Robert M.G. Shawyer

This focused trial determined the valuation date for the equalization of net family properties in a family law proceeding.

The applicant husband sought a valuation date of December 15, 2015, while the respondent wife sought February 14, 2012.

The court, after assessing the parties' credibility and objective evidence regarding their cohabitation and intent to separate, rejected both proposed dates.

The court found that the wife continued to hold a reasonable prospect of resuming cohabitation until some point after December 15, 2015, and that the husband's August 18, 2013 letter from prison indicated his clear intent to end the marital relationship.

The court fixed the valuation date as August 18, 2013, which has implications for the husband's equalization claim potentially being statute-barred.

This decision addresses a motion by M'Chigeeng First Nation to transfer a family law custody and access case from the Ontario Court of Justice to the Ontario Superior Court of Justice.

The case involves three Indigenous children whose parents are members of different First Nations.

The mother and M'Chigeeng First Nation asserted section 35 constitutional rights regarding jurisdiction over the children.

The court dismissed the transfer motion, finding that the Ontario Court of Justice has jurisdiction to hear constitutional claims and grant meaningful remedies short of declaratory relief.

The court also addressed costs of prior motions, appointed amicus curiae, and provided directions for trial preparation.

A trial concerning custody, relocation, and access to a two-year-old child with cerebral palsy.

The child's mother sought permission to relocate with the child from Toronto to Edmonton, Alberta, citing isolation, mental health challenges, and family support.

The father opposed the move and sought greater involvement in the child's care and medical decisions.

The court granted joint custody to both parents, denied the mother's relocation request, and ordered regular supported access for the father.

The decision emphasized the importance of the father's involvement given his shared disability with the child and concerns about the mother's management of the child's health care.

The appellant sought to appeal an order dismissing his motion for leave to bring a motion to change a final family law order from 2007 concerning child support, spousal support, and section 7 expenses.

The Court of Appeal declined to entertain the appeal based on the appellant's long and continuing pattern of wilful default in complying with court orders.

Applying the principle from Dickie v. Dickie, the court stayed the hearing of the appeal until the appellant complied with a recent enforcement order.

The court also awarded costs to the respondent.

The applicant father sought to assume jurisdiction in Ontario to change custody of the parties' nine-year-old daughter from the respondent mother to himself, and to find the mother in contempt for failing to comply with access orders.

The child had been living with the mother in Florida for three years pursuant to a consent order, but the mother had substantially failed to provide the ordered access to the father in Ontario.

The father obtained an emergency pick-up order in Florida and brought the child to Ontario.

The court declined to assume jurisdiction, finding that Florida was the child's habitual residence and that it would be more appropriate for the Florida court to exercise jurisdiction to avoid multiplicity of proceedings.

However, the court made an interim order requiring the child's return to Florida conditional on the mother's undertakings regarding the child's safety and access to the father.

This is a motion to change child support for an adult disabled child.

The respondent sought to reduce or terminate his child support obligations for his adult son, who turned 18 in 2012 and has a lifetime disability.

The applicant challenged the constitutionality of the Family Law Act provision limiting support eligibility to children attending school, arguing it violated the Charter.

The court found the provision discriminatory and applied a broader definition of eligibility.

The court then determined appropriate child support under section 3(2)(b) of the Child Support Guidelines, considering the child's needs, means, and the parents' financial ability to contribute, rather than applying the standard Table amount.

The court ordered the respondent to pay $518.41 per month, representing an equal split of the shortfall between the child's income and identified needs.

This is a summary judgment motion brought by the Children's Aid Society of Toronto in a status review application concerning a child born in 2015 who was removed from parental care due to prenatal drug exposure and other protection concerns.

The society sought an order placing the child in the care and custody of the maternal grandmother pursuant to section 57.1 of the Child and Family Services Act.

The parents sought to have the child returned to their joint care subject to supervision.

The court found that the parents had not made sufficient progress in addressing the original concerns—including substance abuse, domestic conflict, dishonesty, and failure to maintain consistent access—and that placement with the maternal grandmother remained in the child's best interests.

The summary judgment motion was granted.

The applicants, the maternal aunt and uncle of a child, brought a motion to dispense with the biological parents' consent to adoption under section 138 of the Child and Family Services Act.

The child had been in the continuous care of the applicants since age 17 months following removal by child protection services due to the mother's drug addiction, mental health issues, and transience.

The biological father had minimal contact with the child and did not participate in the proceeding.

The biological mother opposed the adoption, expressing concern about losing contact with her daughter and stating she hoped to regain custody within 1-1.5 years.

The court found it was in the child's best interests to dispense with both parents' consent, emphasizing the child's existing family reality with the applicants, her thriving development, and the uncertainty of the mother's ability to parent in the foreseeable future.

This is a costs decision following a motion to change child support.

The father sought to reduce child support for a 14-year-old child, but the motion was dismissed as no material change in circumstances had been established.

The mother, who was unrepresented at the motion, sought costs.

The court awarded costs to the mother despite her lack of legal representation, recognizing that unrepresented litigants may recover meaningful costs to encourage settlements and discourage inappropriate behaviour.

The court awarded costs of $2,760 all-inclusive, calculated at $150 per hour for the mother's time, plus lost wages and disbursements.

The court considered five sentencing cases involving offences committed after October 24, 2013, when amendments to section 737 of the Criminal Code came into effect.

These amendments made the victim fine surcharge (VFS) mandatory, removed judicial discretion in its imposition, increased the percentage calculation from 15% to 30% of any fine imposed, and increased the quantum where no fine was imposed.

The court held that the mandatory VFS provisions constitute a breach of section 12 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms (cruel and unusual punishment) and potentially section 7, rendering them unconstitutional.

The court declined to impose the mandatory VFS in all five cases and waived it entirely.

The court found that the mandatory provisions, when applied to impoverished offenders receiving social assistance benefits, result in sentences that are grossly disproportionate to the offences and offenders' circumstances, forcing individuals to choose between purchasing food and paying the surcharge.

The father brought a motion to change a 2009 order that granted no access to his son Adrian.

The father sought to establish a material change in circumstances since the trial order, proposing a graduated return to access beginning with supervised visits.

The mother opposed the motion, arguing there had been no material change.

The court found that the father's evidence of not using non-prescription drugs, having no new criminal charges, and attending three parenting sessions fell far short of establishing a material change in circumstances.

The court noted the father showed no insight into his past conduct, accepted no responsibility, and demonstrated no change in his attitudes or behaviour.

The motion was dismissed.

An application under the Hague Convention for the return of a five-year-old child to Germany.

The applicant father sought an order that the respondent mother return their son to Germany after she wrongfully retained the child in Canada.

The respondent opposed the application, claiming that return would expose the child to grave risk of physical or psychological harm under Article 13(b) of the Convention.

The court found that the child was habitually resident in Germany, that the father held custody rights, and that the child was wrongfully retained.

The court rejected the respondent's Article 13(b) defences, finding insufficient evidence of domestic violence, that parenting competence was not relevant to a return order, and that the respondent's real motivation was economic and social rather than protective of the child.

The court ordered the child's return to Germany with undertakings from the father regarding interim support and the child's care pending German court proceedings.