COURT FILE NO.: CR-23-10000719-0000 DATE: 20260120
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
HIS MAJESTY THE KING
– and –
MATTHEW SEYMOUR REID
Defendant
Michael Passeri, for the Crown
Cheryl Brunet, for the Defendant
HEARD: February 26, June 18, and July 29, 2025
REASONS FOR DECISION
A. INTRODUCTION
1On the night of May 23, 2023, members of Toronto’s Guns and Gangs Squad executed a search warrant at an apartment they believed to be the residence of Matthew Seymour Reid. They were searching for a firearm. They found a small safe on the top shelf of the master bedroom, which contained a Glock 17 9mm firearm with an overcapacity magazine capable of holding 31 rounds of ammunition. The gun was loaded with 25 bullets, its serial number had been removed, and it was equipped with a device that converted it to a fully automatic weapon.
2Mr. Reid was present in the master bedroom at the time the warrant was executed, as were some of his belongings.
3He was arrested and charged with four offences in relation to the firearm. On February 26, 2025, Mr. Reid pleaded guilty before me to two counts on the indictment: Count 2 (possession of a loaded prohibited firearm contrary to s. 95(1) of the Criminal Code; and Count 4 (possession of that same weapon in breach of a s. 109 prohibition order).1 Based on the agreed statement of facts, I found Mr. Reid guilty of those offences and the other counts were withdrawn by the Crown. Mr. Reid agreed with the facts in the synopsis, but took the position that he did not actually live in the apartment, although the lease was in his name. However, by pleading guilty to the charges, he accepted responsibility for the firearm.
4Sentencing for these offences was delayed several times, for various reasons. Sentencing submissions were made on June 18, 2025 and I then adjourned the matter to July 29, 2025 for sentencing. On July 29, 2025, I sentenced Mr. Reid to 7 years for the firearm possession charge and 1 year consecutive for the prohibition order breach. I allowed a 5-year credit against those sentences for both Summers and Duncan/Marshall credits, leaving Mr. Reid to serve 3 years. At that time, I provided brief oral reasons on the record and advised that more fulsome written reasons would follow. Those reasons are set out below.
B. THE APPROPRIATE SENTENCE
The Position of the Parties
5Mr. Passeri, for the Crown, sought a sentence of 8 years for the firearm possession and 1 year consecutive for the s. 109 breach. Ms. Brunet, for the defence, suggested the more appropriate sentence would be 6.5 years for the firearm and an additional 6 months for the s. 109 breach. Both counsel agreed that the ancillary relief sought by the Crown was appropriate and I therefore ordered: a prohibition order under s. 109 for life; a DNA order; and a forfeiture order for the gun.
6Both counsel agreed that Mr. Reid was entitled to a reduction in sentence for time served in pre-sentence custody according to the decision in Summers at a rate of 1.5:1 and also to some reduction for the harsh conditions of presentence-custody pursuant to Duncan.2 However, they differed on the amount of the Duncan reduction. Mr. Passeri submitted 8 months would be appropriate and Ms. Brunet sought 5 years.
7The positions taken by counsel before me with respect to the appropriate sentence were not significantly far apart. Unsurprisingly, the Crown put more emphasis on the aggravating factors and defence counsel focused more on the mitigating factors, but both were within the appropriate range, given all the circumstances.
8The significant divergence between their positions on the amount of credit to be awarded resulted in my determination that written reasons were required.
The Circumstances of the Offence
9The police obtained the search warrant based on a confidential tip that Mr. Reid had a firearm. The firearm in question was particularly lethal given the over-capacity magazine and the device that converted the gun to fully automatic. Its only purpose is to shoot people. Its embellishments allowed it to shoot more people more quickly than would otherwise be the case.
10Although the firearm was in a locked safe, the key was left in the lock.
11Mr. Reid was subject to two prior prohibition orders, although only charged with breaching one of them.
The Circumstances of the Offender
12Mr. Reid was born in August 1992. At the time of the offence in 2023, he was almost 31 years old. He has one child, who was born after his arrest. He also has a fiancée (not the mother of his child). He did not quite finish high school as a youth but has since completed the necessary credits. He has a history of employment through various odd jobs including moving furniture, landscaping, construction, and house painting. Shortly before his arrest, he had completed a skilled trades pre-apprenticeship program.
13Mr. Reid has a criminal record and was on bail at the time of this offence. I will deal with those circumstances in more detail under the heading “Aggravating Factors.”
14Mr. Reid had a difficult childhood. I will deal with that issue more fully under the heading “Mitigating Factors.”
