Andrew A. Sudano

The case concerns a father's opposition to the mother's request to relocate their child from Belle River, Ontario, to Surrey, British Columbia, following the breakdown of their marriage.

The court also addressed decision-making responsibility and parenting time.

The mother sought to relocate for family and financial support, alleging family violence by the father.

The father opposed, emphasizing the child's stability in Belle River and the child's stated preference to remain with him.

The court found no credible evidence of family violence by the father and rejected the mother's reasons for relocation, particularly her past "self-help" actions of unilaterally withholding the child.

The court prioritized the child's best interests, including stability and the child's clear wishes, denying the relocation request.

Decision-making responsibility remained primarily with the father for long-term matters, and the existing parenting time arrangement (majority with mother) was maintained.

The father brought an urgent motion for the return of the children to Toronto, their habitual residence, after the mother unilaterally relocated them to Pembrooke.

The mother brought a cross-motion seeking an order to permit the relocation.

The court found that the children's habitual residence remained Toronto due to the father's timely objection to the move.

The mother failed to demonstrate compelling circumstances to justify the temporary relocation, and her allegations of family violence were not substantiated on the evidentiary record.

The court emphasized the importance of maintaining the status quo and compliance with notice requirements under the Children's Law Reform Act.

The father's motion was granted, and the mother's cross-motion was dismissed, with an order for the children to be returned to Toronto.

The respondent mother unilaterally removed the parties' child from Ontario to British Columbia under the guise of a visit and commenced proceedings there.

The applicant father brought an urgent motion for the child's return and parenting time, while the mother sought temporary permission to relocate.

The court found the mother's resort to self-help and denial of contact with the father concerning.

Applying the best interests of the child test under the Divorce Act, the court ordered the child returned to Ontario to restore the pre-separation status quo pending a full hearing, granting temporary decision-making to the father and primary residence to the mother provided she returns to Ontario.

This decision addresses a motion by M'Chigeeng First Nation to transfer a family law custody and access case from the Ontario Court of Justice to the Ontario Superior Court of Justice.

The case involves three Indigenous children whose parents are members of different First Nations.

The mother and M'Chigeeng First Nation asserted section 35 constitutional rights regarding jurisdiction over the children.

The court dismissed the transfer motion, finding that the Ontario Court of Justice has jurisdiction to hear constitutional claims and grant meaningful remedies short of declaratory relief.

The court also addressed costs of prior motions, appointed amicus curiae, and provided directions for trial preparation.

The applicant father sought temporary sole custody of two children, an order that they be returned to Toronto from M'Chigeeng First Nation where the respondent mother had unilaterally taken them, and police enforcement of a prior ex parte order.

The respondent mother sought temporary joint custody with the children remaining on M'Chigeeng First Nation, a restraining order, and challenged the court's jurisdiction based on section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982.

M'Chigeeng First Nation intervened, asserting exclusive jurisdiction over the children and instructing a local First Nations police service not to enforce the court's order.

The court granted temporary joint custody, ordered the children returned to Toronto, dismissed the mother's request for relocation and restraining order, and declined to order police enforcement or find contempt, giving the mother one final opportunity to comply voluntarily.

The appellant appealed a decision ordering her two children to remain in the permanent care of their stepfather/father.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred by finding a risk of emotional harm without expert evidence, and by failing to adequately consider her improved circumstances and the respondent's criminal history.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the need for protection had already been established on consent, and the trial judge's finding regarding the risk of emotional harm was well-supported by the evidence and entitled to deference.

An ex parte motion for temporary custody and return of two children, brought by the father following the mother's relocation to Manitoulin Island territory of M'Chigeeng First Nation.

The mother and First Nation challenged the court's jurisdiction based on section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982, asserting aboriginal and treaty rights, as well as alternative statutory and division of powers arguments.

The court addressed procedural complexities, constitutional questions, party status, and case management directions.

M'Chigeeng First Nation was added as a party.

The court held that it retained statutory jurisdiction pending determination of the section 35 claims and could make interim orders.

The matter was scheduled for full hearing on the merits in February 2020.

This case concerns custody and access of two young children, Bella Spring Hare (born 2015) and Lionel Taylor Neshkiwe (born 2017), whose parents are members of different First Nations on Manitoulin Island but have lived primarily in Toronto.

The father commenced proceedings in Toronto seeking custody after the mother removed the children to Manitoulin Island.

The mother sought to transfer the proceeding to Gore Bay and challenged the court's jurisdiction based on a First Nation by-law asserting exclusive jurisdiction over child custody matters.

The court granted an ex parte order for the children's return but the mother refused to comply.

The court appointed the Children's Lawyer and directed notice to the Attorneys General of Ontario and Canada due to constitutional questions arising from the conflict between First Nation by-laws and provincial legislation.

The respondent father brought a motion to contest the Ontario court's jurisdiction over the applicant mother's claims for custody and child support, arguing the child was habitually resident in Iraq.

The father had allegedly abducted the child during a vacation to the Middle East and failed to attend the case conference as ordered.

The court applied the hybrid approach to habitual residence and found the child was habitually resident in Ontario.

The father's motion was dismissed, his pleadings were struck for failing to obey court orders, and the mother was granted temporary custody and leave to proceed to an uncontested hearing.

S.D. brought a motion for summary judgment seeking sole custody of the two children of the marriage and access for R.J. in accordance with the children's wishes.

The court reviewed R.J.'s history of mental illness, non-compliance with medication, and past violence towards one child, as well as the children's expressed preferences to live with S.D. and have supervised, limited contact with R.J. The court found no genuine issue requiring a trial for custody and access, concluding that it was in the children's best interests to grant S.D. sole custody and R.J. access consistent with the children's wishes, contingent on R.J.'s compliance with treatment.

