William John Manuel

An appeal concerning the disqualification of counsel due to an alleged conflict of interest arising from a lawyer's transfer between law firms.

The lawyer, who had worked extensively on an insurance coverage dispute for the plaintiff, transferred to the defendant's law firm where he would work closely with opposing counsel.

The court addressed whether an ethical screen could adequately protect the former client's confidential information given the intense working relationship between the two lawyers.

The appeal court upheld the disqualification, finding that while the firm had achieved technical compliance with professional guidelines, the spirit of those guidelines was absent and the presumption of inadvertent disclosure could not be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence.

The plaintiff sued the police and Crown Attorneys for negligent investigation, unlawful arrest, and intentional infliction of mental suffering following an acquittal on a murder charge that involved a 'Mr. Big' operation.

The Crown Attorneys moved to strike the plaintiff's claim and a crossclaim brought by the police for negligent legal advice.

The court struck the plaintiff's claim against the Crown Attorneys, finding it barred by absolute common law immunity, which only allows claims for malicious prosecution.

However, the court refused to strike the police crossclaim for negligent legal advice, finding it was not plain and obvious that Crown Attorneys do not owe a duty of care to police when providing legal advice during an investigation.

The court also held that statutory immunity under s. 8 of the Ministry of the Attorney General Act applied to the plaintiff's claim but not the crossclaim.

The appellants, environmental groups, appealed a Divisional Court decision dismissing their judicial review application challenging the vires of O. Reg. 176/13 under the Endangered Species Act, 2007.

The regulation provided exemptions from the Act's prohibitions.

The appellants argued the Minister failed to meet a statutory condition precedent by not considering the effect of the regulation on each individual species, and that the regulation's purpose was inconsistent with the Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Minister properly considered the effect on each species and the regulation was not inconsistent with the Act's purpose.

The plaintiffs, former inmates of the Elgin-Middlesex Detention Centre, brought a motion to certify a class action against the provincial Crown alleging systemic negligence and Charter breaches resulting from overcrowding and inadequate supervision.

The Crown opposed certification and moved to strike portions of the claim and evidence.

The court struck the claim for breach of fiduciary duty but found the pleadings otherwise disclosed reasonable causes of action in systemic negligence and Charter breaches.

The court admitted the plaintiffs' evidence for the limited purpose of the certification motion and concluded that all criteria under section 5(1) of the Class Proceedings Act were met.

The motion for certification was granted.

The Attorney General of Ontario (AG) brought a motion to set aside the court's appointment of two amici curiae for an appeal, arguing that the court exceeded its jurisdiction and that the AG's policy of paying only legal aid rates should apply.

The court denied the AG's motion, finding that the AG's refusal to negotiate reasonable compensation with the appointed amici undermined the court's judicial role and appointment power.

The court emphasized the need for a flexible approach to amicus remuneration, especially given the unique qualifications and prior involvement of the appointed amici in this complex constitutional and jurisdictional appeal.

The underlying appeal was stayed until the AG and amici could agree on compensation.

The liquidator of an insolvent insurance company brought a motion to approve settlement agreements with two tobacco companies.

The settlements included a condition requiring court approval of releases that would bar third-party claims against the insurer.

Several provincial Crowns and class action representatives opposed the settlements, arguing they had direct statutory claims against the insurer and were not bound by the Winding-Up and Restructuring Act (WURA).

The court held that the WURA does not expressly or implicitly bind the Crown, nor did the Crowns waive immunity under the benefit/burden doctrine as they had not yet made claims in the liquidation.

The motion to approve the settlements was dismissed.

The appellant sued the police and others for malicious prosecution, negligent investigation, and other torts after criminal charges against him were withdrawn but a peace bond was imposed over his objection.

The motion judge struck most of the claims, finding that the criminal proceedings had not terminated in the appellant's favour.

The appellant appealed, and one police officer cross-appealed the motion judge's decision to allow an abuse of process claim against her to proceed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and allowed the cross-appeal, concluding that the imposition of a peace bond was not a favourable termination and that the abuse of process claim was inextricably tied to the failed malicious prosecution claim.

The defendant public authority moved for summary judgment dismissing a long-running action on the basis that the claims were barred by the six-month limitation period in s. 7(1) of the Public Authorities Protection Act.

Applying the summary judgment framework from Hryniak and the public/private power analysis from Des Champs, the court held the record did not permit a confident determination that the impugned conduct correlated sufficiently with the exercise of a public duty or authority.

The evidentiary record suggested the defendant was acting both as regulator and as a commercial actor dealing with potential lessors of Crown near-shore oil rights.

Summary judgment was refused, a mini-trial was declined, and the action was directed to proceed to trial expeditiously.

Following the release of the court's reasons for judgment, the court received written submissions regarding the costs of the forfeiture hearing.

The court awarded the respondent costs of the forfeiture hearing fixed at $40,000, inclusive of disbursements and HST.

Multiple tobacco manufacturer defendants sought partial indemnity costs of approximately $300,000 after withdrawing previously scheduled motions to strike the Crown’s statement of claim in a health care cost recovery action under the Tobacco Damages and Health Care Costs Recovery Act.

The defendants argued they were the successful parties because their motions prompted extensive amendments to the pleading and that the Crown delayed notifying them of its intention to amend.

The court held that the amendments addressed only some of the alleged deficiencies and that significant legal issues remained unresolved when the defendants chose to withdraw the motions.

