Christopher Spear

The respondent mother (RM) brought a motion seeking the return of her child (M.R.) to her temporary care and custody or expanded access.

The Children's Aid Society (CAS) opposed, citing COVID-19 restrictions and the mother's current parenting capacity.

The court found a material change in circumstances due to the COVID-19 pandemic's impact on access and the impending closure of M.R.'s foster home.

Considering M.R.'s best interests, including his consistent desire to return to his mother, the CAS's delays in providing mandated services, and the instability of M.R.'s placements, the court ordered M.R.'s reintegration into his mother's full-time care by July 31, 2020, under a supervision order, with virtual access in the interim.

The appellant mother appealed a summary judgment order finding her child in need of protection and placing the child in extended society care without access.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge erred in concluding there were no material facts in dispute regarding the mother's parenting capabilities and exposure to domestic violence.

The Court also noted that the motion judge applied an outdated test for access, which was subsequently overturned by the Court of Appeal.

The judgment was set aside and the matter remitted for an expedited trial.

This appeal concerns a mother's request for access to three of her six children in extended care following their apprehension by the Children's Aid Society in 2015.

The motion judge granted Crown wardship without access.

The Divisional Court affirmed the decision but applied the old Child and Family Services Act rather than the new Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the transitional provisions of the new Act applied, the record was insufficient to satisfy the expanded access test, the children's Indigenous heritage was not properly considered, and the approach to summary judgment in child protection matters was misapplied.

The matter was remitted to Superior Court for determination under the new legislation.

The mother appealed a summary judgment order denying her access to her four eldest children after they were made Crown wards.

The Divisional Court found that the motion judge erred in law by applying the pre-Hryniak test for summary judgment and failing to provide adequate reasons.

However, exercising its appellate powers, the Court reviewed the record and concluded that summary judgment was appropriate.

The Court held that the mother failed to establish a beneficial and meaningful relationship with the children that would justify an access order under the Child and Family Services Act.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant mother appealed a trial judge's order making her three children Crown wards, with no access for the purpose of adoption.

She argued the Children's Aid Society failed to provide a proper written Plan of Care, the trial judge failed to consider returning the children under supervision, and the trial judge erred in denying access.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error or error of law.

The trial judge properly considered the Plans of Care, correctly concluded that a supervision order would not work, and reasonably found that access would not be beneficial and would impair adoption opportunities.

The Kawartha-Haliburton Children's Aid Society appealed a decision dismissing its motion for summary judgment in a child protection proceeding.

The Society sought an order finding the two infant children in need of protection and making them Crown Wards for the purpose of adoption.

The parents, who both have significant developmental and cognitive issues, opposed the motion.

The Divisional Court found that the motions judge erred in concluding there were genuine issues for trial, as the evidence overwhelmingly demonstrated the parents' inability to care for the children and the lack of a realistic plan of care.

The appeal was allowed, and summary judgment was granted making the children Crown Wards with no access.

The appellant parents appealed a summary judgment order making their child a Crown ward without access for the purpose of adoption.

The parents argued that the motion judge erred by failing to recognize a gap in the children's aid society's case regarding available support programs, failing to provide adequate reasons, and improperly admitting a parenting capacity assessment.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the parents failed to present a comprehensive plan of care to address their need for 24-hour supervision.

The court held that the motion judge's reasons adequately explained why the child would not be safe in the parents' care and why access should be terminated, and that the assessment was properly admitted.

The moving party mother brought a motion for increased, overnight access to her daughter and for interim spousal support.

The responding party father opposed overnight access, citing concerns about the mother's Huntington's Disease and depression, and argued income should be imputed to her as she was intentionally unemployed.

The court granted the mother supervised overnight access, finding no evidence of risk to the child.

The court declined to impute income to the mother, finding she was not intentionally unemployed given her pending disability appeals, and ordered the father to pay mid-range spousal support of $601 per month.

The Kawartha-Haliburton Children's Aid Society sought Crown Wardship for three children due to ongoing child protection concerns, including exposure to domestic violence, parental substance abuse, and chaotic lifestyles.

The two older children had significant special needs requiring intensive therapy.

The mother sought the return of the children, while the fathers sought access or placement with extended family.

The court found all three children in need of protection and concluded that none of the parents' plans could provide the necessary stability and permanency.

The court ordered Crown Wardship for all three children.

The court denied the parents' requests for access, finding that the relationships were not beneficial and meaningful to the children and that access would impair their future opportunities for adoption.

The orders for the two older boys were silent as to access to allow for clinically managed contact if recommended by their therapists, while the order for the youngest child specified no access.

In this family law parenting dispute, the applicant sought to vary an earlier consent order governing joint custody and a shared parenting schedule for a school-age child.

After reviewing earlier assessment evidence, updated OCL evidence, and extensive evidence of ongoing parental conflict, the court held that significant positive changes in the applicant's circumstances neutralized the concerns that had previously favoured the respondent as primary parent.

The court found that making the respondent the primary residential parent, or imposing a true week-about shared parenting regime, would create an unnecessary and significant disruption to a child who was thriving in the current arrangement and closely bonded to a younger half-sibling.

The prior consent order was varied to continue joint custody, place the child with the applicant during the school week, give the respondent three of every four weekends, and remove police enforcement, telephone access, and exchange provisions.

The applicant school board sought judicial review of a decision by the Child and Family Services Review Board that quashed the expulsion of a student for off-school marijuana use.

The Tribunal had found insufficient evidence of a nexus between the student's off-school activities and the school climate.

The Divisional Court exercised its discretion to hear the moot application, determined the standard of review was reasonableness, and upheld the Tribunal's decision, finding it reasonable and correct in its interpretation of the Education Act.

The appellant mother appealed a trial decision making her three children Crown wards, with the youngest child made a Crown ward without access for the purpose of adoption.

The mother argued the trial judge failed to explicitly consider the children's native heritage, erred in finding the youngest child adoptable without expert evidence, and erred in denying sibling access.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge implicitly considered the native heritage provisions, expert evidence of adoptability was unnecessary for a healthy three-year-old, and the decision to prioritize adoption over sibling access was open to the trial judge.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment order granting Crown wardship leading to adoption with no access.

The appellants conceded that summary judgment was appropriate but argued it was unfair to proceed while the mother was unrepresented.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's conclusion that wardship leading to adoption with access was not possible under the legislation and not in the child's best interests.