The motion for partial summary judgment was allowed.

Following a summary judgment that awarded custody and prospective child support to the mother, a focused trial was held to determine her claims for retroactive child support and section 7 expenses from 2012 to 2017.

Applying the D.B.S. framework, the court found the father engaged in blameworthy conduct by underpaying support, but noted the mother's delay and ambivalence in pursuing her claims, as well as the father's financial hardship.

Balancing these factors, the court ordered retroactive child support and section 7 expenses starting January 1, 2016, resulting in $8,276 in additional arrears.

To mitigate hardship, the father was permitted to pay the total arrears at a rate of $150 per month.

The appellant sought to appeal an order dismissing his motion for leave to bring a motion to change a final family law order from 2007 concerning child support, spousal support, and section 7 expenses.

The Court of Appeal declined to entertain the appeal based on the appellant's long and continuing pattern of wilful default in complying with court orders.

Applying the principle from Dickie v. Dickie, the court stayed the hearing of the appeal until the appellant complied with a recent enforcement order.

The court also awarded costs to the respondent.

The mother brought a summary judgment motion seeking final orders for sole custody of two children (ages 10 and 7), supervised access for the father at an access centre on alternate Saturdays, and child support including special expenses.

The father, acting in person, opposed the motion and argued the court had no jurisdiction.

The court found no genuine issues requiring trial and granted the mother's motion.

The father was ordered to pay child support of $582 monthly plus $46 for daycare expenses, with access fully supervised at APCO.

The issue of retroactive child support was reserved for trial.

The appellant father appealed a final restraining order that prohibited him from attending within 500 metres of the respondent mother's home, work, church, or college, and their child's school or daycare.

The appellant argued the order should include a knowledge requirement since he did not know the addresses, and challenged the motions judge's imposition of preconditions (remorse and counselling) for reviewing the order.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the knowledge requirement ground as it was raised for the first time on appeal, but struck the preconditions, finding the motions judge breached procedural fairness by imposing them without notice and exceeded his jurisdiction under the Family Law Act.

The Catholic Children's Aid Society of Toronto brought a motion for summary judgment seeking a declaration that a child born in January 2015 was in need of protection and should be made a crown ward without access for purposes of adoption.

The respondent mother opposed the motion and sought either dismissal or, alternatively, placement of the child with the maternal aunt subject to society supervision with access to the mother.

The court found that the child was in need of protection due to the mother's untreated psychotic disorder, which rendered her incapable of adequately caring for the child.

The mother had been hospitalized multiple times, refused psychiatric treatment, and demonstrated paranoid thinking, poor insight, and unstable behavior during supervised access.

The court granted the society's motion, finding no genuine issue requiring trial, and made the child a crown ward without access to facilitate adoption by the maternal aunt, who had been providing excellent care since January 2016.

The respondent mother brought a motion to temporarily change custody and access, while the applicant father cross-moved for a referral to the Office of the Children's Lawyer (OCL).

The court found a material change in circumstances due to the applicant's bail conditions prohibiting communication with the respondent, which was fundamental to their joint custody arrangement.

The court declined to grant the respondent sole custody or supervised access, finding it premature and not in the children's best interests at this stage.

However, the court granted the respondent temporary sole authority for educational decisions for one child, made orders for summer arrangements, and directed a referral for therapeutic intervention for the family.

The court also consolidated the files and converted a previous "final" order into a "temporary" order, scheduling a case conference to address outstanding issues.

Both parents brought motions to change a custody and access order dated October 9, 2013.

The father sought sole custody, termination of his support obligations, and child support from the mother.

The mother initially opposed but later sought a joint custody order with equal time-sharing and increased child support.

The court found a material change in circumstances since the original order.

The child had struggled in the mother's care but thrived under the father's primary care since January 2014.

The court awarded sole custody to the father based on his superior parenting abilities, the child's special medical and academic needs, and the mother's demonstrated poor parenting judgment.

The mother was ordered to pay child support of $360 per month commencing April 1, 2015, with arrears to be repaid at $150 per month starting September 1, 2015.

The applicant mother sought an order to strike the respondent father's pleadings based on his non-compliance with disclosure orders and failure to pay temporary child support.

The father had been ordered to provide comprehensive financial disclosure by July 31, 2014, but failed to do so despite multiple adjournments and cost sanctions.

He also failed to pay any amount of the temporary support order of $1,849 monthly made on November 3, 2014.

The court found the father's non-compliance to be deliberate and willful, but granted one final opportunity to comply before striking pleadings, recognizing the importance of allowing participation in family law proceedings.

The Children's Aid Society of Toronto brought a protection application seeking crown wardship of M.B., born in 2011, with no access order.

The respondent mother opposed the application and sought placement of the child with her, or alternatively with her and her stepfather subject to society supervision.

The respondent father died of a drug overdose in December 2013.

The court found the child in need of protection pursuant to clause 37(2)(b) of the Child and Family Services Act based on the mother's young age, immaturity, transience, unstable housing, poor judgment, failure to engage in services, inconsistent access, and lack of insight into protection concerns.

The court made the child a crown ward but granted the mother access on alternate Saturdays, finding that the relationship was beneficial and meaningful to the child and that access would not impair the child's opportunity for adoption.

A motion was brought by S.T., the fiancée of the father of two children in child protection proceedings, seeking to be added as a party to the case and to have supervised access to the children.

The Children's Aid Society of Toronto sought a society wardship order.

The court denied the motion to add S.T. as a party but granted supervised access to the children at the discretion of the Society.

The court found that S.T. was not a statutory party under the Child and Family Services Act and had not met the test under the Family Law Rules for discretionary party status.

The court emphasized the high level of conflict between the parties and the need to prioritize the children's best interests and stability.