Liana Marcon

The offender, Herminta Skardiute, pleaded guilty to dangerous driving causing bodily harm.

The Crown sought 15 to 18 months incarceration and a 3 to 5 year driving prohibition, while the defence requested a conditional sentence order (CSO) of two years less a day.

The offence involved driving unlicensed, at high speed (140 km/h in an 80 km/h zone), passing on a blind hill, resulting in severe, life-threatening, and permanent injuries to the victim, Adam Platt, and injuries to other passengers.

The court considered numerous mitigating factors, including the offender's remorse, guilty plea, community service, and role as a primary caregiver, against significant aggravating factors such as the extreme dangerousness of the driving, the unlicensed status, and the severe bodily harm caused.

The court determined that a CSO would not adequately address the principles of denunciation and general deterrence, particularly given the high moral blameworthiness and the notorious nature of the road where the collision occurred.

The court imposed a sentence of 15 months imprisonment and a 3-year driving prohibition.

The offender, Jonathan Weir, pleaded guilty to manslaughter after killing his best friend with an unlawfully possessed, prohibited machine gun.

The court considered the appropriate sentence, including the four-year minimum for manslaughter with a firearm, and arguments regarding police misconduct during arrest and detention.

The judge found Weir's moral blameworthiness to be high, closer to criminal negligence than a "near accident" due to his reckless handling and storage of firearms and ammunition while intoxicated.

While acknowledging some police misconduct (improper strip searches), the court found it not egregious enough to justify a sentence below the statutory minimum.

The final sentence was 51 months (4¼ years) after credits for pre-sentence custody, rights violations, and strict bail conditions.

The appellant appealed his summary convictions for impaired driving, 'over 80', and dangerous driving.

He argued that the trial judge erred in her findings regarding identity and alleged violations of his rights under sections 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Charter.

The Superior Court of Justice found that the trial judge's findings of fact were supported by the evidence and entitled to deference.

The appeal was dismissed as the appellant failed to demonstrate that the verdicts were unreasonable or the product of a material misapprehension of evidence.

The accused was charged with impaired driving, over 80, and dangerous driving after witnesses observed him driving a white van erratically, including swerving, running a red light, and driving with his feet out the window.

Police followed the van to the accused's residence, where he was arrested.

The accused brought Charter applications alleging violations of his rights under sections 8, 9, and 10(b), arguing unlawful entry onto his property, failure to facilitate access to counsel of choice, and arbitrary detention.

The court dismissed all Charter applications, finding the police had an implied license to knock, fulfilled their duties regarding the right to counsel, and reasonably detained the accused due to his extreme intoxication and belligerent behavior.

The accused was found guilty on all counts.

The offender was convicted after an eleven-day trial of multiple serious firearm offences arising from an incident on July 31, 2017, including discharging a firearm with intent to endanger, pointing a firearm, and possession of a firearm without a licence.

He also pleaded guilty to breaches of recognizance and probation from 2018.

The court imposed a global sentence of 7 years less 34½ months presentence custody credit, resulting in a net sentence of 61 months, with lifetime firearms prohibitions, DNA orders, and a forfeiture order.

The offender's extensive criminal history, pattern of recidivism, breaches of court orders, and the serious nature of the firearm offences were significant aggravating factors.

The defendant appeared for sentencing on two counts of impaired driving causing bodily harm.

The defendant drove his vehicle into oncoming traffic, striking two vehicles and injuring two individuals.

His blood alcohol concentration was between 155 and 200 mg/100ml.

The Crown sought 12 to 15 months in custody, while the defence proposed 6 to 8 months.

Emphasizing general deterrence and the severe consequences of impaired driving, the court sentenced the defendant to 12 months in custody, followed by two years of probation and a three-year driving prohibition.

A 15-year-old youth was sentenced for criminal negligence causing death after stealing a vehicle and driving at extreme speed (148-150 km/h in an 80 km/h zone) on Highway 10 in Caledon, resulting in a crash that killed his 12-year-old passenger.

The defendant was under a release order prohibiting him from occupying the driver's seat of any motor vehicle at the time of the offense.

The court imposed a sentence of 18 months custody and supervision (168 days in custody and 85 days under supervision), followed by two years probation with conditions including a six-year driving prohibition, 100 hours community service, and a probation review hearing.

The court credited 295 days of pre-trial custody on a one-to-one basis.

The appellant, Jasvinder Shoker, appealed his convictions for impaired driving and driving over 80 mg.

He argued the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding impairment and erred in finding no s. 10(b) Charter breach concerning his right to counsel.

The appeal court found no error in the trial judge's assessment of impairment, noting sufficient indicia despite some inconsistencies.

