Visic v. HRTO and University of Windsor, 2015 ONSC 7162

CITATION: Visic v. HRTO and University of Windsor, 2015 ONSC 7162

DIVISIONAL COURT FILE NO.: 234/12

DATE: 20151210

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

DIVISIONAL COURT

MOLLOY, KRUZICK and LOCOCO JJ.

BETWEEN:

ANICA VISIC

Applicant

– and –

HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO, and UNIVERSITY OF WINDSOR

Respondents

David Cousins, for the applicant

James Schneider, for the Ontario Human Rights Tribunal

Michael Wills, for the University of Windsor

HEARD: October 1, 2015 in Toronto

MOLLOY J.:

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

A. INTRODUCTION

1This is an application for judicial review in which Anica Visic seeks to set aside the decision of Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario Adjudicator, Alisa Wiggins, dated November 4, 2010.¹

2In the decision under review, the Adjudicator dismissed Ms. Visic’s complaint of discrimination against the University based on s. 34(11) of the Human Rights Code² (“the Code”) (because she had also commenced a civil action against the University in respect of the same matter) and s. 34(1) of the Code (based on the fact that her complaint was filed more than one year after the incident to which the complaint relates.)

3This matter was argued together with two other applications by Ms. Visic for judicial review of other decisions of the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario (“HRTO”). In one of those cases, Ms. Visic sought to set aside a decision of the HTRO dated November 4, 2010 dismissing her complaint of discrimination against her employer (Div. Ct. File No. 212/13). In the other, Ms. Visic sought to set aside the HRTO Order, dated August 28, 2012, declaring her to be a vexatious litigant (Div. Ct. File No. 98/13). All three applications are dismissed. This Court’s reasons for dismissing the within application are set out below. The reasons for dismissing the other two applications are released separately as follows: Visic v. HRTO and Elia Associates Professional Corporation, 2015 ONSC 7163 (dealing with Ms. Visic’s complaint of discrimination against the law firm that dismissed her from employment during her articling year) and Visic v. HRTO and Law Society of Upper Canada, 2015 ONSC 7161 (dealing with the vexatious litigant issue).

B. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

4Anica Visic entered first year law school in September 1999. She did not identify herself at that time as having a disability. However, throughout the academic year she suffered from myofascial pain in her right shoulder, upper back, neck and arm, making it difficult for her to write for long periods of time. She did not have a successful year academically. In June 2000, the Associate Dean of the University of Windsor advised her that she was required to discontinue the study of law at the University because she had failed two courses and had not achieved a passing cumulative average.

5Ms. Visic successfully appealed this decision to the Academic Status Committee. The Committee held that Ms. Visic would be re-admitted to year 1 of Law School, based on medical grounds. Ms. Visic deferred that acceptance, but re-entered first year law school in September 2002. She completed her three years and graduated in 2005 with an LL.B. For the three years of law school leading up to graduation, Ms. Visic’s unofficial grade report shows a sprinkling of A’s, quite a number of B’s, and a few C’s, but nothing lower than a C-. However, her official transcript from the University Registrar includes the academic year 1999/2000 in which her marks included two F’s, one D-, a few C’s and one B-.

6Ms. Visic first learned that the 1999/2000 year would be included in her official transcript in September 2003, while still in law school. She made several attempts through various channels to persuade University officials to remove the 1999/2000 year from her official transcript, or at the very least to have the grades shown as Voluntary Withdrawals. The University refused.

7On April 5, 2005, Ms. Visic filed a human rights complaint against the University of Windsor, alleging that the University discriminated against her in the provision of services based on her physical disability. In particular, she alleged that the University’s policy of including her failed year’s grade was discriminatory because it adversely affected her right to equal employment opportunities on the basis of physical disability.

8For brief reasons dated March 15, 2006, the Chief Commissioner of the Ontario Human Rights Commission (“the Commission”) advised Ms. Visic that her complaint was dismissed for delay under what was then s. 34(1)(d) of the Code.³ The Commission held that: the events giving rise to the complaint had occurred in September 2003; the complainant first contacted the Commission on June 9, 2004 (nine months after the fact); and the complainant did not file her complaint until April, 2005 (eighteen months after the events giving rise to the complaint). The only reason given by the complainant for the delay was that she was busy with school. The Commission held that this did not adequately explain why the complaint could not have been filed within the six month time frame contemplated by s. 34(1)(d) of the Code and therefore concluded that the delay was not incurred in good faith. Ms. Visic requested Reconsideration of this decision, which was refused by the Commission on December 13, 2006.

