Jessica Gagné

The applicant brought a motion regarding an international child abduction claim.

The court noted that the Children's Lawyer had not been notified and a first meeting had not been held, as required by the Family Law Rules.

Given the issues of credibility and the need for expert evidence on foreign law, the court adjourned the motion, ordered the involvement of the Children's Lawyer, and scheduled a trial of the issues.

The appellants, biological parents of a child (L) in extended society care, appealed a decision denying them leave to bring a status review application for L's return.

L had been in foster care for almost three years and was being considered for adoption.

The Court of Appeal affirmed that leave was required under s. 115(5) of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017, and that the two-year continuous care period includes time prior to an extended society care order.

The court also clarified the flexible framework for granting leave, emphasizing a child-focused approach and the paramountcy of the child's best interests.

The appeal was dismissed, upholding the denial of leave.

This is a costs endorsement following an appeal in a child protection case.

The appellant, T.M., sought partial indemnity costs against the individual respondents (parents and aunt) and the Oneida Nation of the Thames.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario, guided by the Family Law Rules, declined to award costs against the individual respondents but found it appropriate to order costs against the Oneida Nation.

The court noted that the Oneida Nation's costs submissions contained unsworn, unproven, and disrespectful statements attacking the appellant's character, and that the appellant had to bring a contested motion for continued access pending appeal.

The court ordered the Oneida Nation to pay $10,000 in costs to the appellant.

The appellant, a kin caregiver for a First Nations child, appealed an order dismissing a child protection proceeding and denying her motion to be added as a party.

The motion judge had dismissed the proceeding based on a customary care agreement signed by the biological parents, the child's aunt, the First Nation, and the Children's Aid Society, which excluded the appellant.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the appellant met the statutory definition of a 'parent' under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act and was entitled to party status.

The Court further held that the proceeding could not be dismissed on consent without the appellant's participation and a proper analysis of the child's best interests.

This is a costs endorsement following an appeal where L.M. successfully challenged a costs award against her in a constitutional state funding motion.

The parties were unable to agree on the costs of the appeal.

The Court of Appeal fixed costs at $15,000, inclusive of HST and disbursements, to be paid forthwith by the Children’s Aid Society of the Region of Peel to L.M., emphasizing that the amount reflects a fair and reasonable sum for the unsuccessful party rather than an exact measure of actual costs.

The appellant, L.M., appealed a Divisional Court decision that set aside a costs award against the Children's Aid Society (CAS).

L.M. had successfully sought constitutional state funding for an appeal of a child protection order, which the CAS had opposed.

The motion judge awarded costs against the CAS, finding its opposition unreasonable and its rejection of an offer to settle improper.

The Divisional Court overturned this, finding the CAS's conduct reasonable.

The Court of Appeal allowed L.M.'s appeal, reinstating the original costs award, finding the Divisional Court erred in its assessment of the CAS's unreasonableness in opposing the motion and rejecting the offer to settle.

This appeal concerns whether the appellants, who have cared for an Indigenous child (J.T.) since infancy, are entitled to bring an application for parenting orders under the Children’s Law Reform Act (CLRA).

The motion judge allowed the application, but the appeal judge overturned, finding the appellants were "foster parents" precluded from bringing such an application and that a valid customary care agreement existed.

The Court of Appeal found that Dilico Anishinabek Family Care acted without legal authority by maintaining de facto guardianship after temporary care agreements expired and that subsequent agreements were not valid customary care agreements due to lack of consent from all parties.

The Court held that judicial oversight is required and that the appellants are entitled to pursue their CLRA application, regardless of whether they are characterized as foster parents or customary caregivers, as the CLRA provides an avenue for determining the child's best interests, incorporating national standards for Indigenous children.

This appeal concerns the interaction between a provincial legislative scheme governing child protection (CYFSA) and a federal legislative scheme for removing those without citizenship or immigration status from Canada (IRPA).

Specifically, it addresses a disclosure order granted to the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness in a child protection status hearing.

The motion judge granted the disclosure, which was upheld by the Superior Court.

The appellants (the parent, the Children's Aid Society, and the Office of the Children's Lawyer) argued that the disclosure order improperly prioritized the Minister's interests over the children's privacy and best interests.

The Court of Appeal found that while the motion judge had jurisdiction to order disclosure, she erred by not requiring the Minister to establish a prima facie basis for the scope of submissions or the requested disclosure.

The appeal was allowed, and the matter remitted to the motion judge for reconsideration based on a new framework requiring the Minister to justify the scope of submissions and disclosure.

The appellant father appealed a trial judge's order placing one child in extended Society care and two children in the custody of their paternal aunt.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in applying the test for care and custody under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, and made evidentiary errors regarding treatment records, hearsay evidence, and case notes.

The Superior Court of Justice found no palpable and overriding errors or errors in principle in the trial judge's decision.

The appeal was dismissed, subject to a consent variation regarding access.

This is a costs endorsement from the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The applicants' motion resulted in an order for them to pay costs to the respondent, Dilico Anishinabek Family Care, in the amount of $3,500, inclusive of HST and disbursements.

The moving parties, who had cared for an Indigenous child since shortly after birth, sought a stay of a Superior Court decision that struck their custody application and permitted the children's aid society to relocate the child to a different province.

The Court of Appeal granted the stay pending the final determination of the appeal, finding that there was a serious issue to be tried regarding the validity of out-of-court customary care agreements and the best interests of the child.

