Margaret Osadet

The applicant brought a motion seeking to set aside a prior order that removed a Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL) from a property and to obtain an interim order prohibiting the property's sale, alleging fraud.

The court dismissed the urgent hearing request and the interim order prohibiting sale.

The judge found no new urgency, no newly discovered evidence, and insufficient cogent evidence to support the fraud allegations.

The court also noted the applicant's long-standing non-compliance with a disclosure order and that the prior order already provided for sale proceeds to be held in trust, mitigating irreparable harm.

The balance of the motion was adjourned.

The respondent grandmother sought an urgent motion for the return of her grandson to her care after the applicant father refused to return the child following temporary extended access during the COVID-19 pandemic school closures.

The father claimed concerns about COVID-19 exposure in the grandmother's household but failed to bring a motion to change the custody order.

The court found the father's conduct unreasonable and a breach of the existing final custody order.

The parties reached a resolution and the child was returned to the grandmother's custody.

The court addressed the issue of costs, finding that while the father's conduct was unreasonable, it did not rise to the level of bad faith.

No costs were ordered, but the father was warned of potential cost sanctions for future non-compliance.

The appellant appealed a trial judge's order affirming the validity of a domestic contract between the parties.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's thorough analysis and rejection of the appellant's arguments to set aside the agreement.

The appellant raised a new argument on appeal regarding waiver of spousal support rights under the Family Law Act, but this argument was not advanced at trial and was declined for consideration on appeal.

This is a costs endorsement following the applicant's unsuccessful motion to adjourn a trial.

The respondent sought costs thrown away due to the adjournment and costs for responding to the motion.

The court found the respondent's refusal to consent to the adjournment reasonable, citing the applicant's disclosure failures, missed deadlines, and unexplained delays.

The court awarded the respondent costs thrown away and substantial indemnity costs for the motion, payable by the applicant.

The court declined to order costs personally against the applicant's counsel, despite her neglect, emphasizing the high threshold for such orders.

The applicant brought a motion to adjourn a family law trial scheduled to proceed in four weeks due to her counsel's competing trial commitment.

The respondent opposed the adjournment, citing his age, health, and the stress of ongoing litigation, as well as the applicant's counsel's neglect in addressing the scheduling conflict earlier.

The court weighed the prejudice to both parties and the broader public interest, concluding that the potential prejudice to the applicant of proceeding without counsel outweighed the inconvenience to the respondent, which could be compensated in costs.

The trial was adjourned to the fall sittings, peremptory to the applicant, with submissions requested on whether the applicant's counsel should personally bear the costs.

Joel Stevenson was found guilty of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

The Crown sought a seven-year imprisonment sentence, while the defence proposed a conditional sentence or, alternatively, four years with substantial credit for pre-sentence bail conditions, emphasizing the offender's Aboriginal heritage and the application of Gladue principles.

The court rejected a conditional sentence due to the seriousness of the offence, finding that deterrence and denunciation were paramount.

After considering the unique systemic and background factors affecting the offender, including intergenerational trauma from residential schools and personal history of abuse and incarceration, and balancing these with the seriousness of the offence and the principle of parity with a co-accused, the court imposed a sentence of five years imprisonment.

An eight-month credit was awarded for harsh pre-sentence release conditions, resulting in a net sentence of four years and four months.

During a criminal trial for sexual offences against his stepdaughter, the accused was cross-examined by the Crown on a written statement he had provided to a Children's Aid Society worker.

The defence objected, arguing the worker was a person in authority and a voluntariness voir dire was required.

The court found that the CAS worker was a person in authority because the accused reasonably believed she had the power to compel the statement and influence proceedings.

However, the court declined to hold a voluntariness voir dire at that late stage of the trial due to prejudice to the accused, and instead excluded the evidence related to the statement.

Applications for a mistrial and stay of proceedings were dismissed.

The Crown brought a cross-count similar fact application at the close of its case, seeking to admit evidence related to three incidents of alleged sexual abuse by the accused, H.F., against his stepdaughter, LFR, to apply to each other count.

The charges included sexual assault, sexual interference, and invitation to sexual touching.

The court applied the R. v. Handy framework, balancing the probative value of the similar fact evidence against its prejudicial effect.

Despite some dissimilarities in the specific acts, the court found compelling similarities in the surrounding circumstances, such as the complainant's young age and vulnerability, the accused's position of trust, the mother's absence during the incidents, and the location of the acts within the family home.

The court concluded that these common characteristics demonstrated a pattern of conduct, and that the probative value outweighed the potential for prejudice, especially in a judge-alone trial.

The application for the admission of similar fact evidence was granted.

The accused, H.F., facing sexual assault charges, brought an application for the production of Children's Aid Society (CAS) records related to the complainant, LFR, his stepdaughter.

The Defence argued H.F. was already in lawful possession of the records from prior child protection proceedings and thus the s. 278 Criminal Code regime for third-party records did not apply.

The Crown and Complainant argued the records were not in lawful possession for criminal proceedings and were subject to s. 278.

The court found that H.F. was not in lawful possession of the CAS records for the purpose of criminal proceedings, and the records were subject to the s. 278 disclosure scheme.

The court further determined that the Defence failed to establish the records were "likely relevant" to an issue at trial and that their production was not necessary in the interests of justice, considering the complainant's privacy rights and the limited probative value of the records.

