R. v. Pasha, 2025 ONSC 3481

Reasons for Sentence

Court File No.: CR-24-335
Date: 2025-06-11
Ontario Superior Court of Justice

Between:
His Majesty the King
and
Taymoor Pasha, Defendant

Appearances:
V. Mazza, for the Crown
R. Golec, for the Defendant

Heard: November 15, 2024, February 6, March 13, 2025

Justice M. B. Carnegie

Introduction

1The Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Parranto, 2021 SCC 46 noted that “Parliament has chosen to employ the mechanisms of criminal law and sentencing law to advance public safety, hold those who distribute drugs accountable, and communicate the wrongfulness of poisoning people and communities.” The maximum penalty for trafficking in a Schedule 1 narcotic is life imprisonment.

2How close to the maximum penalty is justified when an offender possesses so much fentanyl that it defies local and regional precedent? What message to the community is required when local and much larger seizures of fentanyl continue to set records for trafficking in this poison? These are some of the questions raised by Mr. Pasha’s sentencing hearing.

3For too long, the ravages of fentanyl have been made all too clear, targeting and killing the most vulnerable among us. As a result, those who profit from this carnage must receive exemplary sentences to reflect the gravity of this offence and the harm done to the community.

4Mr. Pasha is among the worst of these offenders. He has pleaded guilty to possessing over 15 kilograms of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking, contrary to s. 5(2) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act. Both the Crown and defence agree that a significant penitentiary term is required. The seriousness of this offending conduct has made that obvious.

Factual Background

5I have been provided an Agreed Statement of Facts outlining the factual circumstances relied upon. While Mr. Pasha has pleaded guilty, a co-accused remains before this court pending his trial outcome.

Circumstances of the Offence

6In 2022, the Ontario Provincial Police (“OPP”) received information that there was a major drug trafficker in the London and Sarnia, Ontario, areas that went by the nickname “Osama”. They acquired intelligence from confidential informants, used judicial authorizations to review cellphone records, obtain cellphone tracking information and conducted surveillance to ultimately identify Mr. Pasha as that drug dealer. He was observed travelling between these two southwestern Ontario cities, and frequenting addresses on Mornington Avenue (his residence) and Cheapside Street (his “stash house”), in London.

7Based upon this information, police sought and obtained a CDSA search warrant for these properties. On January 26, 2023, police executed these warrants and seized the following evidence:

• at the Mornington Avenue address, an iPhone which was itself searched under warrant and found to contain text messages relating to historical and ongoing drug trafficking. A set of keys for the Cheapside Street apartment was also found;
• at the Cheapside Street apartment, police seized a substantial quantity of drugs, drug trafficking paraphernalia and other contraband, including the following:
  • 15.038 kilograms of fentanyl;
  • 3.432 kilograms of cocaine;
  • 1.373 kilograms of MDMA;
  • 2 grams of MDA;
  • 16 grams of Eutylone;
  • 37 grams of Psilocybin;
  • thousands of other opioids in pill form, including: 123 pills of Alprazolam, 721 pills of Benzo, 320 pills of Clonazapam, 824 pills of Codeine, 82 pills of Heroin, 573 pills of Lorazepam, 51 pills of MDMA, 650 pills of Methylphenidate, 83 pills of Morphine, and 900 pills of Oxycodone; and
  • drug packaging material and a drug press, blenders, plastic wrap, scales and cutting agents.

8The “street” value of all of these drugs (if sold at the “gram” level) was estimated at $3.2 million.

9Until several weeks ago, this was the largest fentanyl seizure in London and area history.

10Mr. Pasha was charged with numerous offences, culminating in an Indictment that included 13 counts of drug related charges and a number of firearms offences not advanced here. Despite the nature of these and other charges, he was released on bail and was eventually charged in another drug related investigation. As part of that investigation, I am advised that a further cellphone was seized from him, searched under warrant and found to contain:

• user accounts associated to Mr. Pasha and his known aliases, and text messages concerning historical and ongoing drug trafficking activities;
• 13 notes referring to drug debt lists, drug prices, drug weights, and drug inventory;
• a note which read: “3million in fent they you the reason there’s tents downtown”;
• a note which read: “Idc [I don’t care] if the Fentynol kill people it’ll sell better”; and
• a note which read: “We got every type of colour and every type of line; Yea ill stash 100 bricks up in a rental”.

Circumstances of this Offender

11Mr. Pasha is 25 years of age and was born and raised in London. He grew up in what he described as a “poor, big family”. His parents divorced in 2015. He then lived with his mother, who had a new financially unsupportive partner. He grew up around a lot of criminal activity and was often around drug users. He had three older brothers and the second oldest was a drug user who Mr. Pasha regularly visited in jail. He eventually had a falling out with his mother due to his poor choices of friends. He then moved in with his father only to be eventually “kicked out” of that residence.

12Mr. Pasha told the pre-sentence report writer that he was then “hanging out” with “street friends”. He had no income and that led him to criminal activity. He later returned to his mother’s residence when she was diagnosed with cancer but then began “dabbling” with selling drugs. He got odd jobs to help support his mother but lost them when he was criminally charged. Unbeknownst to his mother, he continued to sell drugs to “support her”. His mother’s partner remained unemployed and was abusive. Mr. Pasha left her home again and from 18 years old onward, has lived on his own. His core group of friends were drug dealers and users and he became entrenched in that lifestyle.