The court concluded that the child would suffer irreparable harm if removed from her long-term caregivers before the appeal was resolved, and that the balance of convenience favoured maintaining the current placement with conditions to ensure ongoing connection to the child's Indigenous culture and family.

The appellant children's aid society appealed an order granting the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness disclosure of child protection records.

The Minister sought the records to make submissions under s. 50(a) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act regarding a pending removal order against the respondent mother.

The Superior Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the Minister had a legitimate interest in determining whether a genuine lis existed in the child protection proceedings, and that the Ontario Court of Justice had jurisdiction under the Family Law Rules to order disclosure to a non-party to ensure a fair procedure.

The court also rejected arguments that the motion judge demonstrated bias during a case conference.

The Children's Aid Society appealed a costs order of $12,482.49 made against it on a motion for state funding brought by the respondent mother.

The motion judge had found the Society acted unreasonably in opposing the motion and failing to accept an offer to settle.

The Divisional Court granted the appeal and set aside the costs award, finding that while the Society did oppose the motion on the merits, taking a position on the merits of an appeal is consistent with its statutory mandate and does not amount to unreasonable conduct justifying a costs award against a child protection agency.

This case involved the final determination of child and spousal support claims, which had been governed by a temporary "without prejudice" order since 2009.

The father sought to retroactively terminate child support for two adult children and spousal support, citing significant financial and health challenges, including bankruptcy and medical license issues.

The mother opposed the retroactive termination and sought continued support for all three children, including one pursuing a graduate degree.

The court, applying sections 15.1 and 15.2 of the Divorce Act, terminated child support for the eldest child (Charlotte) effective April 30, 2019, and for the second child (Stephanie) effective April 30, 2021.

Spousal support was terminated effective November 18, 2019, a date between the parties' proposals.

The court also adjusted the accumulated support arrears, significantly reducing the amount owed by the father due to overpayments based on the new final order.

The appellant mother appealed a trial judge's order finding her child in need of protection due to parental alienation and false allegations of abuse against the father.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's application of the best interests of the child test under the CYFSA, specifically regarding the weight given to the child's views, consideration of relevant risk factors, delegation of future access decisions to the Children's Aid Society, and the issuance of a no-recording order.

The appellate court dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings that the child's views were not independent due to the mother's brainwashing, that the risk of emotional harm to the child if remaining with the mother was overwhelming, and that the discretionary access order and no-recording order were within the court's jurisdiction and in the child's best interests.

The appellant mother sought continued access to her two-year-old child who was placed in the extended care of the respondent children's aid society.

The trial judge granted access at the society's discretion, applying a broad best interests analysis under the new Child, Youth and Family Services Act (CYFSA).

The appeal judge overturned this decision, applying the restrictive test from the predecessor legislation.

The Court of Appeal allowed the mother's appeal and restored the trial judge's order, holding that the CYFSA fundamentally changed the access test to a holistic best interests analysis, which properly includes consideration of future benefits such as access to medical information.

The mother appealed a child protection order placing her child in extended society care with no access, following a trial where the child was found to have suffered serious unexplained injuries.

She raised three grounds: ineffective counsel, the trial judge's incorrect application of the "unexplained injury principle" and the application of an outdated legal test for access.

The court dismissed the first two grounds, finding no miscarriage of justice regarding ineffective counsel and affirming the correct application of the unexplained injury principle.

However, the court allowed the third ground, agreeing that the trial judge erred in applying an outdated legal test for access under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act.

Despite this legal error, the appellate court exercised its jurisdiction to decide the access issue itself, concluding that it was not in the child's best interests to order access for the mother, given the history of serious unexplained injuries and the mother's acknowledged risk.

The Children's Aid Society of Toronto (CAST) appealed a lower court order that granted the Respondent Mother access to her child, A.G., after the child was placed in extended society care.

CAST argued the lower court erred in its interpretation of a "beneficial and meaningful relationship" under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017 (CYFSA), by considering future rather than existing relationships, and by making findings without sufficient evidentiary basis regarding the child's cultural heritage and medical history.

The Superior Court found that the lower court erred in its interpretation of "beneficial and meaningful" by rejecting pre-CYFSA jurisprudence and in making a finding about the child's medical history without evidence.

The appeal was allowed in part, the lower court's judgment was set aside, and the matter was remitted for a new hearing on the issue of access.

The appellant mother appealed the decision of the Ontario Superior Court, which had upheld a motion judge's order making three young children Crown wards (now called extended society care) without access to the mother under the Child and Family Services Act.

The appeal judge applied the wrong legislation (CFSA instead of CYFSA) and the wrong summary judgment principles.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, confirming the extended society care order but granting the mother access to the children.

The court found that the motion judge's factual findings regarding the mother's inability to adequately care for the children were sound, but the denial of access was based on improper judicial notice and unsupported assumptions about adoption prospects.

The nature and extent of access were remanded to the Ontario Court of Justice.

The appellant mother, L.M., appealed a summary judgment decision from the Ontario Court of Justice that granted Crown wardship of her three children without access.

The appeal raised seven grounds, including errors in applying the legal test for summary judgment in child protection cases, reversing the onus of proof for post-wardship access, improper judicial notice, palpable and overriding factual errors regarding the child's time in care, failure to consider the continuing need for protection, and insufficient reasons for admitting hearsay evidence.

The Superior Court dismissed the appeal, finding no errors of law or palpable and overriding errors of fact by the motion judge, and affirmed the lower court's decision to grant Crown wardship without access.