Vincent DeRose

The appellant brought a NAFTA Chapter 11 claim against Mexico, which was dismissed by a three-member arbitration tribunal.

The appellant later discovered that the Mexican-appointed arbitrator had communicated with Mexican officials during the arbitration regarding potential future appointments.

The application judge found a reasonable apprehension of bias but declined to set aside the award, reasoning that the other two arbitrators were impartial.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and set aside the award, holding that a reasonable apprehension of bias concerning one member of a tribunal taints the entire panel and cannot be balanced away as a minor procedural error.

The Samuelson-Glushko Canadian Internet Policy and Public Interest Clinic (CIPPIC) brought a motion for leave to intervene as a friend of the court in an appeal concerning the test for procedural unfairness under the Model Law in international commercial arbitration.

The underlying appeal involved an arbitral claim by Vento Motorcycles Inc. against the United Mexican States under NAFTA, where Vento alleged denial of procedural fairness.

CIPPIC proposed an alternative "material" procedural fairness violation test.

The Court of Appeal dismissed CIPPIC's motion for leave to intervene, finding that CIPPIC did not sufficiently link its expertise to the issue, the case was a private dispute between sophisticated parties, and CIPPIC's proposed arguments risked expanding the scope of the appeal without providing a useful contribution.

The applicant, Vento Motorcycles, Inc., sought to set aside an arbitral award rendered by an ICSID tribunal, alleging two grounds: inability to present its case due to the tribunal's refusal to allow a witness to testify in response to impeachment evidence, and reasonable apprehension of bias by one of the arbitrators due to undisclosed offers of future appointments from the respondent.

The court dismissed the application, finding that Vento was able to present its case and that while a reasonable apprehension of bias existed for one arbitrator, it did not undermine the reliability of the unanimous award or produce real unfairness, especially given the collegial nature of the tribunal and the significant prejudice of redoing the arbitration.

The applicant, Joshua Dean Nelson, sought to set aside an arbitral award rendered under Chapter 11 of the North American Free Trade Agreement against the Government of the United Mexican States.

The application was brought under Article 34(2)(a)(ii) of the Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, alleging denial of natural justice and procedural fairness.

Specifically, the applicant claimed the award was based on an unpleaded theory and that the tribunal ignored expert evidence regarding the existence of interconnection rights and the effect of Mexican regulatory decisions.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the tribunal's decision was based on issues that were pleaded, argued, and subject to cross-examination, and that the tribunal adequately considered the expert evidence, even if not explicitly naming the experts.

The respondent in an application to set aside an international arbitral award brought a motion to strike three affidavits filed by the applicant.

The court determined that the test for admitting fresh evidence on an application to set aside an international arbitral award on procedural fairness grounds is akin to the test applied on judicial review, which requires reasonable diligence, rather than the Palmer test for appeals.

Applying this test, the court struck two affidavits in their entirety because the evidence could have been raised before the arbitral tribunal.

The court also struck portions of a third affidavit that contained improper opinion evidence and speculation.