13As if discussing a different person, his mother and youngest brother describe having no difficulties with Mr. Pasha while he grew up. He was “always a good kid”, “really lovely and very polite”. Neither were aware of any struggles he was having in his youth or the drug abuse that was occurring. He seemed more concerned about the well being of others than himself.

14With respect to his education, Mr. Pasha completed elementary school but was “kicked out” of school in grade 11. He went to an alternative learning facility for troubled teens allowing him to complete some further high school credits. Since his incarceration, he has completed secondary school. He relayed to the pre-sentence report writer that his family was the only “brown family” in the area, he was the “only Muslim” in a Catholic school and was “bullied by the Arabs”. He was targeted by peers and called various racial slurs, including “Osama”. So, he chose to go by that nickname.

15Mr. Pasha has been selling drugs to support his family and himself since he was a teenager. He began using marijuana when he was 13 years old which graduated to taking various pills which would cause “blackouts” and make him do “crazy things”. He then started taking pain killers like Percocet and other opioids. He started to have seizures when he was 18 years old. At 23 years old, after getting arrested which “opened my eyes on how I fucked up my life”, he stopped using drugs. He has never used fentanyl. Yet, he continued selling drugs.

16Mr. Pasha has a related criminal history. In July of 2021, he was convicted of possession of a Schedule 1 substance and sentenced to 12 months probation. He has since been convicted in 2024 of resisting arrest, where he served 15 days of pre-sentence custody.

17Mr. Pasha has accepted responsibility for his actions, evidenced by this plea, his comments to his pre-sentence reporter writer and during his courtroom allocution where he read out a letter in court. He regrets that his conduct “deeply dishonoured” the community and the court. He regrets this “big mistake” and now, since his incarceration, believes that he is a different person, more respectful, understanding, and caring. He has now come to realize that his actions ruined other people’s lives, but at the time he only saw the benefits. He is now focused upon his rehabilitation, completing all available institutional rehabilitative programs.

18Mr. Pasha was arrested on these offences on January 26, 2023. He was released on February 28, 2023, and on bail until re-arrested on February 28, 2024. As of this sentencing date, he has been in-custody for 502 days.

Positions of the Parties

19The parties propose a term of imprisonment of 17 years by way of “joint submission” for my consideration. I am advised that it is the result of a long-term negotiation which included judicial pre-trial scrutiny before me aimed at individualizing this sentence to this offender, sparing significant court and police resources, and reducing litigation risk.

20However, the Crown’s articulation of this joint submission disregards inclusive Duncan mitigation. Instead, both parties request that outside the suggested disposition a further fixed Duncan credit is deducted to reflect the harsh pre-trial sentence conditions experienced by Mr. Pasha. Then, they seek a Summers credit for pre-sentence custody at the maximum 1.5/1 ratio. By way of ancillary orders, a 10-year mandatory weapons prohibition is sought, with a discretionary DNA order and a forfeiture order.

21Despite the proffered joint submission, the Crown also seeks a “pronouncement that those dealing multiple kilograms of fentanyl in London should expect jail sentences of 20 years.”

Legal Framework

22Section 718 of the Criminal Code defines the fundamental purpose of sentencing: “to protect society and to contribute, along with crime prevention initiatives, to respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society by imposing just sanctions that have one or more of the following objectives:

• to denounce unlawful conduct and the harm done to victims or to the community that is caused by unlawful conduct;
• to deter the offender and other persons from committing offences;
• to separate offenders from society, where necessary;
• to assist in rehabilitating offenders;
• to provide reparations for harm done to victims or to the community; and
• to promote a sense of responsibility in offenders, and acknowledgement of the harm done to victims or to the community.”

23Section 718.1 of the Criminal Code identifies the fundamental principle of sentencing as proportionality. It is commonly referred to as the ‘cardinal principal’ of sentencing and requires that the court consider the gravity of the offence and the moral blameworthiness of the offender. It is determined both on an individual basis, that is in relation to the accused and the offence committed, and by comparison to sentences imposed on other offenders for offences committed in similar circumstances, known as parity. The Supreme Court in R. v. Lacasse, 2015 SCC 64 emphasized that a proportionate sentence is one that is individualized. In other words, it is one that is deserved by the offender. Simply put, the Lacasse court noted that “the more serious the crime and its consequences, or the greater the offender’s degree of responsibility, the heavier the sentence will be.”

24The proportionality principle is central to the maintenance of public confidence in the criminal justice system. It demands that the punishment speak out against the offence and punish the offender, but no more than is necessary. In so doing, it seeks to balance the principles of restraint and rehabilitation with the importance of holding offenders accountable for their actions. A helpful tool in this analysis is the consideration of a particular case’s aggravating and mitigating factors.

25Of course, the moral blameworthiness of the offender is important. Offenders who intentionally cause harm should be subjected to a greater punishment than those who did not intend the harm that flowed from their conduct. But, as our common law has made clear, when one elects to traffic in the most serious drugs the consequences of that choice can be extreme whether intended or not. These consequences and an offender’s indifference towards it often plays a significant role when determining the gravity of the offence and the moral culpability of the offender.

