Ryan Handlarski

Sentencing decision arising from a guilty plea to multiple drug trafficking offences involving kilogram quantities of fentanyl and cocaine, together with possession of a loaded prohibited or restricted firearm connected to a large-scale commercial trafficking enterprise.

The court treated denunciation and deterrence as dominant objectives given the extreme community harm associated with fentanyl trafficking and the offender’s trusted role in maintaining a stash house, while recognizing his youth, guilty pleas, lack of record, rehabilitative efforts, family support, and harsh pre-sentence custody as mitigating factors.

Alleged additional state misconduct relating to strip searches, disclosure access, religious restrictions, and institutional conditions was found to lack a sufficient evidentiary foundation, except that lockdowns and triple bunking were considered generally as mitigating conditions of custody.

Applying totality, the court directed the firearm sentence to run concurrently and imposed a global sentence of 9.5 years, reduced by Summers credit.

The appellant pleaded guilty to importing 1.5 metric tonnes of cocaine and possessing it for the purpose of trafficking, receiving a 16.5-year sentence.

On appeal, he argued the sentencing judge erred by anchoring his sentence to the 19-year sentence imposed on the scheme's organizer pursuant to a joint submission.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the sentencing judge erred in principle by using the co-accused's sentence as a starting point and failing to adequately account for the appellant's subordinate role, lack of prior record, and cognitive limitations.

The sentence was reduced to 12 years' imprisonment.

The accused was previously found unfit to stand trial on various firearms and assault charges and was detained at CAMH.

At his annual review hearing, the Ontario Review Board considered updated psychiatric evidence indicating that his psychotic symptoms had resolved and that his fluctuating engagement was due to willingness rather than inability.

Applying the Taylor test as clarified in Bharwani, the Board accepted the joint submission of the parties and found the accused fit to stand trial.

The Board ordered that he be returned to court.

During a murder trial, counsel for one co-accused renewed an application to recall two witnesses to testify about the deceased's general reputation for violence and aggression, arguing that the evidentiary basis had changed since both co-accused had now testified.

The court had previously permitted specific Scopelliti evidence of the deceased's prior acts of weaponized intimidation but denied broader character evidence.

The court found that the law and reasons from its prior ruling continued to apply and denied the renewed request, noting that unlike the other co-accused who had established an air of reality for self-defence, the moving co-accused had not satisfied that threshold.

The appellant appealed her summary conviction findings of guilt for assault and assault causing bodily harm, arguing that the trial judge's written reasons, delivered approximately 11 months after the guilty verdicts, should not be considered on appeal as they were divorced from the reasoning that led to the verdicts.

Applying the framework from R. v. Teskey, the appeal court found that the repeated promises of imminent delivery of reasons followed by repeated failures to deliver, the lack of any satisfactory explanation for the delays, the nature of the evidence requiring detailed credibility and factual analysis, and deficiencies in the written reasons themselves constituted cogent evidence rebutting the presumption of judicial integrity.

The Crown conceded that the brief oral reasons at verdict were insufficient for appellate review under R. v. Sheppard.

The convictions were set aside and a new trial was ordered.

Jevaughn Myers pleaded guilty to kidnapping and administering a stupefying drug.

The victim, an international student, was kidnapped for ransom and held for 13 days.

The Crown sought 16 years, while the defence proposed 8 years.

The court considered aggravating factors (victim impact, Myers' central role) and mitigating factors (guilty plea, first offender, mental health, family support, harsh pre-sentence custody conditions).

Applying sentencing principles, including denunciation, deterrence, and totality, the court imposed a global sentence of 10 years imprisonment, comprising 9 years for kidnapping and 1 year consecutive for administering a substance, after accounting for pre-sentence custody.

A lifetime weapons prohibition and DNA order were also imposed.

This is a mandatory 90-day detention review under s. 525 of the Criminal Code.

The court addresses the onus at such reviews, distinguishing between cases where an initial bail hearing was held (no onus on either party) and where none was held (onus reverts to Crown/accused as per s. 515).

