Jane L. Long

This case involved multiple motions concerning parenting arrangements and decision-making for four children following the death of their mother/sister.

The applicant, the maternal grandmother, sought sole decision-making for one child and increased parenting time/reunification therapy for two others.

The respondents, including the great-grandmother and an extended family member, sought various parenting and decision-making orders.

The court ordered shared decision-making and a week-on-week-off parenting schedule for the youngest child between the grandmother and great-grandmother.

Sole decision-making and primary residence were granted to the extended family member for the two older children, respecting their views.

The court dismissed the request for reunification therapy, finding it not beneficial given the children's wishes and family dysfunction.

The Children's Aid Society's handling of the case was also criticized for failing to adequately address the children's emotional needs and views.

This appeal concerned parenting orders for a child who suffered a catastrophic brain injury.

The trial judge granted sole decision-making responsibility and residence to the father and restricted contact for the maternal grandmother (appellant) due to her delusional beliefs and hostile conduct towards the father and medical team.

The maternal grandfather was granted supervised contact.

The appellant challenged the trial judge's application of the best interests test and alleged infringement of fair trial rights.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's findings that the appellant's conduct was not in the child's best interests and finding no material errors or misapprehensions of evidence.

The maternal grandparents sought contact and access to medical records for their five-year-old granddaughter, who suffered a catastrophic brain injury after her mother (the applicant) attempted to murder her via an insulin overdose.

The child resides with her father, who opposed the grandparents' contact due to extreme conflict, their interference with medical care, and the grandmother's delusional accusations against him and the medical team.

The court denied the grandmother contact and access to medical records, finding her conduct detrimental to the child's well-being, and granted a restraining order against her.

The grandfather was granted limited, supervised contact of one hour per month, as he demonstrated a willingness to cooperate and follow the caregivers' directions.

The appellant father appealed a protection order concerning his twin sons, which had been dismissed by the Divisional Court.

His appeal to the Court of Appeal repeated allegations against various judges, social workers, and lawyers, and included claims of obstruction of justice.

Following a notice under Rule 2.1.01, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process, noting the appellant's pattern of accusations, litigation of already decided issues, and failure to pay costs.

The appellant father appealed a summary judgment order finding his two children in need of protection and placing them in the sole custody of the mother.

The father, who had not seen the children in over four years, alleged widespread misconduct by judges, lawyers, and social workers, but failed to file responding evidence on the summary judgment motion.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no errors of law or palpable and overriding errors of fact in the motion judge's decision, and upheld the refusal to grant an adjournment.

The Children’s Aid Society brought a motion to quash a second appeal by the mother in a child protection matter.

The appeal concerned a temporary order that had since expired and was therefore moot.

The court found no reason to exercise its discretion to hear the appeal, as it would not advance the child's interests and ongoing factual issues belonged in the Ontario Court of Justice.

The motion to quash was granted.

The appellant mother appealed a trial judge's order finding her child in need of protection due to parental alienation and false allegations of abuse against the father.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's application of the best interests of the child test under the CYFSA, specifically regarding the weight given to the child's views, consideration of relevant risk factors, delegation of future access decisions to the Children's Aid Society, and the issuance of a no-recording order.

The appellate court dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings that the child's views were not independent due to the mother's brainwashing, that the risk of emotional harm to the child if remaining with the mother was overwhelming, and that the discretionary access order and no-recording order were within the court's jurisdiction and in the child's best interests.

The appellant appealed a decision ordering her two children to remain in the permanent care of their stepfather/father.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred by finding a risk of emotional harm without expert evidence, and by failing to adequately consider her improved circumstances and the respondent's criminal history.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the need for protection had already been established on consent, and the trial judge's finding regarding the risk of emotional harm was well-supported by the evidence and entitled to deference.

The Office of the Children's Lawyer (OCL) appealed a trial judge's decision holding it jointly and severally liable for 20% of the costs awarded against the mother in a custody and access dispute.

The trial judge had criticized the OCL for failing to seek court orders to compel the father and child to cooperate with its investigation.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge erred in principle by applying the wrong threshold for awarding costs against a non-party.

The Court held that costs against the OCL should only be awarded in exceptional circumstances involving bad faith or patently unreasonable, unfair, or indefensible conduct, which was not present in this case.

The appellant mother appealed a summary judgment order finding her nine-year-old child in need of protection and granting Crown wardship with access.

The child had been apprehended five times due to the mother's serious mental health decompensations and lack of a viable safety plan.

The Divisional Court upheld the motions judge's finding that the predictable interruptions in care caused a risk of emotional harm to the child.

Finding no reviewable errors of fact or law, the court dismissed the appeal.

The requester sought access under the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (FIPPA) to records held by the Children's Lawyer relating to a custody and access dispute involving his children.

The Children's Lawyer refused, arguing the records were not in the custody or control of the Ministry of the Attorney General (MAG) when acting as counsel for a child.

The Information and Privacy Commissioner (IPC) ordered MAG to issue an access decision, finding the records were under MAG's control.

On judicial review, the Divisional Court held the standard of review was reasonableness, not correctness, as interpreting s. 10(1) of FIPPA is not a true question of jurisdiction.

The Court dismissed the application, finding the IPC's decision reasonable and noting that solicitor-client privilege concerns could be addressed through FIPPA exemptions.

The appellant mother appealed a trial judge's order making her three children Crown wards, with no access for the purpose of adoption.

She argued the Children's Aid Society failed to provide a proper written Plan of Care, the trial judge failed to consider returning the children under supervision, and the trial judge erred in denying access.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error or error of law.

The trial judge properly considered the Plans of Care, correctly concluded that a supervision order would not work, and reasonably found that access would not be beneficial and would impair adoption opportunities.

The children's aid society appealed the dismissal of its child protection application regarding three children.

The respondent father brought a motion to quash the appeal, arguing there were no current protection concerns.

The Court of Appeal granted the motion to quash, finding that the appeal lacked merit and that, in the absence of any evidence of existing child protection concerns, proceeding with the appeal would be contrary to the best interests of the children and the administration of justice.