Adam D. Romain

The applicant sought statutory accident benefits for physiotherapy services and orthopaedic and psychiatric assessments following a motor vehicle accident.

The respondent insurer denied the claims based on insurer examinations.

The adjudicator found that the physiotherapy services were reasonable and necessary for managing the applicant's chronic pain, rejecting the insurer's argument that treatment must lead to full recovery.

The adjudicator also approved the assessments, noting the insurer's assessors conducted paper reviews without reviewing key medical reports.

Finding that the insurer unreasonably withheld payments, the adjudicator ordered a special award of 50% of the disputed amounts, plus interest.

An insurer sought to amend its statement of defence approximately nine years after a fire destroyed the insured's restaurant to assert that the insured had deliberately set the fire, rather than relying on its original defence of non-cooperation with the fire investigation.

The motion judge dismissed the amendment motion and awarded substantial indemnity costs.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal of the amendment but reduced the costs award, finding that while the insurer's delay was inordinate and triggered a presumption of prejudice that was not rebutted, the conduct did not rise to the level of egregious misconduct warranting substantial indemnity costs.

The defendant Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's claim for disability benefits, arguing it was statute-barred by the Limitations Act, 2002.

The plaintiff contended that the limitation period had not started due to a lack of a clear and unequivocal denial, or alternatively, that a rolling limitation period applied.

The court found that the plaintiff's claim was discovered before October 30, 2010, making the action commenced in October 2012 outside the two-year limitation period.

The court also rejected the application of a rolling limitation period for claims concerning initial entitlement to benefits.

Consequently, the plaintiff's claim was dismissed.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination in employment on the basis of disability.

While awaiting a decision on a preliminary issue of delay, the applicant commenced a Small Claims Court action seeking damages for the same alleged Code infringements to preserve her limitation period.

The Tribunal found that section 34(11) of the Human Rights Code is mandatory and prohibits an application where a civil proceeding seeking remedies for the same alleged infringement has been commenced.

The Application was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

The accused was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle and excess alcohol on September 23, 2011.

The information was sworn on October 3, 2011.

On January 9, 2013, the accused applied for a stay of proceedings pursuant to sections 11(b) and 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms on the grounds that his right to be tried within a reasonable time had been infringed.

The application was deferred until after trial.

The accused was found guilty of the excess alcohol charge on June 7, 2013.

The section 11(b) application was heard on January 2 and 3, 2014.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the total delay of approximately 21 months from charge to trial, with approximately 7 months of systemic delay, fell within constitutionally acceptable levels.

The court found that the prejudice suffered by the accused was modest and that the societal interest in a trial on the merits outweighed the accused's interest in a trial without unreasonable delay.

The young person appealed their custodial sentence.

The Court of Appeal admitted fresh evidence showing the young person had done well in school and had good prospects, supported by caring grandparents.

The Court allowed the appeal and commuted the balance of the custodial sentence to deferred custody, leaving the probation order intact.

The defendants brought a motion seeking an order compelling the plaintiff to attend a psychiatric defence medical examination after the plaintiff had already attended defence medical assessments with an orthopaedic specialist and a neuropsychologist.

The defendants argued that the neuropsychological assessment did not substitute for a psychiatric evaluation, particularly in light of references in the report suggesting potential psychiatric issues.

The court held that the parties had effectively agreed that the plaintiff would attend either a neuropsychological or psychiatric defence examination but not both, and the defendants had already exercised that option.

In the absence of medical evidence showing the plaintiff was receiving psychiatric treatment or requiring psychiatric assessment, the allegations in the statement of claim alone were insufficient to justify an additional defence medical.

The motion was dismissed and costs were awarded to the plaintiff.

The applicants, two young persons charged with multiple counts of robbery, brought a pre-trial motion seeking a stay of proceedings under section 11(b) of the Charter, alleging unreasonable delay.

The total delay between arrest and the scheduled seven-day trial was approximately 13 months.

The court applied the Morin framework, finding that while the delay was longer than ideal for a youth court matter, it was largely attributable to neutral inherent time requirements, including bail proceedings and retaining counsel.

The institutional delay of just over nine months was deemed reasonable given the complexity of the case, and the motion was dismissed.