ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
HIS MAJESTY THE KING
— AND —
JASANPAL GILL
Before Justice J.P.P. Fiorucci
Heard on January 7 and October 8, 2025 and January 21, February 9 and May 6, 2026
Reasons for Sentence released on June 23, 2026
Ruth McGuirl, Astor Li, Ekaterina Perchenok......................................... Crown Counsel
Ryan Handlarski Counsel for Jasanpal Gill
Overview
1Jasanpal Gill became involved in a large‑scale drug trafficking enterprise involving numerous participants. Mr. Gill was not at the apex of the operation. Rather, the parties agree that his role fell within the lower to mid-level of the hierarchy. His foray into the drug trade resulted in his being in possession of a firearm in circumstances that were somewhat unique.
2Mr. Gill entered guilty pleas to four offences. On July 18, 2023, he possessed fentanyl and cocaine for the purpose of trafficking. On July 28, 2023, he possessed fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking and a loaded prohibited or restricted firearm without the required authorization, licence, or registration certificate. Although Mr. Gill also pleaded guilty to the firearm offence under s. 92(1) of the Criminal Code, the Crown directed a stay of that charge.
3Mr. Gill pleaded guilty before me on January 7, 2025. The parties made sentencing submissions over several days. Mr. Gill expressly waived his s. 11(b) Charter rights to allow adjournments of the sentencing hearing for several purposes, including enabling defence counsel to prepare written submissions, file institutional records, and make further submissions, particularly regarding the Ontario Court of Appeal’s decision in R. v. Purvis, 2026 ONCA 187, and its potential application. These are my reasons for sentence.
Circumstances of the Offences
4The offences arose out of “Project Odeon,” a joint forces investigation led by the Hamilton Police Service into a large-scale fentanyl manufacturing and distribution network operating in the Greater Toronto and Hamilton area. The investigation uncovered clandestine fentanyl laboratories, stash locations, precursor chemicals, and significant quantities of controlled substances intended for trafficking.
5As part of the broader Project Odeon investigation, police ultimately seized more than 1.3 kilograms of fentanyl, approximately 1.8 kilograms of cocaine, 18 kilograms of methamphetamine, 6 kilograms of ketamine, and over 250 grams of MDMA, along with approximately 800 gallons of precursor chemicals, 80 pounds of cutting agents, a loaded firearm, ammunition, and in excess of $250,000 in proceeds of crime. These quantities reflect the scale and commercial nature of the trafficking operation in which Mr. Gill participated. Police arrested thirteen individuals after executing multiple search warrants.
6According to the Agreed Statement of Facts (Exhibit 1), Mr. Gill occupied a lower to mid-level role, acting under direction in relation to the stash house and participating in drug trafficking. The stash house was located at #904-120 Eagle Rock Way in Vaughan. Mr. Gill and a co-accused, Mr. Aman Preet Shergill, had been seen at the Eagle Rock stash house on multiple occasions and were observed to be conducting what appeared to be drug transactions after leaving this location. Mr. Shergill was a main player in the drug trafficking enterprise.
7The events of July 18 provide necessary context for Mr. Gill’s decision to arm himself. On that date, investigators covertly entered the Eagle Rock stash house, seized controlled substances and related trafficking materials, installed audio probes, and staged the apartment to resemble a break and enter. Mr. Shergill and Mr. Gill attended the Eagle Rock apartment multiple times after the July 18 seizure and were heard on intercepted communications theorizing about what could have occurred at the stash house. These communications provided evidence of their knowledge and control of the contraband items. Mr. Gill admits that he possessed the 1,344.12 grams of 83% pure fentanyl and 1,902.74 grams of cocaine seized by police on July 18, 2023 at the Eagle Rock stash house, and that his possession of those substances was for the purpose of trafficking.
8The intercepted communications also revealed that Mr. Shergill appeared to hold Mr. Gill responsible for the missing drugs. Tensions escalated, with Mr. Gill expressing concern that Mr. Shergill was seeking retribution. In response to this perceived threat, Mr. Gill armed himself with the handgun that forms the basis of the firearm charge against him. Paragraphs 118 to 120 of the Agreed Statement of Facts set out intercepted communications from July 27, 2023, in which Mr. Gill speaks with others about possessing a loaded firearm, from which it may be inferred that he was prepared to use it in self-defence.
