Laura Shaw

This is a costs endorsement following an appeal where L.M. successfully challenged a costs award against her in a constitutional state funding motion.

The parties were unable to agree on the costs of the appeal.

The Court of Appeal fixed costs at $15,000, inclusive of HST and disbursements, to be paid forthwith by the Children’s Aid Society of the Region of Peel to L.M., emphasizing that the amount reflects a fair and reasonable sum for the unsuccessful party rather than an exact measure of actual costs.

The appellant, L.M., appealed a Divisional Court decision that set aside a costs award against the Children's Aid Society (CAS).

L.M. had successfully sought constitutional state funding for an appeal of a child protection order, which the CAS had opposed.

The motion judge awarded costs against the CAS, finding its opposition unreasonable and its rejection of an offer to settle improper.

The Divisional Court overturned this, finding the CAS's conduct reasonable.

The Court of Appeal allowed L.M.'s appeal, reinstating the original costs award, finding the Divisional Court erred in its assessment of the CAS's unreasonableness in opposing the motion and rejecting the offer to settle.

The appellant mother appealed the decision of the Ontario Superior Court, which had upheld a motion judge's order making three young children Crown wards (now called extended society care) without access to the mother under the Child and Family Services Act.

The appeal judge applied the wrong legislation (CFSA instead of CYFSA) and the wrong summary judgment principles.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, confirming the extended society care order but granting the mother access to the children.

The court found that the motion judge's factual findings regarding the mother's inability to adequately care for the children were sound, but the denial of access was based on improper judicial notice and unsupported assumptions about adoption prospects.

The nature and extent of access were remanded to the Ontario Court of Justice.

The appellant mother, L.M., appealed a summary judgment decision from the Ontario Court of Justice that granted Crown wardship of her three children without access.

The appeal raised seven grounds, including errors in applying the legal test for summary judgment in child protection cases, reversing the onus of proof for post-wardship access, improper judicial notice, palpable and overriding factual errors regarding the child's time in care, failure to consider the continuing need for protection, and insufficient reasons for admitting hearsay evidence.

The Superior Court dismissed the appeal, finding no errors of law or palpable and overriding errors of fact by the motion judge, and affirmed the lower court's decision to grant Crown wardship without access.

This is an appeal from a Superior Court decision affirming a trial court order making two children Crown wards without access following the death of a third child in the parents' care from complications of vitamin D deficiency and malnutrition.

The appellants challenged the Crown wardship order on multiple grounds, including ineffective assistance of counsel, abuse of process, and the trial judge's findings regarding the children's need for protection.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding ample evidence to support the trial judge's findings that both children were in need of protection and that Crown wardship without access was in their best interests.

The appellant parents appealed a trial decision making their two children Crown wards without access.

The parents had previously been convicted of manslaughter in the death of their middle child due to malnutrition.

On appeal, the parents argued the trial judge made numerous errors, including finding the youngest child in need of protection, excluding the reasons for sentence from their criminal trial, and terminating access.

They also sought to introduce fresh evidence and argued they received ineffective assistance from their trial counsel.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding errors in the trial judge's factual findings or application of the law.

The court also held that the fresh evidence would not have changed the outcome and that the ineffective assistance of counsel claim was both moot and unfounded.

A Children's Aid Society brought a summary judgment motion seeking statutory and protection findings under the Child and Family Services Act, and an order for Crown wardship of a child apprehended at birth.

The respondent parents had previously been convicted of manslaughter in the death of another child due to malnutrition and failure to provide necessaries of life.

Two other children had been made Crown wards without access.

The court dismissed the motion, finding genuine issues for trial regarding whether the child was in need of protection and the appropriate disposition, despite the serious history of parental neglect and the parents' lack of demonstrated change.

This is a summary judgment motion under the Child and Family Services Act where the Children's Aid Society sought a permanent custody order (section 57.1) placing a child with the paternal grandmother.

The biological mother opposed the motion and sought return of the child to her care, alternatively requesting a supervision order or access arrangements.

The court found no genuine issue for trial regarding the child's continued need for protection and determined that placement with the grandmother was in the child's best interests.

The mother's evidence of progress in mental health treatment was insufficient to overcome concerns about her lack of engagement with the child over one year, her refusal to permit home visits, and her ongoing behavioral issues during access visits.

The Children's Aid Society of the Region of Peel sought Crown wardship of two children (Am, age 10, and Az, age 2) following the death of their older sibling M from malnutrition while in the respondents' care.

The respondents were convicted of manslaughter in M's death.

The Society apprehended Am in 2011 after discovering vitamin D and B12 deficiencies, and Az at birth in 2013.

The respondents maintained they had done nothing wrong and resisted the Society's efforts to address nutritional concerns, citing religious beliefs and conspiracy theories.

The court found both children in need of protection due to risk of physical harm from parental neglect and lack of adequate nutrition.

The court ordered Crown wardship for both children with no access to the respondents, finding that the respondents had not changed their dietary practices, profoundly mistrusted the Society, and could not cooperate in a meaningful way to ensure the children's safety.

The father brought a motion to stay a final order making the child a Crown ward without access pending appeal and sought ongoing disclosure of society records.

The court accepted that the disclosure request was consented to and focused on whether the final order should be stayed.

Applying the stay test from appellate authority, the court found there was a serious issue to be tried on appeal, and that maintaining supervised access pending the appeal would better serve the child’s best interests.

The court concluded that continuation of access would preserve the relationship while the appeal was pending and would not prejudice the child’s placement.

The motion to stay the order pending appeal was granted and access continued on the previous terms.

The Children's Aid Society brought a motion seeking to introduce evidence of the respondents' conviction and sentencing for manslaughter of one of their children in a Crown wardship proceeding.

The Society sought to adduce this evidence by way of a 14B motion without an oral hearing.

The respondents opposed, arguing that an oral hearing should be held to permit submissions on the weight to be attached to the convictions.

The court found that sentencing is a distinct process from conviction and dismissed the motion without prejudice, ordering that the matter proceed by way of an oral motion at a scheduled court date to allow the respondents an opportunity to be heard.

A child protection society sought to reopen a child protection trial after all evidence had been heard but before final submissions were made.

The purpose was to introduce evidence that the respondent parents had been convicted of manslaughter of one of their children.

The respondents opposed the motion, arguing the evidence was not necessary, that the society lacked diligence, and that reopening would violate their Charter rights.

The court allowed the motion, finding that the evidence was relevant, necessary, and reliable, and that in child protection cases a flexible approach should be adopted when the evidence relates to the best interests of the child.

The appellant mother appealed an Ontario Court of Justice order granting Crown wardship of her child without access following summary judgment in child protection proceedings.

She argued the motion judge misapprehended the evidence regarding improvements in her parenting, failed to consider extending statutory timelines under the Child and Family Services Act, and gave insufficient weight to her efforts to complete counselling and parenting programs.

The Superior Court held that the motion judge carefully reviewed the evidence and made no palpable and overriding error.

The court found there was no evidence demonstrating that the appellant’s program participation translated into improved parenting capacity and that extending statutory timelines would not be in the child’s best interests.

The appeal was dismissed.

This is a summary judgment motion brought by the Children's Aid Society seeking a final order for placement of two children with their father and stepmother pursuant to section 57(1) of the Child and Family Services Act.

The children had been placed with their stepmother following a protection application initiated due to the mother's drug overdose.

The court found that the mother, while making some progress in addressing her substance abuse issues, had not established a sustained lifestyle change and had not demonstrated that the children would be better served by residing with her.

The court granted the society's motion, finding no triable issues and that the children's stability in their current placement outweighed any potential benefit of returning them to the mother's care.