Louis P. Strezos

The appellant was convicted of fraud over $5,000 for directing corporate rebate cheques to a company he owned, defrauding his employer of nearly $4 million.

He was sentenced to five years' imprisonment and ordered to pay over $3.4 million in restitution.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge improperly intervened during his testimony, failed to exclude banking records obtained in breach of an implied undertaking, and erred in ordering restitution.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's interventions were appropriate to assist a self-represented accused.

Assuming the banking records were obtained in breach of the appellant's Charter rights, the Court applied the Grant framework and concluded the evidence should not be excluded under s 24(2).

The restitution order was also upheld.

Following the dismissal of the Crown's appeal from costs ordered against it in forfeiture proceedings under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, the respondents sought costs of the appeal.

The Court of Appeal declined to award costs, noting that costs are generally not awarded against the Crown in criminal proceedings absent a Charter infringement, serious Crown misconduct, or exceptional circumstances.

The court found no serious misconduct by the Crown on the appeal itself, and no exceptional circumstances justifying a costs award.

Furthermore, the court noted that section 683 of the Criminal Code precludes a costs award on the appeal.

The applicant, convicted of fraud and sentenced to 5.5 years in prison with significant restitution and fines, applied for the appointment of counsel for his appeal under s. 684 of the Criminal Code after being denied Legal Aid.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding that the proposed grounds of appeal primarily contested factual findings and lacked merit.

Furthermore, the applicant failed to adequately explain the whereabouts of the defrauded funds or prove his lack of financial means, and the court concluded he was capable of advancing his own arguments given his business experience and the materials prepared by his trial counsel.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario appointed amicus curiae to vet ineffective assistance of counsel claims raised by four appellants.

The amicus was directed to assess the specificity of the grounds alleged and determine whether the claims, if established, were capable of constituting ineffective assistance of counsel.

The amicus was ordered to report back to the court by July 11, 2016, to facilitate moving the appeals forward.

The Crown appealed a nearly $1 million costs award made against it after its unsuccessful application to forfeit two properties under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

The application judge found the Crown's conduct, including pursuing a meritless application against innocent third parties and taking an intransigent attitude, amounted to a marked and unacceptable departure from reasonable standards.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the Ontario Court of Justice has an implied power to award costs in CDSA forfeiture applications, the correct standard was applied, and the quantum of costs was reasonable.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual interference and sexual assault, arguing the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on how to assess the credibility of the complainant, who was 12 at the time of the events and 17 at trial.

The trial judge instructed the jury that they were considering 'the memory of a 12 year old'.

The majority of the Court of Appeal held this instruction was an error in law as it could have confused the jury into assessing the complainant's credibility on non-peripheral matters as if she were 12 years old.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The accused was convicted after trial of multiple offences involving sexual contact with an 11‑year‑old child, including sexual assault, sexual interference, invitation to sexual touching, and exposure for a sexual purpose.

The court considered the mandatory minimum penalties under the Criminal Code and the principles of denunciation and deterrence applicable to sexual offences against children.

Mitigating factors included the offender’s lack of criminal record, strong community support, and evidence that the conduct fell toward the lower end of the spectrum for such offences, while aggravating factors included the victim’s young age and the repeated nature of the conduct.

The court rejected the Crown’s request for a sentence above the statutory minimum and imposed a custodial sentence of 12 months followed by probation.

Several ancillary orders were also made, including DNA, SOIRA registration, and certain s.161 restrictions.

The accused brought a procedural motion within a Rowbotham application seeking permission to file his Legal Aid Ontario file with the court without disclosing it to the Crown.

He argued the file contained presumptively privileged information and disclosure could prejudice trial fairness given the fraud-related charges.

The Crown agreed that privileged portions could be redacted and undertook not to use fresh disclosure from the file at trial.

The court held that relevant non-privileged information from the Legal Aid file may be necessary to assess a Rowbotham application and that the adversarial process requires disclosure to permit cross‑examination and submissions.

Given the availability of redactions and the Crown’s undertaking, the court found the risk of prejudice minimal and rejected the request to file the materials ex parte.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence.

On the conviction appeal, he challenged the admission of opinion evidence from witnesses identifying him as the "kicker" in a video of an assault, and the trial judge's failure to address certain exculpatory evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, holding that the witnesses' prior acquaintance with the appellant and their viewing of the video immediately after the assault placed them in a better position than the trial judge to make an identification.

The court also found no error in the trial judge's treatment of the evidence.

The sentence appeal was dismissed as the appellant had served his custodial term and abandoned the appeal.

The accused was tried on an eleven-count indictment alleging sexual offences against a child occurring during home haircuts over multiple dates.

The court held that the evidence of the child complainant had to be assessed with regard to the common-sense approach applicable to children, while still requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court found the complainant credible and reliable in relation to the incidents between December 26, 2012 and August 5, 2013 and the events of October 21, 2013, but found reasonable doubt regarding the allegations on August 6, 2013 because of internal inconsistencies and contradictory evidence from another child witness.

The accused was acquitted on counts 1, 2, 5, 6, and 7 and convicted on counts 3, 4, 8, 9, 10, and 11.