As a result, success on the motions was considered divided.

Exercising discretion under s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act, the court ordered that each side bear its own costs.

The Attorney General appealed the dismissal of an application for civil forfeiture of a residential property under s. 8(1) of the Civil Remedies Act.

The property owner's son had used the property for a marijuana grow operation and drug trafficking.

The application judge dismissed the forfeiture, finding an unexplained six-year delay by the Attorney General.

The Court of Appeal found the application judge erred in his findings on delay and by ignoring the lack of a limitation period under s. 8(5).

However, conducting a fresh analysis, the Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding that forfeiture would clearly not be in the interests of justice because the owner was not complicit, did not profit from the crimes, and had made significant efforts to help his son overcome his drug addiction.

The appellant property owner appealed a forfeiture order made under the Civil Remedies Act, 2001.

The property, a 12-unit apartment building, was the site of extensive drug-related criminal activity.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's findings that the owner was not a 'responsible owner' because he knew of the criminal activity and failed to take meaningful steps to prevent it.

The Court also agreed that the appellant failed to establish that forfeiture was clearly not in the interests of justice, given that the unlawful activity permeated the entire building.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Attorney General of Ontario appealed the dismissal of its application for a civil forfeiture order regarding a property used for a marijuana grow operation.

The application judge found that the property was an instrument of unlawful activity, but declined to order forfeiture under the 'clearly not in the interests of justice' exception in s. 8(1) of the Civil Remedies Act.

The judge found that during the respondent's criminal proceedings, the federal Crown made representations that led the respondent to reasonably believe his home would not be forfeited if he pled guilty.

The Court of Appeal upheld this finding and dismissed the appeal.

The applicants sought judicial review of regulations authorizing a two-year spring bear hunt pilot program in northern Ontario, arguing the regulations were ultra vires and the Minister's decision was unreasonable.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the Minister complied with the Environmental Bill of Rights process, an environmental assessment was not required due to an existing exemption, and the regulations did not conflict with the Criminal Code's animal cruelty provisions.

The court also held that the Minister's decision to implement the pilot project was protected by privative clauses and not subject to judicial review.

Following a successful Rule 21 motion striking the plaintiff’s amended statement of claim for failure to disclose a reasonable cause of action, the defendant sought costs of approximately $32,247.

The plaintiff argued the amount was excessive and emphasized his limited financial means, reliance on social assistance, and mental health challenges preventing stable employment.

The court reviewed the principle of reasonableness governing costs awards and the jurisprudence on whether a party’s impecuniosity may be considered.

The court concluded the claimed amount was excessive and determined that, in the circumstances, it was appropriate to consider the plaintiff’s financial hardship.

Exercising its discretion, the court declined to award any costs.

The provincial regulator applied for a declaration that a financial product marketed as a “Basic Line of Credit” constituted a payday loan under the Payday Loans Act, 2008.

The respondents argued that the product was a true line of credit and therefore outside the statutory definition and provincial jurisdiction.

The court applied the statutory direction to examine the real substance of the transaction rather than its outward form.

Despite structural features resembling a line of credit, the product functioned in practice as a series of short‑term advances tied to borrowers’ pay cycles and subject to high interest and brokerage fees.

The court held that the arrangement was substantively equivalent to payday lending and therefore subject to the Act and related regulatory regime.

The plaintiff, having been found not criminally responsible, was ordered detained at a mental health facility but was instead held in a provincial jail for 50 days due to a lack of hospital beds.

The plaintiff sued the Crown for false imprisonment and Charter breaches.

The Crown moved to strike portions of the Statement of Claim.

The court struck the false imprisonment and Charter damages claims with leave to amend, finding the Crown statutorily immune based on the current pleadings and noting the failure to plead bad faith for Charter damages.

The court allowed the underlying Charter breach claims to proceed.

The plaintiff, who was acquitted of manslaughter in a judge-alone trial, sued the Attorney General for malicious prosecution.

The Attorney General had previously attempted to override the plaintiff's election for a judge-alone trial without providing reasons, which the criminal trial judge found to be an abuse of process.

The Attorney General moved to strike the civil claim.

The court granted the motion, finding that the plaintiff failed to plead material facts establishing that the prosecution was continued without reasonable cause or motivated by malice, noting that overriding a trial election is a non-core element of prosecutorial discretion outside the scope of malicious prosecution.

The Liquor Control Board of Ontario (LCBO) applied for judicial review of an Information and Privacy Commissioner (IPC) order directing it to cease collecting personal information from wine club members and to destroy previously collected information.

The LCBO argued the IPC breached procedural fairness by issuing the order without prior notice that such a remedy was being contemplated.

The Divisional Court agreed, finding that the IPC failed to provide adequate notice of the potential consequences of the privacy complaint investigation, thereby depriving the LCBO of a fair opportunity to be heard on the issue of remedy.

The IPC's order was quashed and the matter remitted for reconsideration.

Following the dismissal of the foreign tobacco defendants' jurisdictional appeals, the Court of Appeal determined the costs of the appeals.

The appellants argued that costs should be capped at $100,000, asserting that the Crown treated the five appeals as one by filing a common factum.

The Court rejected this argument, finding no $100,000 ceiling exists for costs awards in the Court of Appeal.

Given the complexity, the $50 billion stakes, and the necessity of responding to five separate appeals, the Court fixed the Crown's partial indemnity costs at $237,332.50, apportioned between the BAT and RJR appellants.