Adam D. Romain

The defendant, Jonathan Williams, was found guilty by a jury of harbouring a person to facilitate the sale of sexual services (s. 286.3 Criminal Code) and receiving financial benefit from the commission of such an offence (s. 286.2 Criminal Code).

The Crown sought a three-year sentence, while the defendant requested an 18-month conditional sentence.

The court rejected the conditional sentence, emphasizing the need for denunciation and general deterrence in human trafficking cases, which are considered inherently violent and exploitative.

The judge imposed a concurrent sentence of 28 months for harbouring and 20 months for receiving financial benefit, along with a three-year no-contact order and a DNA order.

The court considered mitigating factors such as the defendant being a first-time offender with strong community support and low risk of re-offending, but found the aggravating factors, including exploitation of trust and control over the victim's sexual services, to be more compelling.

The plaintiff sought substantial indemnity costs after successfully appealing a Master's order and denying leave to appeal a costs decision.

The court denied substantial indemnity, finding the plaintiff's offer to settle did not trigger Rule 49.10 consequences due to minimal compromise and timing.

The court awarded partial indemnity costs of $26,500, finding the plaintiff's counsel hours and rates reasonable given the complexity and volume of the appeal, and noting the defendants' costs outline was not credible.

Mr. Williams, convicted of sex trade-related offenses, brought an application challenging the constitutionality of s. 286.1(1) of the Criminal Code, arguing it violated his rights under sections 7 (security of the person) and 2(b) (freedom of expression) of the Charter.

He contended the provision was overbroad and grossly disproportionate, exacerbating safety risks for sex workers by inhibiting communication.

The Crown argued the provision was constitutional, citing the secondary nature of safety concerns in the PCEPA amendments and the pressing objectives of reducing demand for prostitution.

The court found that s. 286.1(1) did not offend s. 7 but did offend s. 2(b) of the Charter.

However, the court concluded that the infringement of s. 2(b) was saved by section 1 of the Charter, as the objectives were pressing and substantial, the means were rationally connected and minimally impairing, and the benefits outweighed the harms.

The application was dismissed.

This ruling addresses the admissibility of evidence obtained during a traffic stop where the defendant, a passenger, was questioned and his personal information was subsequently run through a police database.

The court found that the police officer's actions constituted an unreasonable search and seizure under Section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, as the passenger was psychologically detained without reasonable suspicion and compelled to provide identification.

The officer's testimony regarding the voluntariness of the information and the purpose of the questioning was deemed incredible.

Applying the framework from R. v. Grant, the court concluded that the Charter breach was serious, the evidence was conscriptive and created by the breach, and its admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

Consequently, the evidence was excluded from the trial.

The accused was charged with procuring, advertising sexual services, receiving material benefit, and uttering threats.

A preliminary issue arose regarding the applicability of s. 276 of the Criminal Code to evidence of the complainant's past sexual activity.

The Crown argued s. 276 applied, asserting that the procuring charge implied a lack of consent, effectively making the sexual activity sexual assault (a listed offence under s. 276).

The defence argued s. 276 did not apply as none of the charged offences are listed in s. 276(1), nor are they predicate or included offences.

The court ruled that s. 276 was not applicable, distinguishing between "control" in procuring and the vitiation of consent required for sexual assault, and noting Parliament's deliberate exclusion of sexual services offences from s. 276(1) in recent amendments.

An insurer sought to amend its statement of defence approximately nine years after a fire destroyed the insured's restaurant to assert that the insured had deliberately set the fire, rather than relying on its original defence of non-cooperation with the fire investigation.

The motion judge dismissed the amendment motion and awarded substantial indemnity costs.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal of the amendment but reduced the costs award, finding that while the insurer's delay was inordinate and triggered a presumption of prejudice that was not rebutted, the conduct did not rise to the level of egregious misconduct warranting substantial indemnity costs.

The defendant Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's claim for disability benefits, arguing it was statute-barred by the Limitations Act, 2002.

The plaintiff contended that the limitation period had not started due to a lack of a clear and unequivocal denial, or alternatively, that a rolling limitation period applied.

The court found that the plaintiff's claim was discovered before October 30, 2010, making the action commenced in October 2012 outside the two-year limitation period.

The court also rejected the application of a rolling limitation period for claims concerning initial entitlement to benefits.

Consequently, the plaintiff's claim was dismissed.

The accused was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle and excess alcohol on September 23, 2011.

The information was sworn on October 3, 2011.

On January 9, 2013, the accused applied for a stay of proceedings pursuant to sections 11(b) and 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms on the grounds that his right to be tried within a reasonable time had been infringed.

The application was deferred until after trial.

The accused was found guilty of the excess alcohol charge on June 7, 2013.

The section 11(b) application was heard on January 2 and 3, 2014.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the total delay of approximately 21 months from charge to trial, with approximately 7 months of systemic delay, fell within constitutionally acceptable levels.

The court found that the prejudice suffered by the accused was modest and that the societal interest in a trial on the merits outweighed the accused's interest in a trial without unreasonable delay.

The defendants brought a motion seeking an order compelling the plaintiff to attend a psychiatric defence medical examination after the plaintiff had already attended defence medical assessments with an orthopaedic specialist and a neuropsychologist.

The defendants argued that the neuropsychological assessment did not substitute for a psychiatric evaluation, particularly in light of references in the report suggesting potential psychiatric issues.

The court held that the parties had effectively agreed that the plaintiff would attend either a neuropsychological or psychiatric defence examination but not both, and the defendants had already exercised that option.

In the absence of medical evidence showing the plaintiff was receiving psychiatric treatment or requiring psychiatric assessment, the allegations in the statement of claim alone were insufficient to justify an additional defence medical.

The motion was dismissed and costs were awarded to the plaintiff.