9On July 28, 2023, police searched Mr. Gill’s residence at 17 Peachwood Crescent in Stoney Creek and located 9.52 grams of fentanyl, which Mr. Gill admits he possessed for the purpose of trafficking. On that date, investigators observed Mr. Gill and two co‑accused enter and exit a residence on Burgar Street in Welland, after which they arrested all three individuals. Police located and seized a loaded Glock 43 handgun from the purse of the female co‑accused. When police searched the Burgar Street residence in Welland, they located four prohibited extended magazines with ammunition. Mr. Gill had previously been intercepted discussing the firearm, and a subsequent forensic examination of his phone following his arrest revealed photographs of the firearm stored on the device as well as photographs of magazines that match the magazines seized by police on July 28. Mr. Gill concedes that he possessed the loaded handgun in contravention of s. 95(1) of the Criminal Code.
10The Agreed Statement of Facts, filed as Exhibit 1, sets out in greater detail the investigators’ observations regarding Mr. Gill’s involvement in the drug trafficking enterprise. These activities included:
(1) Attending, with Mr. Shergill, at a clandestine fentanyl production laboratory located at 4057 Bethesda Road in Whitchurch‑Stouffville, where investigators believed the purpose was to assist in cleaning and maintaining the property. On Mr. Gill’s phone, police found photographs of the Bethesda Road address, including images of laboratory equipment inside the garage at this residence.
(2) Mr. Gill was observed going to and from his residence on Peachwood Crescent in different vehicles and engaging in brief meetings with various individuals, which were consistent with suspected drug transactions.
(3) On July 28, 2023, investigators conducted a second covert entry and search of the Eagle Rock stash house because both Mr. Gill and Mr. Shergill were observed attending this residence since July 18 with what was believed to be controlled substances. On July 28, the police located 18 kilograms of methamphetamine. Mr. Gill had multiple images of what is believed to be cocaine and crystal methamphetamine on his phone as well as images of the Eagle Rock stash house.
11The Crown concedes that no significant assets, real property, or vehicles were seized from Mr. Gill.
Circumstances of the Offender
12Mr. Gill was 22 years old at the time of his arrest on July 28, 2023. He is now 25 years old. He has no prior criminal record. After graduating from high school in 2019, he enrolled at Wilfrid Laurier University to pursue studies in political science. He dropped out of university due to academic and financial struggles.
13Mr. Gill has held a variety of positions, including employment in a warehouse at Leon’s Furniture and in a steel factory prior to attending university. After discontinuing his university studies, he worked as a ramp agent at Pearson Airport. From late 2020 to early 2021, he was employed at a Walmart store in Alberta. In fall 2021, Mr. Gill returned to Ontario and worked at E.D. Smith Foods in Stoney Creek. In 2022, he was employed at an Amazon warehouse near the Hamilton Airport.
14Prior to his arrest, Mr. Gill was working in car detailing and was actively involved in his community. He volunteered at a Sikh temple, where he assisted with various community activities, including preparing and distributing food to those in need, organizing community events, fundraising and canvassing for charitable causes, and attending prayers.
15Defence counsel filed an extensive record detailing Mr. Gill’s proactive effort at rehabilitation while incarcerated at the Hamilton-Wentworth Detention Centre awaiting sentencing. These efforts include participation in programming, discharge planning, self-reflection, and the development of a vision statement and goals for his eventual reintegration into the community.
16Mr. Gill has a supportive family and circle of friends, some of whom attended court during these proceedings to support him. Letters of support were filed as part of the Defence Sentencing Materials (Exhibit 4). The general theme throughout the letters is that Mr. Gill is intelligent, kind, caring, dependable, family-oriented and eager to move his life in a positive direction upon his release from custody. His cousin, Jaspreet Brar explains that Mr. Gill being separated from his loved ones has been very difficult including missing family milestones.
Positions of the Parties
17The Crown sought a global sentence of 13 years’ imprisonment less Summers credit for pre-sentence custody. The Crown took no position on the allocation of that custodial term among the various offences. The Crown acknowledges that the harsh conditions of Mr. Gill’s pre-sentence custody may be treated as a mitigating factor but submits that adopting the defence position would give disproportionate weight to Duncan and Nasogaluak credits, resulting in a sentence that is not proportionate.
18Defence counsel originally took the position that a 9‑year global sentence was appropriate, less a 3-year reduction for Duncan and Nasogaluak credits and less Summers credit. On the final day of submissions, defence counsel amended his position and sought 8 years’ imprisonment, less those same credits.