9Ms. Visic applied to the Divisional Court for judicial review of the Commission’s decision dismissing her complaint against the University of Windsor. That Application was dismissed for Reasons dated January 30, 2008.⁴ The Divisional Court found that the Commission’s decision was not only reasonable, but correct. In particular, the Court held that the ongoing effect of the University’s policy did not constitute a continuing contravention, in the sense of a succession or repetition of acts of discrimination. Rather, there was a single decision by the University with continuing effects. The six month time frame for bringing the complaint had expired without Ms. Visic demonstrating a good faith basis for not having proceeded in a timely way. Ms. Visic’s motion to the Ontario Court of Appeal for leave to appeal the Divisional Court decision was denied.

10Meanwhile, in 2005, while Ms. Visic’s initial human rights complaint was still before the Commission, she commenced a civil action in the Ontario Superior Court against the University of Windsor and a number of its personnel. The subject matter of the civil action was the University of Windsor’s insistence that Ms. Visic’s official transcript would include her failed 1999/2000 academic year. Within the action, Ms. Visic brought a motion for an interlocutory injunction restraining the University of Windsor from “misrepresenting the academic year 1999/2000 on her academic transcript” and for an order requiring the University to provide her with a transcript without reference to that academic year. Madam Justice Herman dismissed that motion for Reasons dated May 31, 2006. In her Reasons, Herman J. noted that Ms. Visic had delayed applying for articling jobs because of this problem she perceived with the official transcript. Justice Herman held that it was necessary to look closely at the merits of Ms. Visic’s cause of action because the relief claimed on the motion would essentially grant the final relief she sought. The motion judge concluded that Ms. Visic had failed to demonstrate a strong case on the merits and that the balance of convenience favoured not granting the injunction. She stated (at para. 26):

To order the University to alter the transcript, contrary to its policies and the policies of other Canadian postsecondary institutions, would undermine the integrity of the University’s transcripts and thereby cause significant harm.

11Ms. Visic’s motion to the Divisional Court for leave to appeal the decision of Herman J. was dismissed on October 27, 2006. It does not appear that Ms. Visic did anything further to move forward with her civil action. Ultimately, by Order of Master Pope dated April 10, 2013,⁵ the action was dismissed for delay and for Ms. Visic’s failure to pay costs awards against her.

12On November 20, 2006, Ms. Visic was hired as an articling student by Payne Law Professional Corporation. She was dismissed from that employment after completing only five months of her articles. She then took employment as an articling student with Elia Associates Professional Corporation, commencing in July 2007. At the time she applied for the articling position with Elia Associates, Ms. Visic did not reveal anything about her 1999/2000 year at the University of Windsor and supplied only her unofficial Grade Report for the years 2002-2005. In October 2007, one of the associate lawyers came across an internet report of the injunction decision of Herman J. involving Ms. Visic and drew this to the attention of Ms. Elia, a senior partner of the firm and Ms. Visic’s articling principal. As a result, Ms. Elia asked Ms. Visic for a copy of her official transcript, which Ms. Visic provided on October 12, 2007, along with the University’s letter confirming that Ms. Visic had been re-admitted to first year law school due to medical reasons. On November 28, 2007, Elia Associates terminated Ms. Visic’s employment.

13In June 2008, Ms. Visic filed a human rights complaint against the University of Windsor alleging that the University was discriminating against her directly and indirectly with respect to her employment with Elia Associates on the ground of her past physical disability. She further alleged that this discrimination was “continuous, successive and repetitive” and that it involved displaying the appealed year of 1999/2000 on her law school transcript. She also alleged that this constituted discrimination in respect of services. This complaint was filed under the old human rights regime, prior to the extensive amendment to the Code, which came into effect on December 20, 2006 and pursuant to which the current HRTO was created.

14On December 29, 2008, pursuant to amendments in the Code and the creation of the HRTO, Ms. Visic abandoned the prior human rights complaint against the University of Windsor in order to pursue an Application under the new regime with the same allegations. The University of Windsor filed its response to the Application on February 2, 2009. It requested that the Tribunal dismiss the Application because it was filed outside of the limitation period and also because Ms. Visic had commenced a civil action for identical relief.

