M. Salih

During a murder trial, the Crown sought to introduce two pieces of evidence: an internet search conducted by an associate of the accused shortly after the shooting, and a video found on the associate's phone depicting the accused brandishing a firearm 11 days prior to the murder.

The court ruled the internet search inadmissible, finding its limited probative value was outweighed by its prejudicial effect.

However, the court admitted the video as prior discreditable conduct, concluding it was highly probative on the central issue of identity and its prejudicial effect could be mitigated by jury instructions.

The applicant, a young person charged with second-degree murder and firearms offences, brought a Charter application alleging violations of his rights under sections 10(a) and 12 during his arrest.

The police executed a search warrant using a dynamic entry and a violent struggle ensued when the applicant resisted arrest, resulting in officers punching him multiple times to gain control and seize a loaded firearm.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the section 10(a) right to be informed of the reasons for arrest did not accrue until the applicant was safely detained, which was delayed by his own actions.

Furthermore, the court held that the force used by the police was reasonable and justified under the circumstances, resulting in no section 12 violation.

The accused, charged with second-degree murder, sought to exclude a photograph taken of him surreptitiously by a police officer while he was seated in a courtroom for an unrelated matter.

The accused argued the photograph violated his rights under sections 7 and 8 of the Charter.

The court found no Charter breaches, noting there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in a public courtroom and no state compulsion involved.

However, the court exercised its residual discretion to exclude the photograph because the officer violated section 136 of the Courts of Justice Act, which prohibits taking photographs in a courtroom without judicial authorization.

The young person, charged with second degree murder, brought a Charter application challenging the validity of a search warrant executed at his residence.

He argued the Information to Obtain (ITO) failed to establish he resided at the address, the warrant was overly broad, the search of seized cell phones occurred outside the warrant's time limit, and the affiant deliberately misled the issuing justice.

The court dismissed the application, finding sufficient surveillance evidence linked the young person to the residence, the seizure of multiple phones was necessary, the forensic examination of the phones did not need to occur within the warrant's entry window, and there was no evidence of deliberate deception by police.

The young person, charged with second-degree murder, brought a Charter motion alleging a breach of section 8 rights regarding the search of a co-accused's mobile phone.

The applicant sought to exclude photographic and video evidence found on the device.

The court held that the applicant lacked standing, as there was no subjective or objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in images taken by another person in a group setting.

Furthermore, the court found the search warrant was validly issued based on reasonable and probable grounds.

The application was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his summary convictions for sexual assault and sexual interference against a seven-year-old complainant.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in finding the offences occurred within the six-month limitation period, alleging a failure to resolve reliability concerns with the child's evidence.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's credibility and reliability analysis was sufficient and revealed no palpable and overriding error.

The accused were charged with firearm and narcotic offences after police executed search warrants on a vehicle and a residence, discovering a handgun and drugs.

The court previously found that the search warrants were invalid because the information to obtain (ITO) lacked reasonable and probable grounds, violating the accused's s. 8 Charter rights.

In this decision, the court applied the Grant framework under s. 24(2) of the Charter and concluded that the police conduct was grossly negligent and misleading.

Given the seriousness of the breach and the impact on the accused's privacy interests, the court excluded both the handgun and the drugs from evidence.

The applicants, charged with firearm and drug offences following the execution of search warrants, brought a Garofoli application to exclude the seized evidence.

Prior to step five of the application, they sought to amplify the Information to Obtain (ITO) based on cross-examination of the affiant and an email.

The court allowed certain amplifications to correct good-faith errors in the ITO, but declined to add omitted information, noting that omissions could still be raised during the substantive argument on the warrant's validity.

The applicants, charged with firearm and drug offences following the execution of search warrants, sought leave to cross-examine the affiant of the Information to Obtain (ITO) under step five of a Garofoli application.

The court applied the Garofoli test, assessing whether there was a reasonable likelihood that cross-examination would elicit testimony tending to discredit the preconditions for the warrants.

The court granted leave to cross-examine on specific issues, including the omission of information regarding the shooter's name and the use of conclusory statements in the ITO, but denied leave on several other grounds where cross-examination was unlikely to assist or where the issues were better suited for argument at the Garofoli hearing.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and sexual interference involving an eight-year-old child.

At trial, an agreed statement of fact containing the evidence of the complainant's father was filed as an exhibit but was subsequently lost and could not be recreated.

The trial judge had relied on this missing exhibit as independent evidence of the complainant's post-event emotional state to confirm her testimony and reject the appellant's denial.

The Superior Court of Justice held that the incomplete appellate record made it impossible to determine if the trial judge erred in his reliance on the father's statement.

Finding a serious possibility that the missing exhibit deprived the appellant of a ground of appeal, the court allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial.

During a trial for sexual interference, the Crown and Defence brought several pre-trial and mid-trial applications regarding the admissibility of evidence.

The court ruled that the accused's statements to police on November 18 and October 26 were voluntary and did not violate his s. 10(b) Charter rights.

However, a statement made on October 28 was excluded because the accused was heavily intoxicated, rendering it involuntary.

The court also ordered redactions to the complainant's police interview to prevent impermissible oath-helping, and made mid-trial rulings allowing some prior consistent statements by the complainant to rebut allegations of recent fabrication.

The accused, jointly charged with firearms offences, brought applications for a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter, alleging their s. 11(b) rights to a trial within a reasonable time were breached.

The total time from charge to the anticipated end of trial was approximately 33.5 months.

The court analyzed the delay, attributing portions to inherent time requirements, neutral delay (including illness of counsel and accommodating co-accused's counsel), and institutional delay.

The court found the institutional delay of approximately 16 months fell within the combined Morin guidelines for provincial and superior courts.

Balancing the prejudice against the societal interest in trying serious firearms charges, the court dismissed the applications.