General Principles
19The principal purpose of the criminal law, and in particular sentencing, is the protection of society. This is reflected in the sentencing provisions in Part XXIII of the Criminal Code. Section 718 says that the fundamental purpose of sentencing is to protect society, and to contribute, along with crime prevention initiatives, to respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful, and safe society. These goals are to be achieved by imposing just sanctions. Those just sanctions are to have one or more of the following objectives:
(a) to denounce unlawful conduct and the harm done to victims or to the community that is caused by unlawful conduct;
(b) to deter the offender and other persons from committing offences;
(c) to separate offenders from society, where necessary;
(d) to assist in rehabilitating offenders;
(e) to provide reparations for harm done to victims or to the community; and
(f) to promote a sense of responsibility in offenders, and acknowledgment of the harm done to victims or to the community.
20In R. v. Nasogaluak, 2010 SCC 6, at para. 40, the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) observed that the objectives of sentencing are given sharper focus in s. 718.1 by the fundamental principle of proportionality, which mandates that a sentence be "proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender". In R. v. Lacasse, 2015 SCC 64, at para. 12, the SCC described proportionality as the cardinal principle of sentencing; “the more serious the crime and its consequences, or the greater the offender’s degree of responsibility, the heavier the sentence will be”.
21Individualization is central to the proportionality assessment: R. v. Parranto, 2021 SCC 46, at para. 12. As Brown and Martin JJ. wrote in Parranto, at para. 12, “[w]hereas the gravity of a particular offence may be relatively constant, each offence is ‘committed in unique circumstances by an offender with a unique profile’”.
22Section 718.2(b) states that a sentence should be similar to sentences imposed on similar offenders for similar offences committed in similar circumstances. This is known as the principle of parity.
23Lamer C.J.C., writing for the SCC in R. v. M. (C.A.), 1996 SCC 230, said this, at para. 92:
It has been repeatedly stressed that there is no such thing as a uniform sentence for a particular crime… Sentencing is an inherently individualized process, and the search for a single appropriate sentence for a similar offender and a similar crime will frequently be a fruitless exercise of academic abstraction.
24In Parranto, Brown and Martin JJ. said that “parity, as an expression of proportionality, will assist courts in fixing on a proportionate sentence”. They went on to say:
Courts cannot arrive at a proportionate sentence based solely on first principles, but rather must "calibrate the demands of proportionality by reference to the sentences imposed in other cases".
25The principle of restraint is contained in ss. 718.2(d) and (e) of the Criminal Code mandating that an offender should not be deprived of liberty if less restrictive sanctions may be appropriate in the circumstances; and all available sanctions, other than imprisonment, that are reasonable in the circumstances and consistent with the harm done to victims or to the community should be considered for all offenders. The principle of rehabilitation of offenders cannot be ignored even when denunciation and deterrence are significant sentencing objectives: R. v. Fabbro, 2021 ONCA 494.
Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances
26Section 718.2(a) of the Criminal Code instructs that a sentence should be increased or reduced to account for any relevant aggravating or mitigating circumstances relating to the offence or the offender.
Aggravating Circumstances
27The aggravating circumstances in Mr. Gill’s case include his participation in a highly sophisticated, profit-driven large-scale drug trafficking network. Defence counsel relied heavily on Mr. Gill’s status as a lower- to mid-level participant in the hierarchy. Hierarchical role remains a significant indicator of moral culpability: R. v. Purvis, 2026 ONCA 187; R. v. Buffone, 2021 ONCA 825, at para. 35; R. v. Buttazzoni, 2019 ONCA 645, at paras. 65-66. While Mr. Gill was not a main player in the drug operation, unlike the offender in Purvis, he did not occupy the lowest position in the hierarchy.
28The admitted facts establish that Mr. Gill was actively involved in maintaining the stash house where police found large quantities of three highly addictive substances. Prior to July 18, he enjoyed the trust of Mr. Shergill, a principal in the operation, and was frequently in his company. Mr. Gill exercised control over substantial amounts of valuable and dangerous controlled substances. On several occasions, he was observed leaving the stash house and engaging in conduct that police believed to be consistent with drug transactions.
