Louis P. Strezos

Mikhail Vasiliev pleaded guilty to multiple counts of extortion, unauthorized use of a computer to commit mischief to data (related to LockBit ransomware attacks), and possession of prohibited firearms.

He deployed ransomware against three Canadian companies, causing significant financial losses and operational disruptions, totaling approximately $900,000 in damages and remediation costs.

The court considered aggravating factors such as the planned and deliberate nature of the cybercrimes, the motivation of personal gain, the substantial harm to victims, and the possession of loaded firearms.

Mitigating factors included his guilty plea, early resolution efforts, consent to extradition to the U.S. for related charges, anticipated restitution, and being a first offender.

The judge imposed a global sentence of four years and six months imprisonment, emphasizing denunciation and general deterrence for cybercrime.

This is a sentence appeal where the appellant sought a reduction in his sentence.

While the trial judge's original sentence was deemed fit at the time it was imposed, the Court of Appeal considered compelling fresh evidence of the appellant's post-sentencing rehabilitative efforts, including successful completion of numerous programs and strong family connections.

In light of these highly unusual circumstances and the strong fresh evidence, the court reduced the appellant's sentence to 16 months.

The appellant, James Hawryluk, sought leave to appeal his sentence, specifically challenging an automatic s. 109(1) firearm prohibition order and a forfeiture order, arguing his s. 35 Métis right to hunt for sustenance under s. 113(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

He also requested the firearm be transferred to a family member or that the dismissal be without prejudice to a future s. 113(1) application.

The Court of Appeal found no error in principle by the sentencing judge for not considering s. 113 when imposing the s. 109 order, noting that the appellant could bring a s. 113 application before the Superior Court of Justice.

The appeal was dismissed on the firearm issues, but the victim fine surcharge of $200 was set aside due to its unconstitutionality as per R. v. Boudreault.

The applicant, charged with first-degree murder, brought an application for a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter, alleging a violation of his s. 11(b) right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The total delay was 34 months and 9 days, exceeding the 30-month presumptive ceiling.

The Crown argued that the COVID-19 pandemic and case complexity were exceptional circumstances justifying the delay.

The court found the pandemic was a discrete exceptional event and deducted 187 days, bringing the net delay to just under 28 months.

The court declined to find the case particularly complex and held that a stay was not warranted for the sub-ceiling delay, as the Crown's refusal to consent to a judge-alone re-election was reasonable given the joint trial context.

The application was dismissed.

The applicant, charged with first-degree murder, brought a pre-trial application seeking disclosure of information provided to police by a confidential informer, arguing the informer was a material witness and the information was necessary to raise a reasonable doubt.

The court held that the 'innocence at stake' test is the sole exception to informer privilege, even for material witnesses.

While the applicant established that the privileged information was not available from any other source, the court found the application premature.

The court dismissed the application without prejudice, ruling that the trial judge would be in a better position to determine if the applicant could raise a reasonable doubt without the privileged information after the Crown's key witness was cross-examined.

The Crown sought to introduce historical text messages sent by the accused to his wife, which were obtained by police pursuant to a valid general warrant.

The accused sought to exclude the messages on the basis of spousal privilege under s. 4(3) of the Canada Evidence Act and s. 189(6) of the Criminal Code.

The court dismissed the application, holding that spousal privilege is a testimonial privilege that protects a spouse from being compelled to testify, but does not render the communications themselves inadmissible when independently and lawfully obtained by police.

The three accused were charged with importing cocaine after returning from a vacation in Jamaica.

Border Services Officers found approximately half a kilo of cocaine hidden inside cocoa powder cans in each of their checked suitcases.

The accused immediately disavowed knowledge of the drugs, claiming they were planted by unknown persons.

The court rejected the Crown's argument that 'Occam's Razor' proved guilt and found that the accused's immediate disavowals and testimony raised a reasonable doubt regarding their knowledge of the drugs.

All three accused were found not guilty.

The appellant was convicted of sexual offences against his nephew.

He appealed on the grounds that the trial judge erred in assessing his credibility by relying on his prior convictions for driving-related offences without sufficient detail about the nature, dates, or specifics of those convictions.

The trial judge characterized these convictions as crimes of dishonesty demonstrating callous disregard for the rules.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the manner in which evidence of the appellant's criminal record was adduced at trial deprived the trial judge of the information necessary to make an informed assessment of the impact of those convictions on the appellant's credibility as a witness.

The appellant appealed a sentence imposed by the Ontario Court of Justice on February 5, 2019.

The Court of Appeal identified a mathematical error in the trial judge's calculation of credit for pre-sentence custody.

The appeal was allowed and the appellant was granted an additional 22 days of credit for pre-sentence custody, for a total credit of 33 days.

The appellant appealed a sentence imposed by the Ontario Court of Justice on January 16, 2019.

The appeal was dismissed as abandoned after the St. Lawrence Valley Correctional and Treatment Centre communicated that it would receive the appellant immediately as he continued to serve his sentence.

The appellant sought leave to appeal from a summary conviction appeal court decision regarding sentences imposed following convictions in two cases.

