Alexander Karapancev

The accused was sentenced following convictions on multiple counts including human trafficking and sexual assault.

The court imposed a global sentence of 2,155 days (5.9 years) less pre-sentence custody of 232.5 days, resulting in a net sentence of 1,922 days (approximately five-and-a-quarter years).

The court applied Downes and Duncan credit as mitigating factors, reducing what would have been a seven-year sentence.

Ancillary orders included a DNA order, lifetime Sex Offender Registry order, ten-year firearms prohibition, non-communication order, and forfeiture of a cellular telephone.

All sentences were ordered to run concurrently based on the principle of totality.

The court sentenced Patrick Boyd Park for ten serious criminal offences, including sexual assault, human trafficking, and related crimes against four victims.

The decision details the circumstances of the offences, the offender’s background, the parties’ sentencing positions, and the aggravating and mitigating factors.

The court imposed a global sentence of 2,155 days (about 5.9 years), reduced for strict bail and harsh pretrial custody conditions, with all sentences to run concurrently.

This decision addresses the admissibility of evidence in a sexual assault trial, specifically concerning the application of sections 276 and 278.92 of the Criminal Code.

The defence sought to introduce evidence of the complainant's prior sexual activity and communications, arguing relevance to credibility and consent.

The court applied the two-stage test, distinguishing between evidence of other sexual activity and other records.

It permitted evidence of inconsistent statements regarding post-assault sexual activity and certain pre-assault communications expressing future sexual intentions, finding them relevant to credibility and consent without engaging twin myths.

However, it excluded evidence deemed irrelevant or primarily serving prohibited twin-myth reasoning, emphasizing the need to protect the complainant's dignity and privacy while upholding the accused's right to full answer and defence.

The accused, Wendell Brereton, brought an application for a stay of charges of sexual assault and careless storage of a firearm, pursuant to section 11(b) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, arguing that his right to trial within a reasonable time had been violated.

The total delay from charge to scheduled trial date was over 32 months, exceeding the 18-month ceiling set by R. v. Jordan.

The Crown argued that significant portions of the delay were attributable to defence conduct, particularly the first lawyer's lack of diligence and failure to request key disclosure.

The court found that the 11-week period between the charge date and the first appearance was not attributable to the defence.

Even after subtracting all other conceded defence delays, the net delay still exceeded the 18-month ceiling by 12 days, making it presumptively unreasonable.

The Crown was unable to rebut this presumption.

Consequently, the court granted the stay of proceedings.

The defendant, Zeeshan Naseer, brought an application to stay proceedings under section 11(b) of the Charter due to unreasonable delay.

The trial dates were set almost 30 months after the charge, exceeding the presumptive ceiling established by R. v. Jordan.

The Crown argued for significant defence delay and exceptional circumstances, including the defence's failure to raise delay concerns and the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court found that the Crown's arguments did not meet the Jordan test for exceptional circumstances, as the delay was foreseeable and avoidable by the Crown.

The application was granted, and the proceedings were stayed.

This case involved an alleged sexual assault.

The complainant's testimony was found to be highly unreliable due to profound inconsistencies with medical evidence and prior statements, and a lack of corroborative evidence.

The court also found contradictions from another Crown witness whose testimony was deemed credible and exculpatory.

The charge was dismissed due to reasonable doubt.

J.G. was convicted of sex trade-related offenses (influencing/directing, advertising, obtaining material benefit from a minor's sex trade) and child pornography offenses (possession and distribution).

The court imposed a global sentence of 4 years and six months.

Key legal considerations included the unconstitutionality of mandatory minimum sentences for the sex trade offenses, the inadmissibility of the accused's unrequested disciplinary records from custody, and the application of systemic racism as a mitigating factor in sentencing Black offenders.

The court found mandatory minimums unconstitutional, excluded the disciplinary records, and took judicial notice of systemic racism's deleterious impacts as a mitigating factor.

Credit for pre-trial custody and lockdown days due to COVID-19 was also applied.

In a judge-alone criminal trial subject to a publication ban, the Crown alleged that the accused exploited a 17-year-old complainant in connection with sex trade activity, online advertisements, and related offences.