29That Mr. Gill took direction from others does not diminish the fact that he knowingly chose to participate in a highly dangerous and lucrative criminal enterprise. He is described in the letters of support as intelligent, a characterization supported by his educational and employment history. In these circumstances, it cannot be said that Mr. Gill possesses vulnerabilities akin to those of the offender in Purvis, whose background included childhood adversity, longstanding mental health challenges, and an intellectual disability affecting his cognitive functioning and decision-making. Those factors mitigated Mr. Purvis’s moral blameworthiness; no comparable considerations arise here.
30In Purvis, the Ontario Court of Appeal held that the trial judge’s principal error was to treat the sentence imposed on the co‑accused as the starting point and then adjust it incrementally to reflect differences between the offenders. I note that, notwithstanding the offender’s status as a first offender in Purvis, as well as his personal circumstances and demonstrated rehabilitative progress, the Court of Appeal imposed a significant penitentiary sentence to properly reflect the gravity of the offence and the imperatives of denunciation and deterrence.
31Defence counsel placed significant reliance on the absence of any seizure by police of substantial assets, real property, or vehicles attributable to Mr. Gill. Counsel seeks to distinguish the authorities relied upon by the Crown (R. v. Aiton-Poore, 2021 ONCJ 85, R. v. Celenk, 2023 ONSC 6360, and Parranto, 2021 SCC 46) on the basis that those cases concerned individuals who were the beneficial owners and directing minds of the trafficking operations, who profited directly from the sale of drugs and were found in possession of significant quantities of cash. Implicit in this submission is that Mr. Gill earned nothing from his drug trafficking activities because there is no evidence of earnings or profit.
32It would be naïve to infer, from the absence of any cash or luxury items seized from Mr. Gill at the time of his arrest, that his participation in what was plainly a sophisticated commercial criminal enterprise was motivated by anything other than profit. Whatever the scale of his personal gain, the drugs he possessed for the purpose of trafficking posed the same risk to the community as an equivalent quantity in the hands of those higher in the hierarchy who realized substantial financial returns: Purvis, at para. 8. The societal harm addressed in sentencing for hard drug trafficking lies in the inherent dangerousness of the substances and their impact on the community. Mr. Gill’s conduct presented a significant danger to the public.
33The serious dangers associated with trafficking in “hard drugs” are well established: Parranto, at paras. 87–101. As Moldaver J. observed, such conduct produces both direct and indirect harm. The distribution of highly addictive substances fosters dependency, hastens physical deterioration, and, with troubling frequency, leads to fatal overdoses. Those who engage in and profit from this trade bear responsibility for the foreseeable harm and devastation it causes.
34These harms extend well beyond individual users. Drug trafficking supports a wider web of criminal activity, including offences committed to sustain addiction and the operations of organized crime. Even in the absence of overt violence, trafficking cannot be separated from the violence it foreseeably engenders. Its effects radiate outward, destabilizing families, undermining communities, and causing intergenerational harm, particularly to children exposed to addiction.
35The risks are exacerbated in the context of synthetic opioids. As recognized in Parranto, substances such as fentanyl have fundamentally altered the drug trade by combining extreme potency with ease of distribution. A defining characteristic of these drugs is the variability in their potency and composition, such that even minimal quantities may be lethal, leaving users unable to reliably assess the risks involved.
36As the Ontario Court of Appeal said in R. v. Lynch, 2022 ONCA 109, at para. 17, “[s]imply put, the greater those risks are when a particular drug is being trafficked, the greater the offender’s culpability or moral blameworthiness for choosing to traffic in that drug”. At para. 18, the Court stated the following, which is applicable to Mr. Gill’s case:
The trial judge also erroneously downplayed the respondent’s role in all of these consequences when he said that the respondent was not “the representative of the principals of the trafficking enterprise”, who “[produce] fentanyl as a more powerful opioid”. Of course, those at the top of the supply chain deserve harsher sentences. But the fact that the respondent was not at the pinnacle of the drug dealing empire does not reduce the respondent’s level of moral blameworthiness or mean that his actions are not serious. The producers of a product cannot get it into the hands of the consumer if there is no one to sell and deliver it.