15Just prior to that, on November 28, 2008 (the anniversary date of her dismissal from employment), Ms. Elia filed an Application with the newly constituted HRTO alleging that she had been discriminated against, harassed and reprised by Elia Associates because of her disability. (This complaint is the subject of this Court’s decision in Visic v. Elia Associates, 2015 ONSC 7163).

16The complaint against the University of Windsor was dismissed by Adjudicator Wiggins for Reasons dated November 4, 2010, following written and oral submissions. That is the decision which is the subject of this judicial review application.

C. APPLICABLE STATUTORY PROVISIONS

17The University of Windsor sought the dismissal of Ms. Visic’s complaint of discrimination under ss. 34(1) and 34(11) of the Code.

18Section 34(1) provides for the filing of an application with the HRTO alleging discrimination, subject to a one-year time period for filing, as follows:

34. (1) If a person believes that any of his or her rights under Part I have been infringed, the person may apply to the Tribunal for an order under section 45.2,

(a) within one year after the incident to which the application relates; or

(b) if there was a series of incidents, within one year after the last incident in the series.

19The one-year time period may be extended under s. 34(2) if “the Tribunal is satisfied that the delay was incurred in good faith and no substantial prejudice will result to any person affected by the delay.”

20Under the current human rights regime, civil courts may also provide a remedy for a human rights violation. This is provided for in s. 46.1(1) as follows:

46.1 (1) If, in a civil proceeding in a court, the court finds that a party to the proceeding has infringed a right under Part I of another party to the proceeding, the court may make either of the following orders, or both:

1. An order directing the party who infringed the right to pay monetary compensation to the party whose right was infringed for loss arising out of the infringement, including compensation for injury to dignity, feelings and self-respect.

2. An order directing the party who infringed the right to make restitution to the party whose right was infringed, other than through monetary compensation, for loss arising out of the infringement, including restitution for injury to dignity, feelings and self-respect.

21Section 34(11) deals with the impact of a civil action on the ability to also file an application under the Code. It states:

34. (11) A person who believes that one of his or her rights under Part I has been infringed may not make an application under subsection (1) with respect to that right if,

(a) a civil proceeding has been commenced in a court in which the person is seeking an order under section 46.1 with respect to the alleged infringement and the proceeding has not been finally determined or withdrawn; or

(b) a court has finally determined the issue of whether the right has been infringed or the matter has been settled.

C. STANDARD OF REVIEW

22It is well-settled that the reasonableness standard of review applies to decisions of the HRTO involving determinations of fact and the interpretation and application of human rights law.⁶

23In this case, the parties agreed that the Adjudicator’s finding with respect to s. 34(11) was determinative of the judicial review, if upheld by this Court. This issue was treated as a preliminary point. It is a question of law and statutory interpretation, although within a factual context. The statute in question is the Tribunal’s home statute and interpreting it falls squarely within the specialized expertise of the Tribunal, attracting the deferential reasonableness standard. The determination of the limited facts giving rise to the statutory provision is also reviewable on the reasonableness standard.

D. ANALYSIS

24As the Adjudicator noted, Ms. Visic commenced her civil action in 2005. Her application to the HRTO under s. 34(1) was made in 2008. The civil action was still outstanding on the date that Ms. Visic filed her Application to the HRTO. Ms. Visic took no steps to even attempt to withdraw her civil action until January 2010. The Adjudicator held that as of the date of the filing of the Application, and indeed as of the date of the hearing before the Adjudicator on this issue, the civil action was still in existence and had not been finally determined or withdrawn. The adjudicator further held that the “basis and the essential factual content” of the civil action and the human rights application was the University’s decision to display Ms. Visic’s 1999/2000 grades on her official transcript. This was the factual underpinning upon which the Adjudicator relied. It is unassailable.