The trial judge rejected the complainant's evidence that she had entered the sex trade unwillingly, finding instead that she participated voluntarily, which defeated the human trafficking and procuring theories.

The court nevertheless found that one accused actively managed the communications, advertisements, pricing, and operational aspects of the sex trade activity, knew the complainant was under 18, and thereby influenced her movements for the purpose of facilitating the provision of sexual services for consideration.

That accused was convicted of influencing a minor contrary to s. 286.3(2), advertising sexual services, receiving a material benefit, and possessing and distributing child pornography; the co-accused was acquitted on all counts.

Lamar Grant applied for a bail review following his detention on secondary and tertiary grounds.

He argued that a new supervision plan with two sureties, electronic monitoring, and the COVID-19 pandemic constituted a material change in circumstances.

The court found that the new sureties and electronic monitoring, combined with the risks posed by COVID-19 given Grant's pre-existing medical conditions and the conditions in detention, amounted to a material change.

The court concluded that his detention was not necessary in the public interest and ordered his release with strict conditions including a recognizance, house arrest, weapons prohibition, no contact with specific individuals, no non-medically prescribed drugs, and GPS monitoring.

The accused was charged with robbery and wearing a disguise with intent following a convenience store robbery.

The Crown's case on identity relied entirely on circumstantial evidence, specifically surveillance video and matching clothing found in an apartment and a vehicle linked to the accused.

The court applied the test for circumstantial evidence and concluded that the only reasonable inference was that the accused was one of the robbers.

The accused was found guilty of robbery but acquitted of wearing a disguise due to lack of evidence.

A youth was charged with two counts of sexual assault and unlawful confinement arising from incidents on April 25 and June 2, 2017.

The Crown withdrew the charges related to the June 2 incident at the mid-trial stage.

The trial proceeded on the April 25 sexual assault allegation.

The complainant testified that the accused sexually assaulted her in a park by forcing vaginal intercourse against her will.

The accused denied the assault occurred.

The court found the complainant's credibility undermined by surveillance video evidence and inconsistencies in her testimony, and acquitted the accused.

The defendant, Suzana Vidinovski, was found guilty after a jury trial of three counts of fraud over $5,000 and four counts of uttering forged documents.

The offences, committed between 2012 and 2014 while she was an administrative assistant, involved fraudulently obtaining approximately $81,000 from her employer, Core Realty Group Inc., through forged cheques and letters of direction.

The court considered her prior criminal record for similar offences and the significant breach of trust.

The Crown sought a prison term of 4-5 years, while the defence proposed a conditional sentence of 2 years less a day or 8-10 months incarceration.

The court determined that a conditional sentence was inappropriate due to the lack of exceptional mitigating circumstances and the need for general and specific deterrence and denunciation.

Vidinovski was sentenced to 18 months incarceration, 2 years probation, a restitution order of $44,556.44, and a DNA order.

The defendant was charged with sexual assault following an alleged incident at a fraternity house party on March 31-April 1, 2017.

The complainant alleged she was unconscious and therefore incapable of consenting to sexual intercourse.

The defendant maintained the complainant was conscious and consented to multiple instances of sexual intercourse.

The trial turned on credibility assessment and the capacity to consent.

The court found the complainant's evidence unreliable due to significant inconsistencies between her testimony and corroborating evidence, particularly regarding her demeanor and conduct the morning after the alleged assault.

The defendant was acquitted.

The applicant, charged with fraud and related offences, brought a motion for a stay of proceedings under section 24(1) of the Charter, alleging a breach of her right to be tried within a reasonable time under section 11(b).

The total delay from the date of charges to the anticipated end of trial was over 35 months.

The court applied the Jordan framework to determine whether periods of delay caused by defence counsel's unavailability should be deducted as defence delay.

The court concluded that certain periods of unavailability for rescheduled preliminary inquiry and trial dates constituted defence delay, reducing the net delay to 27 months.

As the net delay fell below the 30-month presumptive ceiling, the application for a stay was dismissed.