Aggravating Factors
15The most serious aggravating factor is Mr. Reid’s criminal record, which is both recent and related. The record starts in 2011 with six convictions (in three batches) for possession of stolen property, possession of a Schedule I substance, and breaching four separate court orders, for which he received a variety of suspended sentences and probation orders. The serious record starts with convictions in April 2013 for: possession of a loaded firearm; possession of another weapon; robbery; forcible confinement; and breach of a prohibition order. Some of the sentences were concurrent, but the total of the two most serious offences were consecutive for a total of 9 years and 7 months before reductions for time served were applied. The effective sentence for the loaded firearm possession was 3 years; and the sentence for the robbery and forcible confinement was 6.7 years. In August 2016, Mr. Reid was convicted to possession of a Schedule I substance for the purpose of trafficking and sentenced to one day. At the time he was sentenced for this offence he was likely still serving the sentence for the 2013 robbery conviction. Finally, in June 2018, he was convicted of: possession of a loaded firearm; possession of a Schedule I substance; and possession of the firearm in breach of a prohibition order. He was sentenced to 6 years for the firearm possession and 3 months, 15 days consecutive for the drug possession charge, but was credited with 22 months and 15 days for time served. Mr. Reid’s breach of the prohibition order was given a concurrent sentence.
16Mr. Reid has three court orders prohibiting him from possessing a firearm, in addition to the term of his bail order that was in force at the time of the subject offence now before me. He has been convicted six times for breaching court orders, two of which were for breaching a weapons prohibition order. This record shows a life of criminality characterized by persistently carrying a firearm and consistently breaching the terms of court orders. This is a seriously aggravating factor given that the subject offence involves Mr. Reid in possession, yet again, of a loaded firearm.
17The added features to the gun made it more lethal, which is an additional aggravating factor. The fact that the serial number had been removed is also aggravating. Clearly the gun was possessed for a “true crime” purpose, as referred to in much of the case law.3
18There were two small children (ages two and three) in the apartment at the time the police found the gun there. Although the gun was in the safe, the safe was not locked and was accessible. In addition to the shelving under the safe in the closet, there was a small step ladder. An agile, unsupervised child could easily get to it. The gun was ready to fire. This was a hazard to the safety of the children. I recognize, however, that Mr. Reid was present in the same room, so it is possible the safe was kept locked when he was out of the room. I also accept that this situation is dramatically different from carrying a firearm around in the community, and this distinguishes it somewhat from many of the other firearm possession cases where exemplary sentences have been imposed.
Mitigating Factors
19Mr. Reid accepted responsibility for this offence from the outset and entered a guilty plea at an early stage. There were triable issues with respect to whether he had knowledge and control over the weapon, as it appears he no longer lived in the residence where it was found, having recently split up with his girlfriend and permitting her to stay in the apartment with her two children. There was also a potential alternate suspect and possible challenge to the search warrant. It is to his credit that Mr. Reid pleaded guilty to this offence.
20Based on what Mr. Reid said to me at the sentencing hearing, and from letters filed in his support, I accept that his guilty plea is a true expression of remorse, and not merely acceptance of the inevitable. Notwithstanding the difficult circumstances in the institution and the limited availability of programming there, he has applied himself while in custody, completing several Life Skills programs and a 16-week course through the Urban Rez Solutions “Inside Out” (a Black Employment Support Program funded by the provincial government). He received a very positive report from the case manager of that program who stated that he had shown leadership and that she had “come to admire” the extent to which he had developed strength and skill. The program will continue to assist Mr. Reid when he re-enters the community after the completion of his sentence. His case manager wrote, “I firmly believe that with continued support and guidance Mr. Matthew Reid will thrive and become a productive member of society.”
21I have considered the letters of support filed by his sister, his cousin, and his fiancée. They recognize a change in him and a desire to do the right thing for his family in the future. They are confident that he is now on the road to rehabilitation. His fiancée appears to be in a stable home and work situation and has known him and his family for many years. She lives outside Toronto, which will also bring the benefit of moving him out of the environment where he has gotten into trouble in the past. Mr. Reid has a concrete plan for reintegration through work in the skilled trades, with support from the Urban Rez Solutions program, his fiancée, and other family members. He has expressed a commitment to be a good father and role model for his daughter and his determination to put his criminal past firmly behind him. Based on what Mr. Reid has been able to achieve at the Toronto South, his own words to me, and these letters of support, I believe there is a real prospect for rehabilitation in this case.
22Although I did not obtain a Morris report prior to sentencing, I am familiar with such reports and the general sociological and statistical information they provide. Also, I had sufficient information about Mr. Reid through his counsel and exhibits filed to conclude that Mr. Reid falls squarely within the parameters of the special sentencing considerations referred to in Morris.