37Mr. Gill possessed a loaded handgun for the purpose of self‑defence, arising from a perceived threat posed by another principal participant in the drug enterprise of which he was a part. Violence is an inherent and foreseeable feature of the illicit drug trade and cannot be meaningfully separated from it: Parranto, at para. 89. While the defence attempts to distinguish Mr. Gill’s circumstances from those of offenders who traffic in hard drugs and carry firearms in public as instruments of their criminal activity, as described in R. v. Nur, 2013 ONCA 677, at para. 51, that distinction is unpersuasive. By arming himself with a loaded, illegal firearm, Mr. Gill created a risk to the public that is comparable to those offenders: See R. v. Johnson, 2022 ONSC 2688, at paras. 39-41. I note that the threat to Mr. Gill’s safety arose on July 18 and that, based on the intercepted communications, he had armed himself with a lethal firearm and extended magazines by July 27. His ability to come into possession of an illegal firearm and its accoutrements within such a short period demonstrates that, at the time, Mr. Gill was deeply immersed in the criminal subculture of which he chose to be a part.
38As a judge sitting in this jurisdiction, I am aware of the prevalence of these crimes in Hamilton. Collectively drugs and guns amount to a significant danger to the community. The circumstances in which Mr. Gill chose to arm himself, his age, and the Crown’s concession that he faced a legitimate threat to his safety as reflected in the intercepted communications, place him slightly lower on the spectrum identified in Nur. They do not, however, move him to its lowest end.
Mitigating Circumstances
39There are several mitigating factors in Mr. Gill’s case. He entered guilty pleas. I accept his guilty pleas as a true expression of his remorse and acceptance of responsibility for the offences he committed. The conservation of judicial resources in this busy jurisdiction assumes heightened importance in the circumstances under which Mr. Gill resolved his matters. His case formed part of a broader project involving co‑accused who elected to proceed to trial and advance Charter challenges. The Crown properly acknowledges that Mr. Gill’s guilty pleas conferred a tangible benefit on the administration of justice by streamlining the prosecution of the remaining accused.
40Mr. Gill appears before the Court as a first-time offender at the age of 25, having been 22 at the time of his arrest. Prior to his arrest, he demonstrated an ability to lead a prosocial life, as reflected in his educational achievements and stable employment history. While incarcerated at the Hamilton Wentworth Detention Centre, he has actively engaged in a broad range of programming aimed at personal development and rehabilitation. He has demonstrated meaningful insight into his past conduct, together with a genuine and sustained commitment to redirecting his life in a constructive and pro-social direction in preparation for reintegration into the community. Mr. Gill’s strong support network of family and friends, together with his involvement in positive endeavours within his religious community, indicates that he will not be alone in his rehabilitative journey.
41In determining the appropriate custodial term, I must consider the consequences of family separation: R. v. Habib, 2024 ONCA 830 at paras. 44–45. Courts seek to mitigate the effects of sentencing on an offender’s family, recognizing that “interfering with this foundational social institution … can endanger community safety and society’s well-being”: Habib, at para. 46. That said, these considerations must not dominate the analysis or result in a sentence that is disproportionate. As emphasized, “[t]hese consequences are not an excuse to overlook the harm that the offender’s criminal conduct caused victims of crime, or the importance of protecting those victims and society, or the need for denunciation and deterrence”: Habib, at para. 43. Based on the filed letters of support and the consistent presence of multiple family members at numerous court appearances, I find that Mr. Gill’s incarceration has had, and will continue to have, a significant and detrimental impact on his parents and extended family.
42In his submissions on May 6, 2026, defence counsel pointed out that Mr. Gill had spent approximately 25 percent of his pre-sentence custody, equivalent to 245 days, under some form of lockdown, and about 20 percent of that time, equivalent to 202 days, triple bunked. The defence also tendered institutional records documenting periods of lock‑down and the use of triple bunking. It is reasonable to conclude that comparable housing conditions and restraints on Mr. Gill’s liberty continued at a similar level until the date of sentencing. Mr. Gill’s affidavit describes the impact of these and other hardships on him while awaiting disposition of his charges.
43Defence counsel urged me to address the Duncan credit by expressly quantifying the deduction. He relied on R. v. Reid, 2026 ONSC 136, for the proposition that quantifying the amount attributed to Duncan/Marshall credit advances the twin objectives of transparency and consistency. In Reid, Molloy J. provides persuasive reasons in support of this approach and cites additional authorities in which other judges have similarly quantified the reduction.