26In drug trafficking related cases, the statutory range of sentence is necessarily broad. Here, a maximum sentence of life imprisonment is available. A common feature of trafficking sentencing for the most serious or harmful drugs is the prioritization of the sentencing principles of denunciation and deterrence (both general and specific). Denunciation refers to the communication, through the imposition of a sentence, of society’s condemnation of the offending conduct. General deterrence contemplates sending a message to the community at large, and, in particular, to those of like mind, to discourage similar conduct in the future. Specific deterrence involves sending a message to the offender before the court, to dissuade him from committing similar acts in the future.

27Over the past decade, fentanyl related drug trafficking has garnered the most attention and, generally, the harshest sentencing dispositions. This is because the risk of serious harm and death for fentanyl users is high. In R. v. Loor, 2017 ONCA 696, the Ontario Court of Appeal recognized that fentanyl “is a very powerful drug, up to 100 times more powerful than morphine and 20 times more powerful than heroin.” In that case the court was referencing fentanyl patches, misappropriated from supervised medical treatment. In R. v. Cinelli, 2018 ONSC 4983, Justice Bawden noted how much more dangerous powder fentanyl is: “Although there are significant dangers to the rapid consumption of fentanyl patches, those dangers pale in comparison to the dangers of consuming fentanyl powder.” In 2022, for the Ontario Court of Appeal in R. v. Lynch, 2022 ONCA 109, Justice Paciocco recognized the interplay between the danger a drug poses and the resulting sentencing treatment:

Fentanyl is a more dangerous drug than cocaine.

… It is a well-established principle that drugs vary in the degree of danger that they represent to those who consume them. Consequently, the more dangerous the drug being trafficked, the higher the penalty that will be imposed. Fentanyl is now known to be a much more dangerous drug than almost any other. That reality directs that a sentence imposed for trafficking in fentanyl should be as long or longer than a corresponding sentence for trafficking in cocaine: R. v. Olvedi, 2021 ONCA 519 at para 56, leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused [2021] S.C.C.A. No. 340.

…As the majority recognized in Parranto, at para. 70, moral culpability rises with the risk of serious harm the trafficker is prepared to expose others to.

There is good reason for this. The problems that dangerous drugs pose for our society are well known. They involve drug addiction, adverse health consequences and, unfortunately all too often, death. Further, drugs are often sold to already vulnerable people thereby exacerbating their difficult circumstances. Still further, there are the indirect costs to society through increased health care expense, increased demands on the health care system, increases in robberies or other forms of criminal activity, and increases in violence. Simply put, the greater those risks are when a particular drug is being trafficked, the greater the offender's culpability or moral blameworthiness for choosing to traffic in that drug.

28Making this point, in Loor, one of the first fentanyl trafficking cases to reach the Ontario Court of Appeal, a “low-level member” of a “small” fentanyl trafficking ring who had been using forged prescriptions to obtain a total of 45 fentanyl patches was sentenced to 6 years imprisonment. The offender was 39 years of age and without criminal history. Justice Laskin did not disturb this sentence and commented that “generally, offenders – even first offenders – who traffic significant amounts of fentanyl should expect to receive significant penitentiary sentences.”

Analysis

29As Moldaver J. noted in his concurring judgment in Parranto:

The time has thus come for our perception of the gravity of largescale trafficking in fentanyl to accord with the gravity of the crisis it has caused. Largescale trafficking in fentanyl is not a crime marked merely by the distribution and sale of an illicit substance; rather, it is a crime marked by greed and the pursuit of profit at the expense of violence, death, and the perpetuation of a public health crisis previously unseen in Canadian society. In many ways"[t]rafficking in fentanyl is almost the equivalent of putting multiple bullets in the chambers of a revolver and playing Russian roulette. It is the most efficient killer of drug users on the market today" (R. v. Frazer, 2017 ABPC 116 at para. 11). Put simply, it is a crime that can be expected to not only destroy lives, but to undermine the very foundations of our society.

Ultimately, largescale trafficking in fentanyl is a crime that preys disproportionally on the misery of others – the marginalized and those whose lives are marked by hopelessness and despair. It is a crime motivated by greed and by a callous disregard for the untold grief and suffering it leaves in its wake. Above all, it is a crime that kills – often and indiscriminately. It follows, in my view, that what matters most is that those individuals who choose to prey on the vulnerable and profit from the misery of the Canadian public for personal gain are sentenced in accordance with the severity of the harms they have caused. Fentanyl trafficking, and largescale trafficking in particular, are a source of unspeakable harm. Accordingly, while the range of sentences currently imposed for the directing minds of largescale fentanyl operations straddles the upper single digits and lower double digits, sentencing judges should feel justified, where circumstances warrant, in applying a higher range, consisting of mid-level double digit sentences and, in particularly aggravating circumstances, potential sentences of life imprisonment.

What is a fit sentencing range?

30Strict guidance on the appropriate range for sentencing respecting the trafficking of this quantity of this substance is limited. In Ontario, we do not yet have any established sentencing ranges or ‘starting points’ for largescale or commercial level fentanyl trafficking. What is clear is that I am to prioritize the sentencing principles of denunciation and deterrence. Otherwise, as always, parity can assist in the proportionality assessment and begins with consideration of relevant sentencing authorities.

