Catherine Mullaly

The accused was charged with criminal harassment after his ex-wife discovered a GPS tracking device on her vehicle and found emails in his account confirming its purchase.

The accused argued the emails were obtained in violation of his s. 8 Charter rights.

The court held that while the accused had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his emails, s. 8 was not engaged because the search was conducted by a private citizen without police involvement.

The court found the accused guilty of criminal harassment, concluding that his unprovoked attack on the complainant's companion in her presence constituted 'besetting' under s. 264(2)(c) of the Criminal Code.

The appellant appealed convictions for multiple sexual offences against a child family member and also appealed sentence.

The court rejected the argument that the appellant's statement to police was involuntary, applying the common law confessions rule and holding that he understood the consequences of speaking to police; in any event, any error was harmless given other admissible admissions.

The court also rejected attacks on the complainant's credibility, finding no failure to consider motive, contradictions, or the absence of more serious allegations.

However, the court held that a five-year penitentiary sentence exceeded the appropriate appellate range on the facts and reduced the sentence to four years.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault and two counts of breach of recognizance, and sentenced to 40 months' imprisonment in addition to 16 months' pre-trial custody.

The appellant, a first offender with a history of serious mental illness, appealed the sentence.

The Court of Appeal reviewed institutional records indicating the appellant had resisted treatment in custody.

Given the brutality of the assault and the risk posed to the community, the Court found no error by the trial judge and dismissed the sentence appeal.

The young person appealed their custodial sentence.

The Court of Appeal admitted fresh evidence showing the young person had done well in school and had good prospects, supported by caring grandparents.

The Court allowed the appeal and commuted the balance of the custodial sentence to deferred custody, leaving the probation order intact.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge erred in assessing the complainant's credibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge was aware of the complainant's shortcomings as a witness but reasonably accepted the fundamental point of her evidence that the appellant punched her in the head.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and uttering a death threat, arguing the trial judge misapprehended the complainant's evidence and erred in applying the third stage of the W.D. analysis.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge did not misapprehend the evidence regarding the appellant's boasting or the complainant's description of his post-assault behaviour.

The trial judge was entitled to reject the appellant's evidence and accept the complainant's evidence to find the charges proved beyond a reasonable doubt.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of possession of stolen property over $5,000 after being found in possession of stolen specialty refrigerators.

He appealed, arguing the trial judge misapprehended the evidence by finding the refrigerators were delivered and paid for in the middle of the night, when evidence suggested delivery occurred during regular business hours.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge's misapprehension of the delivery time was material to his reasoning process and met the stringent test for a miscarriage of justice.

The conviction was set aside and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that his rights under ss. 9 and 10 of the Charter were violated during a police encounter in a parking lot.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the trial judge that no detention occurred until the formal arrest, as the initial interaction was preliminary and exploratory.

The court also upheld the finding that there were reasonable grounds for the arrest, making the subsequent search lawful as an incident to arrest.

The appellant appealed a restitution order imposed as part of his sentence.

Fresh evidence demonstrated that the appellant's criminal record prevented him from obtaining employment in his trained field, which in turn prevented him from paying the large restitution amount and obtaining a pardon.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, noting that the restitution order undermined rather than assisted his rehabilitation.

The restitution order was reduced to $40,000, distributed pro rata among the five victims.

The appellant pleaded guilty to manslaughter and was sentenced to two years less a day, plus two years of probation, after serving 599 days of pre-sentence custody.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred by failing to give reasons for departing from the usual two-for-one credit for pre-trial custody under the law prior to the Truth in Sentencing Act.

The Court of Appeal agreed that the trial judge erred in principle, removing the usual deference.

However, upon reviewing the aggravating and mitigating factors, the Court found the ultimate sentence imposed was fit and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of a restricted firearm with ammunition, arguing that the verdict was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's inference that the appellant knew there was a gun in the car he was driving was logically consistent and reasonably supported by the totality of the evidence, including the time of day, the presence of latex gloves, and the fact that the gun was not hidden.

The appellant appealed his robbery conviction, arguing that the trial judge failed to expressly caution himself about the specific dangers of visual identification evidence, particularly that it was interracial, occurred under stress, and involved a weapon.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the experienced trial judge is presumed to know the law and had expressly cautioned himself on the generic risks of identification evidence.

The trial judge provided clear positive reasons for accepting the victim's identification, noting the victim had a clear, close-up look at the assailant and took great care during the photo line-up.