Susan Von Achten

The applicant, Seyedali Salar, sought an order for the sale of the matrimonial home and exclusive possession in the interim.

The respondent, Mahnaz Salari, did not object to the sale but requested $2 million to purchase a new home, interim spousal support, and exclusive possession.

The court found that spousal support was not properly before it on this motion and granted the applicant’s motion in part, allowing the sale of the home, granting exclusive possession to the applicant in 45 days, and ordering that the proceeds be held in trust.

The respondent was awarded a $30,000 uncharacterized payment.

The decision reviews the relevant provisions of the Family Law Act and the Family Law Rules, and applies recent case law on the sale and possession of matrimonial homes.

The respondent, Serafim Beites, moved for an order granting him exclusive possession of real property jointly owned with the applicant, Kimberly Ann Beites, in Texas, and for an order restraining the applicant from attending that property.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that a preservation or restraining order under section 12 of the Family Law Act was not necessary to protect an equalization payment, and that the value of the Texas property was insignificant compared to the parties' other assets.

The court also questioned its jurisdiction to grant exclusive possession of foreign-owned real property and declined to exercise exceptional in personam jurisdiction in the circumstances.

This decision addresses competing applications for a change of venue in a first-degree murder trial.

The Crown sought to transfer the trial from Gore Bay to Sudbury, while the accused sought a transfer to Toronto, or alternatively, North Bay.

The court determined that a change of venue from Gore Bay was expedient due to the lengthy trial, daily travel for the in-custody accused, and winter travel conditions.

The court granted the Crown's application, ordering the trial to proceed in Sudbury, finding it to be the most appropriate venue given its proximity to the original community, adjacent jail facilities, and available courtroom.

The accused's arguments regarding jail conditions and proximity to counsel and family were not sufficiently supported by evidence or did not outweigh the principle of local trials.

The accused were charged with possessing marihuana, cocaine, methamphetamine and ketamine for the purpose of trafficking.

Following a preliminary inquiry, the court discharged both accused on all four counts.

The Crown's case relied entirely on circumstantial evidence.

While the court found sufficient evidence that the accused had resided at the premises where the drugs were discovered, the Crown failed to establish sufficient evidence that the accused had knowledge of and control over the controlled substances on or about the date of the search.

The absence of evidence regarding the accused's whereabouts in the days preceding the search, combined with the presence of identification documents belonging to unknown persons and evidence of other criminal activity at the premises, created reasonable alternative explanations for the presence of the drugs that did not involve the accused.

The Crown applied under s. 521 of the Criminal Code to review and cancel a judicial interim release order granted after a contested bail hearing involving firearm and drug trafficking allegations.

The accused had been released on recognizance with sureties despite a reverse onus and evidence suggesting possession of a loaded handgun and cocaine at a funeral while wearing a bulletproof vest.

The review court considered the tertiary ground under s. 515(10)(c) and the requirement to maintain confidence in the administration of justice.

Although the circumstances involving a firearm were serious, the court held detention was not necessary if stricter supervision conditions were imposed.

The release order was varied to require electronic monitoring and geographic restrictions between residence and employment.

The accused brought an application for the trial judge to disqualify himself based on an alleged reasonable apprehension of bias.

The accused argued that the judge's prior professional relationships with both defence counsel and Crown counsel would prevent a fair trial.

The judge rejected the application, finding that prior collegial relationships and professional disagreements, without more, do not establish a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The judge applied the legal test requiring substantial grounds and concluded that an informed person would not conclude the judge would decide the case unfairly.

The accused applied for an adjournment of a trial scheduled for February 26, 2013.

During a judicial pre-trial held in camera, defence counsel raised concerns about police and Crown conduct in relation to an unrelated matter involving the accused from January 2013.

The court found that the concerns about the separate matter did not provide grounds for adjournment of the current trial, which involved complaints by two civilian witnesses from an earlier date.

The court refused the adjournment application and ordered the trial to proceed as scheduled, with witnesses directed not to attend before 11:00 a.m. to accommodate counsel's scheduling conflict.