31Starting with Parranto, the Supreme Court was dealing with appeals heard jointly where the Alberta Court of Appeal had increased Mr. Parranto’s global sentence from 11 to 14 years, and for Mr. Felix, from 7 to 10 years. Both offenders had pleaded guilty to unrelated trafficking operations that were characterized as “wholesale commercial level”. Both offenders had Gladue factors considered as part of the assessment of these dispositions. In particular, Mr. Felix’s ‘dial-a-dope” operation involved multiple transactions totalling 3,372 fentanyl tablets and almost 90 ounces of cocaine, valued at almost $300,000. Mr. Parranto’s narrative included two separate events, wherein an approximate total of 513 grams of fentanyl powder was seized, representing a ‘street’ value of just over $100,000. The Alberta Court of Appeal took this opportunity to set a 9-year starting point for wholesale fentanyl trafficking.

32In Parranto, the Supreme Court did not devalue appellate sentencing guidance from ‘starting points’ or ‘sentencing ranges’, commenting that such quantitative tools are mere guidelines reflecting judicial consensus about the gravity of particular offending conduct. They cannot turn a sentencing court’s assessment away from achieving proportionality with an individualized sentencing process in mind. As a result, the Supreme Court affirmed the enhanced sentences imposed, finding that the sentences imposed at trial were demonstrably unfit. It found that Mr. Felix’s willingness to exploit at-risk populations and communities merited a more accurate sentencing range of 8 to 15 years. For Mr. Parranto, the quantity of this serious drug coupled with his related history and the presence of other drugs and guns also merited the upward range.

33It is not lost on me that the amount trafficked by Mr. Parranto represents merely 3.5% of that which Mr. Pasha possessed with intention for trafficking.

34The Crown has provided a number of cases which span the degrees of mid to high level commercial trafficking sentences in Ontario. For additional context, I have supplemented these authorities with some other relevant decisions from across the country.

35In R. v. Olvedi, 2021 ONCA 518, the Ontario Court of Appeal endorsed a 15-year sentence on a guilty plea where the offender, found to be wilfully blind, imported and couriered approximately 500 grams of fentanyl, with 12 years concurrent imposed for possession. At that time, the fentanyl was estimated to be worth $19 million.

36In Lynch, the Ontario Court of Appeal established a range of 6–8 years for “mid-level” trafficking in fentanyl. This offender had no criminal record and had pleaded guilty to possession 41 grams of fentanyl (with other drugs). He was sentenced to 4 years which was increased to 6 years on appeal.

37In R. v. England, 2024 ONCA 360, the Ontario Court of Appeal found a 13-year, 9-month sentence fit, for an offender who stored 95 grams of fentanyl and a loaded firearm in a storage locker. 10 years of the sentence was attributed to the fentanyl possessed for the purpose of trafficking offence.

38In R. v. Owusu, 2024 ONSC 671, the offender was found in possession of 127 grams of fentanyl, for the purpose of trafficking, and was described as a “mid-level trafficker”. He was sentenced after trial to a 9-year period of imprisonment. Helpfully, Justice Code canvassed relevant Ontario sentencing cases, and found that like offences a range of 8–12 years imprisonment was appropriate.

39In R. v. Dalia, 2023 ONSC 2114, the offender was found in possession of 1.7 kg of fentanyl and 614 grams of cocaine and was found guilty after trial with possession for the purpose of trafficking. He had a related criminal record with a previous federal penitentiary sentence. He was sentenced to a totality of 13 years imprisonment.

40In R. v. Janisse, 2022 ONSC 4526, the offender stored large quantities of drugs in two safes in a stash house, including almost 2 kg of fentanyl and 9 kg of cocaine. He was 34 years old, had a dated and unrelated criminal history, and was convicted at trial. He was found to be involved in commercial level of trafficking and was sentenced to 16 years on the fentanyl related possession for the purpose of trafficking, with 10 years concurrent on the cocaine related offences.

41In R. v. Abdelgadir, 2023 ONCJ 446, the offender possessed just over 2 kg of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking. He was 28 years old, had a recent and related criminal record, had experienced systemic racism, and pleaded guilty. He was described as a distributor/supplier (or commercial high-level trafficker) who was well aware of the harmful impact his trafficking had on the community. He was sentenced to 13 years imprisonment.

42In R. v. Harmes, 2022 BCSC 663, the British Columbia Supreme Court dealt with an offender who was found guilty of possession for the purpose of trafficking of seven substances alongside firearms offences. Upon a warranted search of his home, police found 3.5 kg of fentanyl, 1.6 kg of methamphetamine, 284 grams of cocaine and other controlled substances. The total ‘street’ value of the drugs found was approximately $874K. He had a related criminal history, was trafficking for profit and was aware of the “devastating impact on the community” he was causing. He was described as running a wholesale or supply-level drug trafficking operation. On the fentanyl related offence, he was sentenced to 12 years imprisonment, with concurrent sentences on the remaining charges.

43In R. v. Fuller, 2019 ONCJ 643, the offender was found to be the “principal actor” in a “high-level” trafficking operation. He was found with 3 kg of fentanyl, ½ kg of methamphetamine and 5.8 grams of cocaine. This 35-year-old had two prior related drug convictions and was clearly aware of the lethality of his conduct. He was sentenced to 15 years imprisonment.

