Darrell Lee Kloeze

This endorsement addresses the issue of costs following the defendant's successful motion to strike the plaintiff's statement of claim.

The defendant sought $1,000 in costs on a partial indemnity scale.

The self-represented plaintiff argued he should be relieved of costs as a "public interest litigant." The court found that the plaintiff's claim, which sought minimal damages for defamation against a judge and stemmed from private family law disputes, did not qualify as genuine public interest litigation.

Consequently, the court applied the usual rule that costs follow the event and ordered the plaintiff to pay $1,000 in costs to the defendant.

The plaintiff, Adan McIntosh, sued Justice Sharon Shore for defamation, alleging she disseminated defamatory remarks to judicial colleagues and included them in a Case History Report with intent to influence other judges.

Justice Shore moved to strike the statement of claim under Rules 21.01(1)(a) and (b) and 25.11(c), arguing judicial immunity and absolute privilege.

The court found that the plaintiff's claim was certain to fail due to Justice Shore's unanswerable defence of judicial immunity, as her actions were within her judicial capacity, even if an error of judgment.

The court also found that absolute privilege applied as the comments were directly connected to judicial proceedings.

The motion to strike was granted without leave to amend.

The Regional Municipality of York brought an application for judicial review seeking mandamus after the Minister failed for several years to make a decision on its environmental assessment for a wastewater project.

After the application was commenced, the Ontario legislature passed legislation that effectively repealed the requirement for a decision and mandated a different wastewater solution, rendering the application moot.

The Divisional Court declined to exercise its discretion to hear the moot constitutional and administrative law issues.

However, due to the government's 'reprehensible' delay and 'egregious' conduct in covertly passing legislation to bypass the environmental assessment process, the court relieved the applicant from a prior agreement to waive costs and awarded the applicant its costs on a full indemnity basis.

The applicant, a Justice of the Peace on long-term disability, sought judicial review of a decision by the Justices of the Peace Review Council recommending her removal from office.

The Council found she committed judicial misconduct by practicing law without a license or insurance on three occasions.

The applicant argued the hearing panel breached procedural fairness by not granting a further adjournment and that the penalty was unreasonable due to her cognitive disabilities.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the hearing was procedurally fair and the recommendation for removal was reasonable given the lack of reliable medical evidence supporting a cognitive deficit and the severity of the misconduct.

The applicants sought judicial review of the Crown's decision to enact amendments to the Environmental Assessment Act and revoke the Forestry Regulation, arguing these actions breached the Crown's duty to consult under s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application.

The majority held that the duty to consult does not apply to the legislative process, relying on Mikisew Cree.

Regarding the revocation of the Forestry Regulation, the majority found no constitutional duty to consult as the revocation did not adversely affect Aboriginal or treaty rights, and even if a duty existed, it was at the low end of the spectrum and the Crown's consultation was adequate.

The Court of Appeal issued a costs endorsement following its decision to partially allow an appeal and award damages to the appellant.

The appellant sought trial costs of $750,000 and prejudgment interest of over $2.3 million, compounded annually.

The respondent conceded entitlement to trial costs but argued for a lower amount due to the appellant's limited success and for a reduction in prejudgment interest due to an 18-year delay in prosecuting the claim, also opposing compounding.

The Court fixed trial costs at $475,000 and prejudgment interest at $600,000, denying compound interest and reducing the amount due to the unexplained and unreasonable delay.

The appellant abattoir owner sued the provincial government for negligence, trespass, and conversion after Ministry officials occupied its plant for 19 months following an investigation into illegal meat processing.

The trial judge dismissed the claim, finding no duty of care and no breach of the standard of care.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, finding that the Ministry owed a duty of care to the targeted suspect, breached the standard of care by unreasonably prolonging its occupation of the plant and allowing meat to spoil, and caused the appellant's inability to sell the plant.

Damages of $3,520,000 were awarded for loss of enterprise value.

The applicants, environmental advocacy organizations, brought applications for judicial review challenging the failure of various Ontario Ministers to conduct public consultations under the Environmental Bill of Rights, 1993 (EBR) before enacting the COVID-19 Economic Recovery Act, 2020.

The applicants argued that the Ministers acted unreasonably by failing to post proposed amendments to several statutes on the Environmental Registry.

The Divisional Court dismissed most of the challenges, finding the Ministers' decisions reasonable or shielded by retroactive legislation.

However, the court granted the application in part, issuing a declaration that the Minister of Municipal Affairs and Housing acted unreasonably and unlawfully by failing to post proposed amendments respecting Ministerial Zoning Orders under the Planning Act prior to implementation.

The plaintiff abattoir sued the provincial government for negligence, trespass, and conversion arising from the 19-month suspension of its licence and detention of meat products following an investigation into the processing of uninspected and dead animals.

The court dismissed the action, finding that the provincial regulator did not owe a private law duty of care to the plaintiff, as its statutory mandate was to protect public health.

Even if a duty existed, the regulator did not breach the standard of care given the extraordinary circumstances of concurrent criminal investigations, nor did its actions cause the plaintiff's business losses.

The respondent, a criminal defence lawyer, was arrested and charged with criminal harassment following complaints from his estranged wife.