44On the other hand, in R. v. Brown, 2025 ONCA 164, the Ontario Court of Appeal reiterated and clarified its earlier observations in R. v. Marshall, 2021 ONCA 344 concerning the calculation of what has been referred to as “Duncan credit.” The court observed that the continued use of that term may now be misleading in light of Marshall. In particular, the Court cautioned against treating the mitigating effect of harsh pre-trial custody conditions as a discrete numerical deduction from the sentence, akin to enhanced credit under Summers. While not foreclosing that approach entirely, the Court expressed a clear preference for treating such conditions as a mitigating factor to be weighed alongside other aggravating and mitigating considerations in arriving at a fit sentence. This approach is intended to avoid according disproportionate weight to pre-trial conditions in the ultimate sentencing determination.
45In short, if an offender has endured unusually harsh pre‑sentence custody, the sentence should be reduced accordingly, but the extent of that reduction is discretionary and not a matter of precise calculation: Brown, at para. 4. I find that the harsh conditions of incarceration Mr. Gill has experienced are mitigating. I have adopted the approach in Marshall by considering these particularly harsh conditions as a mitigating factor in arriving at a proportionate sentence.
46I now turn to the remaining credits sought by the defence, characterized by counsel as arising from Nasogaluak state misconduct. Mr. Gill’s affidavit and filings detail numerous complaints arising from his pre‑trial detention, including restricted or inadequate access to disclosure materials, being subjected to strip searches, having an inspection done in the washroom for black mould, and limitations on his right to religious expression. In particular, he alleges that he was not permitted to pursue his interest in Islam or participate in Muslim prayers, notwithstanding that he expressly identified himself as Sikh and not a convert to Islam.
47In Nasogaluak, 2010 SCC 6, at para. 53, the SCC noted that a sentence can be reduced in light of state misconduct even when the incidents complained of do not rise to the level of a Charter breach. That case involved excessive use of force by the police in the arrest of the accused. The SCC made it clear that other state misconduct can be taken into account while crafting a fit and proportionate sentence: Nasogaluak, at para. 55.
48In paragraphs 21 and 22 of his affidavit (Exhibit 4), Mr. Gill states that strip searches occurred regularly. He deposes that these searches sometimes took place in front of his cellmates and in a bathroom equipped with a camera, which he believes recorded the searches and may have been viewed by others. Mr. Gill adds that it was very humiliating to think that female sergeants and correctional officers with access to the cameras might have watched these searches. He further asserts that he was strip searched more than ten times in the presence of his cellmates.
49Defence counsel relied on the cases of R. v. S.C., 2025 ONSC 1887 and R. v. Rootenberg, 2020 ONSC 171 as support for additional credit for strip searches that Mr. Gill says he endured while serving pre-sentence custody. Both cases involved applications to stay proceedings for strip searches that were conducted throughout pre-trial custody. Both cases were argued based on extensive evidentiary records, including the statutory framework within which strip searches were conducted and the policies and procedures that governed the institutions. In S.C., expert evidence formed part of the evidentiary record.
50Notwithstanding the Crown’s decision not to cross‑examine Mr. Gill on his affidavit, I am not satisfied that his allegations concerning strip searches provide a sufficient evidentiary basis to warrant a sentencing reduction. Notably, Mr. Gill kept detailed records of the occasions on which he sought to review his disclosure but was either denied access or afforded limited time to do so. No comparable record was provided in respect of the alleged strip searches, including their dates, frequency, or circumstances. No institutional records were filed. Nor did defence counsel advise the court of any inquiries made of the correctional facility regarding the number of searches, the presence or recording of surveillance cameras, or whether any recordings were accessible to female staff.
51There are legitimate reasons for strip searches to be conducted in correctional and custodial settings: S.C., at para. 208. Mr. Gill’s inclusion of two brief paragraphs in his affidavit does not make out state misconduct of the type that would warrant consideration of a sentence reduction.
52Similarly, I find that Mr. Gill’s request for a sentence reduction grounded in alleged restrictions on religious expression rests on an incomplete and insufficient evidentiary foundation and does not disclose the type of state misconduct that would justify such relief. In paragraphs 18 and 19 of his affidavit, Mr. Gill asserts that he was told that, because his file identified him as Sikh, he was not permitted to learn about or participate in other religious activities, including Islam. However, he does not identify the person or authority who conveyed this information, nor does he describe the context in which his requests were made or denied. While Mr. Gill expresses disappointment at being unable to participate in Muslim prayers or observe the fasting practices of his Muslim peers, he also confirms that he has not converted and remains a practising Sikh. On the limited and conclusory record before me, these assertions fall short of establishing state misconduct related to religious expression.