44In R. v. Hoang, 2024 ONCA 361, the Ontario Court of Appeal reviewed a sentence imposed upon a “high-level” trafficking offender convicted of 5 counts of possession for the trafficking, amongst other offences. The trafficking charges related to over 16 kg of narcotics, which included 5.1 kg of heroin, 2.2 kg of heroin and fentanyl mix, 994 grams of heroin, carfentanil and fentanyl mix; 494 grams of carfentanil, and 7.5 kg of cocaine/crack cocaine. Carfentanil was noted as one of the few drugs worse than fentanyl. The 38-year-old first-time offender was convicted at trial and sentenced to 18 years on the fentanyl trafficking related counts, which was reduced to 15 years on appeal.

45In R. v. Dubajic, the 47-year-old first-time offender was convicted of a myriad of firearms offences and significant serious drug possession for the purpose of trafficking offences, which included 106 kg of cocaine, 30 kg of crystal methamphetamine, 5 kg of fentanyl, and 4 kg of MDMA. A totality sentence of almost 17 years was imposed, with a concurrent 10-year imprisonment assessed respecting the fentanyl trafficking count.

46In R. v. Ali, unreported SCJ decision of Boswell J., Court file CR-21-15513, from February 11, 2022, Oshawa, Ontario, the offender was found with 26.5 kg of a carfentanil mixed with caffeine, alongside multiple firearms. He entered guilty pleas to 34 counts (mostly firearms related) and, after extensive negotiations and pre-trials (not unlike here), a joint submission for 23 years and a fine of $1 million was advanced. This was the largest carfentanil seizure in Canadian history, worth between $4 and $16 million. Carfentanil was noted as a synthetic opioid, some 10K times stronger than morphine. Mr. Ali was described as running an operation that “traded in death”. His 23-year sentence, after Duncan and Downes mitigation, as well as Summers credit amounted to a net remaining sentence of 18 years. This appears to be a high-water mark in Ontario.

47In R. v. Deol, 2024 MBCA 84, the Manitoba Court of Appeal considered the appropriate sentence for a drug courier found traveling between British Columbia and Ontario. He was 44 years of age, without criminal history and was convicted after trial. He was found in possession of 26 kg of fentanyl. In this case, the court determined that a range of 12–18 years was appropriate for courier cases, where they did not have decision-making authority in a high-level fentanyl trafficking organization. With that range in mind, the appellate court raised the trial judge’s sentence of 14 years, to 18 years imprisonment. Justice Turner commented succinctly: “…significant sentences are necessary for individuals who participate in commercial, high-level trafficking offences to meet the fundamental purpose and principles of sentencing given the insidious nature of fentanyl.”

48This canvass of authorities, particularly those which have more recently grappled with kilogram level fentanyl trafficking, informs me that double digit penitentiary sentences have become the norm. With a view to the continuing urgency that this opioid crisis presents, and the repetition of mid-level and higher fentanyl trafficking cases coming before our courts, it appears that on its face, the scope of Mr. Pasha’s level of largescale or commercial level trafficking could attract a mid-teen to early 20s-year range of imprisonment.

What is a fit sentence here?

49Beyond any general range of sentence, proportionality requires that I assess both the gravity of the offence and the circumstances of the offender to enable the crafting of an individualized sentence.

Aggravating factors

50As part of my proportionality assessment, I must consider the present aggravating circumstances, which here include:

• the nature of the substances found and their harmful effects, including fentanyl, cocaine, MDA, MDMA, and heroin, and many other opioids. With just the fentanyl alone, using a 2-milligram fatal dose calculus noted by counsel, that has the potential of equating to 7.5 million fatal doses;
• the quantities of all these substances found in Mr. Pasha’s possession. A veritable pharmacy of illegal substances was part of his inventory for sale. Again, this is a record quantum of fentanyl seized and now subject to conviction for London and area where fentanyl continues to be a scourge;
• the fact that Mr. Pasha was charged with serious possession for the purpose of trafficking offences, was then released on bail only to be later re-arrested for similar offences;
• the local conditions in London. As noted by the Federal Crown’s filed materials, statistics demonstrate that London fentanyl related deaths, as a percentage of the population, are significantly greater than with the rest of Ontario, year-to-year since 2020. This trend is repeated for emergency hospital visits and related hospital admissions relating to opioid abuse overdoses. Further, as noted, despite this local fentanyl seizures are apparently increasing in scope and severity;
• the extent of drug paraphernalia found emphasizing the commercial nature of this enterprise;
• the cellphone searches have confirmed historical and ongoing trafficking efforts which this offender has acknowledged lasted years;
• the offender’s indifference to the risk he posed to the community, as demonstrated by notes found on his cellphone, including his commentary about the value of his inventory, the effect it is having on the community and his indifference to this substance causing death as it will only somehow sell better. While the defence characterizes these notes as “lyrics” he has crafted, I fail to see how they do not also reflect his state of mind about his illegal sales enhancing his moral blameworthiness; and
• this offender’s motivation was clearly financial at a high commercial level. He does not use fentanyl, only elects to profit from it. The value of his inventory of illegal substances is estimated at $3.2 million. As described in Parranto, Mr. Pasha is a high “commercial level” trafficker.