The appellant appealed his convictions for carrying a concealed weapon and possession of a weapon for a dangerous purpose, as well as his 18-month consecutive sentence.

The convictions arose from an incident where the appellant deposited a shank in a fellow inmate's pocket at a detention centre.

The sole ground of the conviction appeal was ineffective assistance of counsel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no prejudice and rejecting the appellant's claims that counsel coerced him not to testify or failed to pursue evidence.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, with the court finding the 18-month consecutive sentence fit given the appellant's horrendous criminal record, even when considering the totality principle.

The accused, a project manager on a balcony restoration project, was charged with four counts of criminal negligence causing death and one count of criminal negligence causing bodily harm after a swing stage collapsed, causing five workers to fall 100 feet.

The court found that the accused had the authority to direct the workers and breached his duty under s. 217.1 of the Criminal Code by permitting six workers to board the swing stage when he knew there were only two lifelines available.

The court held that this failure constituted a marked and substantial departure from the standard of a reasonable supervisor, showing wanton and reckless disregard for the workers' lives and safety.

The accused's negligence was found to be a significant contributing cause of the deaths and injuries, and he was found guilty on all counts.

In a criminal negligence trial arising from a fatal swing stage collapse, the court considered whether the Crown could tender selected pre-trial statements by the accused without introducing a later video-recorded interview.

Applying the entire statement rule, the court held that fairness required the second statement and the third statement to be treated together because the Crown sought to use the second statement as an admission of negligence, while the third contained the accused's fuller explanation of his supervisory duties.

The first statement, however, was limited to the accused's identification of himself as a supervisor and did not require the later interview to be admitted for fairness.

The Crown could therefore adduce the first statement alone, but not the second without the third.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging sex discrimination and sexual solicitation.

She subsequently commenced a civil action in the Superior Court of Justice encompassing the same allegations and seeking damages under the Human Rights Code.

The Tribunal held a preliminary hearing to determine if the application was barred by section 34(11) of the Code.

The Tribunal found that section 34(11) applies even when the civil action is commenced after the Tribunal application, and that the Tribunal has no discretion to stay rather than dismiss the application in these circumstances.

The application was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of theft and fraud-related offences for stealing computer source code from his former employer and using it to sell competing software.

He appealed his convictions and 30-month sentence, arguing that his Charter rights under ss. 11(a) and 11(b) were violated due to an eight-year delay between the laying of charges and his arrest, and subsequent delays in bringing him to trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no actual or inferred prejudice to his fair trial rights under s. 11(a), and concluding that the post-arrest delay under s. 11(b) was largely attributable to the appellant's own actions and waivers.

The court also upheld the sentence, noting the massive scale of the fraud.

This appeal addressed whether trial judges may fix rates of remuneration for amici curiae and order provincial payment in criminal proceedings where amici were appointed to preserve orderly process.

The majority held that while superior and statutory courts may appoint amici in exceptional circumstances, inherent or implied jurisdiction does not extend to fixing compensation rates absent constitutional or statutory authority.

The Court emphasized separation of powers and held public-funding allocation decisions belong to the legislative and executive branches.

Dissenting judges would have recognized fee-setting as necessarily incidental to the appointment power to protect judicial process integrity.

The appeal was allowed.

The appellant appealed convictions for aggravated assault and assault with a weapon arising from a knife attack on one complainant, and also appealed sentence.

He argued that the trial judge failed to properly consider prior inconsistent police statements, unevenly scrutinized defence and complainant evidence, and neglected a self-defence theory.

He further contended that the sentencing judge failed to meaningfully apply Gladue principles despite the appellant's Aboriginal heritage.

The Court of Appeal rejected all grounds, found the credibility analysis fair, held the self-defence argument had in substance been addressed, and concluded the sentencing judge properly considered s. 718.2(e), the Gladue report, and relevant sentencing authorities.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for unauthorized possession of a firearm, careless handling of a firearm, and failure to comply with a recognizance.

During the execution of a search warrant at his residence, police observed a firearm being thrown out the window into an adjacent yard.

The trial judge declined to determine the validity of the search warrant, finding instead that the appellant had abandoned the firearm and had no reasonable expectation of privacy in it.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing that because the firearm was abandoned, section 8 of the Charter was not engaged, and the trial judge was not required to determine the legality of the search.

The Crown sought leave to appeal a summary conviction appeal court (SCAC) decision that overturned the respondent's sexual assault conviction and ordered a new trial.

The SCAC found that the trial judge misapprehended the complainant's evidence regarding whether she consented to the initial sexual contact.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the SCAC, noting clear inconsistencies in the complainant's testimony about her initial consent that the trial judge failed to recognize when assessing her credibility.

Finding no error in the SCAC's decision, the Court of Appeal denied the Crown's application for leave to appeal.

Following a motion for leave to appeal, the court received written submissions on the reserved issue of costs.

The moving parties argued for a no-costs order, while the responding party sought its costs.

The court found that the responding party was entitled to its costs on a partial indemnity scale, noting that the moving parties had a full hearing on constitutional issues and did not disclose their funding arrangements to support a no-costs order.

Costs were fixed at $28,000 all-inclusive.