53Mr. Gill filed a maintenance request concerning a spot in the washroom that he believed to be black mould (Exhibit 9). The purpose of this filing is unclear, as no reference to it was made in sentencing submissions. To the extent it was advanced in support of a reduction in sentence for state misconduct, it falls well short of establishing any proper basis for such relief. I also note that no evidence was filed as to the outcome of any inspection, if one in fact occurred.
54Before accepting Mr. Gill’s guilty pleas, I conducted a plea inquiry to ensure that they were informed, voluntary, and unequivocal, and that he understood the potential collateral consequences. Defence counsel, Mr. Handlarski, also confirmed on the record that he was satisfied these requirements had been met. At that time, Mr. Gill did not assert that he lacked a sufficient opportunity to review disclosure. To the contrary, he personally signed the Agreed Statement of Facts (Exhibit 1), as did his counsel. The fact that Mr. Gill was unable to review disclosure on certain requested dates, or had only limited access on others, as reflected in Exhibit 7, simply illustrates the ordinary constraints of a custodial environment, including limitations such as staffing. These circumstances do not constitute state misconduct and do not justify a reduction in sentence.
The Sentence
55Mr. Gill’s offences warrant an exemplary sentence to advance the sentencing objectives of denunciation and deterrence. At the same time, I am mindful that I must not lose sight of the principles of restraint and the importance of rehabilitation, particularly given that Mr. Gill is a youthful first offender who has demonstrated meaningful prospects for reform. On the record before me, the need for specific deterrence is markedly attenuated.
56Mr. Gill possessed 1,344.12 grams of 83% pure fentanyl. It is well established that even first‑time offenders who traffic in significant quantities of fentanyl can expect substantial penitentiary sentences: Lynch, at para. 25; R. v. Loor, 2017 ONCA 696, at para. 50. In Parranto, the offenders were trafficking fentanyl at the “wholesale” commercial level: see para. 2. Brown and Martin JJ., at para. 68, set the range of 8 to 15 years for these offenders.
57In Celenk, relied upon by the Crown, the offender, a first‑time offender, was sentenced to 13 years’ imprisonment for possession of 1.35 kilograms of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking. He received concurrent sentences of 3.5 years for possession of a loaded prohibited firearm and 3 years for possession of a firearm while knowingly not the holder of a licence or registration certificate. Mr. Celenk was convicted following a jury trial. Although he was not found to be a kingpin or mastermind, the quantity and street value of the drugs established that he was a trusted participant in a commercial drug operation. The Court further found that Mr. Celenk had strong rehabilitative prospects, supported by family and friends, and that he demonstrated both remorse and insight.
58Celenk reviews post-Parranto Ontario sentencing decisions, at paragraphs 34 to 39, that informed the 13‑year sentence. Defence counsel also provided a sentencing chart with cases for possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking: R. v. Johnson, 2025 ONSC 798; R. v. Pasha, 2025 ONSC 3481; R. v. Sevim, 2023 ONSC 5056; R. v. Belanger, 2025 ONSC 3938; R. v. Abdelgadir, 2023 ONCJ 446; and R. v. Dalia, 2023 ONSC 2114.
59Defence counsel again seeks to distinguish Mr. Gill’s circumstances from Celenk, the authorities cited therein, and the cases referenced in the defence sentencing chart on the basis that the parties have agreed Mr. Gill occupied a lower‑ to mid‑level position within the trafficking hierarchy. On that footing, counsel submits that, although many of those cases attracted double‑digit penitentiary sentences for possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking, Mr. Gill’s case is materially different because of his more limited role. This is said to be so notwithstanding that some of the cited authorities involved comparable or even smaller quantities of fentanyl.
60As noted, the Agreed Statement of Facts contains admissions demonstrating that Mr. Gill was a trusted participant in this commercial drug trafficking enterprise. While his characterization as a low- to mid-level member of the hierarchy is a relevant consideration, it must be evaluated in the broader context of the other admitted facts.