51What is utterly bewildering in this offence narrative is the complete lack of context to it. How was it possible for this young man, even with the possible assistance of a co-accused, to accumulate this quantum of serious narcotics? To this, I have no answer. Nor, apparently, has this offender offered any to the police or this court. I am simply left to infer that he was enterprising enough to accumulate this stash – which, frankly, is a dubious and skeptical reach. While it is tempting to assume that he was a small cog in a larger enterprise, he has offered nothing suggesting that this is true and I cannot, in the absence of evidence, make any finding other than that he was principally involved in a significant largescale commercial level trafficking enterprise.

Local conditions

52In Parranto, the Supreme Court acknowledged that “a just and appropriate sentence may take into consideration ‘the needs and current conditions of and in the community’. Local conditions may enter into the assessment of the gravity of the offence and militate in favour of prioritizing certain sentencing goals.”

53As the Crown has identified, after the Canadian government began tracking opioid related harms in 2016, a federal-provincial/territorial Special Advisory Committee on the Epidemic of Opioid Overdoses published that between January 2016 and July 2024, over 49K opioid toxicity deaths occurred, 73.2% due to fentanyl, on top of the hundreds of thousands of emergency medical responses to opioid related overdoses. More recently, from January 2024 to June of 2024, there were 3,787 opioid related deaths in Canada – an average of 21 deaths per day. Of those deaths, 79% involved fentanyl.

54Locally, London has been disproportionately impacted by opioid-related deaths and hospitalizations. In 2021, London suffered a 32.1% higher average of deaths per 100K people than the overage Ontario rate, a 37.3% higher average in 2022, and a 16.7% higher average in 2023. More than 80% of those opioid related deaths were caused by fentanyl toxicity.

55Further, the London-Middlesex Health Unit declared an opioid crisis 8 years ago. According to a London Police Service study, filed as part of this proceeding, 2.7 people are lost daily due to fentanyl related abuse, usually with more than twice the lethal dose found in their system. In this community from 2014-2021, there was a 3967% rise in the time spent responding to fentanyl deaths. Statistic Canada verifies that this crisis reached a peak during the Covid-19 pandemic but has not abated much since.

56As noted, at the time of arrest, this case represented the largest seizure of fentanyl in London and this region’s history. As has become the norm, police held a press conference displaying the seized narcotics, their value, and their seriousness in February of 2023. As a local jurist, I was alarmed when I heard the quantities involved in this case as they represented a significant graduation from even the worst cases over the past decade.

57Sadly, this case may no longer be an outlier. In the last few weeks, the London Police Service announced another massive fentanyl seizure, amounting to over double the drugs seized here. Yesterday, the Ontario Provincial Police announced their largest fentanyl bust to date, with even a greater quantity of fentanyl seized. Despite over a decade of increasingly alarming fentanyl matters before our courts, locally, provincially, and across the country, deterrent messages have either not been heard, not been received or simply not heeded.

58All of this makes plain that London, in particular, has disproportionately been impacted by the fentanyl trade.

Mitigating factors

59Proportionality also demands that I consider available mitigating circumstances in fashioning an individualized sentence, for which I include:

• most importantly, that Mr. Pasha has pleaded guilty. In doing so, I grant him this formal acknowledgment of remorse. I am advised that while this resolution was not early in the process, that was impacted by his co-accused’s election to have a trial in this court;
• associated to his guilty plea is the resulting benefit to the administration of justice. Counsel have agreed that a trial of this matter would have included significant pre-trial motions including an involved Charter and Garofoli application. Defence counsel assessed the likely length of the trial/motions as exceeding a month of court time which, in this time of pandemic induced trial delays, has saved substantial judicial resources;
• Mr. Pasha is a young adult, only 23 years of age at the time of his offending conduct. This, coupled with a level of familial support from his mother and a brother – relationships that have strengthened since this offender’s incarceration – offers some hope for his rehabilitative prospects;
• he has actively engaged with rehabilitative programming while in custody, completing his secondary schooling and all rehabilitative topics offered in his reformatory setting; and
• I acknowledge the mitigating effect of harsh pre-trial custody conditions, evidenced from the filed institutional records which make out the extent of lockdowns and overcrowding Mr. Pasha has experienced.

Social context evidence

60The defence has raised the issue of social context evidence citing the racism experienced by Mr. Pasha as he grew up as a Muslim in a predominantly non-Muslim community.

61In Ontario, clarity respecting the use of social context evidence was provided by our Court of Appeal in R. v. Morris, 2021 ONCA 115. There, a 23-year-old Black man without a criminal history was found guilty of possessing a loaded firearm in a public place. While the court found that social context evidence does not detract from the seriousness of the offence or the need for denunciation, it can provide a basis for adding weight to the objective of rehabilitation and diminish the weight placed upon specific deterrence where there is found a connection between the overt and/or systemic racism identified and the circumstances or offence related events. Absent this connection, mitigation of a sentence based simply on the existence of overt or systemic racism becomes an impermissible discount based upon an offender’s race or religion.

