David A. Gourlay

The self-represented appellant attempted to appeal a single Divisional Court judge's direction made during a judicial review proceeding concerning a freedom of information disclosure dispute.

The court held that no appeal as of right lay to the Court of Appeal from that direction.

Depending on whether the order was made on a motion, the proper route was either a motion to a panel of the Divisional Court under s. 21(5) of the Courts of Justice Act or, otherwise, a leave appeal under s. 6(1)(a).

Because the notice of appeal clearly failed to engage the court's jurisdiction, the proceeding was dismissed under r. 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure as an abuse of process.

No costs were ordered.

The moving party sought a panel review under s. 21(5) of the Courts of Justice Act of a single judge's decision denying an extension of time to apply for judicial review of a City Council zoning decision.

The moving party attempted to introduce new affidavit evidence, which the panel rejected as improper and available at the original hearing.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding no error of law or palpable and overriding error of fact in the motion judge's discretionary decision to deny the extension due to unexplained delay and prejudice.

A case conference was held to schedule a motion to extend the time for an application for judicial review regarding a development settlement.

The applicant sought procedural orders, including that the respondent pay for the cross-examination of its witness or that the examination be deferred to the hearing, and that the respondent deliver its factum early.

The court dismissed these requests, ordering that cross-examinations and factum delivery proceed in the ordinary course under the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court also noted the corporate applicant requires leave to be represented by its member, who is a lawyer.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiff's action against the Toronto Police Services Board and an individual officer, the defendants sought costs.

The defendants requested a significantly reduced amount of $25,000 on a partial indemnity basis, down from their actual partial indemnity costs of over $207,000, to account for the self-represented plaintiff's financial circumstances.

The plaintiff did not provide costs submissions.

The court found the requested amount reasonable and ordered the plaintiff to pay $25,000 in costs.

The plaintiff, Reza Bahramzadeh, sued the Toronto Police Services Board and Officer Amanda Mason for negligence, wrongful arrest, and assault related to his 2008 arrest and a subsequent 2009 assault by a third party while on bail.

The plaintiff alleged excessive force during arrest, fabricated allegations, and police responsibility for the later assault and missing property.

The court found the plaintiff's evidence unreliable and inconsistent with objective records.

It ruled that the plaintiff's attempts to relitigate criminal convictions constituted an abuse of process and that the police had reasonable grounds for arrest.

The court also found no evidence linking the police to the 2009 assault or the missing property, and no negligence in his transport.

The plaintiff's claims for broad social reforms and unrelated relief were deemed inappropriate for the court.

The action was dismissed.

The Applicant sought to quash a City of Toronto by-law (By-law 1515-2019, section 1(A)) that limited the issuance of new payday loan establishment licenses to renewals only, arguing it was ultra vires the City of Toronto Act, 2006, discriminatory, and in conflict with federal and provincial legislation.

The court dismissed the application, finding the by-law to be a valid exercise of the City's broad authority for consumer protection, not discriminatory in the municipal law sense, and not in conflict with higher legislation, as it did not prohibit all payday loan operations nor frustrate the purpose of the relevant Acts.

The plaintiff brought a defamation action against the defendant, a municipal employee, for statements she made at a Business Improvement Area (BIA) annual general meeting regarding his eligibility to serve on the board.

The defendant brought an anti-SLAPP motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act to dismiss the action.

The court granted the motion, finding that the expression related to a matter of public interest, the defendant had valid defences including statutory immunity and qualified privilege, and the public interest in protecting the expression outweighed the minimal harm suffered by the plaintiff.

The applicants sought judicial review of a decision by the Board of Governors of Exhibition Place to deny them the right to rent space for a Hallowe'en-themed event due to alleged harassment of staff.

The Board raised a preliminary issue that the decision was a private contractual matter and not subject to judicial review.

The Divisional Court agreed, finding that the decision to not enter into a short-term rental agreement was an exercise of private law discretion, not a statutory power of decision or a matter of sufficient public character.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The applicant sought judicial review of two Information and Privacy Commissioner (IPC) decisions that dismissed his appeal regarding a freedom of information request for police records.

The IPC found that the applicant's request was barred by the doctrines of issue estoppel and collateral attack, as the records at issue had already been adjudicated in a prior 2003 proceeding.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the IPC's application of issue estoppel and collateral attack was reasonable, and that there was no denial of procedural fairness.

The plaintiff sought costs following a successful motion regarding 166 undertakings and refusals from the defendants' discoveries.

The plaintiff claimed $228,395.58 on a substantial indemnity basis, citing the defendants' conduct, including delayed disclosure and excessive refusals.

The court declined to award substantial indemnity costs, finding the conduct did not rise to the level of scandalous or reprehensible behavior.

Applying the principle of what is fair and reasonable for the unsuccessful party to pay, the court fixed partial indemnity costs at $100,000, payable jointly by the TTC Defendants.