23Much of the information I received was from Mr. Reid’s counsel through oral submissions. The Crown did not challenge this, and I therefore did not object. Hearsay evidence is admissible in a sentencing hearing, and I am prepared to give some latitude in these circumstances.
24Matthew Reid identifies as Black. He is the youngest of three children. His parents were immigrants, but all three children were born in Canada. His mother was a personal support worker and his father was a truck driver. The family struggled financially. At one point, both parents were unemployed and lost their home as a result. The family moved back to the Malvern neighbourhood, which at the time, was the scene of violence and gang rivalries. Mr. Reid’s mother struggled for years with Parkinson’s disease. As her symptoms progressed, Mr. Reid looked after her, and took charge of looking after his brother, who has disabilities. His mother died in 2017 and his brother now lives in an institution. His father now has dementia as a result of Alzheimer’s Disease.
25Growing up, Mr. Reid’s life was characterized by violence and academic difficulties. He was extensively bullied at school and reported feeling suicidal in elementary school. He was identified at school as being a “slow learner” and was removed from the mainstream classroom for enhanced work in math and reading.
26Malvern, the community in which he was raised, was not a safe environment at that time and there were frequent disputes between various neighbourhoods. He reported that his first experience with a firearm was when he was just under the age of 10, when a youth from Galway (a rival to Malvern) put a gun in his mouth. He also said he was shot at as he was walking home from school after playing basketball. In the summer after graduating Grade 8, he was stabbed in the neck. When he was 15, a youth stabbed him twice in the back over a dispute about a girl they both liked. At some point, his house was shot at in a random drive-by shooting. He has lost a number of friends due to violence, including shootings. He told his lawyer that he started carrying a gun for personal protection.
27While these experiences as a child and young person do not excuse Mr. Reid’s criminal past, they do provide a context for it, and are a mitigating factor on sentencing. They also provide an underpinning for Mr. Reid’s stated wish – that since he is now an adult and father, he wants to move away from that life and provide a better environment for his children.
28Even as a youth in Malvern, Mr. Reid did volunteer work with kids at the Recreation Center. He has reported that he continues to provide advice to younger men around him to avoid the mistakes he has made and aspires to provide a good example by leading a productive pro-social life in the future.
Appropriate Sentence
29Given the criminal record, the breaches of prohibition orders, and particularly, the prior convictions for firearms, a sentence that meets the requirements of denunciation and deterrence is required. I will not reference the cases relied upon by the Crown to this effect. I agree with those principles and with the enormous danger firearms create for our community. The sentence proposed by Mr. Passeri, for the Crown, is within the range of appropriate sentences for this offence in these circumstances. However, it does not reflect the mitigating factors present in this case, which I believe are real and should inform the appropriate sentence. On the other hand, I think the sentence suggested by Ms. Brunet for the defence, does not appropriately reflect the seriousness of the offence, given the aggravating factors present in this case.
30In my view, the sentence that best meets the principles of sentencing and reflects the mitigating and aggravating factors is 7 years for the possession of the firearm. I agree with the Crown’s submission that it is appropriate to impose a consecutive sentence for the breach of the prohibition order. Otherwise, its impact is lost. I also agree that an additional 1 year for that breach is appropriate. Thus, the total sentence is 8 years (7 years for the firearm, and 1 year consecutive for the s. 109 breach). Looked at in totality, I do not consider this to be overwhelming in the circumstances.
D. DEDUCTIONS FROM THE SENTENCE
Summers Credit
31Mr. Reid is entitled to a credit of 1.5:1 in accordance with the principles established by the Supreme Court of Canada in Summers,4 which is conceded by both counsel. As of the date of sentencing on July 29, 2025, Mr. Reid had been in custody for 799 days, which I rounded up to 800 days for ease of calculation. This results in a credit of 1,200 days (approximately 3.3 years).
