibility undermined by surveillance video evidence and inconsistencies in her testimony, and acquitted the accused.

The accused was charged with multiple firearm offences after police found a loaded handgun wrapped in a t-shirt in his family's garage.

The Crown relied on circumstantial evidence, including police surveillance showing the accused and an associate in the garage, and photographs of the associate with a handgun.

The accused testified that he had no knowledge of the handgun and that multiple people had access to the unlocked garage.

The court found the accused's evidence unpersuasive but concluded that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused had knowledge and control of the firearm.

The accused was acquitted of all charges.

The applicants, charged with firearms offences, brought applications to exclude evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, alleging their s. 8 rights were violated by invalid search warrants and an unauthorized cell phone search.

The court found the search warrant for one applicant's residence was valid, but the warrant for the other applicant's residence was invalid due to insufficient corroboration of a confidential informant's tip.

However, the court admitted the handgun found at the second residence under s. 24(2).

Regarding the first applicant's cell phone, the court found the police searched it without informed consent, violating his s. 8 rights, and excluded the cell phone contents under s. 24(2).

The accused was tried on a historical sexual assault allegation arising from alleged incidents in 1986 involving a child complainant and an older cousin.

Applying the W.(D.) framework, the court held that the case turned on credibility and reliability, and drew a distinction between the complainant's sincerity and the reliability of his recollection.

The court identified multiple inconsistencies between the complainant's trial evidence, prior statements, and preliminary-hearing testimony, together with admitted prior false testimony, evidence of animus, and concerns associated with recovered memory unsupported by objective confirmatory evidence.

The court concluded it would be dangerous to convict on that evidence and dismissed the charge.

The defendant was charged with failure to provide a breath sample contrary to section 254(5) of the Criminal Code.

A police officer observed the defendant seated in the driver's seat of a vehicle in a bar parking lot, heard the engine running, and formed reasonable suspicion that the defendant had alcohol in his body and was in care or control of the vehicle.

The officer made a lawful approved screening device demand.

The defendant refused to comply, claiming he had an ignition interlock device installed in his vehicle and was waiting for a designated driver.

The court found the demand was lawful, the refusal was unequivocal and wilful, and the defendant had no reasonable excuse for non-compliance.

The defendant was convicted.

The appellant, Rahman Wahab, appealed his conviction for operating a motor vehicle with excess blood/alcohol, arguing that his s. 10(b) Charter right to counsel of choice was violated.

The trial judge had misapprehended the timing of the appellant's assertion of this right.

However, the appeal court found that the appellant was not reasonably diligent in communicating his request for specific counsel, and the police had made reasonable efforts to facilitate counsel.

Therefore, no s. 10(b) Charter violation occurred.

Even if there had been a breach, the breath sample analyses would not be excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter, given the minimal impact on rights and the strong societal interest in adjudicating drinking and driving cases.

The appeal was dismissed.

The accused, a financial manager at Bank of Montreal, was charged with fraud and conspiracy to commit fraud.

The Crown alleged he knowingly opened numerous fraudulent accounts and issued credit cards to an individual, Mr. Baz, and his associate, Mr. Tariq, using fictitious names and addresses, resulting in a $68,000 loss to the bank.

The defence argued the accused was a victim of a scheme and merely followed common, albeit non-compliant, bank practices under pressure to meet sales targets.

The court disbelieved the accused's testimony regarding his lack of knowledge of Mr. Baz's fraudulent activities, finding his involvement to be a rational inference from the circumstantial evidence, including the recovery of fraudulent IDs and BMO credit cards in Mr. Baz's possession.

The court found the accused guilty on both charges.

The appellant appealed both conviction and sentence for assault arising from a public altercation with his girlfriend witnessed by several civilian motorists.

The appeal alleged misapprehension of evidence, unequal scrutiny of Crown and defence witnesses, ineffective assistance of counsel, and an unfit sentence due to immigration consequences.

The court held that the trial judge’s credibility findings and factual conclusions were open on the record, that no improper differential scrutiny was demonstrated, and that fresh evidence did not establish incompetence or miscarriage of justice.

Applying the deferential standards governing conviction and sentence appeals, the court also held that the suspended sentence appropriately accounted for immigration consequences without undermining sentencing principles.

The appeal from conviction and sentence was dismissed.