The central issue concerned whether a sentencing judge may impose a small fine as part of a sentence for the purpose of reducing the mandatory victim fine surcharge.

The summary conviction appeal judge had corrected an illegal sentence by removing a fine that violated s. 731 of the Criminal Code, which prohibits combining probation with both custody and a fine.

Leave to appeal was dismissed on two grounds: the issue did not arise squarely on the facts, and a pending Supreme Court of Canada decision in R. v. Tinker regarding the constitutional validity of the victim fine surcharge would likely address the applicant's concerns.

The appellant appealed his sentence of three years' custody for domestic violence offences, including assault with a weapon, assault causing bodily harm, forcible confinement, and criminal harassment.

The trial judge imposed a three-year global sentence with 24 months of enhanced pre-sentence custody credit, leaving one year to serve, and a ten-year long-term supervision order.

The appellant identified a calculation error: he should have received 33 months of credit, not 24 months.

The Crown conceded the error but argued the appellate court should increase the global sentence to three years and nine months to maintain the one-year custodial effect and allow time for correctional authorities to develop a release plan.

The appellate court granted the appeal, corrected the credit to 33 months, and reduced the remaining custodial term to three months, rejecting the Crown's argument that the sentence should be increased to accommodate administrative planning.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder of his wife following a judge alone trial and sentenced to life imprisonment with no eligibility for parole for twelve years.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the conviction on grounds of material misapprehension of evidence, specifically regarding a police demonstration video concerning the time required for a wheelchair-bound person to reach an alarm keypad.

The appellant also raised arguments regarding DNA cross-contamination and alternate explanations for gunshot residue.

The Court of Appeal found that while the trial judge erred in stating no video recording existed, this error did not constitute material misapprehension warranting intervention, as the trial judge had fully considered the demonstration evidence and concluded it did not raise a reasonable doubt.

The conviction and sentence appeals were dismissed.

The appellant appealed his sentence imposed following a guilty plea to possession of a prohibited firearm.

The trial judge had described an accidental blast from a sawed-off shotgun as narrowly missing the complainant as an aggravating factor, despite the appellant's qualification of the facts during his guilty plea that the blast was accidental.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge failed to give effect to the appellant's factual qualification and that this mis-description factored into the sentence imposed.

The appeal was allowed in part, and the sentence on the possession of a prohibited firearm charge was reduced from five years and thirty-four days to four years, seven months and four days.

The balance of the sentence appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for aggravated assault and his sentence.

Duty counsel raised three issues: that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence regarding who instigated the dispute, erred in finding excessive force was used in the jail cell context, and erred in assessing Officer Chen's observations of the altercation.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's factual determinations and dismissed the conviction appeal.

The court also found the sentence, imposed for a serious aggravated assault in the context of interference with a justice system participant, to be entirely fit and dismissed the sentence appeal.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of oxycodone for the purposes of trafficking and possession of cocaine, as well as his sentence.

The Court of Appeal granted the appeal from the trafficking conviction and substituted a conviction for simple possession of oxycodone.

The appeal from the cocaine possession conviction was dismissed.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted and a sentence of time served was substituted in place of the original sentence.

Appeal from conviction and sentence for criminal negligence causing death and bodily harm arising from a swing stage collapse at a construction site.

The appellant, a project manager, was convicted of four counts of criminal negligence causing death and one count of criminal negligence causing bodily harm after five workers fell more than 100 feet when the swing stage collapsed.

Only two lifelines were available for six workers, contrary to provincial law and industry practice.

The appellant had authority to direct the workers and was aware of the safety breach but failed to take corrective action.

The Court of Appeal upheld both the conviction and the three-and-a-half-year concurrent sentence, finding no legal error or palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's findings of fact or application of law.

The accused pleaded guilty to possession of cocaine for the purposes of trafficking contrary to section 4(1) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

Police seized 81.64 grams of cocaine powder from the accused's family residence where three young children and a teenager were living.

The Crown sought a 15-month custodial sentence, while the defence sought 3 to 6 months followed by probation.

The court imposed a 6-month custodial sentence followed by 3 years' probation with conditions including a curfew and 180 hours of community service.

The court balanced aggravating factors (quantity of drugs, prior trafficking conviction, presence of children in the home) against significant mitigating factors (full cooperation with police, genuine remorse, role as primary caregiver and financial provider for extended family, successful completion of counselling, low risk of reoffending).

In a criminal appeal, the court addressed whether the jury charge properly instructed jurors on how to assess a complainant's testimony about events allegedly occurring years earlier in childhood.

The intermediate appellate court had set aside convictions for sexual assault and sexual interference and ordered a new trial.

The court held that, read as a whole, the trial judge's instructions conveyed the correct legal approach to credibility and memory assessment.

The appeal was allowed and the convictions were restored.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the rule in Browne v. Dunn was violated when he was not confronted with an alleged motive to fabricate, and that the trial judge erred by failing to give an Oliver instruction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant testified after his co-accused and had ample opportunity to respond to the evidence.

Furthermore, an Oliver instruction was not requested at trial, and its absence did not amount to misdirection.