Farzin Yousefian

The Ontario Media Development Corporation (OMDC) denied Pong Marketing and Promotions Inc.'s application for a digital media tax credit on the grounds that its sweepstakes games were developed primarily to promote the sale of phone cards rather than to educate, inform, or entertain users.

The Divisional Court majority found the OMDC's decision unreasonable, holding that "primary purpose" must be assessed from the user's perspective rather than the developer's motivation.

The Court of Appeal allowed the OMDC's appeal, finding that the OMDC's interpretation was reasonable and that the Divisional Court erred in applying a residual presumption in favour of the taxpayer.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Health Services Appeal and Review Board upholding OHIP's denial of out-of-country payment for medical procedures she underwent in Georgia.

The appellant had declined treatment options in Ontario, including a referral to a leading specialist, and instead sought surgery in the United States.

The Divisional Court found the Board's decision reasonable, as the appellant failed to establish that it was necessary to travel outside of Canada to avoid a delay in treatment that would result in death or medically significant irreversible tissue damage.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicant, who suffers from paranoid schizophrenia, had his Ontario Disability Support Program (ODSP) benefits suspended and later cancelled by the Director for failing to provide requested information.

The Social Benefits Tribunal rescinded both decisions, finding the Director failed to accommodate the applicant's disability.

When the Director failed to reinstate the benefits, the applicant sought an order of mandamus.

The Divisional Court granted declarations that the Director breached his public duty by failing to reinstate the benefits, but declined to issue mandamus for the payment of arrears, finding that retroactive payments were within the Director's discretion and that the applicant had an alternative remedy through a civil action.

The appellants appealed an order dismissing their motion to strike an individual Crown Attorney as a defendant in an action alleging prosecutorial misconduct.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that section 8 of the Ministry of the Attorney General Act grants individual Crown Attorneys immunity from being named personally in such actions, substituting the Attorney General as the proper defendant.

The motion judge erred in relying on case law that predated the enactment of section 8 in 2009.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her action against her former co-operative housing provider, its lawyers, a court employee, and a Landlord and Tenant Board member.

The motion judge had dismissed the action under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding the action was an attempt to re-litigate her eviction and rent subsidy proceedings, and that the claims against the lawyers, court employee, and Board member were bound to fail due to lack of duty of care and statutory immunity.

The liquidator of an insolvent insurance company brought a motion to approve settlement agreements with two tobacco companies.

The settlements included a condition requiring court approval of releases that would bar third-party claims against the insurer.

Several provincial Crowns and class action representatives opposed the settlements, arguing they had direct statutory claims against the insurer and were not bound by the Winding-Up and Restructuring Act (WURA).

The court held that the WURA does not expressly or implicitly bind the Crown, nor did the Crowns waive immunity under the benefit/burden doctrine as they had not yet made claims in the liquidation.

The motion to approve the settlements was dismissed.

The defendants brought motions to strike a statement of claim under the Rules of Civil Procedure on the grounds that it disclosed no reasonable cause of action and constituted an abuse of process.

A self-represented plaintiff attempted to commence and pursue an action on behalf of another individual without authorization, contrary to the Law Society Act and Rule 15.01(3).

The court found the claim against most defendants disclosed no viable cause of action, including claims relating to alleged damages arising from the prosecution and arrest of a third party and claims against duty counsel and police.

Claims against several defendants were struck without leave to amend, while claims against certain government entities were struck with leave to amend due to insufficiently pleaded negligence allegations.

The self-represented moving party brought a second motion within six months seeking to lift a stay of proceedings previously imposed pending completion of a related small claims action and payment of outstanding costs.

The court held that the prior costs orders, including those from the small claims action and earlier motions, were a threshold condition to any further consideration of lifting the stay.

The motion was characterized as an impermissible serial attempt to re-litigate issues already decided rather than a timely appeal or proper motion to set aside the earlier orders.

The motion was dismissed, the moving party's request for his own costs was rejected, and aggregate costs of $2,300 were awarded to the responding parties.