Regarding the Charter issue, the court upheld the trial judge's finding that no breach occurred, as the appellant had agreed to speak with duty counsel if his preferred lawyer was unavailable and expressed no dissatisfaction with this arrangement at the time.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown applied under s. 489 and s. 490(9.1) of the Criminal Code for the continued detention of items seized from the respondents during a complex murder investigation.

While proceedings against one respondent were previously discontinued, the police continued to investigate the other respondent for murder.

The court ordered the return of several items with no evidentiary value.

However, the court granted the continued detention of the remaining items, finding they might reasonably be required for the ongoing investigation and that their detention was in the interests of justice despite delays in forensic analysis.

The Crown sought a warrant to obtain bodily substances for forensic DNA analysis from the respondent pursuant to Section 487.05(1) of the Criminal Code.

The respondent was charged with break and enter of a dwelling house and mischief by wilful damage.

The Crown's evidence consisted of a DNA profile obtained from a half-consumed can of Fruitopia found at the crime scene, which had been matched to the respondent through the National DNA Data Bank.

The respondent argued that there was insufficient evidence that he was a party to the offence and that it was not in the best interests of justice to issue the warrant given the Crown already possessed the original DNA match.

The court granted the DNA warrant, finding reasonable grounds to believe the respondent was a party to the offence based on the inference that the beverage can was introduced to the secured property during the break-in period.

The defendant was charged with driving with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood.

The trial proceeded as a blended trial and Charter application.

The defence challenged the admissibility of breath test results on two grounds: first, that the tests were not taken as soon as practicable as required by the Criminal Code; and second, that the defendant's privacy rights under section 8 of the Charter were breached by video recording in the police cell while using the toilet.

The court found that the breath tests were taken as soon as practicable and that no Charter breach occurred.

The defendant was convicted.

The defendant pleaded guilty to child luring and making sexually explicit material available to a child.

The offences involved online grooming of a 13-year-old American girl in 2012 when the defendant was 25 years old.

The defendant misrepresented his age as 19 and engaged in sexual acts on webcam and obtained a nude photograph of the complainant.

The court imposed a sentence of four months incarceration on each count to be served concurrently, followed by three years of probation with strict conditions including restrictions on contact with minors, internet access, and electronic devices.

A lifetime SOIRA registration order and DNA order were also imposed.

The defendant was charged with failing or refusing to provide a suitable sample of breath into an approved screening device (ASD) at a RIDE checkpoint.

The Crown alleged the defendant deliberately avoided providing a proper sample through stalling tactics and physical avoidance.

The defendant testified he attempted to comply but felt intimidated by the officer's aggressive presentation of the device.

The court found the Crown failed to prove the defendant's mens rea (guilty intent) beyond a reasonable doubt, noting the officer provided insufficient opportunities, moved too quickly to arrest, and dismissed a bona fide offer to provide another sample after arrest.

The accused brought an application for the trial judge to disqualify himself based on an alleged reasonable apprehension of bias.

The accused argued that the judge's prior professional relationships with both defence counsel and Crown counsel would prevent a fair trial.

The judge rejected the application, finding that prior collegial relationships and professional disagreements, without more, do not establish a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The judge applied the legal test requiring substantial grounds and concluded that an informed person would not conclude the judge would decide the case unfairly.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving and driving with excess alcohol following a motor vehicle accident on Mississauga Road in Caledon.

The Crown relied on observations by civilian witnesses and a police officer, as well as toxicology evidence showing blood alcohol concentration well over the legal limit.

The defendant testified that she consumed alcohol after the accident while waiting for help.

The court found that while the defendant's version of events was barely believable, the investigating officer's evidence was completely unreliable due to inexperience, poor note-taking, and inconsistencies between his observations and those of civilian witnesses.

The court concluded that the Crown failed to prove the necessary elements of both charges beyond a reasonable doubt, particularly regarding care or control of the vehicle, and acquitted the defendant on both counts.

The defendant was charged with criminal harassment under section 264 of the Criminal Code for repeatedly contacting his former partner over approximately ten months following their breakup in May 2011.

The Crown alleged unwanted text messages, phone calls, written communications, and physical surveillance.

The defendant was acquitted of the criminal harassment charge but was bound over under a section 810 peace bond for 12 months with conditions prohibiting contact with the complainant and attendance within 100 metres of her residence, employment, or other known locations.

The defendant was charged with driving a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit.

At trial, the defendant challenged the Crown's ability to prove care or control of the vehicle, arguing he had rebutted the statutory presumption under section 258(1) of the Criminal Code by demonstrating his intent not to drive.

The court found the defendant's evidence not credible and concluded that the Crown had established care or control both through the presumption and the evidence.

The defendant was convicted and sentenced to a fine of $1,300 plus victim fine surcharge, with a 12-month driving prohibition.

Two additional charges (open liquor and drive no insurance) were withdrawn by the Crown.