J. Prenger

Heeralal Ramdeo was convicted after a judge-alone trial for kidnapping, use of an imitation firearm to commit assault, and possession of a weapon for a purpose dangerous to public peace.

The Crown alleged Ramdeo masterminded the kidnapping of Dharwant Gill to locate Paul, who had stolen drugs from Ramdeo.

Gill's testimony, though inconsistent and from an unsavoury witness (treated as Vetrovec), was corroborated by other evidence.

The court found a conspiracy proven beyond a reasonable doubt and Ramdeo's probable membership.

Ramdeo's defence was rejected as unreasonable.

He was found guilty on most counts but acquitted of uttering threats due to reasonable doubt regarding the specific content of threats.

J.G. was convicted of sex trade-related offenses (influencing/directing, advertising, obtaining material benefit from a minor's sex trade) and child pornography offenses (possession and distribution).

The court imposed a global sentence of 4 years and six months.

Key legal considerations included the unconstitutionality of mandatory minimum sentences for the sex trade offenses, the inadmissibility of the accused's unrequested disciplinary records from custody, and the application of systemic racism as a mitigating factor in sentencing Black offenders.

The court found mandatory minimums unconstitutional, excluded the disciplinary records, and took judicial notice of systemic racism's deleterious impacts as a mitigating factor.

Credit for pre-trial custody and lockdown days due to COVID-19 was also applied.

The accused, charged with sexual services offences including procuring, sought to cross-examine the complainant about her prior and subsequent involvement in the sex trade.

The Crown objected, arguing the accused must comply with the procedures in s. 276 of the Criminal Code or analogous common law rules established in Seaboyer.

The court declined to follow a recent coordinate decision that extended Seaboyer to sexual services offences, holding that such an extension would exceed the bounds of incremental common law change and circumvent Parliament's deliberate choice not to include these offences in s. 276.

The court concluded that existing rules of evidence are sufficient to protect the trial process from irrelevant and prejudicial evidence.

This ruling addresses the admissibility of evidence obtained during a traffic stop where the defendant, a passenger, was questioned and his personal information was subsequently run through a police database.

The court found that the police officer's actions constituted an unreasonable search and seizure under Section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, as the passenger was psychologically detained without reasonable suspicion and compelled to provide identification.

The officer's testimony regarding the voluntariness of the information and the purpose of the questioning was deemed incredible.

Applying the framework from R. v. Grant, the court concluded that the Charter breach was serious, the evidence was conscriptive and created by the breach, and its admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

Consequently, the evidence was excluded from the trial.

The accused was charged with procuring, advertising sexual services, receiving material benefit, and uttering threats.

A preliminary issue arose regarding the applicability of s. 276 of the Criminal Code to evidence of the complainant's past sexual activity.

The Crown argued s. 276 applied, asserting that the procuring charge implied a lack of consent, effectively making the sexual activity sexual assault (a listed offence under s. 276).

The defence argued s. 276 did not apply as none of the charged offences are listed in s. 276(1), nor are they predicate or included offences.

The court ruled that s. 276 was not applicable, distinguishing between "control" in procuring and the vitiation of consent required for sexual assault, and noting Parliament's deliberate exclusion of sexual services offences from s. 276(1) in recent amendments.

The applicant, Tevin Wheatley, sought a bail review under section 520 of the Criminal Code after his detention was ordered due to breaching previous bail conditions related to serious human trafficking and dangerous driving charges.

The review was premised on a material change in circumstances: the presentation of a new surety (Minister Brenda Clarke) and a plan incorporating GPS electronic monitoring.

The court considered the admissibility of the new evidence under the modified Palmer criteria as per R. v. St. Cloud.

The judge found the new surety and GPS monitoring sufficiently mitigated the secondary (public safety) and tertiary (confidence in the administration of justice) grounds for detention.

Consequently, the applicant was released on a $5,000 recognizance with strict conditions, including GPS monitoring, residency with the surety, and restrictions on phone/internet use and travel.