25Ms. Visic seeks to distinguish her HRTO Application from the civil action on the basis that the former relates to her dismissal from employment in 2007 and is not referred to in the civil action that was commenced in 2005. That misses the point. The University of Windsor was not Ms. Visic’s employer. Rather, Ms. Visic maintains that the University is responsible for the discriminatory actions of the employer law firm because the University included the 1999/2000 grades in the official transcript, with the result that the law firm found out about the past disability. Leaving aside the convoluted nature of this chain of reasoning, the fact remains that the action by the University giving rise to the complaint was the University’s decision to include the 1999/2000 year in the official transcript. That is precisely the issue raised in the civil action (and, indeed, in the 2005 human rights complaint against the University). The Adjudicator’s finding that the basis and essential factual content was the same is a reasonable conclusion.

26In considering the applicability of s. 34(11), the Adjudicator held that the legislative intent of the provision is to avoid a duplication of proceedings. The adjudicator considered Ms. Visic’s argument that the relevant point in time for determining whether there is a civil action outstanding is at the point when the hearing under the Code on the merits is about to start. Ms. Visic had also submitted that it was unfair to require her to withdraw her civil action before she knew that the HRTO would hear her case on its merits. The Adjudicator held that interpreting s. 34(11) in this manner would not have the effect of avoiding a duplication of proceedings.

27Adjudicator Wiggins took into account the decision of Adjudicator Whyte in Guilmoutdinov v. Ontario College of Teachers,7 cited by Ms. Visic in support of her position. In that decision, Adjudicator Whyte stated, at para. 43, that “it makes the most sense to use the commencement of the hearing on the merits of the case as the point in time at which the assessment is to be made as to the ability of the complainants to pursue their human rights claims before both the Tribunal and the courts.” However, Adjudicator Wiggins declined to follow that analysis, stating that such an approach would not avoid the duplication of proceedings and that she preferred the approach taken in other cases, such as Kupiec v. Starburst Coin Machines Inc.8

28In the result, Adjudicator Wiggins ruled that the “relevant time is the point at which the Application is filed.” Therefore, she reasoned, the Application is barred by s. 34(11) and the fact that Ms. Visic was attempting to withdraw her civil action was irrelevant.⁹

29In my view, this interpretation by the Adjudicator of the relevant provisions and applicable case authority is reasonable.

30The central issue in the Guilmoutdinov was not the point in time at which the Application was filed. That case involved complaints of discrimination that had been filed in 2004 (under the old regime) by foreign-trained teachers who had not been denied certification by the Ontario College of Teachers. They did not commence civil proceedings until 2005. Meanwhile the Commission investigated the complaints (as was required under the old regime) and did not make a decision until February 2008 as to whether a hearing was warranted. By that time, the new regime was in force, with various transition provisions, and the Commission therefore referred the case to the HRTO for a hearing. The hearing was scheduled to proceed before the HRTO in October 2009. The trial in the civil action was scheduled for October 2010. A motion was brought by the respondents seeking to dismiss the complaints under s. 34(11) and that motion was heard on August 31, 2009 by Adjudicator Whyte. Nothing in particular turned on the timing of the motion, as compared to the timing of a hearing on the merits, and it is unclear from the decision why that comment was made by Adjudicator Whyte. The central issue in that case was the fact that the Commission would be a party to the Tribunal hearing and would advance the public interest remedies for other foreign trained teachers similarly situated, whereas the Commission was not a party to the civil action, which dealt only with individual remedies. Adjudicator Whyte held that the individual complaints were barred by s. 34(11), but that the HRTO hearing would continue with the Commission as the complainant seeking systemic remedies in the public interest. Those are issues that do not arise in Ms. Visic’s case as she commenced her own Application in 2008, the Commission was not a party, and her civil action was commenced prior to her filing her human rights Application.

31The Kupiec decision (which was relied upon by Adjudicator Wiggins in this case in preference to Guilmoutdinov) involved a complainant who filed a complaint under the old human rights regime alleging age discrimination in employment, and then two months later commenced a civil action for wrongful dismissal and also claiming damages for breach of the Code. Pursuant to the transition provisions of the new Code, the complainant abandoned her previous complaint and filed an Application with the Tribunal, just as was done by Ms. Visic. The applicant had argued that if s. 34(11) applied, he would undertake to withdraw any portions of his civil action that offended the section so that his human rights application could proceed. Adjudicator Slotnick held that the complaint was barred, stating, at para. 13:

