24 total
Indigenous offender sentenced to 3 years and 2 months for severe assaults on two women.
The offender, an Indigenous woman, pleaded guilty to aggravated assault and assault causing bodily harm against two different victims, one of whom was an intimate partner and the other a vulnerable Indigenous woman who suffered a traumatic brain injury.
The court balanced the Gladue principles under s. 718.2(e) of the Criminal Code, which address the systemic factors affecting Indigenous offenders, with the requirement under s. 718.04 to prioritize denunciation and deterrence when sentencing for violence against vulnerable Indigenous women.
The court imposed a total sentence of 3 years and 2 months, reduced to 2 years after credit for pre-sentence custody, along with restitution orders.
Offender sentenced to 12 years, reduced by Summers, Duncan, and Charter breach credits.
The offender was sentenced for aggravated assault, firearm offences, and drug trafficking following an unprovoked knife attack to collect a drug debt.
The court imposed a global sentence of 12 years, emphasizing denunciation and deterrence while recognizing the offender's rehabilitative potential and the mitigating impact of systemic anti-Black racism detailed in an Impact of Race and Cultural Assessment.
The sentence was reduced by a 1.5:1 Summers credit for pre-sentence custody, a 6-month reduction for a Charter breach involving mistreatment by correctional officers, and a 1-year Duncan credit for harsh lockdown conditions.
The remaining sentence to be served is 47 months and 28 days.
The court found Charter breaches regarding a degrading strip search but denied a stay and convicted the accused of aggravated assault.
The applicant was charged with aggravated assault, possession of a loaded restricted firearm, possession of a restricted firearm without a licence, possession of a firearm while prohibited, possession of a prohibited device, and possession of cocaine and crack cocaine for the purposes of trafficking.
The applicant brought a Charter application alleging that correctional officers at Toronto South Detention Centre breached his rights under sections 7 and 8 of the Charter by subjecting him to degrading strip search and forced toilet procedures.
The court found Charter breaches but declined to grant a stay of proceedings, finding alternative remedies adequate.
On the trial proper, the applicant was found guilty of all charges, including aggravated assault, based on DNA evidence linking his knife to the victim's blood and circumstantial evidence establishing his presence and motive.
The accused was found not criminally responsible for second-degree murder due to schizoaffective disorder and command hallucinations.
The court found Dylan Sherief not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder for the second-degree murder of Nicola Maiorano.
The decision reviews the legal test for criminal responsibility, the psychiatric evidence, and the facts of the case, concluding that Mr. Sherief’s schizoaffective disorder rendered him incapable of assessing the moral wrongfulness of his actions at the time of the offence.
The court ordered that Mr. Sherief be remanded to the Ontario Review Board for disposition.
The court dismissed the accused's Charter application, finding the arrest, search, and use of force lawful.
The applicant, John Geddes, brought a Charter application under ss. 7, 8, and 9, seeking a stay of proceedings or exclusion of evidence (knife, firearm, drugs) seized upon his arrest.
He argued police lacked reasonable and probable grounds for arrest, the search was illegal, and excessive force was used.
The court dismissed the application, finding that police had reasonable and probable grounds for arrest based on DVR footage and victim information, the search incident to arrest was lawful and reasonable for safety and evidence discovery, and the force used was reasonable, proportionate, and necessary given the applicant's resistance and the dynamic circumstances.
The offender was sentenced to two years less five days imprisonment for intimate partner violence.
Joseph Marcel Kovacs was found guilty by a jury of three counts of assault, one count of assault with a weapon, and one count of forcible confinement, all involving intimate partner violence against his former partner over four years.
The Crown sought a two-year jail sentence, while the defence sought a two-year conditional sentence.
The court imposed a total sentence of two years less five days imprisonment, emphasizing general deterrence and denunciation due to the gravity of the offences, the offender's criminal record, and the need to protect the public.
A conditional sentence was deemed inappropriate given the circumstances.
An Indigenous offender was sentenced to three years in penitentiary for robbery and break and enter, with a recommendation for a healing lodge.
The accused, an Indigenous man, pleaded guilty to break and enter, robbery, and disguise with intent, committed while serving a conditional sentence.
The court considered aggravating factors, including victim impact and a lengthy criminal record, but extensively applied Gladue principles.
The decision highlighted the accused's traumatic background, systemic failures, and the overrepresentation of Indigenous people in the justice system.