62Here, it is difficult to draw a nexus between this offender’s historical racism experience and the offending conduct. A strict Morris-like mitigation is not justified. However, I cannot ignore that context matters. While racism experienced by this offender has not resulted in nor does it justify or excuse his offending conduct, it provides a context for his upbringing leading to an understanding of his social-economic need to make money in a learned or overexposed illegal manner. This background helps inform and contextualize Mr. Pasha’s moral blameworthiness and is relevant in that regard.

Joint submission

63Joint submissions are a subset of resolution discussions. The Crown and defence counsel agree to recommend a particular sentence to the judge, in exchange for the accused entering a plea of guilty. A sentencing judge must not reject a joint submission unless they find that the proposed sentence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute or is otherwise contrary to the public interest.

64As the Supreme Court of Canada stated in R. v. Anthony-Cook, 2016 SCC 43, rejection of a joint submission "denotes a submission so unhinged from the circumstances of the offence and the offender that its acceptance would lead reasonable and informed persons, aware of all the relevant circumstances, including the importance of promoting certainty in resolution discussions, to believe that the proper functioning of the justice system had broken down." The Court explained that this is "an undeniably high threshold".

65The high threshold for departing from joint submissions is appropriate because the Crown and defence "are well placed to arrive at a joint submission that reflects the interests of both the public and the accused." Moldaver J. noted in Anthony-Cook that "[a]s a rule, [counsel] will be highly knowledgeable about the circumstances of the offender and the offence and the strengths and weaknesses of their respective positions."

66With this in mind, I must exercise extreme restraint when contemplating not following a “joint submission”. I am generally loathe to disagree when the proposed sentence falls within a fit range of sentence for the particular offending conduct.

Duncan mitigation

67Mr. Pasha has complained about the harshness of his pre-trial custody conditions. As recently noted by the Ontario Court of Appeal in R. v. Brown, 2025 ONCA 164, “judges must recognize that where an offender has already experienced particularly punitive conditions during their pre-sentence custody, the punishment they receive should be reduced to take this into account, but the degree of mitigation is a matter of discretion in all the circumstances, and not a matter of mathematical precision.”

68Application of this form of sentencing consideration has evolved. When the Ontario Court of Appeal released R. v. Duncan, 2016 ONCA 754, the broad practice was to respond to especially punitive conditions in pre-trial custody by quantifying and applying a numerical deduction from an otherwise appropriate sentence. However, with that court’s later release of R. v. Marshall, 2021 ONCA 344, Justice Doherty cautioned against treating the mitigating effect of harsh conditions of pre-trial custody “as a deduction from the appropriate sentence in the same way as the ‘Summers’ credit.” That court preferred to treat punitive pretrial conditions as a mitigating factor to be taken into account with the other mitigating and aggravating factors in arriving at an appropriate sentence. This approach prevents the court from giving such harsh conditions “unwarranted significance in fixing the ultimate sentence imposed.” I must guard against this mitigating factor rendering an otherwise fit sentence, unfit.

69While Mr. Pasha has not filed a formal Duncan application or an affidavit supporting one, he has filed institutional records from the various reformatories he has been housed in pending resolution of this matter. Through counsel, he has complained of being overcrowded in his cell – sometimes being triple and quadruple bunked, in addition to numerous institutional or range specific lockdowns which have limited inmate liberty. Experience informs me that such conditions enhance inmate safety risks by increasing inmate tension and violence, adversely impacting inmate mental health and countering inmate rehabilitative prospects.

70The institutional records establish that Mr. Pasha has been unduly subjected to overcrowding and lockdown conditions. For example, at Elgin-Middlesex Detention Centre, where he served the majority of his pre-sentence custody, Mr. Pasha was subjected to 47 institutional lockdowns and numerous triple bunking dates. In the almost six months spent at the Centre North Correctional Centre, Mr. Pasha was subjected to three days of triple bunking and 77 days of various institutional lockdowns for various time periods. Finally, while serving 26 days at the Southwest Detention Centre, he was triple bunked for 20 days, and subjected to 7 institutional or unit lockdowns.

71Presumed innocent inmates deserve better than the ‘warehousing’ environments they often endure. Until we, as a society, live up to our responsibility to appropriately house remand offenders in custody, offenders will be at least given additional custodial credit for the time they have already served in these poor conditions. Mr. Pasha falls into this category and will be granted mitigating benefit for these harsh pre-sentence custody conditions.

72However, the parties have framed their “Duncan mitigation” as little more than a credit, to be deducted off the top of an otherwise suggested fit sentence of 17 years. As I have noted, Marshall identifies the concern with this approach. Where the proposed sentence is already at the low end of an available fit range of sentence, I must consider whether this sentence mitigation for harsh pre-sentence conditions runs the risk of otherwise making unfit this joint sentencing recommendation.

Summers credit

73Section 719 of the Criminal Code allows a sentencing court to credit a person with a ratio of 1.5 days in jail for each actual day served “if the circumstances justify it”. Unlike Duncan mitigation, the Supreme Court in R. v. Summers, 2014 SCC 26 established that this enhanced pre-sentence custody credit is given in recognition that in two respects, pre-trial custody is even more onerous than post-sentencing custody: first, by acknowledging the lack of credited eligibility for parole in pre-sentence custody; and second, by acknowledging the reduced rehabilitative programming available in remand detention. Short of detention being occasioned by an offender’s bad conduct or unlikelihood for early release, Summers credit has practically become a norm deducting the allowable Criminal Code credit.