61Mr. Gill possessed 1,902.74 grams of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking. In R. v. Bajada, 2003 CanLII 15687 (ON CA), [2003] O.J. No. 721 (Ont. C.A.), the Ontario Court of Appeal stated, at paragraph 13, that sentences of 5 to 5.5 years jail were not “uncommon for possession of a substantial amount of cocaine for the purposes of trafficking following an accused’s guilty plea or where the accused has no prior record”. In Bajada, the offender was convicted of possessing over one-half kilogram of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.
62In R. v. Graham, 2018 ONSC 6817, at para. 38, Code J., citing Ontario Court of Appeal authorities, identifies a sentencing range of three to five years for a first offence under s. 95 where the firearm is possessed in connection with criminal activity such as drug trafficking. In R. v. Marshall (2015), 2015 ONCA 692, 340 O.A.C. 201 (Ont. C.A.) and R. v. Gobire (March 7, 2016, Ont. C.A.), the Court upheld sentences of three and a half years and three years respectively for young first offenders involved in drug trafficking and carrying firearms in that context, notwithstanding favourable rehabilitative prospects.
63The case of R. v. Morris, 2021 ONCA 680, concerns the sentencing of an individual convicted of multiple firearm-related offences, including possession of a loaded prohibited/restricted handgun, carrying a concealed weapon, and related charges. The offences arose when the individual was found in possession of a loaded .38 calibre Smith & Wesson handgun after fleeing from police and discarding the weapon in a public stairwell. Mr. Morris argued that systemic anti-Black racism and personal circumstances, including fear for his safety, influenced his actions.
64At para. 151 of Morris, the Ontario Court of Appeal stated that s. 95 criminalizes a broad range of conduct, and that Mr. Morris’s actions fall at the “true crime” end of that spectrum. The Court noted that both it and, more importantly, the SCC have indicated that offences of this nature call for denunciatory sentences. In most cases, penitentiary terms will be required. In some situations, where there are strong mitigating factors, sentences at or near the maximum reformatory term of two years less a day may be appropriate.
65In relation to the drug offences (Counts 2, 3, and 22), I impose a sentence of 9.5 years, to be served concurrently on each count. This is the lowest sentence that is proportionate to the gravity of the offences and Mr. Gill’s moral culpability. A sentence of 2.5 years is imposed on the s. 95 offence (Count 13). The jurisprudence supports consecutive sentences for the gun and drug offences: R. v. Wisdom, 2024 ONSC 4047, at para. 34; R. v. Crevier, 2013 ONSC 2630, affirmed (2015), 2015 ONCA 619, 330 C.C.C. (3d) 305 (Ont. C.A.), at paras. 127–130; Graham, affirmed R. v. Graham, 2020 ONCA 692.
66However, having regard to the totality principle and the need to ensure that the overall sentence remains proportionate and not unduly long or harsh, I direct that the 2.5 year sentence for the firearms offence be served concurrently with the global sentence of 9.5 years imposed for the three drug offences. In my view, imposing a consecutive 2.5 year term would result in a crushing sentence, inconsistent with Mr. Gill’s lack of prior record and his prospects for rehabilitation: M. (C.A.), at para. 42. Given that Mr. Gill is a 25-year-old first offender who has expressed genuine remorse and has positive rehabilitative prospects, a global sentence of 9.5 years’ imprisonment best gives effect to the totality principle: R. v. Hannora, 2020 ONCA 335, at paras. 9–12.
67For clarity, the sentence is apportioned as follows:
Counts 2, 3 and 22: Section 5(2) CDSA fentanyl x 2 and cocaine: 9.5 years (or 3,467 days) jail concurrent reduced by 1,593 days (1,062 days at 1.5 to 1.0) of Summers credit resulting in 1,874 days jail (61.6 months) to be served.
Count 13: Section 95(1) Criminal Code firearm offence: 2.5 years (or 912 days) jail to be served concurrently.
68Therefore, the global sentence remaining to be served is 1,874 days jail (61.6 months).
69I order that a sample of Mr. Gill’s DNA be taken pursuant to the applicable provisions of the Criminal Code. I further order, under s. 109 of the Criminal Code, that Mr. Gill be prohibited from possessing any firearm (other than a prohibited firearm or restricted firearm), and any cross-bow, restricted weapon, firearm part, ammunition, and explosive substance for a period of 10 years, and from possessing any prohibited firearm, restricted firearm, prohibited weapon, prohibited device, and prohibited ammunition for life. I also make the forfeiture order requested jointly by the parties.
Released: June 23, 2026
Signed: Justice J.P.P. Fiorucci