Renatta Tonya Austin

The court issued an endorsement in a child protection proceeding to highlight the severe unintended harm caused by criminal release orders that prohibit parents charged with crimes against their children from having contact with them, without including an exception for family court orders.

The court noted that such release conditions effectively strip family court judges of their jurisdiction to make decisions in the best interests of the child, such as allowing supervised or expanded access when appropriate.

The court urged the criminal justice system to routinely include the exception 'except in accordance with a family court order made after today’s date' in such bail and release terms.

The applicant child applied to the Child and Family Services Review Board to review her emergency admission to a secure treatment unit.

The child conceded she had a mental disorder but disputed that the remaining statutory criteria for admission were met.

The Board heard evidence from the child's mother and a staff psychiatrist regarding the child's escalating self-harm, involvement in an online exploitation group, and the failure of less restrictive community treatments.

The Board found that the child's mental disorder caused a substantial threat of serious bodily harm, that the secure treatment program would be effective, and that no less restrictive method was appropriate.

The application for release was denied.

A wrongfully retained child was ordered returned to her country of origin after Canada granted her refugee status.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario allowed the appeal, finding that the application judge erred in failing to apply the rebuttable presumption against the return of a refugee child and in dismissing the child's objection to return.

The court held that when a child has been recognized as a Convention refugee by the Immigration and Refugee Board, a rebuttable presumption arises that there is a risk of persecution on return.

The application judge improperly questioned the refugee determination process and reweighed evidence without oral testimony or cross-examination.

Additionally, the child's clear and repeated objection to return, based on fear of violence by the father, was not given proper weight.

The matter was remitted to the Superior Court for determination of parenting and decision-making authority under section 23 of the Children's Law Reform Act.

The applicant father brought a Hague Convention application for the return of the 12-year-old child to the Bahamas.

The respondent mother conceded the removal was wrongful but opposed the return based on exceptions under Articles 13(b), 13(2), and 20, alleging a history of domestic violence and a lack of state protection in the Bahamas.

During the proceedings, the mother and child were granted refugee status in Canada, creating a rebuttable presumption of risk.

The court found the father successfully rebutted the presumption, noting the Bahamas has adequate laws and agencies to protect victims of domestic violence.

The court also declined to exercise its discretion to refuse return based on the child's objections, finding the child had been influenced by the mother.

The application was granted and the child was ordered returned to the Bahamas.

This decision addresses the issue of costs following a focused trial on parenting issues involving two children.

The father was the successful party and sought full recovery of costs.

The court applied the amended Family Law Rules (effective January 22, 2025) and considered the reasonableness and proportionality of the parties' conduct, offers to settle, and ability to pay.

The father's non-severable offer to settle did not attract the full costs consequences under subrule 24(12) because it was not as good as or better than the trial result.

The mother was found to have acted unreasonably, including breaching court orders and failing to make an offer to settle, which increased costs.

The court awarded the father costs fixed at $8,000 with a reasonable payment plan.

The applicant applied to the Child and Family Services Review Board to review her emergency admission to a secure treatment program.

The applicant conceded she had a mental disorder and had caused or threatened serious bodily harm, but argued the remaining statutory criteria were not met.

The Board found that the secure treatment program would be effective, appropriate treatment was available, and no less restrictive method was appropriate given the applicant's escalating aggressive behaviours and the exhaustion of community resources.

The application for release was denied.

The appellant mother sought costs against the Children's Aid Society of Toronto (CAS) for a second appeal to the Superior Court of Justice, which became moot after the CAS withdrew its protection application in the Ontario Court of Justice.

The case involved conflicting interim orders between the two courts and concerns about the CAS's conduct in investigation and presentation of its case, including failing to meet with the mother and withholding relevant information from the OCJ.

The court found the CAS acted unfairly and unreasonably, justifying a costs award, despite the general exception for government agencies in child protection cases.

In a status review application, the Children's Aid Society of Toronto sought extended society care for a child (N.G.-L.), while the father (W.L.), supported by the mother (N.G.), sought custody with a supervision order.

The court found intervention necessary due to the mother's long-standing substance abuse issues, the parents' past dishonesty, and minimization of risks.

However, considering the child's best interests, the father's commitment, his capacity to parent with support, and the positive influence of a friend (T.G.), the court determined that a supervision order placing the child in the father's care, following a six-week interim society care transition, was the least disruptive and most appropriate alternative.

The order included strict supervision terms for the father and clear boundaries for the mother's access, which is to be supervised solely by the society.

The respondent brought a motion to change a consent order regarding child access, child support, and travel consents.

The applicant sought to reduce the respondent's access and modify travel consent requirements.

The court varied the access schedule, granting the respondent increased day access and conditional overnight access upon suitable accommodation.

The respondent's requests to reduce child support and expunge arrears were dismissed, as no material change in circumstances was found to warrant a reduction from the previously consented amount.

Travel consent requirements were modified, allowing the applicant to travel within Canada without the respondent's written consent under specific conditions, but retaining the requirement for international travel, school removal, or if it impinged on access.

The respondent was also ordered to promptly sign government documents.