74Here, as noted, Mr. Pasha has served 502 days of pre-sentence custody. Without any institutional malfeasance noted, I will credit him with the usual Summers credit amounting to a total deduction from his sentence of 753 days, or just over two years credit.

Disposition

75In Parranto, Justice Moldaver found it necessary to write a concurring opinion “to focus on the gravity of largescale trafficking in fentanyl for personal gain and the need to impose severe penalties, ranging from mid-level double digit penitentiary terms up to an including life imprisonment, for those who do so.” This emphasis is unassailable.

76The established authorities make it clear that the proper response to this increasing plague of fentanyl trafficking is denunciation and general deterrence. In the strongest of terms, it must be made abundantly clear that this conduct cannot and will not be tolerated. To those who seek to profit from the misery of the most vulnerable among us, an exemplary example must be made. Only lengthy periods of imprisonment to these merchants of death will suffice to reflect the abhorrence shared throughout Canada towards this conduct.

77Mr. Pasha has been found to possess for the purpose of trafficking a staggering amount of one of the most harmful and addictive substances available. The quantum of fentanyl in his possession was, at its time, unprecedented in this area. Equally, the damage that fentanyl is doing to this community, this regional and across the country rises to crisis levels. Further, Mr. Pasha’s circumstances are aggravated by the quantum of other serious drugs in his possession, a veritable pharmacy of illegal drugs including an alarming quantity of cocaine, as well as an inventory of many other in demand drugs like heroin and various other opioids. He was clearly a wholesale commercial level trafficker. As a result, the gravity of this offending conduct is extreme.

78Of course, it cannot be forgotten that Mr. Pasha remains a young, racialized adult with a relatively minor but related record, who has pleaded guilty. His indifference to the harm he was imposing upon this community is noteworthy and is measured only against his apparent present reflection, remorse and renewed interest in his capacity for rehabilitation. Given the nature of this offending behaviour, however, his moral blameworthiness remains high. While his relative youthfulness in the face of significant incarceration cannot be ignored, as this penalty ought not be crushing to her future rehabilitative prospects, the priority remains deterrence and denunciation.

79The parties advance a joint submission of 17 years. This is despite an agreed upon 6+ month credit sought for harsh pre-sentence custody conditions. As noted, I have considered this Duncan mitigation as I must, as part of a total fit sentence determination. With that in mind, to maintain the intention of the joint submission, it appears to me that the parties were, in fact, advancing a submission for a 16½ year sentence. On that basis, I will endorse the recommended sentence. It is the product of diligent and principled work from experienced counsel.

80While sentencing for this offending conduct, involving this quantum of fentanyl, in this community, is without precedent, I am satisfied that a 16½ year sentence of imprisonment, while on the low-end, is nevertheless within an appropriate range of sentence that can satisfy the fundamental purpose and principles of sentencing. The public must be protected from Mr. Pasha, and those of a like mind, who prey upon its vulnerability for profit. I acknowledge that, for a young man, this sentence carries a significant penal consequence that should also send a loud message to the community at large.

81The Crown further requests that, despite this recommended sentence in the circumstances of this case, I make a “pronouncement” that those who traffic multiple kilograms of fentanyl, in London, Ontario, should expect jail sentences of 20 years. I cannot accede to this request. It is not my function to set “starting points” or “sentencing ranges” to instruct other courts. That is the purview of appellate courts. Already, Justice Moldaver’s admonition that largescale fentanyl traffickers should receive severe penalties, including life imprisonment, is well noted. Frankly, but for the guilty plea, joint submission, and other mitigating factors present, Mr. Pasha’s offending conduct may well have yielded 20-year consideration. But, in order to effectively individualize the sentencing process, I can only consider the circumstances that were presented before this court.

Ancillary Orders

82In furtherance of the joint submission, and based upon this overall offence narrative, Mr. Pasha will be required to provide samples of bodily substances reasonably required for the purpose of forensic DNA analysis to be used in accordance with the DNA Identification Act, pursuant to s. 487.051(3) of the Criminal Code.

83In addition, he is now prohibited from possessing any prohibited firearm, restricted firearm, prohibited weapon, prohibited device and prohibited ammunition for life, and any other firearm or any cross-bow, restricted weapon, ammunition and explosive substances for a period of 10 years, pursuant to s. 109(2) of the Criminal Code.

84The parties have not made submissions respecting the victim fine surcharge. Pursuant to s. 737 of the Criminal Code, in light of the global sentence imposed and the extent of his pre-sentence custody, I am satisfied that the imposition of a victim fine surcharge is unwarranted.

Conclusion

85For the reasons outlined, Mr. Pasha is sentenced to a 16½ years imprisonment, or 6,022 days. With enhanced credit granted for his pre-sentence custody amounting to 753 days, Mr. Pasha has 5,269 days, or almost approximately 14½ years left to serve.

86He is ordered to provide a DNA sample and will be subjected to a 10 year weapons prohibition as noted. I have already endorsed the consent forfeiture order provided to the court.

M. B. Carnegie