The accused was charged with three offences: recruiting, holding, concealing, harbouring or exercising control over a person under 18 years of age to offer or provide sexual services for consideration contrary to section 286.3(2) of the Criminal Code; receiving a financial or material benefit from the commission of an offence under section 286.1(2) contrary to section 286.2(2); and knowingly advertising an offer to provide sexual services for consideration contrary to section 286.4.

The Crown's case relied primarily on the testimony of the complainant, a vulnerable 17-year-old who was homeless, drug-addicted, and desperate for money when she met the accused through Instagram.

The court found the complainant credible and reliable, and determined that the accused recruited her into sex work, controlled her movements, plied her with drugs, created a Backpage advertisement using her photographs, and took money from her after she engaged with a client.

The accused was found guilty on all three counts.

The accused, jointly charged with firearms offences, brought applications for a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter, alleging their s. 11(b) rights to a trial within a reasonable time were breached.

The total time from charge to the anticipated end of trial was approximately 33.5 months.

The court analyzed the delay, attributing portions to inherent time requirements, neutral delay (including illness of counsel and accommodating co-accused's counsel), and institutional delay.

The court found the institutional delay of approximately 16 months fell within the combined Morin guidelines for provincial and superior courts.

Balancing the prejudice against the societal interest in trying serious firearms charges, the court dismissed the applications.

The accused was charged with several firearms offences after taking a firearm and ammunition from a vehicle and delivering them to an acquaintance for safekeeping.

The defence argued that the accused acted under duress arising from threats of death or serious bodily harm by an abusive partner with a violent criminal history.

The court assessed the common law defence of duress using the framework from Supreme Court of Canada authorities and considered evidence of threats, fear, the accused’s circumstances including drug dependency and abuse, and whether a safe avenue of escape existed.

The court concluded that the threats were credible, temporally connected to the accused’s conduct, and reasonably believed by the accused.

Although alternatives may have existed objectively, the accused’s circumstances undermined the availability of a safe avenue of escape, and the proportionality requirement was satisfied.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction for dangerous driving, arguing that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence and failed to properly consider evidence suggesting the driving was the result of a momentary lapse.

The appellant also argued the trial judge relied on extrinsic information relating to possible alcohol impairment despite the withdrawal of the excess blood alcohol charge.

The court reviewed the applicable standards of review for factual and legal errors and considered whether the trial judge failed to address potentially exculpatory evidence.

The court held that the trial judge properly considered the evidence, rejected the momentary lapse explanation, and did not rely on extrinsic information.

The conviction was upheld.

Sentencing decision for invitation to sexual touching contrary to s. 152 of the Criminal Code.

The offender, a 22-year-old skate guard, engaged in sexually explicit communications with a 13-year-old girl and sent her an explicit image.

The defence challenged the constitutionality of the mandatory minimum 14-day sentence under s. 152, arguing it constituted cruel and unusual punishment.

The court rejected the Charter challenge and imposed the mandatory minimum sentence of 14 days incarceration, followed by 12 months probation with conditions including no contact, distance restrictions, and counselling requirements.

A DNA order and 10-year SOIRA order were also imposed.

The accused, a Toronto police officer, was charged with criminal harassment and assault on the basis of a private complaint laid in December 2010.

The accused brought an application to stay the charges pursuant to s.11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms on the grounds of unreasonable delay.

The Crown's office had delayed assigning an outside Crown to the case due to a conflict of interest, and the complainant had refused to provide disclosure until after her own trial was completed.

The total delay from the laying of the information to the scheduled trial date was approximately 35 months, with the court attributing 23 months of that delay to the state.

The court found that the delay was unreasonable and stayed the charges.

The accused was charged with multiple firearm offences after police stopped a vehicle in which he was a passenger and found a loaded handgun hidden in a sock in the seat pouch in front of him.

The Crown's case relied entirely on circumstantial evidence, including the presence of the accused's DNA on the sock.

The court found that while the circumstances were suspicious, the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused had knowledge and control of the firearm, as there was no direct evidence connecting him to the gun and alternative explanations for the DNA transfer could not be excluded.

All charges were dismissed.