The applicants brought a motion to enforce an interim settlement agreement with the City of Toronto regarding physical distancing standards in the city's shelter system during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The City had asserted compliance with the agreement on June 15, 2020, which would trigger the termination of the agreement.

The court found that the City breached the agreement by asserting compliance when it had not used its 'best efforts' to achieve the required physical distancing standards across all sites.

The court ordered the City to continue its pre-compliance reporting obligations until it fully met its obligations under the agreement.

The applicants brought a refusals motion to compel answers and document production from the City of Toronto and Ontario in a Charter application challenging shelter standards during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The motion sought to enforce an Interim Settlement Agreement regarding physical distancing and bed capacity in shelters.

The court granted the motion in part, finding many of the City's refusals improper regarding system-wide compliance data for the May 15-June 15, 2020 period, but upheld other refusals based on proportionality, particularly concerning the Central Intake service, daily capacity data, and information outside the specified period.

The applicant, a residential tenant living above an unlicensed cannabis retail store, brought an application under section 18(4) of the Cannabis Control Act to lift an interim closure order that barred entry to the entire premises.

The premises had been repeatedly closed by law enforcement due to illegal cannabis sales, but the operators continually breached the closures.

The court dismissed the application, finding the applicant failed to satisfy the burden of proving that, if access were granted, the premises would not continue to be used for illegal cannabis sales with the landlord's permission.

The City of Toronto sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision finding it had discriminated against the respondent.

The respondent was subjected to a racial slur by another customer at a court services office.

While most City staff responded promptly and appropriately, the Tribunal found discrimination based on one clerk's inadequate response.

The Divisional Court granted the judicial review and quashed the Tribunal's decision, holding that it was unreasonable to find a poisoned environment and fix corporate responsibility on the City based on the inconsequential conduct of a single non-supervisory employee when the overall response was appropriate.

The appellant, a black man, was unlawfully stopped, punched, searched, and left handcuffed on ice by police officers.

The trial judge found breaches of ss. 8, 9, and 10 of the Charter but declined to find racial profiling under s. 15.

On appeal, the Divisional Court found that the circumstantial evidence clearly established racial profiling.

The court increased the Charter damages against the Police Services Board to $50,000 to vindicate society's interest and deter future breaches, and increased punitive damages against both the Board and the offending officer to $25,000.

Following a successful civil Charter action against police defendants, the plaintiff sought substantial indemnity costs after obtaining modest damages and declaratory relief.

The defendants argued that no costs should be awarded because the plaintiff recovered less than $100,000 and should have proceeded under the Simplified Procedure.

The court held that it was reasonable for the plaintiff to proceed under the ordinary procedure given the need for full discovery and cross-examination to establish credibility and Charter violations.

The court further found troubling litigation conduct by the defendants, including problematic testimony and evidentiary issues relating to video recordings.

Balancing the factors under Rule 57.01 and access to justice considerations, the court awarded substantial indemnity costs to the plaintiff.

The plaintiff sued for battery, false arrest, and Charter damages after police stopped him without a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, forcibly subdued him, searched his pockets and wallet, and kept him handcuffed outside in freezing conditions.

The court held there was no lawful investigative detention under the common law framework in Mann, no lawful basis for the searches, and breaches of ss. 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b) of the Charter.

The court also found that one officer punched the plaintiff twice and committed battery and false arrest.

General damages of $9,000, punitive damages of $18,000, and declarations of Charter breach were awarded.

The appellants, police officers and the Toronto Police Services Board, appealed a Small Claims Court judgment finding them liable for excessive force during the arrest of a cyclist who ran a red light and fled.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial judge erred in law by failing to apply the justification analysis under section 25 of the Criminal Code and section 218 of the Highway Traffic Act.

The trial judge committed a palpable and overriding error by ignoring the exigent circumstances of the arrest and imposing an unrealistic standard on the officers.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision dismissing a contempt motion against the respondent municipality.

The motion judge had found that the municipality attempted to comply with an order to provide the appellant with a copy of his file, and therefore was not in contempt.

The Court of Appeal found no error in this decision based on the affidavit evidence.

The appeal was dismissed with no order as to costs, though the municipality was directed to provide another copy of the file.

Multiple defendants brought motions seeking the appointment of a litigation guardian for a self‑represented plaintiff pursuing four personal injury actions.

The court considered medical evidence from a psychiatrist assessing the plaintiff’s mental capacity under s. 6 of the Substitute Decisions Act, 1992 and Rules 7.01 and 7.04 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The expert concluded that the plaintiff suffered from a delusional disorder and was unable to understand information relevant to litigation decisions or appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of those decisions.

The court found the plaintiff’s expectations of recovering approximately $26.9 million in damages to be grossly unrealistic and indicative of an inability to make rational litigation decisions.

On a balance of probabilities, the court determined the plaintiff was mentally incapable in respect of the litigation and required a litigation guardian.