Duncan/Marshall Reduction
32In its 2016 decision in R. v. Duncan,5 Court of Appeal for Ontario held that sentences could be reduced beyond the Summers credit to reflect particularly harsh conditions during an accused’s pre-sentencing custody. Thereafter, many sentencing judges made sentence reductions for what came to be known as the “Duncan credit”, typically as a multiplier based on the number of days of such harsh conditions. The Court of Appeal addressed the issue again in 2021 in R. v. Marshall,6 holding that the “Duncan credit” is more properly characterized as a mitigating factor in sentence, rather than a “credit” against what would otherwise be a fit sentence. Doherty J.A. held that it remains permissible for sentencing judges to calculate the reduction as a multiplier, or to quantify it in some way, although, it is also permissible to say that it was being considered as a mitigating factor without quantifying it as such. The important point from Marshall is that regardless of how the reduction for harsh pre-sentencing custody is calculated, the amount of the reduction cannot be permitted to result in a sentence that is unfit.7
33In my view, the preferable of these two options is to quantify how much is being deducted for the Duncan/Marshall factor. This provides a better picture of what the “real” sentence is for the offence (providing better precedential value for the decision) while providing more transparency with respect to the extent the harsh conditions in the institution affected the sentence. I dealt with this issue in an earlier decision, R. v. Shaikh and Tanoli, and will simply reproduce here what I said then:
With the greatest of respect for the guidance provided by the Court of Appeal for Ontario in Marshall, I consider it preferable, not merely acceptable, to quantify the period of time by which a sentence is reduced to reflect the harsh and punitive conditions of pre-trial custody provided for in Duncan. I take no issue with this being properly characterized as a mitigating factor, nor that it should not be used so liberally as to make a sentence unfit. However, in my opinion, the Duncan credit by its nature, lends itself to being expressed numerically, which is not the case for other kinds of mitigating factors, such as remorse, youth, and the like.
Transparency and consistency are two important underlying principles of sentencing that are best served by specifying the amount of the Duncan credit. If a sentencing judge merely states that the punitive pre-trial custody conditions have been factored in, without specifying how, neither the accused, the public, the government, nor correctional officials will know the extent to which this has been done. In the result, there will be no public knowledge of the impact deplorable conditions in the prisons are having on the sentences served by offenders, providing little incentive to those in authority to fix the problem. While the amount of credit to be given is a matter of discretion to which deference would typically be afforded, sentencing judges being transparent about the amount of the sentence reduction given will also provide a better opportunity for appellate oversight and error correction.
Consistency in sentencing is enhanced in two ways by specifying the amount of the Duncan credit. First, individual sentencing judges will have a better sense of the extent to which other judges are taking the Duncan credit into account. This would reduce the risk of some judges awarding substantial credit for harsh conditions, while other judges may be making only a minimal adjustment to the sentence. This facilitates sentencing judges in complying with the requirement of the Criminal Code that “a sentence should be similar to sentences imposed on similar offenders for similar offences committed in similar circumstances.”
Second, if the sentence that would have been imposed without the Duncan credit is clearly stated, this will assist in determining consistency in sentencing for any given offence. Otherwise, sentences for particular offences may seem completely out of proportion to other sentences, a difference which might be fully explainable by the difference in the circumstances of pre-trial incarceration. In that manner, the Duncan credit will not have the effect of distorting what the “real” sentence would have been, but for the mistreatment of the offender in the correctional institution.8
34As I noted in Shaikh and Tanoli, other judges of this court have taken the same approach, including Schrek J. in R. v. Ahmed, Forestell J. in R. v. Bernard, Himel J. in R. v. Hassan, and Allen J. in R. v. Kongolo. Since that time, there have been many others, including Lacelle J. in R. v. Rush, Kelly J. in R. v. Pintyi, Barrett J. in R. v. Llanos, Schreck J. in R. v. Charley, and R. v. Gorgievski, and Nishikawa J. in R. v. Noor.9
35The Toronto South Detention Centre provided records of triple bunking and lockdowns for the time Mr. Reid was incarcerated there. As I noted in my oral reasons, there is no indication that there has been any improvement in those conditions. Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that the same harsh conditions extended for the rest of his incarceration, post-dating the completion of the report. The records show that the Toronto South was subject to lockdowns for 180 days over the approximate two-year period Mr. Reid had been there. That means that for 25% of his time served, the institution was in lockdown, typically due to staff shortages. During that same period covered by the report, he was triple-bunked for a total of 166 days, which, if carried forward to the date of sentencing, equates to 208 days. I have therefore calculated the appropriate Duncan reduction based on 208 days of triple bunking and 203 days of lockdowns.
36I recognize that some of the lockdowns were for shorter periods of time, and some of the lockdown and triple-bunking days overlap. However, there is a considerable aggravating impact given that during a lockdown, three inmates are locked in a cell built for only two. Even with two to a cell, the space is cramped. The addition of a third man on a mattress on the floor is bad enough, but enduring that during lockdown conditions can only be described as intolerable. Furthermore, many of these triple-bunking days were sequential. Again, one night of triple-bunking is bad enough, but multiple days in a row is unacceptable. The records show that Mr. Reid was triple bunked for multiple weeks in a row. For example, he was triple bunked from October 7 to October 31, 2024 (8 days of which were during lockdowns), and from February 1 to February 20, 2025 (including 7 days on lockdown). These are just two examples; there are others.
