22 total
Absent respondents noted in default at child protection case conference.
In a child protection application, several parties and counsel failed to attend a scheduled case conference.
The court noted the absent respondents in default and issued a strong endorsement condemning the frequent non-attendance and delays in the justice system.
The matter was adjourned to a future case conference.
Court urges criminal justice system to include family court exceptions in no-contact bail orders.
The court issued an endorsement in a child protection proceeding to highlight the severe unintended harm caused by criminal release orders that prohibit parents charged with crimes against their children from having contact with them, without including an exception for family court orders.
The court noted that such release conditions effectively strip family court judges of their jurisdiction to make decisions in the best interests of the child, such as allowing supervised or expanded access when appropriate.
The court urged the criminal justice system to routinely include the exception 'except in accordance with a family court order made after today’s date' in such bail and release terms.
The court ordered temporary placements of the children with the mother and paternal grandmother under strict supervision due to ongoing adult conflict and non-accidental injuries.
A temporary care and custody motion under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017 involving four children (ages 9, 8, 4, and 1) with a history of exposure to intimate partner violence, non-accidental injury, adult conflict, and caregiver instability.
The court determined that both parents posed risks requiring removal from their sole care.
The older children were placed with the mother under supervision with strict conditions, while the younger children were placed with the paternal grandmother under supervision.
All parties received supervised access with the children, with the mother's partner prohibited from any contact.
The decision emphasizes the need for meaningful behavioral change and compliance with supervision orders before unsupervised access or return of children can be considered.
Society ordered to provide written reasons after failing to hear mother's daycare injury complaint.
The applicant mother filed a complaint with the Child and Family Services Review Board alleging that the respondent society failed to hear her concerns and failed to provide reasons for its decision not to investigate allegations that her child was physically harmed at daycare.
The Board found that while the society initially listened to the applicant, it failed to follow up when she provided new information months later.
The Board also found that the society failed to provide meaningful reasons for its decision not to investigate.
The society was ordered to provide written reasons for its decisions.
The court granted a motion to transfer a child protection proceeding to the jurisdiction where the child had the closest connections, discouraging parental forum shopping.
The Children's Aid Society of Toronto (Toronto society) brought a motion to transfer a child protection case concerning the 12-year-old subject child, H, to the Superior Court of Justice (Family Court) in Barrie.
The Simcoe Muskoka Child and Family Connexions (Simcoe society) consented, while the child's father and stepmother opposed the transfer.
The court considered whether there was a preponderance of convenience favoring the transfer, assessing factors related to the child's connections, service providers, society involvement, and the parents' location and conduct.
The court found that H's primary connections and service history were in Barrie, and the Simcoe society had more extensive historical involvement with the family.
The court also noted the parents' attempt to avoid the Simcoe society by moving the child to Toronto, which resulted in instability for the child.
The motion to transfer the case to Barrie was granted, as it was deemed to be in the child's best interests.
The court has jurisdiction under the CYFSA to make temporary travel orders as incidents of custody.
The Children's Aid Society of Toronto brought a motion for temporary care and custody of a child (C.O.) to be placed with the maternal aunt (M.B.), subject to society supervision, and to permit the maternal aunt to travel with the child to Ghana without the consent of the biological parents (M.O. and J.K.).
The court granted the motion, finding it had jurisdiction to make temporary travel orders as incidents of custody under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017, and that the trip was in the child's best interests, considering cultural heritage and family support.
Proposed adoptive parents added as parties to foster parents' adoption refusal review.
The applicants, who are foster parents, applied to review the respondent Society's refusal of their adoption application.
The proposed adoptive parents, with whom the Society planned to place the child, requested to be added as parties to the proceeding.
The Society opposed the request, arguing the issue was strictly between the Society and the foster parents.
The Board granted the request, finding that the proposed adoptive parents' participation was necessary to decide the child's best interests, as the hearing would involve a comparison of the two potential placements.