Despite the Crown seeking a 5-year sentence, the judge imposed a 3-year penitentiary sentence, emphasizing rehabilitation over general deterrence and denunciation, and strongly recommending an Indigenous healing lodge.
The court granted a stay of proceedings because the net trial delay exceeded the 18-month presumptive ceiling.
M.K. brought an application for a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter, alleging a violation of his s. 11(b) right to a trial without unreasonable delay.
The total delay was 858 days (28 months and 7 days), exceeding the 18-month presumptive ceiling for the Ontario Court of Justice established in R. v. Jordan.
The court deducted 224 days for the COVID-19 pandemic (an exceptional circumstance) and 50 days for defence-caused delay (due to lack of diligence in filing a trial scheduling form).
The net delay remained 19 months and 1 week (578 days), which was presumptively unreasonable.
The Crown failed to rebut this presumption, with the court noting a lack of institutional resources and flexibility as a prominent cause of delay.
Consequently, a stay of proceedings was granted.
Charges of sexual assault and exploitation were stayed due to unreasonable delay caused by the Crown's failure to provide timely disclosure.
The accused, K.L., brought an application under s. 11(b) of the Charter for unreasonable delay in a sexual assault and exploitation case.
The total delay was 20 months and 13 days, exceeding the 18-month presumptive ceiling.
The Crown argued the delay was an exceptional circumstance due to the COVID-19 pandemic and the case's complexity (novel defence argument, s. 276 application).
The court found the Crown failed to demonstrate reasonable steps to mitigate the nine-month delay in providing initial disclosure.
The court rejected the Crown's arguments regarding complexity and the pandemic as a blanket excuse, concluding the delay was unreasonable and staying the charges against the accused.
Accused acquitted of attempted murder and aggravated assault after successfully raising self-defence following an unprovoked attack.
The accused was charged with attempted murder and aggravated assault following a stabbing at a street festival.
The accused and the victim, who did not know each other, engaged in a verbal altercation regarding the welfare of a puppy.
The victim, who was larger and older, unexpectedly punched the accused in the head.
In response, the accused drew a folding knife and stabbed the victim.
The court applied the framework for self-defence under section 34 of the Criminal Code and found that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused's actions were unreasonable in the circumstances.
The accused was acquitted of all charges.
Section 11(b) Charter application dismissed; net delay fell below 18-month ceiling after COVID-19 deductions.
The accused, charged with sexual assault and assault, brought an application alleging a violation of his right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter.
The total delay from the date of the charge to the anticipated end of the trial was 27.4 months.
The court deducted 168 days of defence delay and 192 days of delay caused by the COVID-19 pandemic as an exceptional circumstance.
The remaining net delay of 15.5 months fell below the 18-month presumptive ceiling established in Jordan.
The application was dismissed.
The court quashed search warrants and declared a section 8 Charter breach because the Information to Obtain contained misleading statements and lacked reasonable grounds for broad allegations.
ATV Farms sought certiorari to quash search warrants and production orders, and a declaration that its s. 8 Charter rights were infringed, following a CFIA investigation into alleged mislabelling of produce.
The court found reasonable grounds for specific mislabelling offences related to US-grown turnips (Counts 1-4) but not for broader, unparticularized allegations (Count 5).
The Information to Obtain (ITO) contained inaccurate and misleading statements regarding a prior incident, which, once corrected, undermined the grounds for Count 5.
The court held that the broad search warrants and production orders could not be severed and were therefore unlawful, infringing ATV Farms's s. 8 Charter rights.
The Court of Appeal upheld a second-degree murder conviction and 15-year parole ineligibility period, finding no errors in evidentiary rulings.
The appellant appealed his second-degree murder conviction for the shooting death of his common-law partner and the 15-year parole ineligibility portion of his sentence.
The appellant claimed the trial judge erred by preventing cross-examination regarding a polygraph test administered to a key Crown witness and by admitting expert testimony from a bloodstain analyst.
The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals, finding no error in the trial judge's rulings and upholding the sentencing decision despite a jury recommendation for 10 years of parole ineligibility.
Judicial review Application granted
The applicant, ATV Farms, sought certiorari to quash search warrants executed by the Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA) and a declaration that its s. 8 Charter rights were infringed.
The CFIA had seized documents based on alleged mislabeling of produce.
The Crown opposed, arguing the matter should be heard by a trial judge if charges were laid.
