Myriam Marie Seers

Following divided success on cross-motions regarding discovery timetables and pleadings amendments, the parties submitted costs arguments.

The court awarded the defendants partial indemnity costs of $17,499.18, noting they were successful on the most contentious issues, though the plaintiff achieved some success.

The plaintiff brought a motion for procedural relief regarding the location and order of examinations for discovery, and for leave to amend the statement of claim.

The defendants brought a cross-motion for a discovery plan.

The court ordered the defendant, who resides in Russia, to be examined first via videoconference.

The court partially granted leave to amend the statement of claim, allowing procedural updates and an expanded ownership claim, but denying a scandalous allegation and a new debt claim that was statute-barred.

The appellant brought a NAFTA Chapter 11 claim against Mexico, which was dismissed by a three-member arbitration tribunal.

The appellant later discovered that the Mexican-appointed arbitrator had communicated with Mexican officials during the arbitration regarding potential future appointments.

The application judge found a reasonable apprehension of bias but declined to set aside the award, reasoning that the other two arbitrators were impartial.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and set aside the award, holding that a reasonable apprehension of bias concerning one member of a tribunal taints the entire panel and cannot be balanced away as a minor procedural error.

The Samuelson-Glushko Canadian Internet Policy and Public Interest Clinic (CIPPIC) brought a motion for leave to intervene as a friend of the court in an appeal concerning the test for procedural unfairness under the Model Law in international commercial arbitration.

The underlying appeal involved an arbitral claim by Vento Motorcycles Inc. against the United Mexican States under NAFTA, where Vento alleged denial of procedural fairness.

CIPPIC proposed an alternative "material" procedural fairness violation test.

The Court of Appeal dismissed CIPPIC's motion for leave to intervene, finding that CIPPIC did not sufficiently link its expertise to the issue, the case was a private dispute between sophisticated parties, and CIPPIC's proposed arguments risked expanding the scope of the appeal without providing a useful contribution.

The appellant, David E. Wires, appealed a Superior Court judgment that recognized and enforced an arbitration award obtained by the respondent, La Française IC 2.

The appellant raised three grounds of appeal: improper constitution of the arbitral tribunal due to alleged bias, lack of standing of the respondent, and errors in the arbitrator's costs award.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the application judge correctly determined that relitigating the bias issue was an abuse of process, that the respondent had standing, and that the costs award was properly recognized and enforced without double-counting.

The applicant, Vento Motorcycles, Inc., sought to set aside an arbitral award rendered by an ICSID tribunal, alleging two grounds: inability to present its case due to the tribunal's refusal to allow a witness to testify in response to impeachment evidence, and reasonable apprehension of bias by one of the arbitrators due to undisclosed offers of future appointments from the respondent.

The court dismissed the application, finding that Vento was able to present its case and that while a reasonable apprehension of bias existed for one arbitrator, it did not undermine the reliability of the unanimous award or produce real unfairness, especially given the collegial nature of the tribunal and the significant prejudice of redoing the arbitration.

The respondent in an application to set aside an international arbitral award brought a motion to strike three affidavits filed by the applicant.

The court determined that the test for admitting fresh evidence on an application to set aside an international arbitral award on procedural fairness grounds is akin to the test applied on judicial review, which requires reasonable diligence, rather than the Palmer test for appeals.

Applying this test, the court struck two affidavits in their entirety because the evidence could have been raised before the arbitral tribunal.

The court also struck portions of a third affidavit that contained improper opinion evidence and speculation.

The Russian Federation appealed an interlocutory decision that denied its request to adduce fresh evidence on an application to set aside an arbitral tribunal's interim award on jurisdiction.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that an application to challenge a tribunal's jurisdiction under Article 16 of the UNCITRAL Model Law is a hearing de novo, not a deferential review.

Consequently, the parties are entitled as of right to adduce evidence that was not before the arbitral tribunal.

The moving party, The Russian Federation, brought a motion for leave to appeal the decision of Penny J. The Divisional Court granted the motion for leave to appeal, with costs fixed at $7,500 payable in the discretion of the panel deciding the appeal.

The parties were directed to schedule the delivery of appeal materials and a case management teleconference.

The applicant sought to challenge an arbitral award, arguing the arbitrator exceeded his jurisdiction by misapplying French law to read a diligent management requirement into an Earn-Out Clause, despite an Entire Agreement Clause.

The applicant also alleged a denial of natural justice due to the arbitrator's refusal to allow a sur-sur-reply.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the challenge, finding the arbitrator's interpretation was an unreviewable issue of mixed fact and law, not a true jurisdictional error.

The court also held the arbitrator's procedural ruling was a reasonable exercise of discretion that did not deny the applicant a fair hearing.

The respondent's parallel application to recognize the award was granted.

This endorsement addresses the costs of an action brought by CIT Financial Ltd. against several defendants, which was dismissed on summary judgment as statute-barred.

The defendants sought costs on a partial indemnity scale, including legal and expert fees.

The court considered the complexity, importance, and reasonable expectations of the parties.

While the court found the defendants were diligent in bringing their summary judgment motion after discoveries, it significantly reduced the claimed expert fees for Zeifmans (to one-third) and Duff & Phelps (to 50%).

This reduction was due to the defendants' experts' unreasonable refusal to cooperate with the plaintiff's expert, leading to unnecessary duplication of work in calculations.