The CYFSA replaced the strict access test for children in care with a holistic best interests analysis.
The appellant mother sought continued access to her two-year-old child who was placed in the extended care of the respondent children's aid society.
The trial judge granted access at the society's discretion, applying a broad best interests analysis under the new Child, Youth and Family Services Act (CYFSA).
The appeal judge overturned this decision, applying the restrictive test from the predecessor legislation.
The Court of Appeal allowed the mother's appeal and restored the trial judge's order, holding that the CYFSA fundamentally changed the access test to a holistic best interests analysis, which properly includes consideration of future benefits such as access to medical information.
The court ordered extended Society wardship for an infant, denying the mother's request for an extension of interim care.
This is a status review application concerning a child in the care of the Children's Aid Society of Toronto.
The child was apprehended at birth due to the mother's history of substance abuse and failure to engage in prenatal care.
The mother sought return of the child to her care, while the Society sought an order for extended Society wardship with a view to adoption by the child's foster mother.
The court found that while the mother had made significant progress in maintaining sobriety and demonstrating parenting capacity during supervised visits, she had not yet demonstrated the ability to parent the child full-time without supervision.
The court ordered extended Society wardship but granted the mother monthly unsupervised access to maintain the relationship.
Appeal allowed in part and new trial ordered due to errors interpreting CYFSA access provisions.
The Children's Aid Society of Toronto (CAST) appealed a lower court order that granted the Respondent Mother access to her child, A.G., after the child was placed in extended society care.
CAST argued the lower court erred in its interpretation of a "beneficial and meaningful relationship" under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017 (CYFSA), by considering future rather than existing relationships, and by making findings without sufficient evidentiary basis regarding the child's cultural heritage and medical history.
The Superior Court found that the lower court erred in its interpretation of "beneficial and meaningful" by rejecting pre-CYFSA jurisprudence and in making a finding about the child's medical history without evidence.
The appeal was allowed in part, the lower court's judgment was set aside, and the matter was remitted for a new hearing on the issue of access.
CFSRB retains jurisdiction to hear service-related complaints against a Children's Aid Society despite ongoing court proceedings.
The applicant filed a complaint with the Child and Family Services Review Board regarding the services provided by the respondent Children's Aid Society.
The respondent requested that the application be dismissed, arguing the board lacked jurisdiction because the issues were before the court in a child protection proceeding.
Applying the Court of Appeal's decision in D.D., the adjudicator found that while the board cannot review matters exclusively within the court's jurisdiction, it retains jurisdiction to review separate service-related complaints.
The respondent's request to dismiss was granted in part, and the matter was directed to proceed on the service-related issues.
Compliance complaint dismissed because it was filed after the deadline stipulated in the settlement agreement.
The applicant filed a complaint alleging that the respondent Children's Aid Society failed to comply with a settlement agreement because a required letter was signed only by a supervisor and not the assigned caseworker.
The Board found that the respondent's omission was an oversight.
However, because the applicant filed the complaint of non-compliance after the deadline stipulated in the agreement and pre-hearing report, the Board dismissed the complaint and closed the file.
The court granted a mother supervised access to her child in extended society care.
The Children's Aid Society of Toronto brought a motion for summary judgment seeking a finding that a child born prematurely to parents with significant histories of child protection involvement was in need of protection, and seeking an order for extended society care with no parental access.
The mother initially opposed the motion but ultimately consented to the protection finding and extended society care disposition.
The central issue became whether the mother should have access to the child.
The court ordered supervised access, finding it was in the child's best interests despite the mother's significant parenting limitations and the child's secure placement with a foster mother.
The decision provides important guidance on the application of the new access test under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017, which represents a significant shift from the prior restrictive approach to access for children in extended society care.
Child protection appeal dismissed; flexible approach to timing of risk upheld and expert evidence not mandatory.
The mother appealed a trial judge's finding that her child was in need of protection due to a risk of sexual abuse or exploitation.
