E.R. Kruzick

In this divorce proceeding, the mother sought sole custody of the two children, child support, and equalization of net family property, while the father sought sole or joint custody and spousal support.

The maternal grandparents also brought a claim for repayment of a mortgage loan and promissory note.

The court granted sole custody to the mother, finding she was better able to provide stability and prioritize the children's needs, while granting the father specified parenting time.

The court found the father was intentionally under-employed and imputed an annual income of $70,000 for the purpose of calculating child support and his proportionate share of section 7 expenses.

The father's claim for compensatory spousal support was dismissed, but he was awarded a $50,000 lump sum for non-compensatory support based on need.

The court also ordered that the debt to the grandparents be repaid from the proceeds of the sale of the matrimonial home, rejecting the father's argument that the loan had been forgiven.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Social Benefits Tribunal, which had rescinded the Director's finding that he was financially ineligible for ODSP benefits but declined to order retroactive payment to the date of his original application, citing a lack of jurisdiction.

The Divisional Court held that the Tribunal erred in law, as it has the same discretion as the Director and the authority to make any decision the Director could have made.

The Court granted the appeal and ordered the Director to pay ODSP benefits retroactively to September 2012, along with costs.

The appellant father appealed a summary judgment order finding his 17-year-old daughter to be a child in need of protection and making her a Crown ward.

The father sought to introduce fresh evidence and argued the child was not in need of protection when she left home at age 14.

The Divisional Court admitted the fresh evidence but dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the motions judge's conclusions.

The court noted the child's clear preference for no contact with her parents and her need for closure to continue her mental health recovery.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment that upheld a construction lien registered against their property by a numbered company operating as The Loen Group.

The appellants argued they contracted with The Loen Group, not the numbered company, and that the numbered company was not entitled to a lien.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's conclusion that the appellants knew they were dealing with the numbered company and were not misled.

The Court also confirmed that a corporation is a 'person' entitled to register a lien under the Construction Lien Act.

The appellant landlord appealed a decision of the Landlord and Tenant Board finding that its mobile home park was not exempt from rent control under s. 6(2)(c) of the Residential Tenancies Act, 2006.

The appellant argued the park did not exist in 1991 and therefore could not have been occupied for residential purposes prior to November 1, 1991.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's decision reasonable, as an integral part of the premises was used for residential purposes prior to the statutory cut-off date.

The appellant appealed a trial judge's decision granting primary care of a child to the respondent, arguing the trial judge erred by failing to give primacy to the principle that siblings should not be separated except in extreme and compelling circumstances.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error of law or principle.

The trial judge had properly considered the relevant provisions of the Children's Law Reform Act, expressly addressed the case law on separating siblings, and balanced all factors to determine the child's best interests.

The appellant appealed orders regarding retroactive child support, arguing the trial judge erred by using his line 150 income without deducting carrying charges and interest expenses under section 16 of the Federal Child Support Guidelines.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's conclusion that the parties had agreed at trial to base support on line 150 income without further deductions.

The self-represented applicant brought an application for judicial review of a Deputy Judge's costs order.

The Divisional Court found that the Deputy Judge lacked jurisdiction to order costs for a settlement conference over which he did not preside, and erred in awarding motion costs exceeding $100 without finding special circumstances under Rule 15.07.

The court varied the costs order, requiring the applicant to pay $100 for the motion, and awarded the applicant his disbursements for the judicial review application.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision finding that two contracts were not sufficiently connected to support statutory setoff, equitable setoff, or a stay under the Construction Lien Act.

The appellant argued it was prevented from putting a full record before the court due to the motion judge's refusal to grant an adjournment.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error or error in principle in the motion judge's exercise of discretion.

The appellant mother appealed the decisions of the Ontario Court of Justice denying her requests to adjourn a child protection trial and granting sole custody of her child to the maternal grandmother.

The appellant, who was incarcerated at the time of trial, argued the denial of an adjournment breached her section 7 Charter rights and that the trial judge erred in granting custody to the grandmother with access at the grandmother's discretion.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error.

The court held that the trial judge correctly prioritized the child's best interests and need for finality over the mother's adjournment request, and that the custody and access orders were well-supported by the evidence.

Following a judicial review application where the court found a reasonable apprehension of bias by the Child and Family Services Review Board, the parties sought costs against the tribunal for both the tribunal hearing and the judicial review.