The application was denied, and the records were deemed inadmissible.

The applicant mother commenced proceedings in Ontario seeking sole custody and permission to relocate to Texas, despite a prior Florida order governing custody.

The respondent father consented to the relocation shortly after, and the mother moved to Texas.

The parties subsequently consented to dismiss the Ontario application and answer, leaving costs to be determined.

The court found the mother acted unreasonably in launching the Ontario proceedings and maintaining that Ontario had jurisdiction after moving to Texas.

The mother was ordered to pay $2,500 in costs to the father.

The applicant father sought custody, access, and various financial claims, while the respondent mother sought custody, child support, spousal support, and equalization.

The court maintained sole custody with the mother and established a new access schedule for the father, including alternate weekend and weekday access with specific pickup/drop-off arrangements.

The father's income was imputed at $45,000 annually for support purposes, leading to orders for ongoing child and spousal support.

Claims for retroactive child support, retroactive spousal support, equalization, and a post-separation claim were dismissed due to insufficient evidence or potential undue hardship.

A non-removal order was issued, requiring the father to provide the children's Iranian passports to the mother and restricting his ability to remove the children from Ontario.

This family law trial addressed financial issues including child support, spousal support, and equalization of net family property.

The court determined the value of the matrimonial home, the respondent's business interests (ABC Insurance Brokers Ltd. and Dagmar Management Group Ltd.), personal property, and a disputed loan from the respondent's father, which was discounted to zero.

The court imputed income to both parties for support purposes, finding the applicant intentionally under-employed due to insufficient English language upgrading efforts, and imputed rental income to the respondent.

Child support and spousal support were ordered, with spousal support being compensatory and non-compensatory, set at mid-range for a duration of nine years post-separation.

The Children's Aid Society of the Region of Peel sought Crown wardship of two children (Am, age 10, and Az, age 2) following the death of their older sibling M from malnutrition while in the respondents' care.

The respondents were convicted of manslaughter in M's death.

The Society apprehended Am in 2011 after discovering vitamin D and B12 deficiencies, and Az at birth in 2013.

The respondents maintained they had done nothing wrong and resisted the Society's efforts to address nutritional concerns, citing religious beliefs and conspiracy theories.

The court found both children in need of protection due to risk of physical harm from parental neglect and lack of adequate nutrition.

The court ordered Crown wardship for both children with no access to the respondents, finding that the respondents had not changed their dietary practices, profoundly mistrusted the Society, and could not cooperate in a meaningful way to ensure the children's safety.

A dispute arose between separated parents regarding the capacity of their adult daughter and the appropriate guardianship arrangements under the Substitute Decisions Act, 1992.

Following court‑ordered capacity assessments, the court found the individual incapable of managing property and incapable of making personal care decisions related to health and safety, though capable in other personal care domains.

The court considered expert evidence, the individual's expressed wishes, and competing guardianship plans.

It concluded that the father and paternal aunt were suitable joint guardians of property and limited guardians of the person for health and safety decisions.

The court emphasized respect for autonomy, least‑restrictive intervention, and ongoing opportunities for the individual to maintain family relationships.

The Children's Aid Society brought a motion seeking to introduce evidence of the respondents' conviction and sentencing for manslaughter of one of their children in a Crown wardship proceeding.

The Society sought to adduce this evidence by way of a 14B motion without an oral hearing.

The respondents opposed, arguing that an oral hearing should be held to permit submissions on the weight to be attached to the convictions.

The court found that sentencing is a distinct process from conviction and dismissed the motion without prejudice, ordering that the matter proceed by way of an oral motion at a scheduled court date to allow the respondents an opportunity to be heard.

A child protection society sought to reopen a child protection trial after all evidence had been heard but before final submissions were made.

The purpose was to introduce evidence that the respondent parents had been convicted of manslaughter of one of their children.

The respondents opposed the motion, arguing the evidence was not necessary, that the society lacked diligence, and that reopening would violate their Charter rights.

The court allowed the motion, finding that the evidence was relevant, necessary, and reliable, and that in child protection cases a flexible approach should be adopted when the evidence relates to the best interests of the child.

Following convictions for manslaughter by failing to provide the necessaries of life to a child, a publication ban had been imposed under s. 486.5 of the Criminal Code protecting the identities of surviving siblings and information that could identify them.

A media organization sought to narrow or vary the ban, while counsel for the convicted parents requested the appointment of amicus curiae to advance the interests of the affected children.

The Crown ultimately supported narrowing the ban but took no position on the appointment of amicus.

The court considered competing interests between freedom of expression and the protection of vulnerable children.

The court appointed a child advocacy legal clinic as amicus curiae to assist in determining the proper scope of the publication ban before sentencing.

At a preliminary inquiry, the Crown sought to commit two accused for trial on charges arising from a hostage-taking incident at the Toronto East Detention Centre.

Stanton David was charged with three counts of hostage taking, assault with a weapon, and possession of a weapon for a purpose dangerous to the public peace.

Alpha Water was charged with three counts of hostage taking and one count of placing a trap with intent to cause bodily harm.

The Crown also sought committal on two counts of mischief for Water.

The court found sufficient evidence to commit both accused for trial on the hostage-taking charges and committed Water on the mischief charges, but discharged Water on the trap charge due to insufficient evidence of intent to cause bodily harm.