R. Graham Zoppi

The appellant was convicted of historical sexual offences against two sisters.

He appealed the convictions, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting cross-count similar fact evidence and prior consistent statements.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge reasonably concluded the similar fact evidence had significant probative value that outweighed its prejudicial effect, and properly admitted the prior consistent statements under the narrative exception to explain the delay in reporting.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction for assault with a weapon under s. 267 of the Criminal Code.

The appeal challenged the trial judge’s admission of a 911 call under the principled exception to the hearsay rule and argued the trial judge improperly relied on judicial notice regarding the complainant’s injuries.

The appeal court held that the trial judge correctly assessed threshold reliability and necessity when admitting the 911 call and was entitled to consider surrounding circumstances, including corroborating observations by police and the complainant’s availability for cross‑examination.

The court also held that the trial judge did not improperly take judicial notice but instead made permissible credibility findings based on the evidentiary record.

Deference was owed to the trial judge’s credibility assessments and factual findings.

The appellant appealed convictions for impaired driving and refusing to provide a breath sample under the Criminal Code.

He argued that the trial judge provided insufficient reasons, misapprehended evidence regarding impairment, failed to explain the mens rea for the refusal offence, and failed to apply the “last chance” doctrine.

The Superior Court held that although the trial judge’s reasons were brief, they were sufficient when read in light of the record and allowed for meaningful appellate review.

The court found no material misapprehension of evidence and concluded that the trial judge properly found that the appellant deliberately obstructed the breath testing process.

The “last chance” doctrine did not apply because the appellant never attempted to comply with the breath demand.