He was acquitted and subsequently successfully sued the investigating police officers and the Crown for negligent investigation in Small Claims Court.

The appellants appealed the trial judge's finding of liability.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal and dismissed the action, finding that the trial judge erred in law by failing to apply the correct standard of care.

The court held that the officers had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest the respondent and were not required to exhaust all possible avenues of investigation before laying charges.

The General Manager of OHIP appealed a decision of the Physician Payment Review Board which found that five claims submitted by a physician were not stale-dated.

The Divisional Court held that while the Board has jurisdiction to determine the true basis for a denial of claims, its finding that the claims were not denied under s. 18(3) of the Health Insurance Act was unreasonable.

The appeal was allowed, the Board's decision was set aside, and a declaration was issued that the Board does not have jurisdiction to review decisions made under s. 18(3).

The appellant appealed a motion judge's order determining that claims for recovery of legal expenses incurred in connection with a coroner's inquest into the death of a family member were potentially recoverable under section 61(1) of the Family Law Act.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge erred in answering the question of law under Rule 21.01(1)(a) without proper pleadings raising the issue.

The pleadings predated the inquest and contained no reference to legal expenses.

The motion judge's answer that the expenses were "potentially recoverable" if they qualified as pecuniary loss did not advance the litigation or satisfy the purposes of Rule 21.01(1)(a).

The appeal was allowed and the order set aside.

The General Manager of OHIP sought judicial review of a decision by the Physician Payment Review Board to hold a hearing regarding the denial of a physician's billing claims.

The General Manager argued the Board lacked jurisdiction to review denials made under s. 18(3) of the Health Insurance Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application as premature, finding no exceptional circumstances to justify judicial intervention before the Board had fully considered the jurisdictional issue and the true basis for the claim denials.

The applicant, who suffers from paranoid schizophrenia, had his Ontario Disability Support Program (ODSP) benefits suspended and later cancelled by the Director for failing to provide requested information.

The Social Benefits Tribunal rescinded both decisions, finding the Director failed to accommodate the applicant's disability.

When the Director failed to reinstate the benefits, the applicant sought an order of mandamus.

The Divisional Court granted declarations that the Director breached his public duty by failing to reinstate the benefits, but declined to issue mandamus for the payment of arrears, finding that retroactive payments were within the Director's discretion and that the applicant had an alternative remedy through a civil action.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiff's actions, the successful defendants sought costs.

The self-represented plaintiff also sought costs despite being entirely unsuccessful.

The court denied the plaintiff's request and awarded costs to the defendants, noting the plaintiff's unrelenting and vengeful pursuit of doomed litigation.

The court balanced the plaintiff's conduct with the need for costs to be fair, reasonable, and proportionate, awarding $9,500 to the Queen and $3,500 to the defendant Ramage.

Multiple motions arising from five civil proceedings related to the Algo Centre Mall collapse sought transfer of a certified class action to Sault Ste.

Marie, trial together or common case management of related actions, and appointment of a single motions judge.

The court held that opt-out plaintiffs in separate proceedings lacked standing under rule 13.1.02 to seek transfer of the class action, and in any event failed to show that Sault Ste.

Marie was a significantly better venue than Toronto in the interest of justice.

The court further declined relief under s. 107(1) of the Courts of Justice Act because any transfer necessary to enable common case management or trial together would impose substantial cost and inefficiency, particularly given the existing class action case management structure.

Appointment of a rule 37.15 judge was also refused.

The appellant, a lawyer, appealed the Chief Justice's summary dismissal of his complaint against a Case Management Master.

The appellant alleged the Master lacked integrity and impartiality, and that the Chief Justice exceeded her jurisdiction and denied him procedural fairness by asking the Master for comments without disclosing them or referring the matter to a committee.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Chief Justice had clear authority under s. 86.2(2) of the Courts of Justice Act to dispose of groundless complaints summarily and was not precluded from seeking the Master's comments.

The appellant appealed an order striking out his claim without leave to amend and dismissing his action for malicious prosecution and other claims.

He also sought an adjournment and to admit fresh evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the adjournment and fresh evidence application, finding the evidence irrelevant.

The Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the motion judge's finding that the claim was fatally flawed, raised allegations beyond the limitation period, and sought damages for non-existent causes of action.

The applicant sought reconsideration of a decision dismissing her human rights application against the Attorney General of Ontario.

The original application was dismissed because the allegations related to judicial decision-making rather than court administration services.

The Tribunal found that the applicant was attempting to re-argue the same issues and failed to establish any of the criteria for reconsideration under Rule 26.5.

The request for reconsideration was denied.

The self-represented applicant brought three procedural motions within his application for judicial review of decisions by the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario.

First, he sought to strike the respondents' materials for late filing; the court dismissed this, allowing the materials nunc pro tunc as the delay was minimal and caused no prejudice.

Second, he argued the Tribunal's record of proceedings was incomplete; the court agreed and ordered the Tribunal to allow the applicant to select correspondence for a supplementary record, awarding him $150 in costs.

Third, he sought to remove respondent counsel for an alleged conflict of interest; the court dismissed this as the Tribunal had already decided the issue.