The Divisional Court held it lacked jurisdiction under section 131 of the Courts of Justice Act to award costs for the proceeding before the administrative tribunal.

Furthermore, the court declined to award costs of the judicial review application against the tribunal, finding its participation was not adversarial and its conduct did not rise to the exceptional level required to justify such an award.

The self-represented parties' alternative claim for costs against the children's aid society was also dismissed as they were unsuccessful in the application.

The Kawartha-Haliburton Children's Aid Society appealed a decision dismissing its motion for summary judgment in a child protection proceeding.

The Society sought an order finding the two infant children in need of protection and making them Crown Wards for the purpose of adoption.

The parents, who both have significant developmental and cognitive issues, opposed the motion.

The Divisional Court found that the motions judge erred in concluding there were genuine issues for trial, as the evidence overwhelmingly demonstrated the parents' inability to care for the children and the lack of a realistic plan of care.

The appeal was allowed, and summary judgment was granted making the children Crown Wards with no access.

The children's aid society and the prospective adoptive parents sought judicial review of decisions by the Child and Family Services Review Board regarding the adoption placement of a child.

The Board had rescinded the society's decision to refuse another foster family's adoption application and confirmed the termination of the prospective adoptive parents' adoption placement.

The Divisional Court allowed the applications for judicial review, finding that the Board's conduct during the hearing, including uneven treatment of the foster families and inappropriate questioning of witnesses, gave rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Court set aside the Board's decisions and ordered a new hearing before a newly constituted panel to determine the child's current best interests.

The plaintiff appealed a motion judge's order requiring it to post $30,000 as security for costs in a fraudulent misrepresentation action against a real estate brokerage.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the plaintiff had established impecuniosity and that its claim against the brokerage had a good chance of success.

The order for security for costs was set aside.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision dismissing her complaint of discrimination, harassment, and reprisal against her former employer, a law firm where she articled.

The applicant alleged she was terminated due to her disability after the firm discovered she had failed her first year of law school and requested her official transcript.

The Divisional Court found the HRTO's decision to be reasonable, upholding findings that the request for the transcript was not discriminatory, disability was not a factor in her dismissal, and there was no harassment or reprisal.

The application for judicial review was dismissed with costs.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision dismissing her complaint of discrimination against a university.

The adjudicator had dismissed the complaint under s. 34(11) of the Human Rights Code because the applicant had an outstanding civil action against the university regarding the same essential factual content—the inclusion of a failed academic year on her official transcript.

The Divisional Court found the adjudicator's interpretation of s. 34(11) to be reasonable, confirming that the provision requires an applicant to choose between the Tribunal and a concurrent civil action at the time the application is filed.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision that dismissed her request to add the University of Windsor as a party to her complaint against the Law Society, dismissed her complaint against the Law Society, and declared her a vexatious litigant regarding her attempts to pursue allegations against the University over her official transcript.

The Divisional Court held that the standard of review was reasonableness and found that the HRTO had ample authority to control its processes and prevent abuse.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The applicant, a former NHL referee, sought judicial review of an OLRB decision dismissing his unfair labour practice complaint for undue delay.

The applicant had previously challenged his termination in 2008 without success.

In 2013, he requested severance pay under the collective agreement, which the NHL denied on the basis that he had forfeited it by bringing the 2008 application.

The applicant then filed a new OLRB complaint alleging the denial was an unfair labour practice.

The OLRB dismissed the complaint, finding it crystallized in 2008.

The Divisional Court found the OLRB's decision unreasonable, as the applicant could not have known with certainty in 2008 that the NHL would deny his severance claim in a manner that potentially contravened the Labour Relations Act.

The decision was quashed and remitted to the Board.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Tribunal denying Ontario Disability Support Program benefits on the basis that the appellant did not have a substantial impairment.

The appellant argued that the Tribunal erred in law by incorrectly applying the governing legal principles to the medical evidence.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the Tribunal correctly stated the law and that the appellant's arguments merely challenged the Tribunal's weighing of the evidence, which does not constitute an error of law.

The tenants brought an application for judicial review of a Landlord and Tenant Board consent order.

The tenants had previously agreed to vacate the premises by a specified date in exchange for the landlords waiving $3,500 in rent arrears.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the record inadequate to understand the tribunal proceedings and noting that judicial review is a discretionary, equitable remedy.

The court held it would be inequitable to grant relief because the consent order substantially reflected the tenants' agreement.