The court addressed the preliminary issue of whether to hear the application at this stage, concluding that the overall interests of justice favoured allowing the application to proceed.
This decision was based on the applicant's claim of reputational and financial harm and its decision to seek only declaratory relief, not the return of seized documents, which mitigated concerns about interfering with the ongoing investigation.
The Court of Appeal restored a trial sentence for a regulatory offence, holding that an appeal court cannot substitute its own factual findings absent palpable and overriding error.
The appellants were convicted of two counts of breaching a regulation under the Conservation Authorities Act.
At trial, they were sentenced to fines of $5,000 each and a two-year probation order requiring reconstruction of a seawall.
The Conservation Authority appealed to the Provincial Offences Appeal Court, seeking removal of a home addition as a sentencing term.
The POAC judge allowed the appeal, set aside the original sentence, remitted the fines, and ordered removal of the addition.
The appellants appealed to the Court of Appeal for Ontario, arguing the POAC judge exceeded the scope of appellate review by reversing factual findings without identifying palpable and overriding error.
The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the POAC judge impermissibly substituted his own findings regarding whether the conduct constituted a flagrant and deliberate breach of the regulations.
A perjury conviction was upheld where the accused gave deliberately misleading and evasive testimony, even absent an explicit falsehood.
The appellant was convicted of perjury for giving evasive and deliberately misleading testimony at another trial.
While the appellant was never directly asked whether he associated the nickname "Carlito" with Pierre Aragon, the trial judge found that the appellant deliberately refrained from identifying Aragon by that nickname despite knowing the questions were directed at soliciting that information.
The appellant's inadvertent reference to Aragon as "Carlito" and subsequent attempt to cover up the mistake further demonstrated deliberate intent to mislead.
The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding that the trial judge's findings were open to her on the evidence and that the Crown had established all requisite elements of perjury.
The court dismissed all securities charges, finding the mere creation of a promotional website did not constitute an act in furtherance of trading.
Accused charged with trading in securities without registration, issuing securities without filing prospectus, and representing that securities would be listed on exchange with intention of effecting trade.
Accused developed website for company (Asia Global/Asia Power) which stated company would be listed on exchange in future.
Website made clear company was not currently listed and no shares available for purchase.
Unregistered sales representatives defrauded private investors by selling non-existent shares.
Evidence did not establish connection between accused and sales representatives or investors, or that website was created to induce share purchases.
Creation of website not constituting act in furtherance of trade.
Accused not trading in or issuing security and not making representation with intention of effecting trade.
All charges dismissed.
Sentence appeals by Crown and offender dismissed; pre-trial custody on unrelated charges cannot be credited.
The offender was convicted of cocaine trafficking and related offences, receiving a 6.5-year sentence.
The Crown appealed, arguing the sentencing judge erred in interpreting aggravating factors under the CDSA and in refusing a half-parole order.
The offender cross-appealed, seeking pre-trial custody credit for time spent in custody on unrelated charges that were later stayed.
The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, finding the sentencing judge properly weighed the aggravating factors, appropriately exercised discretion regarding parole eligibility, and correctly refused to credit time served on unrelated charges.
Application for government-funded appellate counsel granted as applicant demonstrated current lack of financial means.
The applicant, convicted of second-degree murder and other offences, applied under s. 684(1) of the Criminal Code for the appointment of government-funded counsel for his appeal.
The Crown conceded that the appeal was sufficiently complex to warrant counsel but opposed the application on the basis that the applicant had not exhausted his Legal Aid remedies or been transparent about his finances.
The Court of Appeal found that while the applicant lacked candour regarding his historical finances, his current financial situation demonstrated he had no assets or other sources of funding.
The application was granted and counsel was appointed.
Appeal from fraud conviction and restitution order dismissed; banking records admissible under s. 24(2) Grant analysis.
The appellant was convicted of fraud over $5,000 for directing corporate rebate cheques to a company he owned, defrauding his employer of nearly $4 million.
He was sentenced to five years' imprisonment and ordered to pay over $3.4 million in restitution.
On appeal, he argued the trial judge improperly intervened during his testimony, failed to exclude banking records obtained in breach of an implied undertaking, and erred in ordering restitution.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's interventions were appropriate to assist a self-represented accused.
Assuming the banking records were obtained in breach of the appellant's Charter rights, the Court applied the Grant framework and concluded the evidence should not be excluded under s 24(2).
The restitution order was also upheld.