A child protection society brought a summary judgment motion seeking an order for extended society care of two children, with no access to their mother, and access to their maternal uncle.

The mother opposed the motion and sought return of the children to her care.

The court found that the mother suffered from serious untreated mental health issues, including amphetamine-induced psychosis, and had engaged in concerning behaviour including violating court orders, posting confidential information on social media, and attempting to undermine the children's foster placement.

The court granted the society's motion for extended care, denied the mother's request for access, and granted access to the maternal uncle at the society's discretion.

The appellant parents appealed a trial decision making their two children Crown wards without access.

The parents had previously been convicted of manslaughter in the death of their middle child due to malnutrition.

On appeal, the parents argued the trial judge made numerous errors, including finding the youngest child in need of protection, excluding the reasons for sentence from their criminal trial, and terminating access.

They also sought to introduce fresh evidence and argued they received ineffective assistance from their trial counsel.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding errors in the trial judge's factual findings or application of the law.

The court also held that the fresh evidence would not have changed the outcome and that the ineffective assistance of counsel claim was both moot and unfounded.

The applicant, the Mayor of the Township of Springwater, sought judicial review of a decision by the Township's Compliance Audit Committee to order a second, 'forensic' audit of his election campaign finances after finding the first audit unsatisfactory.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application as premature, holding that the court should not intervene in ongoing administrative proceedings absent exceptional circumstances.

The court found that the Committee's decision to order a second audit involved the interpretation of its home statute and was not a true question of jurisdiction.

The court also limited the Committee's standing on the judicial review to jurisdictional issues and confirmed that the Committee's term had not expired.

The moving party, an accounting firm appointed to conduct a compliance audit of a mayoral candidate's election campaign finances, brought a motion to dismiss an application for judicial review against it.

The applicant sought to quash the auditor's report.

The Divisional Court granted the motion to dismiss, finding that the auditor was not exercising a statutory power of decision under the Judicial Review Procedure Act when preparing the report.

The court held that the report was merely a technical step and not determinative of legal rights, making it plain and obvious that the application against the auditor was devoid of merit.

A Children's Aid Society brought a summary judgment motion seeking statutory and protection findings under the Child and Family Services Act, and an order for Crown wardship of a child apprehended at birth.

The respondent parents had previously been convicted of manslaughter in the death of another child due to malnutrition and failure to provide necessaries of life.

Two other children had been made Crown wards without access.

The court dismissed the motion, finding genuine issues for trial regarding whether the child was in need of protection and the appropriate disposition, despite the serious history of parental neglect and the parents' lack of demonstrated change.

The Children's Aid Society of Toronto sought access to youth criminal justice records of A.C., now an adult, for use in child protection proceedings regarding A.C.'s infant son.

The records were created when A.C. was a young person and are protected under the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

The court was required to balance the society's interest in protecting the child against A.C.'s privacy rights under the Act.

The court granted limited access to two records within the statutory access period (robbery and breach of recognizance charges) but denied access to all other records that fell outside the access periods.

The court imposed strict conditions on the use and distribution of the records granted.

This is a costs decision following a three-day family law trial in which the mother successfully obtained an order permitting her to relocate the child to British Columbia, secured a parenting schedule favourable to her position, and established ongoing child support at $566 per month.

The father was unsuccessful on the dominant issues but succeeded on secondary matters regarding travel restrictions and spousal support.

The mother sought $5,000 in costs while the father sought no costs award.

The court awarded costs to the mother as the substantially successful party, fixing the amount at $3,500 inclusive of fees, disbursements, and HST, payable in monthly instalments of $100 commencing July 1, 2016.

The mother sought to relocate with the parties' two children (ages 10 and 8) from Ontario to British Columbia to care for her ailing mother and pursue better employment opportunities.

The father opposed the relocation and sought custody if the move was permitted.

The court found a material change in circumstances and, applying the Gordon v. Goertz framework, determined that permitting the relocation was in the children's best interests.

The mother's plan provided greater financial security and family support, while the father had demonstrated a pattern of non-compliance with child support obligations and poor parenting judgment.

The court granted the relocation with modified access arrangements and increased child support.

Following a divided outcome on an application regarding taxi licensing by-laws, the intervenor, Taxiworkers Association of Ontario, sought costs against the applicant.

The court denied costs for the intervention and injunction motions because the intervenor was not a necessary party and participated on its own initiative.

However, the court awarded the intervenor $2,500 in costs for the main application, recognizing that its evidence was critical to the court's determination of the notice issue.

The applicant challenged municipal resolutions and by-law amendments implementing a new one-tier taxi licensing regime, alleging lack of notice, breach of the City's procedural by-law, and bad faith.

The court held that City Council was acting legislatively, not administratively, so no common law duty of procedural fairness applied.

The court further held that Council could consider the referred recommendations and that adequate notice had been given for the general TTL reforms, but not for the newly introduced mandatory 2024 deadline requiring all licences to convert.

That notice failure was a substantive breach going to the root of validity, so only the mandatory conversion deadline was quashed; the remainder of the regime was upheld and the bad faith claim failed.