Under the revisions to the Code, the courts were given clear jurisdiction to determine claims of human rights violations when those claims are part of a broader action, such as for wrongful dismissal (see section 46.2 of the Code). However, the person claiming infringement of human rights must make a choice on whether to put that allegation before the courts or before this Tribunal. The remedies available in each forum are just one of many factors that will influence that choice. However, once a person claiming infringement has commenced a civil action claiming damages for the alleged human rights violation, that person has made a choice and section 34(11) of the Code is clear in stating that the person cannot then proceed with a complaint to this Tribunal unless he or she has first withdrawn the civil action. The legislation does not contemplate withdrawal of a portion of a civil action only after a responding party objects, as is the case here. On the contrary, it compels the applicant to make a decision on where to seek redress for alleged human rights violations before filing an application with the Tribunal. In the circumstances here, as long as the civil action was not withdrawn or amended prior to making the application, the application to the Tribunal will be barred. [Emphasis added.]

32A similar conclusion was reached by Vice-Chair Wright in Beaver v. Dr. Hans Epp Dentistry Professional Corporation,10 also relied upon by Adjudicator Wiggins in this case. Ms. Beaver had been dismissed from her employment. In May 2008, she commenced a civil action seeking damages for wrongful dismissal. She also claimed punitive damages and alleged that her employer had acted in bad faith, the basis for which was her allegation that she had been discriminated against because of her age and disability. At the time the action was commenced, the civil courts had no jurisdiction to grant any remedies under the Code. That jurisdiction was created by s. 46.1 of the new Code, which came into force on June 30, 2008. Ms. Beaver filed an Application to the HRTO in August 2008, alleging that her employers discriminated against her because of her age and disability by failing to accommodate her and dismissing her from employment. Vice-Chair Wright dismissed her HRTO Application under s. 34(11) and described the provision as jurisdictional. He held, as follows, at para. 12:

The applicant is correct that s. 46.1 was not yet in force at the time the action was filed. The courts may have to determine in what circumstances it applies. However, it is not for the Tribunal to determine the strength of the applicant’s Code claims in the court action. Having decided to rely upon the Code in the ongoing action to seek damages (and not having amended the Statement of Claim to remove the claims based upon it), the applicant is precluded from bringing this Application by s. 34(11). There is no question that the factual and legal foundations for the Code-based allegations are the same in the Application and the civil action. The Tribunal therefore has no jurisdiction over the Application.

33The decisions in Kupiec and Beaver are not referred to in Guilmoutdinov, although they pre-date it. As I previously noted, the reference to the relevant point in time in Guilmoutdinov appears to be obiter. Also, Kupiec and Beaver are more directly on point to the situation involving Ms. Visic. It was reasonable for the Adjudicator in this case to give more weight to those decisions than to the decision in Guilmoutdinov.

34Subsequent authority in this Court supports the approach taken by Adjudicator Wiggins in this case. In Grogan v. Toronto District School Board,¹¹ the Ontario Divisional Court upheld the decision of Vice-Chair Sherry Liang dismissing a human rights complaint under s. 34(11) because the applicant had an outstanding civil action also seeking damages for largely the same claims, even though the civil action was commenced after the application to the HRTO. The Divisional Court referred to other sections of the Code in which the Tribunal has discretion to dismiss a complaint, and contrasted the language of those provisions to s. 34(11). The Court stated, at para. 48:

Section 34(11), however, is not discretionary. It says that a person “may not make an application” in the face of an outstanding civil application. In other words, the Tribunal does not have the discretion to proceed when the applicant has also commenced a civil action involving the same alleged Code infringements. It does not matter that an applicant asserts the intention to withdraw the civil action ….

And further, at para. 52:

In short, s. 34(11) requires an applicant to choose between the Tribunal and a (concurrent) civil action. It is not up to this court, absent a constitutional challenge, to question the legislator’s clear position on this point.

35The decision of the Adjudicator in this case dismissing Ms. Visic’s complaint is rational, supported by compelling reasons, and consistent with the weight of other authority from the Tribunal, and with the decision of the Divisional Court in Grogan. It easily meets the reasonableness standard of review.

E. CONCLUSION and ORDER

36The decision that Ms. Visic’s Application to the HRTO is barred by s. 34(11) is determinative of this judicial review application. It is therefore unnecessary to deal with whether the Adjudicator acted reasonably in also dismissing Ms. Visic’s Application under s. 34(1) of the Code, and we refrain from doing so.