The court also clarifies the appropriate procedures and scope of s. 525 reviews, emphasizing they are not de novo bail hearings and that the Palmer/St-Cloud due diligence and relevance criteria for new evidence still apply.

The applicant sought release based on a new surety plan, but the court found it did not constitute a material change in circumstances and dismissed the application, finding continued detention justified.

The applicant, Givonn Bowen-Wright, sought a stay of proceedings for firearm possession charges, arguing an infringement of his s. 11(b) Charter right to a trial within a reasonable time, as the total delay exceeded the 30-month Jordan ceiling.

The Crown opposed, attributing delay to the defence and arguing case complexity.

The court found that the primary cause of delay was institutional shortcomings, specifically judicial unavailability, and rejected the Crown's arguments regarding defence delay and case complexity.

The application was granted, and the proceedings were stayed.

Kyle Marier pleaded guilty to possession of a loaded prohibited firearm.

The Crown sought 34 months imprisonment, while the defence sought an 18-month conditional sentence.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the public possession of a loaded firearm, flight from police, discarding the weapon, and being on bail for another offence.

Mitigating factors included Marier's youth (19 at the time of offence, 23 at sentencing), lack of prior criminal record, guilty plea, strong family and community support, and significant rehabilitative efforts while on house arrest bail for over four years.

The court also considered social context evidence of systemic anti-Black racism and its impact on the offender, which mitigated his moral culpability.

The judge found the appropriate sentence to be in the range of two years and, applying the principles from R. v. Morris, determined that a conditional sentence was appropriate given Marier's rehabilitative potential and the systemic factors.

Marier was sentenced to a two-year conditional sentence (less 46 days credit for pre-trial custody), with the first 12 months under house arrest and the remainder under curfew, followed by one year of probation.

Ancillary orders included a DNA order, a 10-year/lifetime firearms prohibition, and forfeiture of seized items.

The offender, Jonathan Weir, pleaded guilty to manslaughter after killing his best friend with an unlawfully possessed, prohibited machine gun.

The court considered the appropriate sentence, including the four-year minimum for manslaughter with a firearm, and arguments regarding police misconduct during arrest and detention.

The judge found Weir's moral blameworthiness to be high, closer to criminal negligence than a "near accident" due to his reckless handling and storage of firearms and ammunition while intoxicated.

While acknowledging some police misconduct (improper strip searches), the court found it not egregious enough to justify a sentence below the statutory minimum.

The final sentence was 51 months (4¼ years) after credits for pre-sentence custody, rights violations, and strict bail conditions.

The accused, a 22-year-old Black male with no prior criminal record, pleaded guilty to possessing a loaded restricted firearm and an over-capacity magazine found in his bedroom.

The court considered the accused's background, including experiences with anti-Black racism and his status as a first-time offender, applying the principles of restraint and rehabilitation under s. 718.2(e) of the Criminal Code.

A sentence of two years was imposed, but after applying Summers credits (1.5:1) and Duncan credits (2:1 for lockdown conditions) for pre-trial custody, the accused was sentenced to time served and 18 months of probation.

During a trial for first degree murder, the accused applied for directed verdicts of acquittal at the close of the Crown's case.

The Crown's case relied entirely on circumstantial evidence, including cell tower data and security video, to place the accused at the scene of the shooting or assisting the shooters.

The court dismissed the directed verdict applications, finding sufficient evidence for a properly instructed jury to convict.

The court also ruled on several jury charge issues, declining to instruct the jury on co-principal liability, abetting, or the common unlawful purpose doctrine for second degree murder, and opting to provide an expanded instruction on circumstantial evidence.

The accused, charged with first degree murder, brought a motion to sit at counsel table rather than in the prisoner's dock during their trial.

The Crown opposed the motion, arguing for the traditional placement in the dock due to security concerns and to allow the jury a better view for identification purposes.

The court reviewed the conflicting jurisprudence on the issue and concluded that there is no presumption regarding an accused's placement.