37This is not an isolated problem. It is endemic and ongoing. For the past several years, I and numerous other judges, have written often about this problem and granted additional reductions in sentence for unacceptably harsh conditions at the Toronto South Detention Centre (and other nearby institutions). And yet, the underlying problems persist. Such reductions have now become more the norm rather than the exception.
38I have commented before on these problems, including in Shaikh and Tanoli,10 and will not repeat here everything that I said before.
39As futile as it may seem, all I can do in response to this mistreatment is provide some relief by way of a sentence reduction to the unfortunate individuals who have been forced to live this way. I am aware that this is but a band-aid and that it appears to do little to persuade those with power to do anything to fix the root cause. It is particularly troubling that so many of the inmates in these institutions are enduring these conditions while waiting for their trials and, therefore, while presumed innocent. These conditions are not civilized and will likely result in justifiable resentment and outrage against “the system” rather than promoting or encouraging positive attitudes towards rehabilitation.
40Nevertheless, politicians continue to urge that fewer people be released on bail and stiffer sentences be imposed on those found guilty of offences. My question is: where are these people meant to go? Adding more inmates to already over-crowded jails will simply exacerbate the situation. More tempers will flare in these anxiety-producing conditions; more correctional officers and inmates will be exposed to violence; more correctional officers will be off on sick leave; more will seek employment elsewhere; and fewer people will apply for correctional officer positions because of the poor working conditions. All I can do is provide some minimal relief after-the-fact, and that is what I will continue to do. However, I continue to feel that I am pounding my head on the proverbial concrete walls of the Toronto South Detention Center and other institutions like it.
41There is no science to the calculation of the reduction for the Duncan factor. Sometimes, it is based on a multiplier applied to the number of days when the conditions were particularly harsh; sometimes it is expressed as an additional multiplier for the whole of the time served (for example, an additional half day for all the days served, effectively granting a 2:1 credit for time served when the Summers credit is added; other times, it is simply what the sentencing judge considers to be a fair reduction for the overall harshness of the circumstances. In this case, the conditions were more generalized and a simple multiplication of the days does not reflect the harshness of the impact of overlapping lockdowns and triple-bunking. In my view, the appropriate reduction for the harsh conditions is 1.7 years.
E. CONCLUSION
42I sentence Mr. Reid to imprisonment for 7 years on Count 2 (possession of a loaded prohibited firearm in breach of s. 95(1) of the Criminal Code).
43I further sentence Mr. Reid to imprisonment of 1 year on Count 4, (breach of a s. 109 prohibition order), which will be consecutive to the sentence on Count 2.
44The total sentence is 8 years, from which is deducted 5 years (3.3 years for the Summers credit and 1.7 years for Duncan). There are 3 years remaining to serve.
45In addition, I make the following ancillary orders: a prohibition order under s. 109 for life; a DNA order; and a forfeiture order for the gun.
MOLLOY J.
Released: January 20, 2026
CITATION: R. v. Reid, 2026 ONSC 136
COURT FILE NO.: CR-23-10000719-0000 DATE: 20260120
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
HIS MAJESTY THE KING
– and –
MATTHEW SEYMOUR REID
Defendant
Released: January 20, 2026
Footnotes
- Criminal Code, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-46, at ss. 95(1), 109.
- R. v. Summers, 2014 SCC 26, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 575; R. v. Duncan, 2016 ONCA 744 (“Duncan”).
- R. v. Nur, 2013 ONCA 677, 117 O.R. (3d) 401.
- Supra, note 2.
- Duncan, supra, note 2.
- R. v. Marshall, 2021 ONCA 344 (“Marshall”)
- Ibid, at para. 52.
- R. v. Shaikh and Tanoli, 2024 ONSC 774 at paras. 23-25
- R. v. Ahmed, 2021 ONSC 8157 per Schreck J.; R. v. Bernard, 2021 ONSC 5817 per Forestell J.; R. v. Hassan, 2023 ONSC 5040 per Himel J.; R. v. Kongolo, 2022 ONSC 3891 per Allen J.;R. v. Rush, 2025 ONSC 5024 per Lacelle J.; R. v. Pintyi, 2025 ONSC 3371, per Kelly J.; R. v. Llanos, 2025 ONSC 3986, per Barrett J.; R. v. Charley, 2025 ONSC 2490, per Schreck J.; R. v. Gorgievski, 2024 ONSC 5899, per Schreck J, at paras. 34-35; R. v. Noor, 2024 ONSC 6026, per Nishikawa J.
- Supra note 8, at paras.73-84.