Edward R. Van Voort

This decision addresses the remaining issues of spousal support between Warren Muir and Lucille Schaaf, following a prior determination that they were spouses.

The court considered the commencement, duration, and amount of spousal support.

Ms. Schaaf, aged 65 with health issues and limited employability, sought indefinite support of $1,500 monthly from July 2022.

Mr. Muir, a high-income millwright, proposed $800 monthly for three years from August 2023.

The court ordered indefinite spousal support of $1,000 per month, commencing July 1, 2022, granting Mr. Muir credit for payments already made.

No orders were made for medical/dental benefits or life insurance.

This trial determined whether the unmarried parties, Warren Muir and Lucille Schaaf, were "spouses" as defined by section 29 of the Family Law Act, which requires continuous cohabitation in a conjugal relationship for at least three years.

The court assessed the credibility of both parties, finding the applicant's testimony unreliable due to inconsistencies and self-serving statements.

Relying on the respondent's evidence and objective factors such as shared residences, financial support, and societal perception (Molodowich factors), the court concluded that the parties were indeed spouses from sometime in 2015/2016 to early 2022, satisfying the statutory definition.

This case involved an uncontested hearing to determine the distribution of proceeds from the sale of a matrimonial home.

The respondent sought credit for expenses paid towards the home since its ordered sale, arguing the applicant obstructed the sale.

The court found the applicant had intentionally obstructed the sale, leading to the respondent incurring significant expenses.

The court accepted the respondent's detailed summary of deductions and credits, including half of mortgage payments, property taxes, utilities, and insurance, which were deemed to offset de facto spousal support to which the applicant was not entitled.

The final distribution resulted in the respondent receiving the entire net proceeds of sale, with the applicant's notional share being negative.

This is a costs endorsement from the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The applicants' motion resulted in an order for them to pay costs to the respondent, Dilico Anishinabek Family Care, in the amount of $3,500, inclusive of HST and disbursements.

The moving parties, who had cared for an Indigenous child since shortly after birth, sought a stay of a Superior Court decision that struck their custody application and permitted the children's aid society to relocate the child to a different province.

The Court of Appeal granted the stay pending the final determination of the appeal, finding that there was a serious issue to be tried regarding the validity of out-of-court customary care agreements and the best interests of the child.

The court concluded that the child would suffer irreparable harm if removed from her long-term caregivers before the appeal was resolved, and that the balance of convenience favoured maintaining the current placement with conditions to ensure ongoing connection to the child's Indigenous culture and family.

Dilico Anishinabek Family Care appealed an order dismissing its motion to strike a custody application brought by the foster parents of an Indigenous child.

The child had been placed with the foster parents under an alternative care agreement, while a customary care agreement was in place with the child's First Nation.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge erred in concluding that out-of-court customary care agreements fall outside the CYFSA.

The court held that the applicants were foster parents and thus prohibited from bringing a custody application under the CLRA, and that deference was owed to the placement decision of the agency acting under the authority of the First Nation.

This motion concerned an application by D.A. for custody of or access to a child, A.H., under the Children's Law Reform Act (CLRA).

Dilico Anishinabek Family Care, a respondent, brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss or strike D.A.'s application.

Dilico argued that D.A. was a foster parent prohibited from bringing such an application under Family Law Rule 7(4), and that there was no genuine issue for trial under Rule 16 because a valid customary care agreement (CCA) was in place, to which the court should defer.

The court dismissed Dilico's motion, finding that D.A. was not a "foster parent" as defined by the Child, Youth and Family Services Act (CYFSA) and that Rule 7(4) does not prohibit a foster parent from commencing an application.

Furthermore, the court found the customary care agreements invalid due to lack of proper signatures and First Nation involvement, and that Dilico had acted outside its mandate.

The court concluded there was a genuine issue for trial regarding the child's best interests and ordered the CLRA proceeding to continue, staying the customary care agreement.

In an uncontested family hearing after the respondent's pleadings were struck except for the divorce claim, the court addressed equalization, occupation rent, and divorce.

The applicant established that the respondent remained in the matrimonial home after separation, refused to facilitate its sale, failed to comply with disclosure and other court orders, and made no equalization claim.

The court accepted that the applicant had potential entitlement to occupation rent and prior costs, but on the applicant's proposal deemed the parties' net family property equalized with no payment by either side.

The application was amended to include divorce, a divorce was granted, and no further costs were ordered.