Ultimately, CIT Financial Ltd. was ordered to pay the defendants legal fees totaling $1,706,147.92 and reduced disbursements (including expert fees) totaling $550,182.34.

The appellant appealed an Ontario Energy Board decision requiring it to pay a $1,287,548 penalty to Union Gas for failing to meet contractual balancing requirements, with most of the penalty to be paid by shareholders due to a finding of imprudence.

The Divisional Court applied a reasonableness standard of review and dismissed the appeal.

The Court found that the OEB had jurisdiction to impose a punitive penalty to maintain system integrity, properly grounded its decision in deterrence, and reasonably concluded the appellant's conduct was imprudent despite uncontradicted evidence.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment seeking to dismiss the plaintiff's action for indemnity under a share purchase agreement.

The action was based on alleged breaches of a tax representation and warranty.

The defendants argued the action was statute-barred and that the plaintiff's claim for "loss of use of funds" was limited by contract.

The court granted summary judgment, finding the action was statute-barred because the six-year limitation period began when the plaintiff knew the material facts of the breach and the resulting "claim" (Revenue Canada's reassessment), not upon a demand for indemnity or its refusal.

The court also dismissed the claim for loss of use of funds beyond the contractually agreed prime rate.

The applicants, International Steel Services Inc. (ISSI), sought an interim injunction to restrain the respondent, Dynatec Madagascar S.A. (Dynatec), from interfering with ISSI's contractual rights under a Sulphuric Acid Plant Operation and Maintenance Agreement.

The dispute centered on whether the agreement was extended to September 27, 2018, as ISSI contended, or if it terminated on May 1, 2016, as Dynatec argued.

The court applied the RJR-MacDonald test for injunctions, finding a serious issue to be tried regarding the agreement's extension and Dynatec's termination notice.

It determined that ISSI faced a meaningful risk of irreparable harm to its business reputation and employee relations if Dynatec proceeded with its takeover plans.

The court also found the balance of convenience favoured ISSI, noting Dynatec's "hardball tactics" and delay in facilitating arbitration.

The interim protective order was granted to ISSI, prohibiting Dynatec from interfering with ISSI's contractual rights and operation of the Acid Plant pending an arbitral decision.

The Ontario Energy Board appealed a decision that had required it to apply a mandatory prudence framework when assessing Ontario Power Generation compensation costs in rate-setting.

The majority held tribunal participation in defending its own decision was proper in this regulatory context and found no impermissible bootstrapping on appeal.

The Court held the governing statute did not require a single prudence methodology and permitted the Board to use a mixed approach for costs that were partly committed and partly subject to managerial discretion.

The Board’s disallowance of $145 million in compensation costs was found reasonable, and its original decision was reinstated.

The applicant, a teacher whose employment was terminated after unsatisfactory performance evaluations, sought judicial review of several decisions by the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario (HRTO).

The HRTO had dismissed his numerous complaints against his former employer, his union, various legal counsel, and several administrative bodies, finding no evidence of discrimination based on race or colour.

The HRTO also declared him a vexatious litigant.

The Divisional Court applied the reasonableness standard of review and found no error in the HRTO's decisions, noting that the applicant failed to establish any link between his dismissal or the subsequent administrative decisions and a prohibited ground of discrimination.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

Applicants under multiple long-term power purchase agreements sought declarations that the respondent miscalculated Total Market Cost after the 2011 global adjustment reallocation regime came into force.

The court held that the contractual definition of TMC implicitly required aggregated electricity costs to be allocated pro rata based on electricity consumption, and that the respondent's new formula improperly reflected a regulatory reallocation between customer classes rather than the underlying costs of generation and supply.

Although the court found the respondent breached the PPAs, it also held that neither the change of law clauses nor the material change provisions were triggered by the reallocation regulation.

Declaratory and consequential relief was granted requiring recalculation from January 1, 2011 and compensation with interest.

The self-represented applicant brought three procedural motions within his application for judicial review of decisions by the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario.

First, he sought to strike the respondents' materials for late filing; the court dismissed this, allowing the materials nunc pro tunc as the delay was minimal and caused no prejudice.

Second, he argued the Tribunal's record of proceedings was incomplete; the court agreed and ordered the Tribunal to allow the applicant to select correspondence for a supplementary record, awarding him $150 in costs.

Third, he sought to remove respondent counsel for an alleged conflict of interest; the court dismissed this as the Tribunal had already decided the issue.

Following a prior decision staying the action in favour of arbitration, the defendants sought costs of the motion.

The defendants claimed $61,538.71 all-inclusive, while the plaintiff argued that fees should fall in the range of $25,000.

The court reviewed the billing approach, including reliance on the principle that partial indemnity costs may reflect a percentage of actual billing rates, and assessed the reasonableness of the work performed and hourly rates claimed.

Applying the reasonableness standard and the factors in Rule 57.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court concluded the work appeared excessive in the circumstances.

The court fixed fees and disbursements at a reduced amount payable by the plaintiff.

The defendants moved to stay the plaintiff's action on the basis that the dispute was subject to an arbitration agreement contained in a Share and Asset Purchase Agreement.

The plaintiff had commenced an action claiming oppressive conduct regarding the calculation of EBITDA, which affected the purchase price of the remaining shares.

The court found that it was arguable the dispute fell within the arbitration clause, which covered disputes over any amount shown in an EBITDA report.

The action was stayed pending the arbitrator's determination of jurisdiction and the merits.