The risk stemmed from the mother's brother, who lived in the home and was convicted of luring and child pornography offences involving his students.
The mother argued the trial judge erred by making the finding without expert evidence, by rejecting an expert report filed on consent, and by not requiring the risk to be present at the time of the hearing.
The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence and upholding the flexible approach to the timing of risk in child protection matters.
The court appointed amicus curiae for a self-represented mother in a child protection proceeding after multiple solicitor-client relationship breakdowns.
This is a status review application under Part III of the Child and Family Services Act where the Children's Aid Society sought to place a 10-year-old child in the care of the father for ten months subject to society supervision, with access to the mother in the society's discretion.
The mother opposed the application and sought custody.
The mother was self-represented and had previously had three legal aid-funded lawyers whose relationships with her had broken down.
The court considered whether to order state-funded counsel for the mother or appoint amicus curiae.
The court appointed amicus curiae to assist in presenting the mother's case fairly to the court, finding this was the appropriate remedy to protect the mother's Charter section 7 rights while ensuring timely resolution of the child's status.
Motion for access pending appeal of Crown wardship denied to prevent risk of second final separation.
The maternal grandmother brought a motion for access to her two grandchildren pending her appeal of a trial decision granting Crown wardship without access.
Due to systemic delays, the motion was heard two months after access had been terminated and a good-bye visit had occurred.
The court found that while access with one child had been meaningful, restoring access now would expose the child to the risk of a second final separation if the appeal failed.
Assessing the appeal as unlikely to succeed, the court concluded that restoring access was not in the child's best interests and dismissed the motion.
Father's appeal of Crown wardship and access order dismissed; trial judge made no palpable errors.
The father appealed a trial judge's order making his child a Crown ward and denying him the right of access, instead granting the child the right to hold access.
The father argued the trial judge misapprehended the evidence regarding his plan of care and erred in the access determination.
The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding errors.
The trial judge's conclusions that the father's plan of care was not viable and that granting the father access would impair the child's future adoption prospects were fully supported by the evidence.
The court dismissed a mother's motion for disclosure of her children's therapy records and struck her status review application.
A mother sought disclosure of her children's therapy records in the context of a Status Review Application challenging a crown wardship order made without access.
The Children's Aid Society moved to dismiss the disclosure motion and to strike the mother's application as disclosing no reasonable claim.
The court dismissed the disclosure motion, finding that the children's therapy records were protected by case-specific privilege under the Wigmore test, that the children had significant privacy interests, and that the mother's request was speculative and lacked relevance to the issues before the court.
The court also struck the mother's application for failing to establish a prima facie case for material change of circumstances or to demonstrate steps taken to address the protection concerns that led to the crown wardship order.
The court granted summary judgment terminating Crown wardship and returning the children to their parents.
A motion for summary judgment brought by the parents seeking termination of a Crown wardship order and placement of two children in their permanent care with society supervision.
The parents sought final orders regarding access to foster parents.
The Children's Aid Society initially sought a termination of the Crown wardship order and society supervision, but later amended its position to seek more structured access between the children and foster parents.
The Office of the Children's Lawyer opposed the summary judgment motion, arguing that conflicting evidence regarding the children's views and preferences required a trial.
The court granted the parents' summary judgment motion, finding no genuine issue for trial despite the children's expressed wishes to maintain contact with foster parents, based on uncontested material facts regarding the foster parents' inappropriate conduct and manipulation during the reunification process.
The court dismissed motions for party status by grandparents but granted limited participation rights.
This is a child protection status review proceeding under Part III of the Child and Family Services Act.
Two motions were heard: one by the maternal grandmother seeking to be added as a party to present an alternative placement plan for the children, and one by the father seeking to add the paternal grandparents as parties.
The children had been in the father's care subject to supervision orders since May 2011.
The court dismissed both motions but granted the paternal grandparents limited participation rights under subsection 39(3) of the Act as essential caregivers who had cared for the children continuously for the preceding six months.