37In the result, this judicial review application is dismissed. We advised the parties of this determination at the close of oral argument and invited submissions on costs. The OHRT advised that it would not be seeking costs. However, the University of Windsor requested costs on a substantial indemnity basis in the amount of $13,500.00.

38Ms. Visic requested an opportunity to place evidence before the Court on the issue of her ability to pay costs. Accordingly, she was given until October 16, 2015 if she wished to file a brief affidavit (two to three pages) with respect to financial circumstances relevant to costs, with the respondents being given until October 23, 2015 to file any responding material. Material was filed by both parties.

39Ms. Visic takes the position that each party should bear its own costs. She states in her affidavit that she has no assets, no income outside her employment, and that her employment situation is precarious. She also states that she has “significant outstanding student debts” but does not provide any particulars. I agree with the submissions of the University that the information provided is lacking in particularity and is unsupported by any documentation. It is nothing more than a bare allegation. Although Ms. Visic asserts that she has been found by previous courts to be impecunious, that is not the case. In any event, earlier cases that gave her a break in respect of costs were based on the status of the proceeding at that time, which is quite different from the circumstances now. I do not consider Ms. Visic’s personal financial circumstances to be such that she should be excused from the normal cost consequences of the proceedings she commenced.

40Ms. Visic also seeks to avoid costs on the basis that the issues raised are novel, complex, and involve issues of public policy and importance. I disagree. This was a procedural issue of importance to Ms. Visic, but not one of general public importance.

41Finally, Ms. Visic argues that this is an access to justice issue and that she was found by the Law Society Tribunal to have an honest belief that she was discriminated against by the University. I do not doubt that Ms. Visic honestly believes in the righteousness of her cause. What she fails to understand is that just because she believes herself to be right, does not mean she actually is right. Her persistent efforts to pursue the University on this issue, despite numerous rulings against her, are simply not reasonable. I see no basis for excusing her from the normal rule that the costs follow the event. She has been completely unsuccessful and is liable to the University for its costs.

42That said, I do not see this as a case in which substantial indemnity costs are warranted. I would award costs to the University fixed at $7500.00, payable forthwith.

MOLLOY J.

KRUZICK J.

LOCOCO J.

Released: December 10, 2015

CITATION: Visic v. HRTO and University of Windsor, 2015 ONSC 7162

DIVISIONAL COURT FILE NO.: 234/12

DATE: 20151210

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

DIVISIONAL COURT

MOLLOY, KRUZICK and LOCOCO JJ.

BETWEEN:

ANICA VISIC

Applicant

– and –

HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO, and UNIVERSITY OF WINDSOR

Respondents

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Molloy, J.

Footnotes

1. 1Visic v. University of Windsor, 2010 HRTO 2196.
2. 2Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended by 2005, c. 5, s. 32.
3. 3Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended by 2005, c. 5, s. 32.
4. 4Visic v. Ontario (Human Rights Commission), 2008 20993 (ON SCDC), [2008] O.J. No. 1768 (Div. Ct.).
5. 5Visic v. University of Windsor, 2013 ONSC 2063, [2013] O.J. No. 1743 (Ont. Master).
6. 6Shaw v. Phipps, 2010 ONSC 3884, 325 D.L.R. (4th) 701 (Div. Ct.), aff’d 2012 ONCA 155, at para.103; Adams v. Ontario (Human Rights Tribunal), 2012 ONSC 6119, 222 A.C.W.S. (3d) 482 (Div. Ct.); Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190, at para. 47; Alberta (Information and Privacy Commissioner) v. Alberta Teachers’ Association, 2011 SCC 61, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 654, at paras. 34 and 39.
7. 7Guilmoutdinov v. Ontario College of Teachers, 2009 HRTO 1843.
8. 8Kupiec v. Starburst Coin Machines Inc., 2009 HRTO 75.
9. 9Visic v. University of Windsor, supra note 1, at para. 24.
10. 10Beaver v. Dr. Hans Epp Dentistry Professional Corporation, 2008 HRTO 282.
11. 11Grogan v. Ontario (Human Rights Tribunal), 2012 ONSC 319, [2012] O.J. No. 864 (Div. Ct.), leave to appeal refused by O.C.A. October 26, 2012.```