Applying a case-by-case analysis based on fair trial interests and courtroom security, the court found that sitting at counsel table enhances communication with counsel and avoids the risk of prejudice associated with the dock.

Given the accused's good behaviour during prior court appearances and the lack of specific security risks, the motion was granted.

The applicants, charged with first-degree murder, applied to sever their trial from a co-accused who had recently been extradited to Canada and was unready for the scheduled trial.

The applicants had been awaiting trial for nearly 30 months and had caused no delay.

The Crown opposed severance, citing the societal interest in a joint trial.

The court granted the application, finding that the applicants' right to a trial within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter outweighed the public interest in a joint trial, especially given the Crown's duty to mitigate delay caused by discrete events like extradition.

The accused pleaded guilty to robbery with a weapon following a home invasion.

Prior to sentencing, the accused sought a stay of proceedings, alleging multiple Charter breaches including a failure to bring him before a justice within 24 hours of arrest, delays in his bail hearing, and being unlawfully held in custody for 30 hours after being granted bail.

The court found breaches of sections 7, 9, and 11(e) of the Charter but concluded a stay of proceedings was disproportionate.

Instead, the court granted a significant sentence reduction.

Considering the Charter breaches, the accused's lack of a prior record, his compliance with bail, and systemic factors related to his background as a young Black man, the court imposed a suspended sentence and one year of probation.

The accused was tried on one count of sexual assault arising from an allegation that, while the complainant slept on a sofa after a social gathering, he manipulated her hand onto his penis.

The court ruled on pre-trial evidentiary issues, admitting certain prior consistent statements only for narrative, state of mind, or spontaneous reaction purposes, and refusing to admit alleged prior conduct as discreditable conduct beyond narrative.

Applying the W.(D.) framework, the court found the accused's evidence strong and materially consistent with other witnesses, while identifying numerous credibility concerns in the complainant's evidence, including inconsistencies relating to post-incident conduct, social media searches, police communications, finances, and an extortion letter.

The Crown failed to prove the charge beyond a reasonable doubt, and an acquittal was entered.

The young person pleaded guilty to second degree murder for killing his mother.

Both the Crown and defence agreed to a seven-year Intensive Rehabilitative Custody and Supervision (IRCS) youth sentence.

The only issue was the amount of credit for 688 days of pre-sentence custody.

The court granted one year of credit, leaving three years to serve in custody and three years under conditional supervision, noting the young person's significant neurodevelopmental needs and the requirement for long-term treatment and support.

The accused, a young Black man, sought release from custody through a combined 90-day detention review and a bail review.

He was facing charges including possession of a loaded prohibited firearm and breaching a previous release order by deliberately evading GPS monitoring.

The court found that while the justice of the peace erred in law by failing to explicitly consider the accused's status as a member of a vulnerable population under s. 493.2 of the Criminal Code, the error did not affect the outcome given the egregious nature of the breach and the inadequacy of the proposed release plan.

The court also rejected the accused's argument for release based on fear of COVID-19, noting his refusal to be vaccinated.

The application for release was dismissed and continued detention was found justified.

The accused applied for judicial interim release after being charged with firearms and drug offences while already on bail for similar charges.

The accused proposed a new release plan involving house arrest, a GPS ankle bracelet, and his girlfriend as a surety.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the accused had previously breached his bail conditions flagrantly and had shown a lack of respect for the proposed surety by taking her car without her knowledge.

The court concluded that GPS monitoring is reactionary and insufficient to prevent further offences, justifying detention on the secondary ground.

Clifford Campsall pleaded guilty to the manslaughter of his girlfriend, Shelby Goldhar, whom he strangled and partially dismembered.

The court considered aggravating factors including the domestic nature of the homicide, the victim's vulnerabilities, the offender's prior assault conviction against the victim, and the indignity to the body.

Mitigating factors included the guilty plea, youthfulness, intellectual disability, and family support.

The court sentenced the offender to 9 years imprisonment, with credit for pre-sentence custody, including additional credit for difficult conditions of incarceration (lockdowns, triple bunking, and COVID-19 pandemic stress).